According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

In an indeterministic universe, it's indeterminate whether you chose or whether some accident happened. You can blame God or the devil or the luck of the draw, instead of yourself.

But is that really true? That’s what I’m interested in discussing — whether libertarianism holds in an indeterministic world. I think a strong argument can be made that it does, and an equally strong argument can be made the the world is fundamentally non-determinstic, although this also depends on which interpretation of quantum mechanics you subscribe to, or on whether superdeterminism is true, which Sabine Hossenfelder argues is not an interpretation of QM but rather a replacement theory.

That's the thing: if there is no process (even by process of "smoothing over" large numbers of random events with bounded probability until the randomness stabilizes and things can be determined again owing to sufficiently deterministic expressions of nature), then there is nothing to respond to, nothing that can effectively be influenced so as to create plans contingent on any such precursor.

The fundamental purpose of discussing things like "free will" is to determine what happened and who or what was responsible for the outcome so that contingencies can be assembled or addressed. If the outcome is contingent on "literally nothing that can be controlled" there is NO responsibility for any such thing, and thus no free will, just unbound madness.

 

[pood]

I am always trying to update my knowledge on any number of topics, and what captured my attention on the subject I have raised here is this paper, which I am still working my way through.

I have always wanted a thread like this to be an exchange of views and an exploration of news ways to explore old topics, and not, as it ends up being, a pitched war between two opposing camps. I think we all, always, ought to be updating our knowledge in light of new findings or new arguments, and we should always be open to the possibility that we are wrong, that our arguments have gone astray somewhere. And there are still more ways to explore this topic. Given the well known Hard Problem of Consciousness, how do we know that mental events depend on material processes (metaphysical naturalism) and not the other way around (metaphysical idealism)? We don’t know. Perhaps we should mutually explore all the ideas with good-faith exchanges and not combative snark.

 

[pood]

To put this yet another way, IF indeterminism is true, THEN we would all need to adjust our understanding of free will, whether it’s possible, and how to formulate our arguments for or against it. I am suggesting here that we accept indeterminism as hypothetically true (wave-function collapse interpretations of QM strongly support it, and for that matter offer some support to metaphysical idealism), and, from that arguendo, develop our arguments. If nothing else, it’s a good exercise for the toolkits of our minds.

 

[The AntiChris]

If determinism is not true, then neither hard determinism nor soft determinism (compatibilism) is true, because both require determinism to be true.

I don't think this is quite correct.

Compatibilist free will only requires Adequate Determinism (reliable cause and effect). I don't think anyone seriously denies 'Adequate Determinism' as described in the provided link.

 

[Jarhyn]

If determinism is not true, then neither hard determinism nor soft determinism (compatibilism) is true, because both require determinism to be true.

I don't think this is quite correct.

Compatibilist free will only requires Adequate Determinism (reliable cause and effect). I don't think anyone seriously denies 'Adequate Determinism' as described in the provided link.

Quite my point, I think.

As someone with neck-deep involvement with making systems that act independently, i have NEVER, no matter how deep I dig, observed any sort of "idealistic imposition" on an adequately deterministic system.

It has NEVER been observed that any sort of ideal can interact with reality except in the accidental or coincidental formation of the image of that ideal such that it instantiates as a natural interactive material object.

It has OFTEN been observed that entities interacting as natural interactive material objects determine behavior based on other natural interactive material objects.

The evidence strongly supports metaphysical naturalism rather than any sort of idealism as the source of directed, ordered behavior.

 

[pood]

I am perfectly OK with adequate determinism. I am a compatibilist. I am interested in discussing whether, if quantum indeterminism is such that adequate determinism is somehow inadequate, can we vindicate libertarianism from indeterminism? I think possibly we can. And I think, maybe, if that’s right, then we could justify libertarianism even in the face of adequate determinism. It’s an intellectual exercise for me.

 

[Jarhyn]

I am perfectly OK with adequate determinism. I am a compatibilist. I am interested in discussing whether, if quantum indeterminism is such that adequate determinism is somehow inadequate, can we vindicate libertarianism from indeterminism? I think possibly we can. And I think, maybe, if that’s right, then we could justify libertarianism even in the face of adequate determinism. It’s an intellectual exercise for me.

Ah, that makes more sense then. Still, I really don't think there's a way to liberate libertarianism from its own issues in terms of the contradiction between "the ability to adequately respond", and "the inability to direct response at ideals".

