According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[DBT]

Just calling something 'free will' - acting without being forced or coerced - doesn't mean that will itself is free,

Yes it does.

It doesn't because the means and mechanisms by which will and action has nothing to do with freedom of will.

To say it does is akin to theists saying 'it's the will or work of God.'' That they say it doesn't make it so.

Just to say that will is free doesn't make it so. It's just words. Words that don't reflect reality.

just that we are acting according to our will, which if determinism is true, is inevitable.

Indeed. Determinism is entirely compatible with our acting according to our will.

So what?

Asserting compatibility does not make freedom of will a reality. Compatibilism is a failed argument because it does not account for the means and mechanisms by which will and action is generated.

Not because I say, but how the brain works and what happens when the means and mechanisms of will and actions break down and the illusion of conscious control is exposed.

 

[peacegirl]

Just calling something 'free will' - acting without being forced or coerced - doesn't mean that will itself is free,

Yes it does.

It doesn't because the means and mechanisms by which will and action has nothing to do with freedom of will.

To say it does is akin to theists saying 'it's the will or work of God.'' That they say it doesn't make it so.

Just to say that will is free doesn't make it so. It's just words. Words that don't reflect reality.

just that we are acting according to our will, which if determinism is true, is inevitable.

Indeed. Determinism is entirely compatible with our acting according to our will.

So what?

Asserting compatibility does not make freedom of will a reality. Compatibilism is a failed argument because it does not account for the means and mechanisms by which will and action is generated.

Not because I say, but how the brain works and what happens when the means and mechanisms of will and actions break down and the illusion of conscious control is exposed.

This entire argument boils down to responsibility. If will is not free, how can we hold anyone responsible, which compatibilists are trying to reconcile so as not to lose the most important aspect of this debate. The way determinism is defined is creating a problem because (accept this as a premise that needs to be further examined, please don't poo-poo it in a knee-jerk fashion) nothing causes, which gives the impression that we don't have a choice, or that we can't make our own decision. It doesn't mean determinism is wrong (it's actually right) but the way it's defined is problematic. It feels like determinism is prescriptive, which makes us turn into dominoes, without considering our will in the process. Maybe this excerpt from Decline and Fall of All Evil will help. (NOTE: People have not given this author a chance. If you don't like his style of writing, focus on the content, not the form.)

Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true that man has to make choices, he must always prefer that which he considers good, not evil, for himself when the former is offered as an alternative. The words ‘cause’ and ‘compel’ are the perception of an improper or fallacious relation because in order to be developed and have meaning it was absolutely necessary that the expression ‘free will’ be born as their opposite, as tall gives meaning to short. But these words do not describe reality unless interpreted properly. Nothing causes man to build cities, develop scientific achievements, write books, compose music, go to war, argue and fight, commit terrible crimes, pray to God, for these things are mankind already at a particular stage of his development, just as children were sacrificed at an earlier stage.

These activities or motions are the natural entelechy of man, who is always developing, correcting his mistakes, and moving in the direction of greater satisfaction by better removing the dissatisfaction of the moment, which is a normal compulsion of his nature over which he has absolutely no control. Looking back in hindsight allows man to evaluate his progress and make adjustments when necessary, as he is always learning from previous experience. The fact that will is not free demonstrates that man, as part of nature or God, has been unconsciously developing at a mathematical rate, and during every moment of his progress, was doing what he had to do because he had no free choice. But this does not mean that he was caused to do anything against his will, for the word ‘cause,’ like ‘choice’ and ‘past,’ is very misleading as it implies that something other than man himself is responsible for his actions. Four is not caused by two plus two; it is that already. (NOTE: I think this is what Jaryn is trying to get across) As long as history has been recorded, these two opposing principles have never been reconciled until now. The amazing thing is that this ignorance, this conflict of ideas, ideologies, and desires, theology’s promulgation of free will, and the millions that criticized determinism as fallacious, was exactly as it was supposed to be. It was impossible for man to have acted differently because the mankind system is obeying this invariable law of satisfaction which makes the motions of all life just as harmonious as the solar system; but these systems are not caused by these laws; they are these laws.”

