fast
Contributor
Something to be mindful of is to resist the temptation to unreasonably raise the standard for what it even means to say of something that it’s evidence at all. One can have evidence and there be no guarantee akin to the guarantee as found in sound deductive arguments.
If your fingerprints are on a glass found at a crime scene, then like it or not, that’s evidence you were at a crime scene because it can be used to SUPPORT the contention you were at the crime scene. It need not guarantee what is purported—it merely needs to SUPPORT it.
Suppose the evidence was planted and you can prove that. Countervailing evidence minimizes its strength.
One step further: your fingerprints on the glass is strong evidence you handled the glass, but the fact it’s possible to surreptitiously plant the fingerprints of others onto foreign objects (using simple tools and some know-how) thereby negating the guarantee that the presence of the prints came from your handling of the glass does not (does not, I say) alter the “evidence” as being a proper description.
Many people have the faulty notion that for something to in fact be evidence of something there must be an inextricable link whereby something can’t be evidence for something that is not the case. What is true is that there can be evidence of something and there be no truth to that something. For instance, if you have never killed anyone, it’s still plausible for there to be evidence that you have. Saying “it’s not evidence for that but rather evidence for something else” is appealing, but that distorts what it means to say of something that it’s evidence.
If you claim that a huge bomb exploded over Central Park in New York City, the absence of any evidence that one did explode can be used to support the contention that one didn’t. We cannot guarantee that one didn’t with such strength that it’s impossible to be mistaken, but the lack of evidence for it can be cited as used to SUPPORT the contention it didn’t and thus rightly be called evidence despite the lack of guarantee.
So, absence of evidence is evidence of absence; just don’t confuse such evidence as implying some kind of undeniable guarantee.
If your fingerprints are on a glass found at a crime scene, then like it or not, that’s evidence you were at a crime scene because it can be used to SUPPORT the contention you were at the crime scene. It need not guarantee what is purported—it merely needs to SUPPORT it.
Suppose the evidence was planted and you can prove that. Countervailing evidence minimizes its strength.
One step further: your fingerprints on the glass is strong evidence you handled the glass, but the fact it’s possible to surreptitiously plant the fingerprints of others onto foreign objects (using simple tools and some know-how) thereby negating the guarantee that the presence of the prints came from your handling of the glass does not (does not, I say) alter the “evidence” as being a proper description.
Many people have the faulty notion that for something to in fact be evidence of something there must be an inextricable link whereby something can’t be evidence for something that is not the case. What is true is that there can be evidence of something and there be no truth to that something. For instance, if you have never killed anyone, it’s still plausible for there to be evidence that you have. Saying “it’s not evidence for that but rather evidence for something else” is appealing, but that distorts what it means to say of something that it’s evidence.
If you claim that a huge bomb exploded over Central Park in New York City, the absence of any evidence that one did explode can be used to support the contention that one didn’t. We cannot guarantee that one didn’t with such strength that it’s impossible to be mistaken, but the lack of evidence for it can be cited as used to SUPPORT the contention it didn’t and thus rightly be called evidence despite the lack of guarantee.
So, absence of evidence is evidence of absence; just don’t confuse such evidence as implying some kind of undeniable guarantee.
