It's internal-indeterministic, but as some idiots think means more than it does, it does not bar super-determinism.Well, state vector reduction, or wave function collapse, is inherently indeterministic. That’s the heart of quantum indeterminism.
Everything otherwise "indeterministic".Superdeterminism is a replacement theory for quantum mechanics, championed by Sabine Hossenfelder, which states that everything was pre-arranged at the big bang. This includes the result of every single quantum experiment. It is pre-determined that we are fore-doomed to conduct each and every experiment in such a way that they falsely show QM results to be inherently indeterministic. If true, that would be the end of science, of course, because no experimental result could be trusted.
Well, it's not insane from the perspective of game design. It's a really valuable concept for people who are designing some manner of deterministic environment.Regardless of how superdeterminism impacts compatibilism, I’m just noting that the entire concept, in addition to being untestable, is insane.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".I'm not convinced.Right, but worth pointing out anyway.Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
I should amend slightly. The brain can and does often choose inputs as well as outputs. It can avoid inputs it dislikes.
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".I'm not convinced.Right, but worth pointing out anyway.Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
Huh? Did I say otherwise? This is what I’ve been saying all along. How could you possibly have missed that?“They understand that the brain as a decision maker is bound by antecedents, which does not permit alternate or 'arbitrary' actions.”That’s exactly it. The big bang replaces god.
I don't why you keep running a Strawman.
That’s what you just said. So the inescapable implication of this “argument” is the reductio that the big bang writes jazz scores. And in so doing, it just takes the place of the Calvinistic predestinationist God.
Wrong. It's not a reducto fallacy because the brain is in fact the sole agent of mind, consciousness, thought, decision making and action initiation.
The brain is you. You are the brain. The state of the brain is the state of you.
Right. Um, that’s what I’ve been saying all along.
The brain does not choice its own state or condition (examples have been given)
It does not choose inputs. It chooses outputs.
Like it or not, that is the fundamental fact of the matter.
Yeah. So?
No straw there. That’s your position laid bare.
What you always miss is that the brain’s choice making is part of the deterministic process. No jazz score writer, no jazz score.
You don't actually address my position. You habitually skirt around it. And what you do say suggests that you miss the point.
No. You are skirting around the point, again. Does the big bang write jazz scores? Yes? No?
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".I'm not convinced.Right, but worth pointing out anyway.Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
Nothing in your reply was germane to the conversation that you replied to... It wasn't discussing nor even disagreeing with definitions. Rather, it was about systems theory and the non-disprovability of superdeterminism."Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".I'm not convinced.Right, but worth pointing out anyway.Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
You miss the point even while pretending to make one.
FTFY.Outputs are determined by inputs, memory function and the non chosen state and condition of the brain, which is the non chosen state of you, your talents or weaknesses, abilities, disabilities....how you think and what you do.
FTFY.Outputs are determined by inputs, memory function and the non chosen state and condition of the brain, which is the non chosen state of you, your talents or weaknesses, abilities, disabilities....how you think and what you do.
Why you think that my lack of choice about who I am is in any way important or even vaguely relevant is a mystery.
I didn't choose to be me. But that doesn't mean that somebody or something else imposed myself on me. I am the sum of my genetics (unchosen), my physiology (mostly unchosen) and my experiences (mostly chosen). That last is an entirely internal set of decisions; They are chaotic (and so are unpredictable), and they are ME.
My descisions are, critically, largely influenced by my earlier decisions. When my earlier decisions are the most important factor in my current decision making, we say "I chose to...". When external factors are more important, we say "I had to...".
At the age of three, literally nobody could have predicted that I would choose to emigrate to Australia in my twenties. Not me, not anyone. It was MY choice. Obviously it was massively influenced by a huge range of external events; But equally obviously, the critical choices were made in and by my brain, and had to wait until all of the circumstances were right - including, but certainly not limited to, my state of mind.
Nothing in your reply was germane to the conversation that you replied to... It wasn't discussing nor even disagreeing with definitions. Rather, it was about systems theory and the non-disprovability of superdeterminism."Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".I'm not convinced.Right, but worth pointing out anyway.Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).
I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
You miss the point even while pretending to make one.
This flew entirely over your head.
That's the problem here, I think: you don't realize that "the special will" that is "the will to make decisions for yourself" specifically excludes the influence of internal conditions by its very nature.If... external conditions place constraints on free will, they must acknowledge that internal conditions also place constraints on free will
Yes. We are talking about will, not randomness. I make decisions based on stuff happening in my brain, and on inputs from my senses.internal conditions also place constraints on free will, that you must necessarily 'will' what is willed and do what is determined by elementsbeyond your access or controlin your brain.
FTFY.To label this process as 'free will' isabsurdcompatiblism.
That's great. Nobody here disagrees that that could well be true of all events in our universe.constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.