About Knowledge, Truth and Falsity

[Speakpigeon]

They might not be randomly placed. It is at least conceivable that the universe may be able to produce true statements about parts of itself through some cognitive organs or organisms. We don't seem to know that the brain is such a truth-producing organ but if it's not that still does not mean no such organ or organism exists. However, it's for the universe (or whatever is truly in charge over here) to "decide" on the issue. It's also an interesting question as to whether humanity could or will ever be able to build a truth-producing machine. It seems we are certainly trying hard. We may already have some very simple devices that are just that but do we really know they are?
EB

I have trouble understanding what the point of your posts are. They don't seem to be addressing my OP even though you are on the right topic. You mention things that are either too far beyond things that I know about or just don't focus in on a point that I can find.

You don't even understand my first sentence, "They might not be randomly placed"?

The rest is a straightforward justification of why they wouldn't be randomly placed. I can't see how you can fail to get that.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I already did. Read my previous posts in thus thread and use that mass between your ears.

To cut it short: the "link" is somewhat an illusion. The link is behavior, a time process, not an object.

Assume you walk through a jungle and see some beanches on the ground. It is then a very big evolutionary advantage if you can figure out if the beanches just lie there ny chance or if they are placed there by a reason: if there is an intention and thus tells us that there are other intelligent animals to beware of. Thus identifying intension is definitely selected for by evolution.

Then it is not far to see the ordered twogs as a symbol for that intension. That is: each time you see something that can ve interpreted as the result of intent tgat something works like a symbol for that intent. Say that you learned that thise twigs was used for making fire then bringing twigs together in that fasion makes a it a way to say "make fire". When you have done this several time it becomes a symbol of fire. Thus the link between the symbol and the fire lies in this interaction. Not in some magical mental link.

Think about what a relationship of two objects is. It is not either of the objects. It is something that links them in such a way that they are simultaneously recognized, and their differences are known.

How could a process such as the consciousness also be a singular entity that knows about more than the fundamental particles? This doesn't make sense with a purely causal universe of particles. We should only be one particle at a time and not have these notions of groups of particles.

I suspect that the scientific idea is that physical things do what they do anyway. Our mental representation(s) of what physical things do is just a consequence of what physical things do. It's just the way the universe works. The value of these representations shouldn't be understood as knowledge of the physical world. Instead, they just are. It's a bare fact. We may want to say that we use these representations to survive or something, and it might even be true that they work to some extent or in some context but to pretend that they are true of the material world is just a metaphysical claim. So maybe there is a hard connection between the world and our representions of it but only to the extent that they are a direct result of whatever things in the world do. Even the possible usefulness of our representations would have to be a direct result of what things in the world do, i.e. it would be just a fact of the world that our representations are useful in a particular context. And since we don't know what this context is we don't know that our representation are true of the world.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I am talking about meaning and what the connection is between two otherwise randomly placed objects in the universe, the reference and a referent.

Meaning is a function of usage. Usage is people dependent, just as sentences are people dependent, but a proposition (at least to me) take the human element out of the equation. There could not have been sentences uttered by people back when there were no people, so how could there have been propositions back then when there were no sentences that express them (or people to express propositions with sentences)? Well, the referent is that which would have been expressed had there been people to express them. So, even if a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence, that doesn't necessitate sentences for there to be propositions. The explanatory definition is quick but weak.

Meaning, however, is beside the point, as meaning and referent are two different things, but there is a similar issue. The referent of a word is the object, but we speak of the referent being the object even when there were no people to use words. In other words, the referent of the word "Earth" was here long before people were around to use the word. The referent of a term is no more word dependent than a proposition is sentence dependent. We're speaking about the object, and we shouldn't let language muck that up, so it's okay to say some things that might make us apprehensive.

Oh, and science does tell us things. It's easy to get bogged down and think words must be talented little fellows to do all the things we say they do, and even when we think we're being smart and turning things topsy turvy to say that it's not words that mean, or words that refer, or words that denote and choose to give credit where credit is due, as it's the people that do things with words, it's an accepted part of language to imbue them as such.
As with words as to fields of study as well. Are we clever when we deny that science teaches us ... When we give credit not to science but to scientists? This reminds me of the insanity of discussing laws of nature

It's also an accepted part of language to be able to utter falsehoods. And then it's an accepted part of language to be able to disagree about them. I will assume here that we all favour truths over falsehoods.

