According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Copernicus]

Thanks for your comment, Jarhyn. I have nothing more to contribute on the subject for now. You seem to feel that you have a better way of addressing DBT's concerns, so I feel you should take up those concerns with him. Sorry for giving you that papercut.

Well, I feel you don't have a suitable way, and I wanted to discuss with you whether you could help make my approach more suitable, seeing as it is quite dense and difficult to unpack or explain.

As TheAntiChris points out I have NEVER encountered another philosopher who approaches it the way I do, by searching systems theory for isomorphism.

Sorry, but much of what you say about systems theory and its relationship to free will makes little sense to me. If you feel that you have some kind of deep understanding of the problem because of your effort to relate systems theory to free will, I just do not see it. So I cannot help you to explain it.

I acknowledge that you are quite intelligent, and I acknowledge that I'm an intractable asshole. For what it's worth, I don't have any problem following your formal language treatment, I just think you need to keep going.

Thank you for the compliment, but I really wanted to keep my explanation of free will as simple and clear as possible. The subject is confusing enough with all of the different takes that people have on the nature of free will. I have a tendency to be wordy as it is.

I would very much like to see if you think my semantic completion makes sense.

I honestly have no idea what that term means to you, although I suspect you are treating natural language semantics as one might think of semantics in a formal language or in information theory. There are good reasons why would that approach would not be useful, but I doubt I could make you understand why I think that.

Also, read the ETA.

ETA: it does in fact discuss time, but in terms of some other rather unfortunate terms "real" and "not real (yet)". This gets really close, but it leans on the unfortunate notion of "imaginary numbers" being "simply made up" rather than "polar rotational components" of physical systems.

Is is no more "imaginary" than the charge held by a capacitor, in my estimation. It's not here yet, but it is actually over there. In this way, alternatives can also be held, not merely in "the unreal imagination" but rather "in the hand as an object relative to a choice operation", as the marble in the bag of marbles waiting to be picked out, but still a real material object.

I've tried a few examples over the years.

The clearest concrete example I've used is "selecting from a set of marbles", with examples such as "the marbles are in a narrow tube (LIFO)", or "the marbles are in a one way tube (FIFO)", the tube IS a choice structure; the marbles ARE alternatives to the choice function; only one marble is free such that a force applied will exit it from the space of the tube. This is a description of the tube in ANY physical environment. The tube does not need to be operated for it to be a choice function, nor for an outside observer to accurately describe the degrees of freedom of the system. It is no less "imaginary" than the aforementioned charge in the capacitor. The question is not whether there is a charge, but where and how that charge will find ground.

I have no doubt at all that calculating such things as what a system will do requires "imaginary" numbers, in fact. We certainly know that's on the bill for discussing the charge in a capacitor in terms of voltage over time, and that time certainly enters into it... But "imaginary" is a misnomer here.

Another thing that happened, for what it's worth, was a long discussion about "alternality" and "imagination", and in fact simulation. At one point DBT was arguing that there are no available or real alternalities. I think there was (is?) a misunderstanding there along the lines of "if I went back in time and chose differently it wouldn't be 'myself in that moment' choosing it would be someone else so the exercise doesn't make sense," though to be fair I can't recall if it eas DBT dropping that nugget or FromDerInside.

My answer to that at the time was, to paraphrase, "I don't really need an alternality; I need to know the generalized rules of physics and to faithfully simulate those rules with regards to directing simulated force at a simulated target; I am interested in exploring the properties of the target in general. This simulation provides suitably physical environment for provisioning the artifacts on which my choice function operates, and provides one of the loci from which my 'will to act by internally sourced wills' is set up to accept 'internal'."

As long as the "error bars" of the simulation keep the metaphorical poles of the goalpost suitably wide, thus revealing the will more as a handler of a set of continuities and the goal more as a set of locations and results, it will suitably include "whatever actually is going to happen". In fact whether it inevitably does or doesn't is itself a real and momentary measure of the freedom of the will, thus making freedom both a provisional irrealis concept in terms of what the simulation predicts, as well as an actual concrete observable in terms of what reality says on the matter.

You combined a lot of disparate ideas together in a way that probably made sense in your mind. However, I cannot put them back together in any reasonably coherent fashion.

Free Will in this way discussed not just what will happen, but what did happen. "Did I fail of my own free will?"

I believe I have seen others handle it in terms of "did it not happen by my free won't?"

About all I can say at this point is that you seem to be acknowledging the importance of tense and time reference in explaining free will. I thought I provided a high level, but succinct explanation of how that worked in natural languages and in a way that helped explain the ordinary usage of the expression. Not just in English, but in all languages. The semantics of tense and time reference is universal across all languages and cultures, even though the phrase structure and words used to express it may differ radically. Obviously, I could go into far more detail with examples and perhaps some instruction on the interplay with other types of temporal reference, but I have no time or space for that, and I don't see it as necessary. Anyway, I really have nothing more to add at this point.