To me, it's the fact that there ISN'T any way to prepare response that damns libertarian thought.

 

[The AntiChris]

I am interested in discussing whether, if quantum indeterminism is such that adequate determinism is somehow inadequate,

An "Adequate determinism" that isn't fully adequate is not adequate determinism - it's simply indeterminism (random events). I agree with hard determinists that there's no free will (libertarian or otherwise) to be found in random events.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Re, GenesisNemsis, it spills out into ideology and religion, 'our God given free will' to choose or reject God, to choose good or evil. In law, how we treat what may be damaged people, those who literally cannot feel empathy or understand the consequences of their actions, and so on.....with some, the very idea of free will takes on the tone of a religion, an emotional attachment to an ideal.

There are determinists who claim race causes certain undesirable behaviors. There are believers in free will who claim that women choose to be raped. Both concepts have their moral problems. Again, not impressed.

 

[DBT]

Re, GenesisNemsis, it spills out into ideology and religion, 'our God given free will' to choose or reject God, to choose good or evil. In law, how we treat what may be damaged people, those who literally cannot feel empathy or understand the consequences of their actions, and so on.....with some, the very idea of free will takes on the tone of a religion, an emotional attachment to an ideal.

There are determinists who claim race causes certain undesirable behaviors. There are believers in free will who claim that women choose to be raped. Both concepts have their moral problems. Again, not impressed.

That's a different issue, what we have here is a dispute on how compatibilists define free will in order to make it appear compatible with determinism as they define it.

And of course incompatibilism, which argues (basically) that the compatibilist definition of free will ignores key elements of determinism in their carefully crafted definition of free will, and in so doing, the compatibilist fails to make a case for compatibility.

 

[DBT]

No, please try to read what I write, including my recent post just above. I wrote, putting free will to one side … I would like to focus on whether determinism is true at all. If it’s not, then yes, we move to libertarianism. However, I’m not conflating the two, but rather pointing out that free will can be adduced as compatibilism in the domain of determinism, but if indeterminism is true, we need to consider whether libertarianism is possible. Please stop charging me with dishonesty. Instead, learn to read better.

Whether determinism is true or not, compatibilists give their definition of determinism and claim that their given definition of free will is compatible with their definition of determinism, and that claim is disputed by the incompatibilist regardless of whether determinism is true or not.

The Libertarian must reject determinism because determinism does not permit free will as Libertarian defines it.

There are those who argue that quantum randomness allows free will, as in the ability to choose alternate actions in any given instance, which may suit the Libertarian, but still ignores the inconvenient fact that random events are no more a choice than events determined by antecedents.

A hopeless case any way you look at it.

Yet some still hold the view, sometimes compatibilists who want things both ways.

Quote;
''According to the libertarian position on free will and moral responsibility, people sometimes exercise free will and are morally responsible for what they do, but this freedom and responsibility is incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. Frequently maligned within the history of philosophy, this view has recently gained increasingly sympathetic attention among philosophers. But stark questions remain: How plausible is this view? If our actions are not casually determined, how can we have control over them? Why should we want our actions to be breaks in the deterministic causal chain? The recent resurgence of interest in libertarianism is due, most significantly, to Robert Kane, who is the leading contemporary defender of this view of free will.''

 

[Jarhyn]

what we have here is a dispute on how compatibilists define free will in order to make it appear compatible with determinism

Well, you don't get to "dispute" someone else's definition. You can only work under it and either find a contradiction in the system rather than on the facial definitions, or you can sit down and shut up.

the compatibilist definition of free will ignores key elements of determinism

No, it doesn't.

The point is that it is compatible.

Let's look at the bear trap on the floor, in isolation.

It is set such that there is spring tension against the trigger that will. "The trap is in the 'set' state" is a true statement of this tableau.

Is "if someone were to step there squarely with their foot, the trap would close; if they were not very fast in removing their foot, the trap would close on their leg or foot." A true statement of the trap?

The compatibilist says "yes, that is a true statement about the trap".

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Re, GenesisNemsis, it spills out into ideology and religion, 'our God given free will' to choose or reject God, to choose good or evil. In law, how we treat what may be damaged people, those who literally cannot feel empathy or understand the consequences of their actions, and so on.....with some, the very idea of free will takes on the tone of a religion, an emotional attachment to an ideal.

