According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

I don't think I asked you for examples of anything

You specifically stated that all philosophy on such subjects should come with concrete examples.

The game is a concrete example.

I am not asking for you to play it to have fun; you MIGHT have fun, but all the icons are so very tiny that you might have a hard time.

The reason I suggest it is because it is exactly as I said: an example of all of these concepts of this thread laid bare.

The fact that someone has engineered a computer game that has the appearance of producing results that are not fatalistic (within the programming of the game) does not prove anything. Personally, I am skeptical of the assertion that the results of the game are not entirely deterministic in a fatalistic manner within the game, but that is of no moment to the issue under discussion, which is involves the way the universe operates. The foundational premise of a fatalistic future is impervious to proof or falsification, and no computer game can even approach providing such proof -- even if the structure of the game is sufficiently complex to appear to produce non-fatalistic results.

Nobody is arguing that our world is sufficiently simple that every future activity can be predicted -- even with perfect knowledge and unlimited computational power. Indeed, I have stated that I doubt the future can be perfectly predicted -- even theoretically. But, predictability and fate are two different concepts.

Again, I am not arguing that the universe does, in fact, operate in a fatalistic manner. It may or may not do so. If the universe does not act in fatalistic manner, that is the case without regard to what anyone might believe or feel. The same is true of the universe does operate in a fatalistic manner. The universe either does or does not operate that way. There is no way to prove or disprove either hypothesis, and a video game certainly does not approach doing so.

The best logical analysis we have shows that the universe does not operate in a fatalistic manner.

Moreover, quantum mechanics shows that some results are indeterministic. It’s fascinating how the ancient Greeks anticipated this with the swerve argument.

 

[pood]

Mad props to the ancient Greeks. They technically got a lot of stuff wrong but they were on to a lot of stuff, too, without the benefit of our modern knowledge base.

 

[BSilvEsq]

@BSilvEsq perhaps you would like to address my latest poss.

I think we have now said the same thing in different ways multiple times, and further back and forth is not worthwhile.

No amount of logic can factually refute an assertion of any foundational premise. Logic can only be used to show that a foundational premise results in a self-contradiction (if it does). That is the point of Godel's incompleteness theorems. Nonetheless, your posts repeatedly assert that the foundational premise of fatalism involves a fallacy. That does not compute.

If you have free will, you are free to reject the foundational premise of fatalism as hogwash. If you lack free will, and you purport to refute the premise of fatalism, you do so because you lack the freedom to do otherwise.

The sea battle argument does not include a foundational premise of fatalism. It is an effort to show that other premises do not support a logical conclusion of fatalism. Thus, the sea battle argument, like the idle argument, is a non sequitur with respect to the assertion you repeatedly make that the foundational premise of fatalism involves a fallacy. Stated differently, the argument that the sea battle argument establishes the fallacy of the foundational premise of fatalism is, itself, a fallacious argument.

You are plainly an intelligent and educated person. You also plainly have a strong affinity to what you feel to be your free will. That is all good. But nothing you have posted provides falsification of the foundational premise of fatalism, and any such falsification is theoretically impossible, as is proof of the truth of the premise.

I hope you enjoy your beer volcano from the Flying Spaghetti Monster in the afterlife.

 

[pood]

@BSilvEsq perhaps you would like to address my latest poss.

I think we have now said the same thing in different ways multiple times, and further back and forth is not worthwhile.

No amount of logic can factually refute an assertion of any foundational premise. Logic can only be used to show that a foundational premise results in a self-contradiction (if it does). That is the point of Godel's incompleteness theorems. Nonetheless, your posts repeatedly assert that the foundational premise of fatalism involves a fallacy. That does not compute.

Again, I do not state any such foundational premise. I show that fatalism is refuted as a derived result of simple logic. There is no foundational premise here, unless one considers logic a foundational premise.

If you have free will, you are free to reject the foundational premise of fatalism as hogwash. If you lack free will, and you purport to refute the premise of fatalism, you do so because you lack the freedom to do otherwise.

This does not address the point of the refutation of fatalism. I have shown that the arguments to theological and epistemic fatalism run afoul of modal logic, as does the appeal to causal determinism.

The sea battle argument does not include a foundational premise of fatalism.