<snip>

The definition of determinism is the philosophical and ethical doctrine that man’s choices, decisions, and actions are decided by antecedent causes, inherited or environmental, acting upon his character. According to this definition, we are not given a choice because we are being caused to do what we do by a previous event or circumstance. But I know for a fact that nothing can make me do what I make up my mind not to do, as you just mentioned a moment ago. If I don’t want to do something, nothing, not environment, heredity, or anything else you care to throw in, can make me do it because over this I have absolute control. Since I can’t be made to do anything against my will, doesn’t this make my will free? And isn’t it a contradiction to say that man’s will is not free, yet nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to do?”

“How about that? He brought out something I never would have thought of.”

“All he said was that you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink, which is undeniable; however, though it is a mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to another what he makes up his mind not to do — this is an extremely crucial point — he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment of his existence to do everything he does. This reveals, as your friend just pointed out, that man has absolute control over the former but absolutely none over the latter because he must constantly move in the direction of greater satisfaction. It is true that nothing in the past can cause what occurs in the present, for all we ever have is the present; the past and future are only words that describe a deceptive relation. Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the opposite, that man was not caused or compelled; he did it of his own accord; he wanted to do it; he didn’t have to. The term ‘free will’ contains an assumption or fallacy, for it implies that if man is not caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not mathematical, conclusions. The expression ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted due to the general ignorance that prevailed, for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because they wanted to, this in no way indicates that their will is free. In fact, I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself, which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?”

 

[DBT]

If multiple options can be taken at any given instance in time, that is not determinism.

If determinism is true, how determinism is defined is a description of how the system works in reality.

 

[peacegirl]

If multiple options can be taken at any given instance in time, that is not determinism.

If determinism is true, how determinism is defined is a description of how the system works in reality.

You are right, but this is not forced by a prescription that gives no way to contemplate options. What is contemplation for, if not to decide?

 

[Jarhyn]

a belief in the existence of Free Will that has a religious origin

Again, no. Rather, I asked "why does stuff exhibit behavior?" And sought to find the answers to that.

Many ideas have religious origins and aren't strictly "wrong", so this doesn't actually make the intuitions that one draws from religious dogmas automatically entirely wrong; it just means that you need to see if there are alternative approaches to the question and to suspect that it might only be "mostly right", especially because people in antiquity were quite often ready to start arguments with these ideas of omniscient Gods.

This is especially true with something as enigmatic and obscure as where the motion arises from in the meat of a human body, and more so still when asking where the motion in a single cell comes from.

People literally thought they were magic, so the easiest culprit to point to and say "that gives us our freedom" is this idea of whatever "magical supernatural thing" allows humans to be animate autonomous things. They used their intuitions based on their assumptions at the time (namely that people would have to be gods to have free will in the presence of an omniscient god).

Some thousands of years later, we discovered it's not magical, and it arises from an interaction of neurons that may be well understood.

The first requirement is then to get rid of all those unfounded assumptions but the most basic axioms one can find, and then see if you can reconstruct the thing with just those axioms, or something "like it enough to qualify as the thing people were talking about previously but without using Gods and rotten theist logic".

As I have said before, all of this terminology arises in contexts of software engineering; I don't need to assume anything extra, I can engineer it up right from comfortable space within the axioms of math, and known, proven mathematical principles.

 

[peacegirl]

If multiple options can be taken at any given instance in time, that is not determinism.

If determinism is true, how determinism is defined is a description of how the system works in reality.

Continued...

