Jarhyn
Wizard
- Joined
- Mar 29, 2010
- Messages
- 15,618
- Gender
- Androgyne; they/them
- Basic Beliefs
- Natural Philosophy, Game Theoretic Ethicist
Robert Sopolsky is wrong — and, as the article concludes, he’s to blame for being wrong.
This is not true. Really, let's explore a different, very long name for pain of one particular sort: "nervous activation in the presence of some form of physical state to be called 'ostensible damage'".But there is no neuron that experiences pain; there is no neuron that experiences anything
From here, just one neuron can experience it, even if that experience is *hallucinatory*, the result of non-pain-like activities that accidentally activate it.
The tendency of the activation to occur in the presence of a positive signal creates a certainty on the experience of pain determined by how much over-expression beyond a threshold activation the neuron allows.
Once this neuron joins its neighbors, more certainty comes into association between probable stimulus and converging on information about the presence of some phenomena. Down the line, there is no longer any individual experiences of neurons, and instead there are experiences of absurdly certain reports of something going on somewhere, and the various qualities of that. Eventually these sum to experiences of things which we have developed translational linguistic embeddings for, such as our names ifq
I think rather it makes more sense to ask "what is it experiencing, in terms of some dimension of causal interest" rather than "does it experience?".
Again, this is a naive statement by the author. Language is bad at handling this, so please forgive me: I have parts of my mind that are aware of me and of themselves and they are not "the thing talking to you". Experience is constructive and regional within a system and always "of" the available inferential context within that region.But it must be neurons (plural); basically all of the neurons in a person’s brain taken together, and only taken together.
In fact, this is where my interest in and framework of Free Will actually makes contact with my interest in and framework of Consciousness, which I've discovered is an intellectual sibling to Integrated Information Theory, though I'm critical of their interest in "extent" rather than in specifics of microstructure, the truth of the system.
I think a lot of these things can and should be approached the way we approach evolution: it's not all or nothing bang flash from a fish to a man, but rather a progressive accumulation of small mutations over long time frames.
Every time we discover the reality of nature as pertains to some thing, it's not broad binaries we find but disgustingly complex models which all construct from very small things, even if the smallest of things may have rather simple and fixed rules.