The practice of attributing meaning to words themselves is common practice in everyday life and in linguistic work because it's convenient and no harm is done in those contexts. But if the question is whether words really have meaning then it's a philosophical context and what matters are whether the arguments you offer are convincing. I don't see how the convenience of everyday life and linguistics could possibly be a convincing argument. Compare with science v. everyday life. In everyday life it's Ok to talk as if the sun was actually moving through the sky. But you couldn't seriously ask scientists to accept that kind of talk in the context of a scientific discussion. At the very least, when you say that words have meaning, you should qualify your assertion: we can talk as if words had meaning. Or state that you are not here to debate any issue but to enjoy a chat with other posters. Or that you choose to limit your discussion to a technically linguistic point of view.
EB

 

[ryan]

They might not be randomly placed. It is at least conceivable that the universe may be able to produce true statements about parts of itself through some cognitive organs or organisms. We don't seem to know that the brain is such a truth-producing organ but if it's not that still does not mean no such organ or organism exists. However, it's for the universe (or whatever is truly in charge over here) to "decide" on the issue. It's also an interesting question as to whether humanity could or will ever be able to build a truth-producing machine. It seems we are certainly trying hard. We may already have some very simple devices that are just that but do we really know they are?
EB

I have trouble understanding what the point of your posts are. They don't seem to be addressing my OP even though you are on the right topic. You mention things that are either too far beyond things that I know about or just don't focus in on a point that I can find.

You don't even understand my first sentence, "They might not be randomly placed"?

The rest is a straightforward justification of why they wouldn't be randomly placed. I can't see how you can fail to get that.
EB

I don't think you understand what I am going for here. I am not talking about the possibility of truth or if it exists. I am interested in discussing what truth would be in relation to what it is true about. I am trying to figure out what ties a referent and a reference in a quantified and mechanical universe.

 

[ryan]

Think about what a relationship of two objects is. It is not either of the objects. It is something that links them in such a way that they are simultaneously recognized, and their differences are known.

How could a process such as the consciousness also be a singular entity that knows about more than the fundamental particles? This doesn't make sense with a purely causal universe of particles. We should only be one particle at a time and not have these notions of groups of particles.

I suspect that the scientific idea is that physical things do what they do anyway. Our mental representation(s) of what physical things do is just a consequence of what physical things do. It's just the way the universe works. The value of these representations shouldn't be understood as knowledge of the physical world. Instead, they just are. It's a bare fact. We may want to say that we use these representations to survive or something, and it might even be true that they work to some extent or in some context but to pretend that they are true of the material world is just a metaphysical claim. So maybe there is a hard connection between the world and our representions of it but only to the extent that they are a direct result of whatever things in the world do. Even the possible usefulness of our representations would have to be a direct result of what things in the world do, i.e. it would be just a fact of the world that our representations are useful in a particular context. And since we don't know what this context is we don't know that our representation are true of the world.
EB

Physically speaking, things aren't really connected, except for in cases like entanglement. How is it that we can have these interconnected thoughts, or even the illusion of thoughts, when our brains are suppose to be made out isolated particles.

 

[Juma]

I suspect that the scientific idea is that physical things do what they do anyway. Our mental representation(s) of what physical things do is just a consequence of what physical things do. It's just the way the universe works. The value of these representations shouldn't be understood as knowledge of the physical world. Instead, they just are. It's a bare fact. We may want to say that we use these representations to survive or something, and it might even be true that they work to some extent or in some context but to pretend that they are true of the material world is just a metaphysical claim. So maybe there is a hard connection between the world and our representions of it but only to the extent that they are a direct result of whatever things in the world do. Even the possible usefulness of our representations would have to be a direct result of what things in the world do, i.e. it would be just a fact of the world that our representations are useful in a particular context. And since we don't know what this context is we don't know that our representation are true of the world.
EB

Physically speaking, things aren't really connected, except for in cases like entanglement. How is it that we can have these interconnected thoughts, or even the illusion of thoughts, when our brains are suppose to be made out isolated particles.