Determinism is 100% true, but the description of how the system works assumes the past causes the present. That's the first flaw in how determinism is presently defined. You may disagree, but I ask anyone here, how can the past cause the present if all we have is the present? If you think the past exists along with the present, you may disagree with this premise, but truthfully, it's not so far-fetched that people would immediately disagree. In fact, many philosophers would say that the past is a memory held in the brain, and if someone had amnesia, they would lose any memory of the past; consequently, only the present would exist for them. That is why this author tweaked the definition to make it more accurate. This change in definition actually reconciles "doing of one's own accord" with determinism without any contradiction, while freedom of the will (being able to have done otherwise) is proven to be false. Up until now, no one could get past the implications, for if will is not free, how can anyone be held responsible? This is the elephant in the room, and it does not get resolved with compatibilism. If will is not free, it cannot be free, no matter how compatibilists try to make these two thought systems compatible. The irony here is that with the truth of determinism, responsibility is increased, not decreased, which no one understands because it appears that people would be able to rationalize away their bad behavior. That is completely false, and I'm trying to show people why that isn't so.

 

[BSilvEsq]

If multiple options can be taken at any given instance in time, that is not determinism.

If determinism is true, how determinism is defined is a description of how the system works in reality.

Right.

Rather than continue to advance the illogical argument that Determinism and Free Will are compatible based on their classical definitions, it is so simple to say:

I accept that Determinism and Free Will as classically defined are incompatible
I believe that people have Free Will as classically defined
Therefore Determinism as classically defined is a false construct​

Instead, multiple defenders of Compatibilism on this thread insist on reinventing the meaning of words and out forth a Rube Goldberg-like argument that (i) rejects the definition of Determinism as classically defined based on an argument that the classical definition is fallacious, self-contradictory and/or paradoxical, (ii) replaces the classic definition of Determinism with Newtonian Determinism as modified by a view of Quantum Mechanics that a majority of physicists contend to establish an exception to Newtonian Determinism, (iii) asserts that an exceedingly complex system can produce inherently unpredictable results, (iv) asserts that one example of such an exceedingly complex system is the "mind" (whatever that might be -- although some Compatibilists are willing to state that it is the brain), and (v) claims that Free Will is the result of the inherently unpredictable activity of the mind -- without specifically defining Free Will beyond being the result of that complex and unpredictable process. Once those details are established, the defenders of Compatibilism are able to reduce their argument to the following syllogism:

Determinism does not foreclose an exceedingly complex system from producing unpredictable results
Free Will is the result of an exceedingly complex system
Therefore Determinism and Free Will are Compatible​

Personally, I reject the modern modification to the classical definitions of Determinism and Free Will that are used to stack the deck in favor if Compatibilism, but I accept the logic of the modified argument.

In the classical literature, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are conceptual terms used to describe the relationship between the hypothetical truth of Determinism and the hypothetical existence of Free Will. In the classical literature, the concepts of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism include no truth statements about Determinism or the existence of Free Will. Thus, a person can be a Compatibilist or Incompatibilist without having a belief about the truth or falsity of Determinism and/or the existence of non-existence of Free Will.

There are people who subscribe to Incompatibilism and who further contend either (i) that Determinism is, in fact, true and that Free Will (by necessity) does not exist, or (ii) Free Will does, in fact, exist and that Determinism (by necessity) is false. In the classical literature, the former position is called Hard Determinism and the latter position is called Libertarian Free Will.

There also are people who subscribe to Compatibilism and who further contend that Determinism is, in fact, true and that Free Will does, in fact, exist. In the classical literature, this position is called Soft Determinism.

For some reason, the classical literature does not offer a term for people who subscribe to Compatibilism and who (i) further contend that Determinism is, in fact, true and are agnostic about the existence of Free Will, or (ii) further contend that Free Will does, in fact, exist and are agnostic about the truth of Determinism.

Notably, multiple (if not all) defenders of Compatibilism are what the classical literature calls Soft Determinists -- because they believe not only in the compatibility of Determinism and Free Will, but they assert that Determinism (as they define it) is, in fact true and Free Will (as they describe it) does, in fact exist.

