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According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

Well, state vector reduction, or wave function collapse, is inherently indeterministic. That’s the heart of quantum indeterminism.
 
Well, state vector reduction, or wave function collapse, is inherently indeterministic. That’s the heart of quantum indeterminism.
It's internal-indeterministic, but as some idiots think means more than it does, it does not bar super-determinism.

But as I keep saying, not even super-determinism, in fact NO form of determinism bars compatibilist free will because free will happens as a result of determinism under compatibilistic "free will".
 
Superdeterminism is a replacement theory for quantum mechanics, championed by Sabine Hossenfelder, which states that everything was pre-arranged at the big bang. This includes the result of every single quantum experiment. It is pre-determined that we are fore-doomed to conduct each and every experiment in such a way that they falsely show QM results to be inherently indeterministic. If true, that would be the end of science, of course, because no experimental result could be trusted.
 
It’s the “scientific” equivalent of Last Thursdayism. God exists, and created the world last Thursday, with a false record of an ancient history. Why not? That would be perfectly OK under superdeterminism.
 
Superdeterminism is a replacement theory for quantum mechanics, championed by Sabine Hossenfelder, which states that everything was pre-arranged at the big bang. This includes the result of every single quantum experiment. It is pre-determined that we are fore-doomed to conduct each and every experiment in such a way that they falsely show QM results to be inherently indeterministic. If true, that would be the end of science, of course, because no experimental result could be trusted.
Everything otherwise "indeterministic".

See also my discussion of pRNG and prerolled dice.

It doesn't, and in fact can't eliminate the process parts, the internal deterministic actions: it can't injure compatibilistic free will any more than if the world were quantim-deterministic with a known pRNG algorithm.

Dwarf Fortress (in an automated closed conception) is a handy example of a real "superdeterministic system", and it still supports the language of compatibilism: it has dice rolls, those dice rolls were pre-determinable, but this doesn't change that individual elements within the system have momentary responsibilities, "selves", wills, and boundaries of internality and externality which are actively used to determine whether something was responsible or coerced.
 
Regardless of how superdeterminism impacts compatibilism, I’m just noting that the entire concept, in addition to being untestable, is insane.
 
Regardless of how superdeterminism impacts compatibilism, I’m just noting that the entire concept, in addition to being untestable, is insane.
Well, it's not insane from the perspective of game design. It's a really valuable concept for people who are designing some manner of deterministic environment.

I would agree, however, that it's a pretty insane concept to apply in trying to understand responsibility.

My desire to understand how to make a verifiable game with strong cheat detection for example, brought me into the need to actually conceptualize superdeterminism.

So, not exactly "globally insane" or even necessarily false... It just doesn't prevent the universe itself from handling responsibilities as per compatibilism, so it isn't worthwhile to the question of compatibilistic free will.
 
And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.
Right, but worth pointing out anyway.
I'm not convinced.

Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).

I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".

Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
 
I should amend slightly. The brain can and does often choose inputs as well as outputs. It can avoid inputs it dislikes.

The function of a brain is to make decisions. Inputs are acquired by the senses, converted to nerve impulses and transmitted for distribution and processing. If the process is deterministic, as compatibilists say, the process is determined/fixed by antecedents, which is no more a matter of free will than external elements, force, coercion, undue influence, etc, acting on the brain/self.
 
And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.
Right, but worth pointing out anyway.
I'm not convinced.

Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).

I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".

Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.
 
That’s exactly it. The big bang replaces god.


I don't why you keep running a Strawman.
“They understand that the brain as a decision maker is bound by antecedents, which does not permit alternate or 'arbitrary' actions.”

That’s what you just said. So the inescapable implication of this “argument” is the reductio that the big bang writes jazz scores. And in so doing, it just takes the place of the Calvinistic predestinationist God.

Wrong. It's not a reducto fallacy because the brain is in fact the sole agent of mind, consciousness, thought, decision making and action initiation.
Huh? Did I say otherwise? This is what I’ve been saying all along. How could you possibly have missed that?

The brain is you. You are the brain. The state of the brain is the state of you.

Right. Um, that’s what I’ve been saying all along.

Sure, you just tend to overlook the implications. That we don't get to choose our own condition.

''The increments of a normal brain state is not as obvious as direct coercion, a microchip, or a tumor, but the “obviousness” is irrelevant here. Brain states incrementally get to the state they are in one moment at a time. In each moment of that process the brain is in one state, and the specific environment and biological conditions leads to the very next state. Depending on that state, this will cause you to behave in a specific way within an environment (decide in a specific way), in which all of those things that are outside of a person constantly bombard your senses changing your very brain state. The internal dialogue in your mind you have no real control over.''

