According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[BSilvEsq]

But do keep citing Google AI. Which is not to say that Google AI is wrong, which would be — what? An ad LLM fallacy? — only that it is just stealing stuff off the internet and is empirically unreliable.

It would be an ad LLM fallacy. I like that formulation. I have elsewhere acknowledged the lack of authority of the AI explanation. As you note, however, the fact that Google AI could be wrong does not make it wrong. The AI post does contradict the unsupported assertion of Jarhyn, so we are faced with two conflicting assertions that could both be wrong or one could be right. But I think it is safe to say they cannot both be right if they are contradictory, which is the ultimate point of my original post about Compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

As expected, a claim of proof without the proof, itself -- just a naked claim.

Oh for the love of fuck, if you can't read and understand the post about Spectres and Hats and aperiodic systems with momentary transforms based on the expanding inclusion of tiles as they were in the expanding cone of light, I don't know what else you will accept!

It seems you didn't even read my claims to see the proof.

Google AI, powered by Gemini 2.5 claims otherwise

Hahaha!!

And I have a ChatGPT that might disagree with you!

My point with being able to understand a basic syntax error was missed, I guess.

the flatland Spectre/Game-of-Life concept illustrates that Free Will is an illusion within a truly deterministic closed set

As was stated by others, argument from..AI will get you nowhere. Then, I haven't used AI to actually describe your modal fallacy, just to test whether something dumber than a human child was smart enough to understand it just from seeing the words after discussing some set theory principles.

an artificial assertion of proof with an artificial counter-authority

You clearly either didn't read it or didn't understand it, and you keep on injecting your Radical Fatalism.

The fact is that unless you actually discuss the possibility of a difference between radical fatalism and determinism, given the ubiquitous conflation of determinism with Radical Fatalism in the literature, you're tempting it to make the same mistake you and DBT make for the same reasons (because it's an easy mistake to make).

Determinism involves absolute necessity of a future action that cannot occur other than it will / does occur

And in doing so, you commit a modal fallacy.

How many times do we need to beat around that bush?

I pointed out a process which would, necessarily, if made to run somehow, yield a fully deterministic block universe of a finite patch size, given an aperiodic field patch of sufficient size.

That's not really negotiable; it's right there in the post that you clearly didn't read or even think about and now you're asking for proof like a child who swept the thing they broke under the rug.

 

[pood]

The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.

The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way. That is neither here nor there with respect to the argument I am advancing -- which, again, is simply an argument about the logical consequences of presuming the existence of a perfectly deterministic universe, and not an assertion that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic (which may or may not be the case).

I am not arguing that the mere fact that someone did something means that they could not have done differently. To draw that conclusion from that premise would, in fact be a modal fallacy. Actually, it would be an even greater fallacy of arguing a conclusion from a single premise.

What I am arguing is the following:


Premise 1.1: Determinism, to be true, requires that all activity, including human cognition, is, at all times and in all places, inexorably determined by antecedent activity such that any given activity, including human cognition, cannot be anything other than it is (and was so before it even occurred).

Premise 1.2: Free Will, to be true, requires that a human being have the capacity to act (or, at least, to decide to act) in a manner that is not inexorably determined by antecedent activity.

Conclusion 1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.


Conclusion 1 / Premise 2.1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.

Premise 2.2: Compatibilism, to be valid, requires that Determinism and Free Will can both be true at the same time (and in the same universe).

Conclusion 2: Compatibilism is not valid.

Again, I am not arguing that it is a fact that any act could not have been different before it occurs based on the fact that it does occur. I am arguing only that hypothesizing it to be true that an act could not have been different than it occurred simply because it did, in fact, occur, necessarily leads to the conclusion that Free Will (as opposed to the illusion of Free Will) does not exist. And to be clear, the premise of determinism is for all worlds and all times, so it is not an argument that the conclusion fails based on a allacy that the conclusion fails to take into account other worlds and/or times.

I don’t really feel Iike wading through all this tonight. i may do so tomorrow.

But I’d say, even if your argument is valid, is it sound?

I’d particularly right away question P1, though I might have objections to other presmises as well.

Also, are there any enthymematic premises?

 

[steve_bank]

It was fate that BsilEsq and Pood would meet on this forum.

They have no choice but to contend, neither side can have been anything else.

It was fated before they were born.

 

[pood]

It was fate that BsilEsq and Pood would meet on this forum.

They have no choice but to contend, neither side can have been anything else.

It was fated before they were born.

Nah, Simply a matter of contingency. Coulda been otherwise,

 

[BSilvEsq]

The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.

The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way. That is neither here nor there with respect to the argument I am advancing -- which, again, is simply an argument about the logical consequences of presuming the existence of a perfectly deterministic universe, and not an assertion that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic (which may or may not be the case).