In my view, nobody can "know" (which is a word I use to describe a level of certainty that is not even conceivably mistaken -- such as the results of mathematics) whether Determinism is true or false and/or Free Will does or does not exist. The best we can do is have a belief (however strong) about such matter. Within my lexicology, an unshakable belief in the inherently unknowable is best described as "faith" -- which is a term that is often believed to fall within the exclusive realm of religion, but which more generally means "the complete trust or confidence in someone or something."

When dealing with concepts of compatibility and incompatibility, I believe that the most rigorous approach is to do so without regard to one's belief respecting the truth or existence of the objects or concepts of comparison, so as to avoid any bias resulting from such beliefs.

I could be mistaken, but it is my impression that most defenders of Compatibilism begin their analysis with a belief that they do, in fact, possess Free Will (as they describe it) -- a belief for many defenders of Compatibilism that is so strong that they go so far as to call call that belief knowledge (which I consider to be faith, because I reject that any person can know, for a fact, that they possess Free Will). It is my impression that most defenders of Compatibilism also begin their analysis with the additional belief that the universe does, in fact, operate in a deterministic manner (as they define it). It seems to me that less defenders of Compatibilism are of the latter view than those who are of the former view, but it seems to me that the difference in number is relatively insubstantial. In other words, most Compatibilists tend to be Soft Determinists (as classically defined). I submit that these beliefs unconsciously (and sometimes deliberately) unduly influence the debate about Compatibilism by foreclosing defenders of Compatibilism who engage in the debate from so much as considering the possibility that their beliefs about reality may be mistaken -- for to do so would create serious cognitive dissonance.

Returning to the classical definitions of Determinism and Free Will:

I reject the contention that the classical definition of Determinism is fallacious, self-contradictory and/or paradoxical -- especially if it is viewed as a hypothetical factual description of the way in the universe has operated from no later than the dawn of the existence of humans through no earlier than the present instant, and makes no claims about (i) how the universe came to operate in that manner prior to the dawn of the existence of humans, or (ii) whether the universe will continue to operate in that manner into the future.

I also reject the notion that "predictability" is an element of classical definition Determinism -- although I readily acknowledge that some classical defenders of Incompatibilism did view all activity of the universe to be theoretically predictable -- albeit only with perfect knowledge of everything, which has never been posited to be possible (outside of those who believe in an omniscient God). In that regard, I digress to note that classical Determinism does not, in any way, stem from the possibility of perfect predictability or advance knowledge of the future, so much as those constructs have been asserted as theoretical products of Determinism (again with perfect knowledge of everything). As such, the argument of a modal fallacy is misplaced and is, itself, the result of fallacy of a different sort. What I mean by this is that some detractors of the classical definition of Determinism argue against the concept by arguing that it is a modal fallacy to say that the perfect ability to predict the future establishes that the future is fixed in advance and unavoidable. Accepting the logic of that argument, I submit that Determinism does not include the argument that the perfect ability to predict the future establishes that the future is fixed in advance and unavoidable. Rather, some proponents of Determinism argue that the truth of Determinism would mean that the future would be fixed in advance and it would, therefore, follow that perfect knowledge would include the ability to understand how that future would play out in advance of it occurring. The difference between the two arguments is that (i) the former argument, which is said to be fallacious by some detractors of classical Determinism), draws a conclusion about a necessary future from the postulate of a hypothetical present, and (ii) the latter argument draws a conclusion (with which I disagree) about a possible present from a postulate of a necessary future. I am not certain of the proper term in formal logic for the fallacy of attacking the latter argument on the basis of the former argument, but I believe it to be a form of transpositional fallacy.

Turning to Free Will, I am willing to accept that human thought is the result of an exceedingly complex system, that an exceedingly complex system might produce inherently unpredictable results, and that human thought may be inherently unpredictable. I do not accept, however, that the mere fact that human thought may be inherently unpredictable means that it is, in fact, "free" from the forces of nature that we call Determinism (even in the modified form advanced by Compatibilists).