Sure it does. That is exactly why Aristotle tried to resolve it by positing that propositions do not become true until the time that the events they describe occur. But modal logic shows that this solution is not necessary, thus undercutting the fear of fatalism.

It is an effort to show that other premises do not support a logical conclusion of fatalism. Thus, the sea battle argument, like the idle argument, is a non sequitur with respect to the assertion you repeatedly make that the foundational premise of fatalism involves a fallacy. Stated differently, the argument that the sea battle argument establishes the fallacy of the foundational premise of fatalism is, itself, a fallacious argument.

I don’t know what the above is supposed to mean.

You are plainly an intelligent and educated person. You also plainly have a strong affinity to what you feel to be your free will. That is all good. But nothing you have posted provides falsification of the foundational premise of fatalism, and any such falsification is theoretically impossible, as is proof of the truth of the premise.

I gave you two modal logical refutations of theological and epistemic fatalism. You have failed to address either. Got it. This has nothing to do with my affinity for anything, It seems it has more to do with your inability to meet an argument,

 

[pood]

BTW, as a lawyer, do you agree with Darrow’s defense of his clients that they had no moral responsibility for what they did because … determinism??

I know, I know, IF determinism is true. But even if it is true Darrow’s argument does not go through.

Are you a defense lawyer? Do you use Darrow’s argument? If so, does it work?

 

[BSilvEsq]

Again, I do not state any such foundational premise. I show that fatalism is refuted as a derived result of simple logic. There is no foundational premise here, unless one considers logic a foundational premise.

Exactly -- you "do not assert any such foundational premise." I do assert that premise for the sake of argument. And my point is that no amount of logic can refute or invalidate that premise -- just as you say that your hypothetical Flying Spaghetti Monster cannot be invalidated or refuted.

I have shown that the arguments to theological and epistemic fatalism run afoul of modal logic, as does the appeal to causal determinism.

You may or may not have shown that "arguments" in support of fatalism run afoul of modal logic. Again, however, that is not the issue. Without regard to whether your posts refute arguments that purport to establish fatalism as a conclusion, that is not the issue here, as I have now said multiple times. Rather, the issue is whether you have posted anything that falsifies fatalism as a foundational premise -- and you have not done so, and cannot do so because it is not theoretically possible to do so.

This has nothing to do with my affinity for anything, It seems it has more to do with your inability to meet an argument,

Your last sentence is why I previously decided to stop replying to you, and is now the reason why I will stop doing so going forward.

Good day.

 

[BSilvEsq]

BTW, as a lawyer, do you agree with Darrow’s defense of his clients that they had no moral responsibility for what they did because … determinism??

I know, I know, IF determinism is true. But even if it is true Darrow’s argument does not go through.

Are you a defense lawyer? Do you use Darrow’s argument? If so, does it work?

I am not a criminal defense lawyer. I do represent both plaintiffs and defendants in civil disputes. As I previously posted, the legal precedents uniformly reject that defense, and there is no point is putting forth a losing argument simply because it makes sense. The law is about applying legal principles, and not about truth.

For the foregoing reasons, I do not argue Determinism as a defense. I do, however, seek to explain my clients' actions based on antecedent and surrounding circumstances, which is both effective and realistic, and which many lawyers do not do.

As a student of philosophy, however, I do appreciate Darrow's argument.

I previously posted about this subject in post #1221, which can be found at https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ill-does-not-exist.27739/page-62#post-1316668

 

[Elixir]

"do you agree with Darrow’s defense of his clients that they had no moral responsibility for what they did because … determinism??"
Absolutely not.
You were determined to make that specious argument, and your scumbag clients were determined to remain guilty. Get over it Clarence. Be happy with the execution stays you earned.

Hard determinism has to include neural functions as well as overt actions.

 

[pood]

Your honor, sure I killed my parents, but now I’m an orphan, so have mercy on me!

Your honor, sure I killed my parents, but I’m a Christian and Satan possessed my soul, so have mercy on me!

Your honor, sure I killed my parents, but I’m a hard determinist and the Big Bang made me do it, so have mercy on me!

 

[BSilvEsq]

"do you agree with Darrow’s defense of his clients that they had no moral responsibility for what they did because … determinism??"
Absolutely not.
You were determined to make that specious argument, and your scumbag clients were determined to remain guilty. Get over it Clarence. Be happy with the execution stays you earned.