Interconnected thoughts???? You have to decide what you want to discuss and then stick to it. Is it meaning, or thoughts?

 

[ryan]

Physically speaking, things aren't really connected, except for in cases like entanglement. How is it that we can have these interconnected thoughts, or even the illusion of thoughts, when our brains are suppose to be made out isolated particles.

Interconnected thoughts???? You have to decide what you want to discuss and then stick to it. Is it meaning, or thoughts?

How can there be meaning without thoughts? Thoughts are where meaning comes from.

 

[fast]

"true" and "not true" are both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive thereby satisfying typical category grouping requirements (or something like that). If there is no cat on the mat, then a) the fact of the matter is that there is no cat on the mat and b) there is no fact of the matter that there is a cat on the mat.

To say meaningfuly that there is or there isn't a cat on the mat you need to assume that there is a mat, and maybe there isn't.

Facts are often times lying in wait of our discovery. Before I cross the sand dune, it's either true there is a dead camel lying in my path or it's not true there is a dead camel lying in my path. I don't need to know anything for that to be true. I don't even need to qualify it by saying "before I cross the sand dune."

Here you assume there is such a thing as your path but maybe there isn't. So to make a meaningful claim you have to assume something which maybe is not true.
EB

If I say there is a cat on the mat, then what I've said is false if there is no cat on the mat. Several things could be true making that false. For instance, if there is no mat. Or, there is no cat. Or, if there is both a cat and mat but the cat's not on the mat.

 

[fast]

Meaning is a function of usage. Usage is people dependent, just as sentences are people dependent, but a proposition (at least to me) take the human element out of the equation. There could not have been sentences uttered by people back when there were no people, so how could there have been propositions back then when there were no sentences that express them (or people to express propositions with sentences)? Well, the referent is that which would have been expressed had there been people to express them. So, even if a proposition is what's expressed by a sentence, that doesn't necessitate sentences for there to be propositions. The explanatory definition is quick but weak.

Meaning, however, is beside the point, as meaning and referent are two different things, but there is a similar issue. The referent of a word is the object, but we speak of the referent being the object even when there were no people to use words. In other words, the referent of the word "Earth" was here long before people were around to use the word. The referent of a term is no more word dependent than a proposition is sentence dependent. We're speaking about the object, and we shouldn't let language muck that up, so it's okay to say some things that might make us apprehensive.

Oh, and science does tell us things. It's easy to get bogged down and think words must be talented little fellows to do all the things we say they do, and even when we think we're being smart and turning things topsy turvy to say that it's not words that mean, or words that refer, or words that denote and choose to give credit where credit is due, as it's the people that do things with words, it's an accepted part of language to imbue them as such.
As with words as to fields of study as well. Are we clever when we deny that science teaches us ... When we give credit not to science but to scientists? This reminds me of the insanity of discussing laws of nature

It's also an accepted part of language to be able to utter falsehoods. And then it's an accepted part of language to be able to disagree about them. I will assume here that we all favour truths over falsehoods.

The practice of attributing meaning to words themselves is common practice in everyday life and in linguistic work because it's convenient and no harm is done in those contexts. But if the question is whether words really have meaning then it's a philosophical context and what matters are whether the arguments you offer are convincing. I don't see how the convenience of everyday life and linguistics could possibly be a convincing argument. Compare with science v. everyday life. In everyday life it's Ok to talk as if the sun was actually moving through the sky. But you couldn't seriously ask scientists to accept that kind of talk in the context of a scientific discussion. At the very least, when you say that words have meaning, you should qualify your assertion: we can talk as if words had meaning. Or state that you are not here to debate any issue but to enjoy a chat with other posters. Or that you choose to limit your discussion to a technically linguistic point of view.
EB

I'm following what you're saying, but I think you should be a bit more open to what I'm saying. People do use words to refer, and when they do, they are referring using words, but it is not therefore an inaccuracy to say that words refer, for it is a linguistic truth that words refer (not just that we say they do and therefore they do--but instead, as part of linguistic rule they do). It's integral to our language that they do. If a child mistakenly uses the word, "horse" when referring to a zebra at the zoo, the word, "zebra" does not therefore take on a new corresponding referent. If it did, dare not correct the child.