There are determinists who claim race causes certain undesirable behaviors. There are believers in free will who claim that women choose to be raped. Both concepts have their moral problems. Again, not impressed.

That's a different issue, what we have here is a dispute on how compatibilists define free will in order to make it appear compatible with determinism as they define it.

And of course incompatibilism, which argues (basically) that the compatibilist definition of free will ignores key elements of determinism in their carefully crafted definition of free will, and in so doing, the compatibilist fails to make a case for compatibility.

Well, I think my view is perfectly in line with compatibilism I'd say.

 

[DBT]

Re, GenesisNemsis, it spills out into ideology and religion, 'our God given free will' to choose or reject God, to choose good or evil. In law, how we treat what may be damaged people, those who literally cannot feel empathy or understand the consequences of their actions, and so on.....with some, the very idea of free will takes on the tone of a religion, an emotional attachment to an ideal.

There are determinists who claim race causes certain undesirable behaviors. There are believers in free will who claim that women choose to be raped. Both concepts have their moral problems. Again, not impressed.

That's a different issue, what we have here is a dispute on how compatibilists define free will in order to make it appear compatible with determinism as they define it.

And of course incompatibilism, which argues (basically) that the compatibilist definition of free will ignores key elements of determinism in their carefully crafted definition of free will, and in so doing, the compatibilist fails to make a case for compatibility.

Well, I think my view is perfectly in line with compatibilism I'd say.

Fine.

 

[DBT]

what we have here is a dispute on how compatibilists define free will in order to make it appear compatible with determinism

Well, you don't get to "dispute" someone else's definition. You can only work under it and either find a contradiction in the system rather than on the facial definitions, or you can sit down and shut up.

Dispute means to question and challenge or debate. The incompatibilist sees the flaws in the compatibilist definition of free will and questions, challenges or debates its validity.

the compatibilist definition of free will ignores key elements of determinism

No, it doesn't.

Of course it does. How and why compatibilists ignore the key elements of determinism has been explained.



''An action’s production by deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

The point is that it is compatible.

The compatibilist definition of free will is flawed. The argument is lost. Compatibilism is a failed argument.


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point,'' Cold comfort in Compatibilism.

Basically, determinism means inevitable decisions, and inevitable decisions are not freely willed decisions.

Let's look at the bear trap on the floor, in isolation.

It is set such that there is spring tension against the trigger that will. "The trap is in the 'set' state" is a true statement of this tableau.

Is "if someone were to step there squarely with their foot, the trap would close; if they were not very fast in removing their foot, the trap would close on their leg or foot." A true statement of the trap?

The compatibilist says "yes, that is a true statement about the trap".

Your example has nothing to do with free will. Learning how the world works and how to respond to its conditions and events is the evolved function of a brain.

The issue is the nature of the means and mechanism of response and whether this may be defined as free will....which clearly it cannot because the means of response is the neural architecture and information state of the brain that determines response, and not our will.

''This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.''' Volitional control of movement: The physiology of free will
Clinical Neurophysiology, Volume 118, Issue 6, Pages 1179-1192 M. Hallett

 

[Jarhyn]

Dispute means to question and challenge or debate

Right, and definitions are debated in a specific way: by actually finding contradictions within the presented definitions. Definitions are not themselves to be considered "flawed" unless they involve contradiction against other definitions.

YOU include a modal fallacy in your definitions that is easy to find:

Your statement that degrees of freedom of an object don't exist due to external factors to that object not forming preconditions to exercise those freedoms is where the conflict arises from.

The salad is right there at the salad bar. The steak is right there, too.

Your failure to stand up and pick up the steak instead of the salad does not unmake their locations nor the degrees of freedom in the system towards them, does not erase the contingency that allows you to simply pick them up, if you were to choose to do so.

The salad will continue to be an alternative, as will the steak, until each crosses some horizon beyond which it can no longer be accessed even if you were to choose to try.

There's a reason well over half of all philosophers are compatibilists.

 

[DBT]

Dispute means to question and challenge or debate

Right, and definitions are debated in a specific way: by actually finding contradictions within the presented definitions. Definitions are not themselves to be considered "flawed" unless they involve contradiction against other definitions.

The presented definition of free will ignore the key elements of the presented definition of determinism.