Based on my understanding of the debate in this thread, I believe (i) Incompatibilism is logically sound and Compatibilism is logically fallacious if the Incompatibilist's classic definitions of Determinism and Free Will are used, and (ii) Incompatibilism is logically fallacious and Compatibilism is logically sound if the Compatibilist's modernly modified definition of Determinism and description of Free Will are used.

I also have yet to see a definition or description of Free Will that is logically compatible with the classical definition of Determinism, which means to me that the classical concept of Compatibilism is incoherent, as recognized by Karl Popper and William James, among others.

Lastly, I reject all assertions that anyone "knows" (as opposed to believes) that (i) Determinism (however defined) is true or false, or (ii) Free Will (however defined or described) exists or does not exist. As I see things, those who claim to know such things set themselves up as the omniscient God they claim to know to not exist. Personally, (i) I do not believe that an omniscient God exists, (ii) I have no belief respecting the truth of Determinism (as classically defined), (iii) I tend to believe that the universe operates in the manner described by Newton and Einstein and I am skeptical of quantum physics (at least as it is described by most folks), and (iv) whether or not people do or do not have Free Will, I am fine with holding them criminally accountable for transgressions of enforceable promulgated rules, and I reject that anyone is bound by any rules of so-called morality that fall outside the realm of the law (because I believe that morality is inherently subjective, the law reflects the agreed upon morality of the population, and anything left ungoverned by the law falls outside that agreed morality).

I note in advance that there are some posters on this board with whom I refuse to further engage on account of their irrational and belligerent approach to this subject. They are, if course, "free" to post whatever gibberish and abusive comments they wish (subject, I suppose, the the moderator cutting them off at some point), but I am compelled to refrain from continuing to engage with them further. I will pause to note, however, that I have detected a tell on the part of one such poster, who tends to respond with expletives when met with a comment that logically refutes that poster's position. It is fascinating to see, and I encourage others to watch for it.

 

[peacegirl]

If multiple options can be taken at any given instance in time, that is not determinism.

If determinism is true, how determinism is defined is a description of how the system works in reality.

Right.

Rather than continue to advance the illogical argument that Determinism and Free Will are compatible based on their classical definitions, it is so simple to say:

I accept that Determinism and Free Will as classically defined are incompatible
I believe that people have Free Will as classically defined
Therefore Determinism as classically defined is a false construct​

Instead, multiple defenders of Compatibilism on this thread insist on reinventing the meaning of words and out forth a Rube Goldberg-like argument that (i) rejects the definition of Determinism as classically defined based on an argument that the classical definition is fallacious, self-contradictory and/or paradoxical, (ii) replaces the classic definition of Determinism with Newtonian Determinism as modified by a view of Quantum Mechanics that a majority of physicists contend to establish an exception to Newtonian Determinism, (iii) asserts that an exceedingly complex system can produce inherently unpredictable results, (iv) asserts that one example of such an exceedingly complex system is the "mind" (whatever that might be -- although some Compatibilists are willing to state that it is the brain), and (v) claims that Free Will is the result of the inherently unpredictable activity of the mind -- without specifically defining Free Will beyond being the result of that complex and unpredictable process. Once those details are established, the defenders of Compatibilism are able to reduce their argument to the following syllogism:

Determinism does not foreclose an exceedingly complex system from producing unpredictable results
Free Will is the result of an exceedingly complex system
Therefore Determinism and Free Will are Compatible​

Personally, I reject the modern modification to the classical definitions of Determinism and Free Will that are used to stack the deck in favor if Compatibilism, but I accept the logic of the modified argument.

In the classical literature, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are conceptual terms used to describe the relationship between the hypothetical truth of Determinism and the hypothetical existence of Free Will. In the classical literature, the concepts of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism include no truth statements about Determinism or the existence of Free Will. Thus, a person can be a Compatibilist or Incompatibilist without having a belief about the truth or falsity of Determinism and/or the existence of non-existence of Free Will.