Hard determinism has to include neural functions as well as overt actions.

That is the point of a relatively famous parable about Zeno of Citium, the founder of Greek Stoicism. According to legend:

"Zeno built his philosophy of apatheia on a determinism which a later Stoic, Chrysippus, found it hard to distinguish from Oriental iatalism. When Zeno, who did not believe in slavery, was beating his slave for some offense, his slave pleaded, in mitigation, that by his master’s own philosophy he had been destined from all eternity to commit this fault; to which Zeno replied, with the calm of a sage, that on the same philosophy he, Zeno, had been destined to beat him for it."

Will Durant, “The History of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophersof the Western World,” at 76 (1926) (First Simon & Schuster Paperback Ed. 2005).

 

[pood]

Again, I do not state any such foundational premise. I show that fatalism is refuted as a derived result of simple logic. There is no foundational premise here, unless one considers logic a foundational premise.

Exactly -- you "do not assert any such foundational premise." I do assert that premise for the sake of argument. And my point is that no amount of logic can refute or invalidate that premise -- just as you say that your hypothetical Flying Spaghetti Monster cannot be invalidated or refuted.

I have shown that the arguments to theological and epistemic fatalism run afoul of modal logic, as does the appeal to causal determinism.

You may or may not have shown that "arguments" in support of fatalism run afoul of modal logic. Again, however, that is not the issue. Without regard to whether your posts refute arguments that purport to establish fatalism as a conclusion, that is not the issue here, as I have now said multiple times. Rather, the issue is whether you have posted anything that falsifies fatalism as a foundational premise -- and you have not done so, and cannot do so because it is not theoretically possible to do so.

This has nothing to do with my affinity for anything, It seems it has more to do with your inability to meet an argument,

Your last sentence is why I previously decided to stop replying to you, and is now the reason why I will stop doing so going forward.

Good day.

No, you decide to stop replying to me because you are not able to meet my arguments,

I hope you are a better lawyer than philosopher, because you are lousy at the latter.

 

[Jarhyn]

The fact is, we can directly observe a *logically possible world*, and there is nothing fatalistic going on about it unless you assume some sort of super-fatalism.

Ultimately, fatalism is faith based claim, and I think now this has been revealed well and truly to be the case.

Like any unfalsifiable claim of hidden complexity, I will file it away with all the others to which I am not a believer of or in.

If we're going to pretend that even creating a system where we can observe a deterministic system is insufficient to declare that there are many possible worlds which are not fatalistic which will only end up one way, and which there are multiple observable ways in which it could have been otherwise, and observably so.

It just also exposes that "in the same time and place" isn't really sensible language.

It's a logically possible world that isn't fatal. Therefore it's logically possible for the world to not be fatal, so assuming it is is a huge jump in complexity. It's faith of exactly the sort I sought to rid myself of.

 

[Jarhyn]

The fact is, we can directly observe a *logically possible world*, and there is nothing fatalistic going on about it unless you assume some sort of super-fatalism.

Ultimately, fatalism is faith based claim, and I think now this has been revealed well and truly to be the case.

Like any unfalsifiable claim of hidden complexity, I will file it away with all the others to which I am not a believer of or in.

If we're going to pretend that even creating a system where we can observe a deterministic system is insufficient to declare that there are many possible worlds which are not fatalistic which will only end up one way, and which there are multiple observable ways in which it could have been otherwise, and observably so.

It just also exposes that "in the same time and place" isn't really sensible language.

It's a logically possible world that isn't fatal. Therefore it's logically possible for the world to not be fatal, so assuming it is is a huge jump in complexity. It's faith of exactly the sort I sought to rid myself of.

Moreover, every discussion I have seen to fore about trying to describe fatalism has always resulted in a contradiction being uttered.

Funny, that.

So presenting fatalism without uttering contradictions, and then assuming that can be done, believing that this universe is that much more complicated thing, and that we aren't already somehow evolved to on large scales resist malarkey at small scales involving any backwards component... That seems like a lot of stuff I have yet to see anyone demonstrate.

It's... A really far goalpost, but it's there planted in solid ground. Way way way over there, behind what MAY be a wall of infinite height. I certainly haven't seen the top.

