I was asking for something coherent
No, I gave you something coherent. Your inability to follow it was your own issue.
What you have said about determinism and free will to date is as coherent as your claim for consciousness and will in computers, which is neither supportable or coherent.
There is no evidence for consciousness or will in computers, and your software design, debug, etc, rationale has no merit because, as pointed out, you seek to circumvent the very terms and conditions of determinism that you, yourself gave.
You are not separate from the world as a deterministic system. What you think and do, design, program or debug is subject to the very same conditions as the system you design and program. The system you design and create doesn't function according to its non-existent will, and you were brought to that point through a countless series of events that made you who you are, what you think and do.
Your claim that I lack, as I am, the ability to interact with myself such that I am different after than I was before, and that i lack the power to do this intentionally, is spurious.
That's incoherent. Nobody claims that we can't think and act.
I have regulatory control over at least some of my cognitive states, therefore you are wrong that this control is absolutely absent.
You are whatever the brain is doing in response to the information it acquires via the senses integrating with memory function.
If memory function fails, for instance, you cease function rationally. You lose your sense of control, you no longer recognize the world around you.
This has been explained over and over.
Brain function is not free will. The non-chosen state of the brain is the state of you.
It would have to be absolutely untrue that someone could do something that changes themselves through some state transition.
So there it is, you have yet to grasp what is being explained.
''The
compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''
The anatomy of movement
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''
If, due to my cognitive state, I pick up a drill and put it through my brain, my cognitive state will lead to a change in my cognitive state. Therefore regulatory control exists. The very power of a cognitive entity, due to their cognition, to change that cognition, is exactly the thing you deny existence of, despite clear evidence that it is not only possible but ubiquitous that people do so.
People decide, gnostically, to study so as to change their cognitive state, too.
Your attempt to treat responsibility as "zero sum" so as to say "something is responsible for making the agent what they are so the agent cannot also be responsible for making changes to itself" is misplaced. Both are true, the maker of the agent was responsible at time t for creating the agent that would modify itself at t+1 and the agent itself was also responsible at t+1 for modifying itself.
The brain decides and brings the decision to consciousness, initiating motor actions in the process.
Once again, it's not that we (the brain) can't think, decide or act, but given the terms of determinism, what you think and do in any given instance, you think and do necessarily, which is not a matter of free will.
Again;
''An
action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''
Think about the implications.