 

[Jarhyn]

I honestly have no idea what that term means to you, although I suspect you are treating natural language semantics as one might think of semantics in a formal language or in information theory. There are good reasons why would that approach would not be useful, but I doubt I could make you understand why I think that

So, your own incredulity is your own problem there.

Semantic completion to me is about supporting each idea with a definition until all the ideas are either supported with physical examples, or until you hit a contradiction between terms that cannot be reconciled.

Regardless, every time you say "I don't think I could explain in a way you would understand" you insult me and my intelligence in being able to translate your understanding.

I discuss things in ways that at least bring the hope that you will see the bigger, deeper picture which I am discussing, which is to say concrete examples of a freedom, not merely in the future tense, but in the present tense.

Regardless of whether you wish to consider my language "natural" by whatever interpretation of "natural" you wish to apply here (which in my experience is more "ordinary" language than anything "natural" or contextless), but the way I use language in this discussion of free will is strictly formal, for all I adopt more "ordinary" tokens for the treatment.

I acknowledge that you are quite intelligent, and I acknowledge that I'm an intractable asshole. For what it's worth, I don't have any problem following your formal language treatment, I just think you need to keep going.

Thank you for the compliment, but I really wanted to keep my explanation of free will as simple and clear as possible.

The problem is that by keeping it "simple and clear" you don't actually defend it as a visible process of physical interactions.

I keep soliciting you to give just one trivial example of something that ISN'T a human doing it, something that you could dissect and examine the bits of to their deterministic parts.

Also, read the ETA.

ETA: it does in fact discuss time, but in terms of some other rather unfortunate terms "real" and "not real (yet)". This gets really close, but it leans on the unfortunate notion of "imaginary numbers" being "simply made up" rather than "polar rotational components" of physical systems.

Is is no more "imaginary" than the charge held by a capacitor, in my estimation. It's not here yet, but it is actually over there. In this way, alternatives can also be held, not merely in "the unreal imagination" but rather "in the hand as an object relative to a choice operation", as the marble in the bag of marbles waiting to be picked out, but still a real material object.

I've tried a few examples over the years.

The clearest concrete example I've used is "selecting from a set of marbles", with examples such as "the marbles are in a narrow tube (LIFO)", or "the marbles are in a one way tube (FIFO)", the tube IS a choice structure; the marbles ARE alternatives to the choice function; only one marble is free such that a force applied will exit it from the space of the tube. This is a description of the tube in ANY physical environment. The tube does not need to be operated for it to be a choice function, nor for an outside observer to accurately describe the degrees of freedom of the system. It is no less "imaginary" than the aforementioned charge in the capacitor. The question is not whether there is a charge, but where and how that charge will find ground.

I have no doubt at all that calculating such things as what a system will do requires "imaginary" numbers, in fact. We certainly know that's on the bill for discussing the charge in a capacitor in terms of voltage over time, and that time certainly enters into it... But "imaginary" is a misnomer here.

Another thing that happened, for what it's worth, was a long discussion about "alternality" and "imagination", and in fact simulation. At one point DBT was arguing that there are no available or real alternalities. I think there was (is?) a misunderstanding there along the lines of "if I went back in time and chose differently it wouldn't be 'myself in that moment' choosing it would be someone else so the exercise doesn't make sense," though to be fair I can't recall if it eas DBT dropping that nugget or FromDerInside.

My answer to that at the time was, to paraphrase, "I don't really need an alternality; I need to know the generalized rules of physics and to faithfully simulate those rules with regards to directing simulated force at a simulated target; I am interested in exploring the properties of the target in general. This simulation provides suitably physical environment for provisioning the artifacts on which my choice function operates, and provides one of the loci from which my 'will to act by internally sourced wills' is set up to accept 'internal'."

As long as the "error bars" of the simulation keep the metaphorical poles of the goalpost suitably wide, thus revealing the will more as a handler of a set of continuities and the goal more as a set of locations and results, it will suitably include "whatever actually is going to happen". In fact whether it inevitably does or doesn't is itself a real and momentary measure of the freedom of the will, thus making freedom both a provisional irrealis concept in terms of what the simulation predicts, as well as an actual concrete observable in terms of what reality says on the matter.

You combined a lot of disparate ideas together

I combined a lot of related ideas together in a way that made sense

in a way that probably made sense in your mind.

This, however, is vaguely insulting. It's OK to say you don't really get HOW they go together, or even ask questions as to how they relate.

However, I cannot put them back together in any reasonably coherent fashion

So ask about the points that you are disjointed about instead of doing as the above and taking swipes and implying that I don't know what I'm talking about.

Specifically, I am addressing a past argument had about what a "choice function" is, an example of how "alternatives" to a choice function are easily observable not as immaterial or unreal objects, but as concrete assemblies of stuff, as functions of their immediate local physical properties, facts about them as real as, say, "there is a charge in the capacitor".