 

[Juma]

Interconnected thoughts???? You have to decide what you want to discuss and then stick to it. Is it meaning, or thoughts?

How can there be meaning without thoughts? Thoughts are where meaning comes from.

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

 

[ryan]

How can there be meaning without thoughts? Thoughts are where meaning comes from.

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

 

[fast]

How can there be meaning without thoughts? Thoughts are where meaning comes from.

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

Thoughts are not symbols.

- - - Updated - - -

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

person, but he's conflating stipulative meaning with lexical meaning.

 

[ryan]

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

person, but he's conflating stipulative meaning with lexical meaning.

I thought that Juma might have used "one" to mean "symbol" or "thought".

 

[Juma]

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

Thoughts are not symbols.

- - - Updated - - -

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

person, but he's conflating stipulative meaning with lexical meaning.

Yes to person but no to conflating. You create meaning when you interpretate your surrounding world.

And yes, thoughts are symbols. They are bearers of meaning.

 

[fast]

Thoughts are not symbols.

- - - Updated - - -

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

person, but he's conflating stipulative meaning with lexical meaning.

Yes to person but no to conflating. You create meaning when you interpretate your surrounding world.

And yes, thoughts are symbols. They are bearers of meaning.

Words denote meaning, that is, they stand in place of meaning. Specifically, I know what the word "cat" means when I see the word. That does not therefore imply that I have grasped what a person may have meant by his or her use of the word, as it may have been used in an alternative or unusual manner; thus, what a person means may not accord with what a word means. Either way, whether a word is used in a lexical manner or a stipulative manner, the words we use are symbols that denote meaning.

When you say, "you create meaning ...", do you mean understanding? (Like, make sense of?)

Oh, I can't bridge thoughts and symbols together in a way to make sense of what you're saying. I could use a word (which is a symbol) to convey thoughts, but that's about as close as I'm getting.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't think you understand what I am going for here. I am not talking about the possibility of truth or if it exists. I am interested in discussing what truth would be in relation to what it is true about. I am trying to figure out what ties a referent and a reference in a quantified and mechanical universe.

The simple answer is we don't seem to know that for statements about the material world. Maybe we will one day but we don't now.

JTB philosophers are still debating the issue of justification, which really is the closest thing to a link between a truth and what this truth is about. They don't seem to agree among themselves on this issue.

There are also truths we know are truths and yet even here we seem at a loss to identify what it is that links them to what they are about. Maybe there is no link.

We can however imagine solutions. Suppose science gets to the point where it knows the material world then presumably it would be in a situation to define the link between science and the material world and we can always speculate on that now, which is what JTB philosophers are really doing.
EB

 

[Juma]

Thoughts are not symbols.

- - - Updated - - -

No, thoughts are symbols, just as words and signs. Meaning is something else.
Meaning is created by each one when interpreting the surrounding world.

What are you using "one" as a pronoun for?

person, but he's conflating stipulative meaning with lexical meaning.

Yes to person but no to conflating. You create meaning when you interpretate your surrounding world.

And yes, thoughts are symbols. They are bearers of meaning.

Words denote meaning, that is, they stand in place of meaning. Specifically, I know what the word "cat" means when I see the word. That does not therefore imply that I have grasped what a person may have meant by his or her use of the word, as it may have been used in an alternative or unusual manner; thus, what a person means may not accord with what a word means. Either way, whether a word is used in a lexical manner or a stipulative manner, the words we use are symbols that denote meaning.

When you say, "you create meaning ...", do you mean understanding? (Like, make sense of?)

Oh, I can't bridge thoughts and symbols together in a way to make sense of what you're saying. I could use a word (which is a symbol) to convey thoughts, but that's about as close as I'm getting.