I am not arguing that the mere fact that someone did something means that they could not have done differently. To draw that conclusion from that premise would, in fact be a modal fallacy. Actually, it would be an even greater fallacy of arguing a conclusion from a single premise.

What I am arguing is the following:


Premise 1.1: Determinism, to be true, requires that all activity, including human cognition, is, at all times and in all places, inexorably determined by antecedent activity such that any given activity, including human cognition, cannot be anything other than it is (and was so before it even occurred).

Premise 1.2: Free Will, to be true, requires that a human being have the capacity to act (or, at least, to decide to act) in a manner that is not inexorably determined by antecedent activity.

Conclusion 1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.


Conclusion 1 / Premise 2.1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.

Premise 2.2: Compatibilism, to be valid, requires that Determinism and Free Will can both be true at the same time (and in the same universe).

Conclusion 2: Compatibilism is not valid.

Again, I am not arguing that it is a fact that any act could not have been different before it occurs based on the fact that it does occur. I am arguing only that hypothesizing it to be true that an act could not have been different than it occurred simply because it did, in fact, occur, necessarily leads to the conclusion that Free Will (as opposed to the illusion of Free Will) does not exist. And to be clear, the premise of determinism is for all worlds and all times, so it is not an argument that the conclusion fails based on a allacy that the conclusion fails to take into account other worlds and/or times.

I don’t really feel Iike wading through all this tonight. i may do so tomorrow.

But I’d say, even if your argument is valid, is it sound?

I’d particularly right away question P1, though I might have objections to other presmises as well.

Also, are there any enthymematic premises?

Thanks for that reply.

I am not asserting that premise 1.1 is sound or true or correlates to reality (to the extent there is such a thing). It is, however, the conceptual definition of the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism, as articulated by Popper and others. The definition of a paradigm is not, itself, susceptible to proof, because it is not the assertion of an empirical fact. Rather, it is simply a starting point for drawing logical conclusions that flow from acceptance of the premise. As such, for the sake of testing the logic of the argument about the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, it is necessary to accept the definitional premises of the two concepts.

The enthymematic premises are the validity of the rules of logic, and the meanings of words. For example, there is an unstated premise that something cannot be both true and not true, and that the word "false" is interchangeable with the words "not true." If there are other unstated assumptions that feed into the stated conclusions, I am not aware of them, but I am open to learning what I am missing.

As I stated from the start, the purpose of my post is to test the validity of the conclusion that the existence of Free Will (as defined) cannot be harmonized with the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism (also as defined) -- no more and no less. I am not advocating a view of reality. I am simply challenging the assertion that Free Will can be harmonized with Determinism if you accept the stated definitions of the three concepts. My contention is that the Free Will (as defined) and Determinism (as defined) cannot be reconciled. I have not claimed anything else.

 

[pood]

Somehow I am getting a notification that I am ignoring content by @BSilvEsq . I had no intention of doing that but don’t know how to undo it. Can a mod please help?

 

[pood]

I figured it out.

 

[pood]

The idea that you could not have acted differently after the act has occurred is a modal fallacy. Which means you could have acted differently before the act occurred.

One must not conflate contingency with necessity.

The modal fallacy is in assuming that one could not have acted differently based on the fact that one did, in fact, act in a specific way. That is neither here nor there with respect to the argument I am advancing -- which, again, is simply an argument about the logical consequences of presuming the existence of a perfectly deterministic universe, and not an assertion that the universe is, in fact, perfectly deterministic (which may or may not be the case).

I am not arguing that the mere fact that someone did something means that they could not have done differently. To draw that conclusion from that premise would, in fact be a modal fallacy. Actually, it would be an even greater fallacy of arguing a conclusion from a single premise.

What I am arguing is the following:


Premise 1.1: Determinism, to be true, requires that all activity, including human cognition, is, at all times and in all places, inexorably determined by antecedent activity such that any given activity, including human cognition, cannot be anything other than it is (and was so before it even occurred).

Premise 1.2: Free Will, to be true, requires that a human being have the capacity to act (or, at least, to decide to act) in a manner that is not inexorably determined by antecedent activity.

Conclusion 1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.


Conclusion 1 / Premise 2.1: Free Will is false if Determinism is true.

Premise 2.2: Compatibilism, to be valid, requires that Determinism and Free Will can both be true at the same time (and in the same universe).

Conclusion 2: Compatibilism is not valid.

Again, I am not arguing that it is a fact that any act could not have been different before it occurs based on the fact that it does occur. I am arguing only that hypothesizing it to be true that an act could not have been different than it occurred simply because it did, in fact, occur, necessarily leads to the conclusion that Free Will (as opposed to the illusion of Free Will) does not exist. And to be clear, the premise of determinism is for all worlds and all times, so it is not an argument that the conclusion fails based on a allacy that the conclusion fails to take into account other worlds and/or times.