But it's there, a goalpost that, assuming that wall has a top, could be cleared.

At one point I did imagine a way that certain quantum phenomena might operate that's vaguely fatalistic?

I might imagine that some entangled particle is split. Then, somewhere in the universe, there is the first place where the probability waves of both particles meet, exactly at the same strength when one of the two collapses, and sends a shockwave back along the trajectory in reverse through time to the other end and fixes some aspect of how it behaves, as the only particle in the universe that it can make contact with on that backwards trajectory through time is the particle that it's tracing back along a "probability wave".

The issue is that this phenomena does not let us observe it except potentially through the implications on gravity at large scales due to interactions; it would be a "dark" mass, and depending on how many uncollapsed entanglements that may exist at great distances, that might be a very large mass as well. Maybe they can be caught, and this forces the sudden death of an entanglement elsewhere?

But even if this is the case, and time is... Spikey? It can still be resolved, and doesn't violate causality in the relativistic sense. It just means that sometimes when something spits two identical particles or where two long lived identical particles create the disruption that allows a third interaction to take place, it sometimes happens because something earlier had something very weird happen there (an entanglement).

It also means that we can probably find where in the past certain events happened? That would be cool, though it wouldn't necessarily tell us where in the future they will happen unless we control things through the past into the present where we would detect it and track the sudden appearance of the collision event that was enabled by being at the Nexus of some potential collision.

What would be more bizarre is if the photons themselves could only collapse to those directions as a probability wave because they also met at that point, completing the event?

That doesn't create fate of the sort that tells us that we can't make decisions for ourselves as what we are in the moment... It just means there would be some very bizarre ways events get resolved. The past would still determine the future, but the future would also be constrained at any given location to the future that works with the past... But we already knew the future has to be one that accords with and is driven by the past.

 

[DBT]

if the trajectory of an object is determined there can be nothing to constrain it.

Do you not understand Newton's second law and what momentum is? These are simply just different perspectives on the nature of momentum.

You already even admitted it's a perfectly valid perspective.

Because... Its a discussion about the fact that forces were imparted and where they came from specifically.

Here's a clue;

Albert Einstein: "If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man’s illusion that he was acting according to his own free will."

Einstein wrote, "In human freedom in the philosophical sense I am definitely a disbeliever. Everyone acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity. Schopenhauer's saying, that 'a man can do as he will, but not will as he will' has been an inspiration to me since my youth up."

''Man does at all times only what he wills, and yet he does this necessarily. But this is because he already is what he wills.'' -Arthur Schopenhauer

 

[DBT]

Not a hope of that happening

And this is why we know you are here in bad faith.

You have zero intentions of changing your views no matter how rational they are or are not. They are religious beliefs for you, not rational ones.

Bad faith? No. There is no chance of me becoming a compatibilist because I see the fatal flaw in its definition and argument. Which results in, as in the words of William James, a quagmire of deception.

Antecedent conditions determine current states.

Determined actions are, by definition, not freely chosen actions.

The decision-making process within neural networks is determined by the state and condition of the system in any given instance in time.

State and condition is not freely chosen or willed.

Will is not a regulator or conductor within the system and plays no part in what decision is made in any given instance in time, hence will cannot be defined as free.

The idea of free will in relation to a determined system is an illusion

 

[Jarhyn]

And this, folks, is why we call him religious. He literally admits there is no flaw, that compatibilism offers iron clad definitions, the guy he claims agrees with him and who he claims to agree with agrees to as much...

And then he goes on to disagree with himself and start claiming that now there are flaws because we don't make modal errors.

This, Bruce, is why I begged you to disabuse him of this rather than to claim he agrees with us but no, you just can't seem to understand it yourself.

This is why I discussed the difference between DBT's fatalism, and compatibilism's determinism, and pointed out how all the words make sense and none of it needs to happen "at the same place and time" and how all the language works out as I describe when run in a concrete model.

The problem here is that almost universally when discussing this with a fatalist or a libertarian, it is exposed that this is a subject they attached to to sound smart rather than to one they attached themselves to because they thought something might be wrong about the conversation.

At least we have gotten through the most recent iteration of exposing it as a religious belief for Bruce's sake, but we're still having trouble disabusing DBT of his fatalism.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

What will be, WILL be ... is a tautology

Things just ARE the way they are

Essentially, these are the same tautology just expressed from different perspectives. The ARE tautology can refer either to any present or to all of static spacetime.