Free Will in this way discussed not just what will happen, but what did happen. "Did I fail of my own free will?"

I believe I have seen others handle it in terms of "did it not happen by my free won't?"

About all I can say at this point is that you seem to be acknowledging the importance of tense and time reference in explaining free will.

I'm trying in fact to make a point that freedom does NOT only have grounding in the future tense. It happens as much in the present tense. There is a "provisional" freedom Irrealis, and there is a freedom Realis.

As much as when considering what actions MAY be free (irrealis), there is also a moment when you observe the "true" freedom of the system in what happened, and the determinant of that true freedom is the momentary decision that the chooser makes.

When asked "why were you not free to do those other things" you can say "because I decided that I wouldn't be", and this is an important distinction from "because I decided I would be and something else overrode that decision". This is the distinction between internal self constraint and external constraint.

I thought I provided a high level, but succinct explanation of how that worked in natural languages and in a way that helped explain the ordinary usage of the expression.

All it did was discuss now people often apply the term in common usage.

It gives a reason to reject DBT's argument but yet again does not show in any language of systems theory why the "definitions as provided" for free will must be compatible with determinism as a concept.

Not just in English, but in all languages. The semantics of tense and time reference is universal across all languages and cultures, even though the phrase structure and words used to express it may differ radically.

This is a claim, and a fairly strong one and it indicates some real and emergent principle is PROBABLY at play here. It doesn't, as I keep saying, support the idea that the terms being used actually function as a component in some visibly deterministic system agnostic to how the system first started up.

Obviously, I could go into far more detail with examples and perhaps some instruction on the interplay with other types of temporal reference,

...

but I have no time or space for that, and I don't see it as necessary. Anyway, I really have nothing more to add at this point.

What? You have quite a bit of time to argue with me about why you don't have the time, and if it's necessary enough to bicker with me about how you don't have time, I think rather you might be lying to yourself about the above.

What else are you going to do on the subject after all? Bicker with the Black Knight over the subject? He's been a brick wall for years and years.

You had, what, 2-3 hours today to complain about not wanting to take what, an hour or two to see if you could formulate an example that doesn't rely on a temporal reference, but on a immediate observation?

If the freedoms of a system amount to the exit points from an algorithm (ie, a throw or a return), there's going to be an actual moment the instruction counter reaches that point, and in that one singular moment, that freedom will be reified, not as a time reference to the future but as an aspect of the present relating to the past. There will be an answer in that moment not of the form "may this will be free" but "this will was/is free." This, if I am not mistaken, stands in contrast with your claim that freedom is an aspect treated exclusively by the irrealis mode.

 

[Copernicus]

Jahryn, I don't mean to insult you, but you need to understand that I have another life with obligations that supersede your needs. Not all of my time can be spent monitoring this forum and posting responses. And I understand some of the issues you do not, because I have spent many years teaching and researching these kinds of issues. You are not going to do the coursework or get a semester course on tense and time reference here. You are not stupid, and I am not insulting your intelligence. I am just pointing out that going into more detail than I have would be both time-consuming and probably not very useful to you. You are not an expert on natural language or linguistic semantics, and you will only have endless demands for more explanations. I used to get paid to answer those questions. You are not paying me. All we are doing here is having a very informal chat about the nature of free will and its relationship to determinism. Let's keep it simple.

 

[Jarhyn]

Jahryn, I don't mean to insult you, but you need to understand that I have another life with obligations that supersede your needs. Not all of my time can be spent monitoring this forum and posting responses.

I'm not asking all or even much. Just pointing out that the "some" you do spend is often ill spent and I question whether it can be a bit more successfully or usefully spent discussing things with people who actually want to discuss things rather than play runaround fuck-fuck games.

And I understand some of the issues you do not, because I have spent many years teaching and researching these kinds of issues.

I don't think you understand anything I do not. Rather, I think the situation is reversed and hampered only by a surmountable language barrier. ETA: until the language barrier is gone, it will be difficult to ascertain who knows what about what things.

You are not going to do the coursework or get a semester course on tense and time reference here.

You would be surprised what I do and accomplish here, or what I need, or what I don't. Rather, I have enough experience on time reference that the sort of debugging I do on real systems assumes a very precise form of understanding time references. Someone cannot go through the process of naming or planning nor hacking a process without understanding what time reference is and how it works.

What I propose is that someone who deals purely with the subject in terms of natural language isn't going to understand it to the raw mechanical level of an experienced software engineer, someone who handles language all day and observes in an intimate way what language is necessary to say or even create awareness of certain things, and what physical structural elements are necessary to that pursuit.

I have had well over a decade of experience this point (closer to two and a half decades now) in being slapped in the face by unwanted function and the results of having a "junky" understanding of those very concepts, but moreover I took the job specifically to look for that education and understanding.

You are not stupid, and I am not insulting your intelligence. I am just pointing out that going into more detail than I have would be both time-consuming and probably not very useful to you.