I don’t really feel Iike wading through all this tonight. i may do so tomorrow.

But I’d say, even if your argument is valid, is it sound?

I’d particularly right away question P1, though I might have objections to other presmises as well.

Also, are there any enthymematic premises?

Thanks for that reply.

I am not asserting that premise 1.1 is sound or true or correlates to reality (to the extent there is such a thing). It is, however, the conceptual definition of the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism, as articulated by Popper and others. The definition of a paradigm is not, itself, susceptible to proof, because it is not the assertion of an empirical fact. Rather, it is simply a starting point for drawing logical conclusions that flow from acceptance of the premise. As such, for the sake of testing the logic of the argument about the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, it is necessary to accept the definitional premises of the two concepts.

The enthymematic premises are the validity of the rules of logic, and the meanings of words. For example, there is an unstated premise that something cannot be both true and not true, and that the word "false" is interchangeable with the words "not true." If there are other unstated assumptions that feed into the stated conclusions, I am not aware of them, but I am open to learning what I am missing.

As I stated from the start, the purpose of my post is to test the validity of the conclusion that the existence of Free Will (as defined) cannot be harmonized with the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism (also as defined) -- no more and no less. I am not advocating a view of reality. I am simply challenging the assertion that Free Will can be harmonized with Determinism if you accept the stated definitions of the three concepts. My contention is that the Free Will (as defined) and Determinism (as defined) cannot be reconciled. I have not claimed anything else.

Too tired to respond in my time zone. Probably the reason I inadvertently put you on ignore and made a couple of other errors. See you tomorrow as I have time. Have a good night!

 

[pood]

If determinism will let you have a good night,

 

[BSilvEsq]

If determinism will let you have a good night,

So far, so good.

 

[DBT]

It was fate that BsilEsq and Pood would meet on this forum.

They have no choice but to contend, neither side can have been anything else.

It was fated before they were born.

If deterministic, the world evolves as it must. Event unfold as they must, including brain activity and deliberation. That is how determinism is defined.

 

[pood]

If determinism will let you have a good night,

So far, so good.

I hope determinism lets you have a good night.

Me, I think my prior choices will let me have a good night or not.

 

[pood]

So far, frankly, it is not looking good,

 

[Elixir]

"an object in motion freely continues to some location unless acted upon by outside forces."

To some location? It transits infinite locations if not acted upon.

 

[Jarhyn]

DBT, the world evolves as it does, and as it will, not as it "must".

You have no justification for the "must" as we have discussed, elsewhere it is otherwise.

It is, however, the conceptual definition of the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism, as articulated by Popper and others. The definition of a paradigm is not, itself, susceptible to proof, because it is not the assertion of an empirical fact. Rather, it is simply a starting point for drawing logical conclusions that flow from acceptance of the premise. As such, for the sake of testing the logic of the argument about the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, it is necessary to accept the definitional premises of the two concepts.

And I yet again reject the premises that the block divorces from the rule, which is necessary for accepting this jankedy radical fatalism concept as if it was in any way sensible; it is not, as any attempt to describe it leads you to making a modal fallacy of the form "he couldn't because he didn't" or thereabouts.

Popper and others failed to understand this, perhaps because popper and others lived years before anyone was born who might live a lifetime and career of understanding the difference between a type and a value not merely in theory but in practice.

Of course the concept of free will doesn't make sense when you come back around to it through a logical fallacy.

And what's worse, you keep conflating mathematical determinism of the sort that might be observed in a game like Dwarf Fortress for, as I keep indicating, Radical Fatalism.

I would expect you to demonstrate to me ANY manner of actual system that identifies a true "pre-determined block" such that you can identify why it is "pre-determined" and not just "determined" or please recognize that you might have been tricked by some sophistry.

 

[pood]

There is so much freely willed noise outside our NYC place that falling asleep is hard, but I will manage.

 

[Elixir]

There is so much freely willed noise outside our NYC place that falling asleep is hard, but I will manage.

You have to will yourself to sleep.

 

[BSilvEsq]

It was fate that BsilEsq and Pood would meet on this forum.

They have no choice but to contend, neither side can have been anything else.

It was fated before they were born.

If deterministic, the world evolves as it must. Event unfold as they must, including brain activity and deliberation. That is how determinism is defined.

Thanks for saying so. Some people (even very intelligent people) have such an visceral reaction to a definition of a philosophical concept that they insist on rejecting the definition as opposed to simply stating that they believe the concept (as defined) does not correlate to reality (or, at least, the reality they believe to exist). Personally, I believe there are aspects of quantum physics that are fantastical gobblygook. But, that does not mean that I find fault in the math or other analysis used by quantum physicists to form their views.