P1 Past, present and future are fixed and unalterable. This is derived from the evidence of relativity theory and Minkowski’s block world mathematical formulation of it.

This is an eternalism which applies both to determinists who hold to a static spacetime as well as a non-static spacetime. The determinism put forth by BSilvEsq seems wholly compatible with both of those sorts of eternalism, although his apparently preferred expressive perspective is that of the non-static internal to spacetime viewpoint. Differences in expression necessarily arise when the perspective changes from one that is imagined as outside of spacetime to one from within spacetime.

As Herman Weyl says: "The objective world simply is, it does not happen." But then he immediately adds, "Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time."

From within spacetime, the determinism at issue (whether that determinism is physicalism, materialism, naturalism, or what have you) holds that all of those perceived changes are physical, and all of those changes are presumed to occur inexorably and in full accord with the so-called laws of physics such that all which appears to happen is always already determined without there being any possibility of deviation from the determinateness effected by the identified laws (certainly at the macrophysical level).

There does not appear to be any disagreement between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist determinists with regards to this understanding - even if static spacetime proponents might think that the non-static spacetime laws regarding change are actually illusions, since, from the static spacetime perspective, nothing happens.

P2 Compatibilism holds that my will is free insofar as it is not balked by external factors (it cannot be balked by internal factors because internal factors just are me).

As I previously noted, incompatibilist determinists have the compatibilist experience of feeling free when they act in accord with their own desires/wishes. Also as I previously noted, this sense of being free is a sense of being free-from external coercion/control.

C Compatibilism is compatible with the Minkowski block world and so free will holds.

This conclusion is certainly correct with regards to the "free[-from] will", and the free-from will is similarly compatible with the viewpoint which holds to a non-static spacetime which is always determined despite there being happenings that actually occur.

So, on occasion, humans have the experience of being free-from external coercion/control. But some humans on some occasions also have the sense of spacetime not being always determined. Some humans on some occasions have the sense of there being indeterminateness at the macrophysical level. It is this indeterminateness which provides the sense that persons are free-to determine - that is to say settle - which way spacetime is to be determined. Alternatively and more precisely, the sense of there being indeterminateness would indicate occasions at which the processing or the momentum of spacetime could be interrupted. This being free-to is clearly dependent on persons being free-from external coercion/control; being free-from is necessary for this being free-to.

This indeterminateness - if actual - would be sufficient to eradicate the determinism possibility.

However, all forms of determinism deny that there is ever the indeterminateness which is necessary for a person to be free-to.

The compatibilist determininsts identify being free with being free-from external coercion/control; the incompatiblist determinists (seem to, or could) insist that there is more to the sense of being free than being free-from external coercion/control; the incompatiblists (seem to, or could) focus on the conditions necessary for being free-to, and they note that the indeterminateness necessary for being free-to is incompatible with determinism since determinism denies that there is ever such macrophysical indeterminateness. It is in the sense of free-to that persons are not free under the determinism rubric.

Incompatibilist determinists most commonly express the denial of there being macrophysical indeterminateness in terms of the so-called laws of physics. These so-called laws are supposed to be sufficient for precluding any macrophysical indeterminateness, and this leads to the thought of these so-called laws as controlling what humans do. However, many of these same determinists will accede to regarding the laws of physics as descriptive rather than prescriptive, in which case it makes less sense (or no sense) to insist that the laws do any actual controlling.

And, yet, whether the so-called laws are prescriptive or descriptive, determinists of the incompatibilist and the compatibilist varieties agree that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness subject to being determined by human acts. And this is to say that the incompatibilist determinist viewpoint can be expressed without reference to coercion or control, and their focus upon being free-to as incompatible with determinism is in no way supplanted by compatibilism, since it is not necessary that free be identified only with free-from to the exclusion of the free-to.

This being the case, the incompatibilist determinists object to compatibilist determinists arbitrarily restricting free to the sense of free-from.

 

[Jarhyn]

The ARE tautology can refer either to any present or to all of static spacetime

Except it can't, because then you still have "all of static spacetime as compared to all of other static spacetimes."

Things will be as they will be, but only as things may be, and only where they happen to be so.