You could let me be the judge of what is useful to me, perhaps. You don't get to make that decision for me (which is quite the point of the thread I think, namely the locality issue). You at best get to decide whether you care that I express that usefulness or what you do with the time you spend responding to me, whether that's to edge towards condescension over the fact I got my education from a different and much more direct process, or whether you accept my request for your time, or whether you actually disengage from banging your head against the DBT wall and this thread and engage what you DO think would be a better way to spend/waste your retirement.

You are not an expert on natural language or linguistic semantics, and you will only have endless demands for more explanations.

Again, you sell me short because you don't think that my education is valid because it came from years of careful self-study rather than your preferred source, and came from what is, quite honestly, the most brutal sort of deconstruction not even of how people use it to communicate, but how actual systems are observed as functioning in real time.

Do not tell me what I will do or what I will not, furthermore. It is quite rude. I admit I am also a rude asshole too often, but I think we should BOTH aspire to be better than we were (assuming we have the necessary regulatory control).

I used to get paid to answer those questions.

And now you can do it for fun and the infinite value of ongoing education rather than squeezing the joy out of it for money.

You are not paying me.

Not in anything but a conversation that might help you, or I, or both, to learn new ideas and perspectives. ETA: nobody's paying me either; not everything is about money. This place is the closest I get to the doors of a school or church these days. One is expensive and the other is junk.

All we are doing here is having a very informal chat about the nature of free will and its relationship to determinism.

I'm not. I'm engaged in an academic discussion far from academic walls because the academy charges a lot of money and requires a lot of time to access, and I have a job and a mortgage, and as much as that job has taught me, if I want to make my point about Realis Freedom to anyone who isn't me, I'm going to have to get my hands dirty.

Let's keep it simple.

That's up to you, but I don't really want to. I've never wanted "simple".

People who want to find "simple" often find it. "Simple" views on sex "simple" views on race. "Simple" views on life came from... Simple has its issues.

ETA: for example, in academic linguistic theory, how do you treat machine language? I use "natural" to describe it because it is the language that speaks to the lowest level nature of a thing, but you assure me this is not the appropriate word. Neither is IL. IL is a higher level formalization of Machine Language. The argument we have over that is semantic, over quibbles of how we say, not over what we say.

 

[DBT]

...
I feel like I am in a debate with a bot caught in an endless loop.

You are not the only one. I have been caught in that loop for a number of years. That we are both caught in this loop appears to prove my case.

No, it doesn't. That endless loop is caused by your tendency to post reactions to arguments that don't address or try to refute those arguments. Your reactions just tend to ignore what I posted and simply restate what you've said before--a classic ad nauseam tactic. That is the endless loop I referred to. If you tried to understand the text you were reacting to and actually said what you specifically objected to in it, you would advance the discussion beyond that endless repetition.

I don't post reactions. I respond to the issue as it stands. I point out, time and time again, how and where compatibilism fails as an argument for free will. Yet the point of failure has yet to be addressed. Where each and every time it is brought up, the response slides away and the focus turns alswhere, 'the author doesn't understand compatibilism,' the article is poorly written,' etc, etc....

The point is not a 'reaction.' It is simply - to repeat - that if external elements can negate free will as compatibilists define it, so does inner processes that determine response prior to conscious experience of thought and action.

You just keep repeating the same misunderstandings of my position on free will without really directly addressing anything I say in response to those misunderstandings. It is not just about optional volitional actions that an agent has to select. It is about an imaginary model of a future in which the different imagined actions lead to different imagined outcomes. The point is that the future is irrealis to an agent. IOW, it is indeterminate prior to the volitional act. The "free" in free will is totally subjective. It depends on how the agents judge the extent of their control over their actions. If that control is felt to be unduly impeded, then they feel that they lacked reasonable control over their past behavior. That could lead them to believe that their action was not an execution of free will. I am trying to make this clear to you, but I see no evidence, as of yet, that you get what my point is or that you are willing to consider the possibility that I have made a reasonable point.

I keep repeating because the same erroneous objections keep being invoked. The issue of the failure of compatibilism has been addressed countless times.

No, you keep repeating because you refuse to address what is said to you. For example, see the fourth sentence in the above paragraph--the one that starts with "The point is..." That is where I define the concept of "free" in free will. What do you have to say in response? Nada. Nothing.

It is not complicated.

To repeat: if external elements, force, coercion, etc, are acknowledge to be restraints on freedom of will, so must production by determistic processes that fix the article of will, what you think and want, without awareness or choice...

What does that have to do with what I said about the concept of "free" in free will???? You just ignore it and repeat your reference to deterministic processes as if I disagreed with determinism. I am not an indeterminist. To act as if I were is a straw man fallacy. The dispute is over what free will means, not determinism!!! We are in violent agreement that every event has an antecedent cause, even the neural events that represent our thought processes.

I stick to the point. Which, for the given reasons, is the failure of compatibilism as an argument.