An example that most people understand is that of religious belief. Many people (also including very intelligent people) have a belief in God -- a belief that is so strong it rises to the level of faith. I am able to have a contrary belief without denigrating the theological concept to which others subscribe. Sometimes, a person who is of a particular religion may have a misconception about the dogma of their religion. In that case, it is possible to have a dispute about the validity of the conclusions that person may draw from that person's religion, because the conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of the definitional premises established within the religion. If, however, that person should say, "OK, I appreciate that this particular religion, as defined by the religious leaders, does not include this particular belief about which we are talking, but I choose to believe it, anyway, and it then follows from my personal belief that such and such is the right thing to do." In that case, I still might seek to test whether the conclusion the person has drawn from their stated variation of the religion logically follows, but I would not question the stated underlying belief from which the conclusion is drawn.

So, to come back to Determinism. As I have written very clearly, I am addressing the ramifications of acceptance of the foundational premise of the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism, as summarized very well by Karl Popper -- who fully understood the definition of the paradigm and also disagreed that it correlated to reality. Popper was able to accept, without qualification, that the truth of Determinism (if it were true) would preclude the existence of Free Will. He had no issue with the logic underlying that conclusion. Popper also disagreed that the universe was, in fact, perfectly deterministic, and he had not problem saying so. The same is true of William James -- acknowledged how the paradigm works, agreed with the conclusion that the truth of Determinism would preclude the existence of Free Will, and disagreed that the universe is perfectly deterministic.

It also is no argument against the conclusions that flow from the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism that the paradigm is misnamed and should be called radical fatalism, pre-determination, predestination, or any other term one might wish to assign a paradigm that already has a well accepted name and definition. In the American jurisprudence, many disputes arise because the English language contains multiple words that have multiple meanings, which is a phenomenon known as polysemy. As Led Zeppelin wrote: "There's a sign on the wall, but she wants to be sure 'cause you know sometimes words have two meanings." Sometimes, the multiple definitions of a word are even contradictory. Such a word is called a contranym. Take the word "resign" for example. It means both (i) to quit, and (ii) to agree to again be bound by an expiring agreement. As I have explained multiple times, my posts about the metaphysical paradigm called Determinism are not, and are not intended to be, posts about Newtonian Determinism, which is a concept within the realm of physics. The metaphysical paradigm of Determinism and Newtonian Determinism are similar, but they are not identical. As such, when I argue that the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism and the notion of Free Will cannot be logically harmonized by compatibilism, it is no answer to explain how Free Will can exist within Newtonian Determinism and/or to argue that Newtonian Determinism has been displaced by Quantum Indeterminacy (an argument that is accepted by some physicists and rejected by others).

Aside from the foregoing, the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism cannot be proven true or falsified. Significantly, this is true of most, if not all, metaphysical paradigms about the ultimate nature of reality (which, itself, is a metaphysical concept). While Science rejects concepts that cannot be proved or falsified, Science, itself, is based on a metaphysical assumption about the universe that cannot be proved or falsified -- namely, the assumption that there is an empirical reality that is capable of being discerned by human (with or without the aid of scientific instrumentation).

Long story short, within philosophy / metaphysics Determinism and Free Will are incompatible, and the notion of Compatibilism is not logically sustainable. Or, as William James wrote, "“The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”

 

[DBT]

DBT, the world evolves as it does, and as it will, not as it "must".

You have no justification for the "must" as we have discussed, elsewhere it is otherwise.

It is, however, the conceptual definition of the metaphysical paradigm of Determinism, as articulated by Popper and others. The definition of a paradigm is not, itself, susceptible to proof, because it is not the assertion of an empirical fact. Rather, it is simply a starting point for drawing logical conclusions that flow from acceptance of the premise. As such, for the sake of testing the logic of the argument about the relationship between Determinism and Free Will, it is necessary to accept the definitional premises of the two concepts.

And I yet again reject the premises that the block divorces from the rule, which is necessary for accepting this jankedy radical fatalism concept as if it was in any way sensible; it is not, as any attempt to describe it leads you to making a modal fallacy of the form "he couldn't because he didn't" or thereabouts.

Popper and others failed to understand this, perhaps because popper and others lived years before anyone was born who might live a lifetime and career of understanding the difference between a type and a value not merely in theory but in practice.

Of course the concept of free will doesn't make sense when you come back around to it through a logical fallacy.

And what's worse, you keep conflating mathematical determinism of the sort that might be observed in a game like Dwarf Fortress for, as I keep indicating, Radical Fatalism.

I would expect you to demonstrate to me ANY manner of actual system that identifies a true "pre-determined block" such that you can identify why it is "pre-determined" and not just "determined" or please recognize that you might have been tricked by some sophistry.

If there are no alternate actions within a deterministic system, which is how determinism is defined, events must unfold as determined.

must
: be compelled by fate or by natural law
: be compelled by physical necessity - Merriam Webster