There are people who subscribe to Incompatibilism and who further contend either (i) that Determinism is, in fact, true and that Free Will (by necessity) does not exist, or (ii) Free Will does, in fact, exist and that Determinism (by necessity) is false. In the classical literature, the former position is called Hard Determinism and the latter position is called Libertarian Free Will.

There also are people who subscribe to Compatibilism and who further contend that Determinism is, in fact, true and that Free Will does, in fact, exist. In the classical literature, this position is called Soft Determinism.

For some reason, the classical literature does not offer a term for people who subscribe to Compatibilism and who (i) further contend that Determinism is, in fact, true and are agnostic about the existence of Free Will, or (ii) further contend that Free Will does, in fact, exist and are agnostic about the truth of Determinism.

Notably, multiple (if not all) defenders of Compatibilism are what the classical literature calls Soft Determinists -- because they believe not only in the compatibility of Determinism and Free Will, but they assert that Determinism (as they define it) is, in fact true and Free Will (as they describe it) does, in fact exist.

In my view, nobody can "know" (which is a word I use to describe a level of certainty that is not even conceivably mistaken -- such as the results of mathematics) whether Determinism is true or false and/or Free Will does or does not exist. The best we can do is have a belief (however strong) about such matter. Within my lexicology, an unshakable belief in the inherently unknowable is best described as "faith" -- which is a term that is often believed to fall within the exclusive realm of religion, but which more generally means "the complete trust or confidence in someone or something."

I don't quite agree with you here. I believe determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether (IOW, could have done otherwise). This claim isn't about belief or faith. It is about a definition that keeps "doing of one's own desires" intact, which makes it possible to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought in a way that accomplishes what the law could not. Of course, we have to blame and punish people for breaking the law in a free will society, but this natural law goes far beyond what threats of punishment could accomplish. The corollary that follows supports the truth in that we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will. If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about. This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof. I don't know where you know me from, but it seems I must not have given you a good impression because you haven't been curious about this discovery. I hope you stick with me because I like the way you write. You are very clear in your explanations. Maybe you could help me clarify certain points as well, if you're up to it, although I think it's pretty explanatory as it stands. I want to add that prediction is not necessary for determinism to be true, nor is it necessary for the extension of these principles to work.

 

[BSilvEsq]

I don't quite agree with you here. I believe determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether (IOW, could have done otherwise). This claim isn't about belief or faith. It is about a definition that keeps "doing of one's own desires" intact, which makes it possible to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought in a way that accomplishes what the law could not. Of course, we have to blame and punish people for breaking the law in a free will society, but this natural law goes far beyond what threats of punishment could accomplish. The corollary that follows supports the truth in that we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will. If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about. This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof. I don't know where you know me from, but it seems I must not have given you a good impression because you haven't been curious about this discovery. I hope you stick with me because I like the way you write. You are very clear in your explanations. Maybe you could help me clarify certain points as well, if you're up to it, although I think it's pretty explanatory as it stands. I want to add that prediction is not necessary for determinism to be true, nor is it necessary for the extension of these principles to work.

Hi Janis. I know who you are, and you have not given me a bad impression. To the contrary, I appreciate that your posts (here and elsewhere) are both thoughtful and civil, and I admire your ability to suffer the slings and arrows of some of the buffoons on this board whose posts often obfuscate (deliberately or unwittingly) the point of discussion and tend to break down into childish insults when their nearly-incomprehensible gibberish is refuted. Personally, I am unable to resist the urge to give them back a small taste of the offal they dish out, but you always take the high road and comport yourself with dignity.

I have tried reading your father's book from time-to-time, but I have been unable to get past the initial boasting and proclamations. I find it difficult to get into the book from your comments, as well. It would be really helpful if you were to provide a brief summary or synopsis of your father's idea(s) that does more than assert their value and consequences if pursued.