Compatibilist free will is defined as acting according to one's will without being forced, coerced or unduly influenced. Which ignores the nature of the means and mechanisms of our conscious experience.

With a habit or addiction you act according to your own will without being forced or coerced, for instance, yet you may be doing the very thing you do not want to do, where will is in conflict, to continue with the habit or addiction and to give it up because it is harmful.

There is no free will to be found there, each and every instance of need, want, habit, addiction, desire, hope, dream has its drivers and is experienced as an urge or will to act, often one in conflict with the other, where the stronger drive dominates.

Look, my argument is not impossible to understand, although it might be a little more complicated than you would like. We can describe the mind, thoughts, and linguistic concepts in terms of the underlying physical events that they supervene on, but we can also describe the overall behavior and function of the mind at a higher level of mental activity. Free will is not a concept that can be broken down easily into components that we can map to neural activity, but neuroscientists have made a lot of progress in that area. They don't talk a lot about the concept of free will, because it has no significance to their work. That doesn't prevent some neuroscientists from mentioning free will and how their work might have a bearing on the subject, but philosophy isn't their core area of expertise.

I don't see an argument that addresses the issue. It's not that it's complicated, just that it misses the point.

Free will is not being 'broken down into components' because the it is the compatibilist definition that is being used.

To be valid, the given definition cannot refer only to external elements, someone forcing or coercing you, but also the means by which you think and act.

This is not 'breaking free will down into components' but looking at the whole picture, all the elements that go into generating behaviour.

Trying to explain free will at the level of neural activity is a bit like trying to explain a computer program in binary or assembler language. It can be done, but the overall logic of the program is best explained at a higher level of function--in terms of data structures that programmers rely on to make computers produce interesting results. If you look at the same program in assembler or binary, it becomes extremely difficult to comprehend what the program is trying to do. That's why most programmers work with high level computer languages that are then automatically compiled into the low level components that actually execute in the machinery. Programmers don't actually have to know anything about binary code and registers in order to discuss the flow of logic in their programs. Similarly, you don't have to be a neuroscientist or psychologist in order to understand what free will is. You just have to pay attention to how people use the expression.

Neuroscience doesn't seek to explain free will, its purpose is to better understand how the brain works and why we think and behave as we do.

Which is quite relevant, inseparable in fact, to the issue of free will and how it may work, or even if there is something at work that can be defined as free will.

But it's not looking good. All we have are flawed definitions in the form of compatibilism, Libertarian free will and common perceptions of choice.

 

[Jarhyn]

Black Knight (@DBT ): Come on then.

Arthur(literally everyone else here): What?

Black Knight: Have at you!

Arthur: You are indeed brave, Sir Knight, but the fight is mine.

Black Knight: Oh, had enough, eh?

Arthur: Look, you stupid bastard, you've got no arms left.

Black Knight: Yes I have.

Arthur: Look!

Black Knight: Just a flesh wound.

Arthur: Look, stop that.

Black Knight: Chicken! Chicken!

Arthur: Look, I'll have your leg. Right!

Arthur cuts off the Black Knight's leg.

Black Knight: Right, I'll do you for that!

Arthur: You'll what?

Black Knight: Come 'ere!

Arthur: What are you going to do, bleed on me?

Black Knight: I'm invincible!

Arthur: You're a loony.

Black Knight: The Black Knight always triumphs! Have at you! Come on then.

Arthur cuts off the Black Knight's other leg.

Black Knight: All right; we'll call it a draw.

Arthur: Come, Patsy.

Black Knight: Oh, oh, I see, running away then. You yellow bastard! Come back here and take what's coming to you. I'll bite your legs off

 

[pood]

...

The point is not a 'reaction.' It is simply - to repeat - that if external elements can negate free will as compatibilists define it, so does inner processes that determine response prior to conscious experience of thought and action.

And yet it has been demonstrated to you that this is false, but you ignore the demonstrations and keep repeating yourself.

Response is SOMETIMES “determined” prior to conscious experience, and sometimes not. Even Libet did not claim what you are claiming, and anyway, I linked an article sometime back that talked about how later experiments did not replicate what Libet said he did find. But, it’s irrelevant anyway, because, as I have noted time and again, and to which you have not responded, our subconscious processes ARE us, are part of us, and anyway, to the extent that subconscious “dictates” what we do, it’s often because the subconscious has absorbed prior conscious information and decisions to update its picture of the world and help in making choices.

But we’ve been over and over this, as well as your inability to distinguish between contingently true and necessarily true propositions. You don’t care to engage these arguments. You simply baldly assert your same position, containing the same errors, again and again, with no effort to address directly the rebuttals that you have been offered. Under such circumstances conversation is pointless.

 

[Copernicus]

At this point, I feel that I have nothing further to contribute to this thread, so I'm content to leave my last posts to DBT and Jarhyn as my last comment to them on this subject.

 

[DBT]

...