There are only symbols. It the handling of those symbols that create meaning.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I suspect that the scientific idea is that physical things do what they do anyway. Our mental representation(s) of what physical things do is just a consequence of what physical things do. It's just the way the universe works. The value of these representations shouldn't be understood as knowledge of the physical world. Instead, they just are. It's a bare fact. We may want to say that we use these representations to survive or something, and it might even be true that they work to some extent or in some context but to pretend that they are true of the material world is just a metaphysical claim. So maybe there is a hard connection between the world and our representions of it but only to the extent that they are a direct result of whatever things in the world do. Even the possible usefulness of our representations would have to be a direct result of what things in the world do, i.e. it would be just a fact of the world that our representations are useful in a particular context. And since we don't know what this context is we don't know that our representation are true of the world.
EB

Physically speaking, things aren't really connected, except (...)

I take it that you are talking about physical interactions. If so, it may well be that a representation (model, theory etc.) could be the result of an interaction such that there is a bijection between the set of the possible states of the thing represented and the set of the possible states of the representation itself. In which case I think one could talk of actual knowledge (subject to possible logical inconsistencies). And the connection between representation and thing represented would be a physical one. I don't see how this could work in the kind of universe we think we inhabit but we may be wrong about that.

(...) , except for in cases like entanglement.

Yes and except in some exceptional cases you woudn't go to the extreme of having the representation and the thing represented entangled. Perhaps not very practical.

How is it that we can have these interconnected thoughts, or even the illusion of thoughts, when our brains are suppose to be made out isolated particles.

Yes, that seems to be a problem.

The information processed in thoughts doesn't seem to be the problem. We can conceive of physical process that might one day perform as well as our kind of thinking. What seems to be the problem, to many people, is that we have the subjective experience of thoughts and ideas which each contains many bits of information. I agree we don't seem to have any proper explanation for that.

Yet, I'm not sure why it would be less of a problem if we only had the subjective experience of one bit of information at a time.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

To say meaningfuly that there is or there isn't a cat on the mat you need to assume that there is a mat, and maybe there isn't.

Facts are often times lying in wait of our discovery. Before I cross the sand dune, it's either true there is a dead camel lying in my path or it's not true there is a dead camel lying in my path. I don't need to know anything for that to be true. I don't even need to qualify it by saying "before I cross the sand dune."

Here you assume there is such a thing as your path but maybe there isn't. So to make a meaningful claim you have to assume something which maybe is not true.
EB

If I say there is a cat on the mat, then what I've said is false if there is no cat on the mat. Several things could be true making that false. For instance, if there is no mat. Or, there is no cat. Or, if there is both a cat and mat but the cat's not on the mat.

Sure but you're still assuming there is a mat. Your initial sentence, and now your comment on it, doesn't make sense if there's no mat to begin with.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'm following what you're saying, but I think you should be a bit more open to what I'm saying.

I understand what you say and I wouldn't mind if I took this conversation to be a social conversation like we might have at a cocktail or something. The thing is, you are mixing linguistic contexts.

For example, it's not true like you seem to suggest ("People do use words to refer") that people in their everyday lives think consciously of words as refering to things. Rather, as we may conjecture, there is a mental association between a word and the idea of something such that a person who wants to convey the idea of thing A to someone else will immediately use the word associated in his mind with this idea.

There is (maybe) a linguistic notion of reference and there is certainly a philosophical (and logical) notion of reference. I will ignore all but the philosophical one because I think that has to be what we are talking about here. In my view, it's nonsensical to say that words refer just as it is nonsensical to say that an arrow aims at the target. The archer aims the arrow at the target and the speaker use a word to refer to a thing. However, while the speaker is doing that, he may have not inkling that he is using this word to refer to anything.

People do use words to refer, and when they do, they are referring using words, but it is not therefore an inaccuracy to say that words refer, for it is a linguistic truth that words refer (not just that we say they do and therefore they do--but instead, as part of linguistic rule they do). It's integral to our language that they do.

If words are used to refer, it is inaccurate to say that words refer. They don't and I don't even see how they possibly could. The notion that words refer is only a short cut and it is misleading to claim it's accurate.

If a child mistakenly uses the word, "horse" when referring to a zebra at the zoo, the word, "zebra" does not therefore take on a new corresponding referent. If it did, dare not correct the child.

If a child used the word "zebra" to refer to a horse then, in this instance, the reference of the word "zebra", as used by the child, would just be the horse and nothing else. This is what refering means. You are confusing reference with dictionary definitions.
EB