The brain does not choice its own state or condition (examples have been given)

It does not choose inputs. It chooses outputs.

Outputs are determined by inputs, memory function and the non chosen state and condition of the brain, which is the non chosen state of you, your talents or weaknesses, abilities, disabilities....how you think and what you do.

Like it or not, that is the fundamental fact of the matter.

Yeah. So?
No straw there. That’s your position laid bare.

What you always miss is that the brain’s choice making is part of the deterministic process. No jazz score writer, no jazz score.

You don't actually address my position. You habitually skirt around it. And what you do say suggests that you miss the point.

No. You are skirting around the point, again. Does the big bang write jazz scores? Yes? No?

Not that again. You should know how determinism is defined by now. You gave a definition yourself. All you need to do is understand the implications of the given definition of the determinism.

''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: ''Constant conjunction.'' - Pood.

''In philosophy, constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.'' - Wiki.

What do you think this means for the notion of free will when all events are constantly conjoined? Where whatever happens must happen as determined because event A is always followed by event B and there is no alternate choice.

Where whatever happens must happen precisely as determined by its antecedents.

It's not the Big Bang that writes music in this day and age, but everything that has happened in the past, from the BB to now, that has brought the world to the point where there someone, humans, with the ability to write music.....
 
And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.
Right, but worth pointing out anyway.
I'm not convinced.

Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).

I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".

Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.

You miss the point even while pretending to make one.

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And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.
Right, but worth pointing out anyway.
I'm not convinced.

Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).

I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".

Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.

You miss the point even while pretending to make one.
Nothing in your reply was germane to the conversation that you replied to... It wasn't discussing nor even disagreeing with definitions. Rather, it was about systems theory and the non-disprovability of superdeterminism.

This flew entirely over your head.
 
Outputs are determined by inputs, memory function and the non chosen state and condition of the brain, which is the non chosen state of you, your talents or weaknesses, abilities, disabilities....how you think and what you do.
FTFY.

Why you think that my lack of choice about who I am is in any way important or even vaguely relevant is a mystery.

I didn't choose to be me. But that doesn't mean that somebody or something else imposed myself on me. I am the sum of my genetics (unchosen), my physiology (mostly unchosen) and my experiences (mostly chosen). That last is an entirely internal set of decisions; They are chaotic (and so are unpredictable), and they are ME.

My descisions are, critically, largely influenced by my earlier decisions. When my earlier decisions are the most important factor in my current decision making, we say "I chose to...". When external factors are more important, we say "I had to...".

At the age of three, literally nobody could have predicted that I would choose to emigrate to Australia in my twenties. Not me, not anyone. It was MY choice. Obviously it was massively influenced by a huge range of external events; But equally obviously, the critical choices were made in and by my brain, and had to wait until all of the circumstances were right - including, but certainly not limited to, my state of mind.
 
Outputs are determined by inputs, memory function and the non chosen state and condition of the brain, which is the non chosen state of you, your talents or weaknesses, abilities, disabilities....how you think and what you do.
FTFY.

Why you think that my lack of choice about who I am is in any way important or even vaguely relevant is a mystery.

No mystery at all. Quite simple really.

If compatibilists acknowledge - which they do - that external conditions place constraints on free will, they must acknowledge that internal conditions also place constraints on free will, that you must necessarily 'will' what is willed and do what is determined by elements beyond your access or control.

Is that free will? I'd sat it bears no resemblance to anything you can label 'free will'

But of course that won't stop believers.


I didn't choose to be me. But that doesn't mean that somebody or something else imposed myself on me. I am the sum of my genetics (unchosen), my physiology (mostly unchosen) and my experiences (mostly chosen). That last is an entirely internal set of decisions; They are chaotic (and so are unpredictable), and they are ME.

Environment acting upon the system that is the brain goes well beyond what is you. We are not only products of our genetic makeup, but also our environment and life experiences, where we were born, our circumstances, etc.

To label this process as 'free will' is absurd.


My descisions are, critically, largely influenced by my earlier decisions. When my earlier decisions are the most important factor in my current decision making, we say "I chose to...". When external factors are more important, we say "I had to...".