The point is not a 'reaction.' It is simply - to repeat - that if external elements can negate free will as compatibilists define it, so does inner processes that determine response prior to conscious experience of thought and action.

And yet it has been demonstrated to you that this is false, but you ignore the demonstrations and keep repeating yourself.

Nothing of the sort has been demonstrated. The opposite is true, that there is more than sufficient evidence to show that the brain is the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and that it is state and condition of the brain that determines how you think and what you do.

I have posted the relevant studies numerous times, the consequences that brain damage, memory loss, chemical imbalance, etc, has in terms of thought, decision making and behaviour.

For instance;


''Goldberg brings his description of frontal dysfunction to life with insightful accounts of clinical cases. These provide a good description of some of the consequences of damage to frontal areas and the disruption and confusion of behavior that often results. Vladimir, for example, is a patient whose frontal lobes were surgically resectioned after a train accident.

As a result, he is unable to form a plan, displays an extreme lack of drive and mental rigidity and is unaware of his disorder. In another account, Toby, a highly intelligent man who suffers from attention deficits and possibly a bipolar disorder, displays many of the behavioral features of impaired frontal lobe function including immaturity, poor foresight and impulsive behavior.''

Response is SOMETIMES “determined” prior to conscious experience, and sometimes not.

There goes compatibilism. Goodbye compatibilist free will.

Even Libet did not claim what you are claiming, and anyway,

What do you think Libet claimed? That mind and consciousness precedes its own means and mechanisms of existence?

I linked an article sometime back that talked about how later experiments did not replicate what Libet said he did find. But, it’s irrelevant anyway, because, as I have noted time and again, and to which you have not responded, our subconscious processes ARE us, are part of us, and anyway, to the extent that subconscious “dictates” what we do, it’s often because the subconscious has absorbed prior conscious information and decisions to update its picture of the world and help in making choices.

Response always follows information input, transmission, distribution, memory integration. That's a matter of physics, not magical free will, where the state of the system/the brain equates to how it functions and how it responds.

Neither consciousness or will runs the brain, it is the brain that generates and runs both mind and will.

But we’ve been over and over this, as well as your inability to distinguish between contingently true and necessarily true propositions. You don’t care to engage these arguments.

Not true. That is poor rationale.

This issue, and incompatibilism, is simply about the physical, deterministic functionality of the brain in relation to how compatibilists define determinism - which includes brain function - and free will.

You simply baldly assert your same position, containing the same errors, again and again, with no effort to address directly the rebuttals that you have been offered. Under such circumstances conversation is pointless.

I have no need to assert. This is straightforward. Compatibilists give their definition of determinism and their definition of free will....so I merely point out that the argument fails because it does not account for inner processes, inner necessity, output in terms of actions taken determined by brain states, not free will as compatibilists define it, where if external elements such as coercion negate free will, so do inner states and conditions that are neither willed or chosen.

 

[pood]

...

The point is not a 'reaction.' It is simply - to repeat - that if external elements can negate free will as compatibilists define it, so does inner processes that determine response prior to conscious experience of thought and action.

And yet it has been demonstrated to you that this is false, but you ignore the demonstrations and keep repeating yourself.

Nothing of the sort has been demonstrated. The opposite is true, that there is more than sufficient evidence to show that the brain is the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and that it is state and condition of the brain that determines how you think and what you do.

This one thing above is why it’s pointless to talk to you. You created a man of straw out of what I said, and responded to that instead of what I wrote.

Did I say, somewhere, somehow, that the brain is NOT “the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and it is state and condition of the brain that determines how you think and what you do.”?

No, I AGREE with all that. I never said, implied, or hinted otherwise. Do you even actually read for comprehension what people write to you?

In fact, I AGAIN point. out that since you ARE your brain, the above sentence is easily and correctly recast as:

“Since I am my brain, I am the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and it is my state and condition that determines how I think and what I do.”

As to the rest, I’m not even going to try bothering yet again sorting for you what Libet actually said (he denied that his studies refuted free will), nor am I again going to mention a study that did not replicate his results, a paper to which I linked and you never responded. Nor am I going to go over with you again why it’s OK that some of our choices are made subconsciously. Once again, your entire spiel seems really directed against libertarianism. I’m not sure at this point you even know the different between libertarianism and compatibiism. I do know discussing this with you is utterly pointless, if after all this time you are still so egregiously stuffing straw.

 

[pood]

Science shows how nicely compatibilist free will fits in with the subconscious.

Well, look at that! The sleeping brain rehearses the future, and how to plan and choose, based on past conscious inputs and experience! Who’d a thunk, right, for the bunch of robotic meat puppets of the big bang that hard determinists claim we are!

 

[DBT]

...

The point is not a 'reaction.' It is simply - to repeat - that if external elements can negate free will as compatibilists define it, so does inner processes that determine response prior to conscious experience of thought and action.

And yet it has been demonstrated to you that this is false, but you ignore the demonstrations and keep repeating yourself.