Namely, that the definition of determinism as given by the compatibilism poses as much a challenge to basic-desert responsibility (non-chosen brain conditions) as deterministic manipulation by external agents

''An action’s production by deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

YOU include a modal fallacy in your definitions that is easy to find:

You repeat that like a mantra. A chant. It was false the first time you invoked it, and remains false no matter how many times you repeat it,

Your statement that degrees of freedom of an object don't exist due to external factors to that object not forming preconditions to exercise those freedoms is where the conflict arises from.

What? You miss the point and make up your own narrative. Nothing exists in isolation. The inner subjective condition is related to the immediate environment in which it operates and responds to.

The salad is right there at the salad bar. The steak is right there, too.

Your failure to stand up and pick up the steak instead of the salad does not unmake their locations nor the degrees of freedom in the system towards them, does not erase the contingency that allows you to simply pick them up, if you were to choose to do so.

The salad will continue to be an alternative, as will the steak, until each crosses some horizon beyond which it can no longer be accessed even if you were to choose to try.

Oh, boy.

There's a reason well over half of all philosophers are compatibilists.

There's a reason why neuroscientists, who actually study the brain and behavioural output, are moving away from the term 'free will' because it does not represent the brain or the process of cognition;


Basic Assumptions of Consciousness Research
''The majority of consciousness research is steeped in an evolutionary perspective and a fundamental assumption of mind-brain unity. Single-cell organisms do not need brains, because they interface directly with their environment through chemo-tactic receptors. The brain evolved as an information processor, to bring the outside inside so that the whole organism is privy to environmental stimuli. Primitive brains react reflexively. The higher vertebrate brain emerged because natural selection favours brains that respond rapidly, yet are flexible enough to adapt to changing environments.''




''Investigators searching for the physical substrate of consciousness have perhaps failed to separate production and judgement. They have looked for a high-bandwidth central control channel, a "little man" inside the machine, and have failed to find him. They have been looking for the wrong thing and have even come to the conclusion that maybe there is no central control, that it is all done in parallel.''

''The most obvious candidates for central control channels are the various nuclei that broadcast neurotransmitters non-specifically, i.e. the serotonergic, dopaminergic, cholinergic and noradrenergic nuclei. A critical feature of their outputs is that they involve special neurotransmitters and these neurotransmitters are allowed to diffuse into the brain medium before reaching their targets.''

Free will, if it existed, would need to be that 'little autonomous man inside the brain,' but sadly for idealists and true believers, such a thing doesn't exist.

 

[Jarhyn]

Nothing exists in isolation. The inner subjective condition is related to the immediate environment in which it operates and responds to

If things are locally real, as Superdeterminism wages, this is false.

The limit of the speed of change, the speed of light, demands that the environment cannot force something to be anything else than what it is before it gets a chance to be that which it is, as it is, exerting its own influence of force on everything else.

The inner environment gets the first, and most influential say, on the inner environment. C means that every inner "subjective" condition is related first and most powerfully to inner "subjective" conditions, though these conditions are objectively also phenomenal.

 

[Jarhyn]

Also, I might note, moral desert responsibility is a shifted goalpost.

The compatibilist doesn't discuss, nor need to discuss, moral desert responsibility in defense of compatibilism.

In fact, moral desert responsibility only starts far later in a discussion about as far removed from basic mechanical responsibility as can be; we are still in the mode of "can respond", not "ought respond", so bringing up "ought respond" as if it has any bearing here is intensely misleading, potentially dishonest, and wholely inappropriate.

We discuss the ABILITY to render response at this stage, the obligation comes as a product of different logical concerns.

 

[DBT]

Nothing exists in isolation. The inner subjective condition is related to the immediate environment in which it operates and responds to

If things are locally real, as Superdeterminism wages, this is false.

For heavens sake, the compatibilist defines the terms and conditions of determinism. You did it yourself, if you recall. No randomness, etc, which means no deviation or non determined events within the system.

The limit of the speed of change, the speed of light, demands that the environment cannot force something to be anything else than what it is before it gets a chance to be that which it is, as it is, exerting its own influence of force on everything else.

The inner environment gets the first, and most influential say, on the inner environment. C means that every inner "subjective" condition is related first and most powerfully to inner "subjective" conditions, though these conditions are objectively also phenomenal.

There is no inner say as to state and condition of a brain. Genetic makeup and neural architecture isn't the result of a selection process, 'oh, I'll take this attribute rather than that feature. There is no inner agent who decides to be a math wiz, a linguist, a musician, a genius, etc.