At the age of three, literally nobody could have predicted that I would choose to emigrate to Australia in my twenties. Not me, not anyone. It was MY choice. Obviously it was massively influenced by a huge range of external events; But equally obviously, the critical choices were made in and by my brain, and had to wait until all of the circumstances were right - including, but certainly not limited to, my state of mind.


Determinism isn't a matter of decisions being 'largely influenced.' Determinism, ss defined, means that all actions are fixed at every point in time, where earlier decisions set current decisions, which set future decisions.

As Pood has it; ''Just what I said it means, and what Hume said it means: ''Constant conjunction.'' - Pood.

The consequences of constant conjunction being;

''constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.'' - Wiki.

No influence, just inevitability.

Inevitable actions are not freely willed actions.
 
And, of course, it’s really not fundamentally deterministic. It’s fundamentally quantum indeterministic.
Quite possibly true but totally irrelevant to the compatibilist free will debate.
Right, but worth pointing out anyway.
I'm not convinced.

Quantum indeterminacy has no bearing on compatibilist free will and neither will it change the minds of hard determinists (I don't know of any who would concede free will even if it could be 'proved/demonstrated' that the universe wasn't really deterministic).

I think there's a danger that it just confuses the issue.
Yeah, the hard determinist always has "pRNG state vector determinism" to fall back on because as I have said before "all probabilistic systems can be modeled with a deterministic one wherein the probabilistic collapse is 'just so'".

Once more; determinism is defined the same way in compatibilism and incompatibilism. The issue is whether the notion of free will is compatible with determinism as it is defined.
"Whoosh" was the sound the discussion made when it went over your head.

You miss the point even while pretending to make one.
Nothing in your reply was germane to the conversation that you replied to... It wasn't discussing nor even disagreeing with definitions. Rather, it was about systems theory and the non-disprovability of superdeterminism.

This flew entirely over your head.

All you do is whine.

You lost credibility when you claimed that computers are conscious and have free will, where function is equivalent to will and computers have mind and will of their own.

Obviously, coming from that position, you are going to feel misunderstood. Not surprising. It's to be expected.

But keep trying.

Maybe you can try to explain how your notion of computer mind and will is possible? As it stands, you are playing the semantic shuffle, a word game based on equivocation. Shallow and meaningless....yet if it keeps you happy, floats your boat, brings meaning to your life, go for it. Who am I to stand in the way of your happiness. :rolleyesa:
 
If... external conditions place constraints on free will, they must acknowledge that internal conditions also place constraints on free will
That's the problem here, I think: you don't realize that "the special will" that is "the will to make decisions for yourself" specifically excludes the influence of internal conditions by its very nature.

Those internal conditions cannot constrain that will, because the will being discussed by it is specifically "that only the internal bits constrain behavior in any given moment"

How would "only the internal bits meaningfully acting to constrain behavior" constrain "the will that only the internal bits momentarily act such to constrain behavior"?

The fact is, you bang on and on about the brain being an information processor but seem entirely disinterested and outright ignorant of how information processing systems process information.
 
internal conditions also place constraints on free will, that you must necessarily 'will' what is willed and do what is determined by elements beyond your access or control in your brain.
Yes. We are talking about will, not randomness. I make decisions based on stuff happening in my brain, and on inputs from my senses.
To label this process as 'free will' is absurd compatiblism.
FTFY.

We already know that you (incorrectly) consider compatiblism to be absurd; But you might want to note that shreiking "It's absurd! It's absurd", does not, even when dressed up in flowery prose, constitute an argument, nor evidence, for your position.

Humans are absurd. They make decisions, in accordance with their experiences, senses, and memories. It matters not one whit whether this will of theirs is deterministic, as long as it is both unpredictable and entirely their own, it is their own free will.

It justifies their punishment for bad decisions, and their reward for good ones. People are the decisions they make.
 
constant conjunction is a relationship between two events, where one event is invariably followed by the other: if the occurrence of A is always followed by B, A and B are said to be constantly conjoined.
That's great. Nobody here disagrees that that could well be true of all events in our universe.

The problem for hard determinists is that it's not useful to know that A always leads to B, unless we know what A is with sufficient precision to determine what B is.

And we don't and can't.

We cannot even solve the three body problem*. Whether or not the universe is completely deterministic, it does NOT follow that it is predictable.

A human brain makes decisions; The ONLY way to predict those decisions is to wait for them to happen.





*I will go out on a limb, here, and suggest that, although I don't have any idea how many neurons (or atoms, or sub-atomic particles), you have in your brain, the number in all cases is likely greater than three.
 
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