Nothing of the sort has been demonstrated. The opposite is true, that there is more than sufficient evidence to show that the brain is the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and that it is state and condition of the brain that determines how you think and what you do.

This one thing above is why it’s pointless to talk to you. You created a man of straw out of what I said, and responded to that instead of what I wrote.

Are you being compelled to respond? I didn't set out to 'create a strawman' of what you said. What you said was - ''And yet it has been demonstrated to you that this is false, but you ignore the demonstrations and keep repeating yourself'' - and that is what I responded to, pointing out that an actions production through determinist processes is no less a restriction for the notion of free will as deterministic manipulation by other agents.

This has not, as you claimed, been demonstrated to be false.

Did I say, somewhere, somehow, that the brain is NOT “the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and it is state and condition of the brain that determines how you think and what you do.”?

No, I AGREE with all that. I never said, implied, or hinted otherwise. Do you even actually read for comprehension what people write to you?

In fact, I AGAIN point. out that since you ARE your brain, the above sentence is easily and correctly recast as:

“Since I am my brain, I am the sole agency of mind, consciousness, thought and response, and it is my state and condition that determines how I think and what I do.”

Yet the brain has no choice in how it is wired or how it functions, be it rationally or irrationally. If you want to call that 'free will,' knock yourself out.

As to the rest, I’m not even going to try bothering yet again sorting for you what Libet actually said (he denied that his studies refuted free will), nor am I again going to mention a study that did not replicate his results, a paper to which I linked and you never responded. Nor am I going to go over with you again why it’s OK that some of our choices are made subconsciously. Once again, your entire spiel seems really directed against libertarianism. I’m not sure at this point you even know the different between libertarianism and compatibiism. I do know discussing this with you is utterly pointless, if after all this time you are still so egregiously stuffing straw.

Believe it if it makes you feel better. If you think that conscious experience does not have antecedents; sensory input transmitted to brain regions for processing milliseconds prior to conscious representation of that information, you should explain how that is possible.

Look how silly this statement in this article is;

''You can’t blame your brain for your actions!​

Neuroscientists at HSE University have challenged the famous studies that question the free will of our decisions. You can’t shift responsibility for your actions to the brain.''


You can't blame your brain for the actions you take? Do you understand how absurd that claim is?

If it's not the brain doing it, what is? A soul or spirit? Homunculus? Magic? A Ghost in the machine?

It's mindboggling that the author of the article would say such a thing.

The brain is the sole agency of response. If you can't 'blame your brain, what can you blame? You as the autonomous driver of ''your brain?''

It's a joke.

 

[DBT]

Science shows how nicely compatibilist free will fits in with the subconscious.

Well, look at that! The sleeping brain rehearses the future, and how to plan and choose, based on past conscious inputs and experience! Who’d a thunk, right, for the bunch of robotic meat puppets of the big bang that hard determinists claim we are!

The brain is an information processor. Of course it can extrapolate. Not only that, it can generate a mental representation of the world and self and respond to events as the information is acquired and processed. And on top of that, that amazing ability has absolutely nothing to do with free will as Compatibilists, Libertarians, etc, define it.

 

[Jarhyn]

Science shows how nicely compatibilist free will fits in with the subconscious.

Well, look at that! The sleeping brain rehearses the future, and how to plan and choose, based on past conscious inputs and experience! Who’d a thunk, right, for the bunch of robotic meat puppets of the big bang that hard determinists claim we are!

The brain is an information processor. Of course it can extrapolate. Not only that, it can generate a mental representation of the world and self and respond to events as the information is acquired and processed. And on top of that, that amazing ability has absolutely nothing to do with free will as Compatibilists, Libertarians, etc, define it.

And most importantly, information processors implement and execute algorithms, algorithms have positions which are selected by their processing infrastructure and those positions, depending on whether they are selected or not.

In more common terms, brains have "wills" which are either "free" or "constrained" (or are provisionally free in lieu of eventually being either observably free or observably constrained).

 

[DBT]

Science shows how nicely compatibilist free will fits in with the subconscious.

Well, look at that! The sleeping brain rehearses the future, and how to plan and choose, based on past conscious inputs and experience! Who’d a thunk, right, for the bunch of robotic meat puppets of the big bang that hard determinists claim we are!

The brain is an information processor. Of course it can extrapolate. Not only that, it can generate a mental representation of the world and self and respond to events as the information is acquired and processed. And on top of that, that amazing ability has absolutely nothing to do with free will as Compatibilists, Libertarians, etc, define it.

And most importantly, information processors implement and execute algorithms, algorithms have positions which are selected by their processing infrastructure and those positions, depending on whether they are selected or not.

In more common terms, brains have "wills" which are either "free" or "constrained" (or are provisionally free in lieu of eventually being either observably free or observably constrained).

Brains function according their neural architecture, networks and structures, not will, not free will. The abilities of a brain are not a matter of 'free will.'' Whatever a brain can or cannot do is determined by its physical makeup. Will is related to its article, the article of will may be a habit, addiction, something that may appeal or repulse, the urge to act, to eat, drink, seek company, spend time with family......which the work of a brain as an information processor. And of course, the key being memory function, which enables recognition, comprehension, pattern recognition, to think, extrapolate, make predictions and form plans....

Quote;
''Memory is an essential cognitive function that permits individuals to acquire, retain, and recover data that defines a person’s identity (Zlotnik and Vansintjan, 2019). Memory is a multifaceted cognitive process that involves different stages: encoding, consolidation, recovery, and reconsolidation.''
The concept of memory is not reducible to a single unitary phenomenon; instead, evidence suggests that it can be subdivided into several distinct but interrelated constituent processes and systems (Richter-Levin and Akirav, 2003).

There are three major types of human memory: working memory, declarative memory (explicit), and non-declarative memory (implicit). All these types of memories involve different neural systems in the brain. Working memory is a unique transient active store capable of manipulating information essential for many complex cognitive operations, including language processing, reasoning, and judgment (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley and Logie, 1999; Funahashi, 2017; Quentin et al., 2019).

Previous models suggest the existence of three components that make up the working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986). One master component, the central executive, controls the two dependent components, the phonological loop (speech perception and language comprehension) and the visuospatial sketchpad (visual images and spatial impressions processing).''



''Memory serves many purposes, from allowing us to revisit and learn from past experiences to storing knowledge about the world and how things work. More broadly, a major function of memory in humans and other animals is to help ensure that our behavior fits the present situation and that we can adjust it based on experience.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Brains function according their neural architecture

It's almost as if you don't understand the first thing about information processing. Fancy that.

 

[DBT]

Brains function according their neural architecture

It's almost as if you don't understand the first thing about information processing. Fancy that.

That's quite a poor response. It's almost as if you are scraping the bottom of the barrel. Which, given that your barrel has been empty for some time, that is most likely the case.....especially with absurdities such as 'computers have consciousness and free will,'' conflating function with will, etcetera, where you have a tendency to deny the fundamentals, then assert fantastic claims such as consciousness being present in machines.

''Genetically determined circuits are the foundation of the nervous system.

1. Neuronal circuits are formed by genetic programs during embryonic development and modified through interactions with the internal and external environment.
2. Sensory circuits (sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste) bring information to the nervous system, whereas motor circuits send information to muscles and glands.
3. The simplest circuit is a reflex, in which sensory stimulus directly triggers an immediate motor response.
4. Complex responses occur when the brain integrates information from many brain circuits to generate a response.

1. Simple and complex interactions among neurons take place on time scales ranging from milliseconds to months.
2. The brain is organized to recognize sensations, initiate behaviors, and store and access memories that can last a lifetime.

The more information circuits the brain can integrate at once, the more complex its response to a scenario can be.
The simplest response is a reflex, in which sensory stimulus triggers an immediate motor response.
More complex responses are possible when the brain integrates sensory stimuli with additional forms of information, such as memory.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Says the person who is being told by multiple sources every day that they're not paying attention nor reading for comprehension... Black Knight, have fun with playing with yourself.

The existence of a circuit as a "determined structure", has NOTHING to do with whether it can implement arbitrary algorithms. It comes down to what the structure actually is, not what caused it to be as it is.

 

[DBT]

Says the person who is being told by multiple sources every day that they're not paying attention nor reading for comprehension... Black Knight, have fun with playing with yourself.

This dispute is compatibilism versus incompatibilism. As it happens that I argue for incompatibilism, I don't expect compatibilists to agree with what I say, in fact It'd be surprising if they did.

The accusation that I don't pay attention is bogus.

It's bogus because the argument is straightforward; compatibilism fails for reasons that have been explained countless times.

It is the compatibilist who skirts around the issue, blowing smokescreens to cover an inability to address the point: that inner necessity, as the non chosen state of the system at any given instance, is as much a challenge for the compatibilist definition of free will as external elements such as force, coercion, etc.

As simple as that.

So what do you think I'm not paying attention to?

The existence of a circuit as a "determined structure", has NOTHING to do with whether it can implement arbitrary algorithms. It comes down to what the structure actually is, not what caused it to be as it is.

Crock, determinism has nothing to do with 'arbitrary algorithms' in terms of decisions and actions being generated by a deterministic system, a brain.

Pay attention now, you fail to account for the definition of determinism as compatibilists define it, and you ignore its implications only to insert your own terms and conditions that imply Libertarian free will rather than compatibilism.

You are all over the place. Virtually incoherent.

 

[Jarhyn]

Crock, determinism has nothing to do with 'arbitrary algorithms'

Literally my entire position as a compatibilist is that a will IS any arbitrarily selected algorithm, and that all discussions of freedom relate to which areas of the algorithm will/may see execution.

You've got no legs, and insist on biting at kneecaps.