From what I have read, I do not follow the logic of the book's thesis. I get that your father and you have lofty and admirable objectives and ideas about how to achieve them, but I do not see their relationship to the debate about Determinism and Free Will -- which is how you couch them.

As you might tell from my writing, I am more interested in the theoretical aspects of the debate about Determinism and Free Will than I am interested in justifying or excusing behavior, and I do not profess to have any particularly valuable insight respecting the value of specific behaviors -- other, perhaps, than my distaste for muddled and insulting writing by folks who have no interest in the exercise of honestly examining seemingly competing points of view in an effort to resolve the competition and, if possible, find common ground on which a further discussion might rest.

As I wrote in my last post, I reject that the notion of morality, which I view to be no more nor less than the relative preferences of the majority in a given society. Rather, I look to the law for guiding principles -- i.e., the Social Compact or Leviathan that sets forth the law and maintains order in an otherwise lawless and chaotic society.

* * *​

In any event, you wrote in your post that I might help to "clarify certain points" that you have been making. Accordingly, without intending any criticism, much less any insult, I offer the following questions and comments in an effort to hep clarify what you have written -- to me, at least.

You begin by stating that you "believe determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether." As I understand it, that is the approach of a Hard Determinist -- but one never knows without knowing what someone means y Determinism and Free Will. Accordingly, for purposes of discussion, it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of Determinism and of Free Will (or "freedom of the will"), as you use those terms in your post. It also would be helpful if you would state how it is that you believe that Determinism has been proven to be true and why you state that the truth of Determinism excludes Free Will altogether.

You also offer the parenthetical "(IOW, could have done otherwise)." I assume that you mean from that parenthetical that it is a correct that the existence of Free Will requires the ability to think or act in at least two ways, with at least one such way being different than the way that a given person does, in fact, think or act -- a state of being that I understand to be incompatible with Determinism.

You next state that "[t]his claim isn't about belief or faith." Based on the antecedent claim in your post, I take your statement at the beginning of this paragraph to mean that you claim to have absolute and/or certain knowledge (as opposed to a belief of faith) of the truth of your claim that "determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether." As I understand it, that is an assertion of a truth statement about Determinism (based on your definition of Determinism, which I am hoping you will provide). I have a very difficult time accepting the assertion of any truth statement, much less that particular one, but I am open to hearing your explanation of how it is that you have such knowledge that cannot possibly be wrong (which is different from not possibly be proved to be wrong).

Your next statement is that "It is about a definition that keeps 'doing of one's own desires' intact, which makes it possible to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought in a way that accomplishes what the law could not." I have to confess that you have totally lost me with that sentence. Are you able to elaborate?

Skipping ahead just a bit, you refer to "natural law." Do you mean by that term (i) the physical laws of nature that govern cause and effect, (ii) Jeffersonian inherent moral principles that are claimed to be divinely endowed, or (iii) something else. If something else, please elaborate.

Next further state that "we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will" -- which I understand to be one of the conclusions of your father's work. This statement confuses me. If we accept that humans lack Free Will and are governed by the laws of nature such that all human thought and activity at any given instant is the result of all antecedent activity at that given instant, then how can anyone do anything other than whatever it is that the antecedent activity causes -- which may or may not include engaging in war. Stated different, if you "know" that Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can "we" "prevent" (or mandate) anything other than whatever it is that nature compels? Indeed, if Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can anything humans think or do have any meaning whatsoever.

Finally, you conclude the summary of your position with the following two assertions: (i) "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about" and (ii) "This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof." With respect to those two assertions, I offer the following questions and observations.

First of all, and addressing only the statement "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about", are you arguing that because you believe that the existence of Free Will would preclude the peaceful existence you strive to attain, it must be that the peaceful existence is attainable as a consequence of truth of Determinism? If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

 

[steve_bank]

Past, present, and future are convenient abstractions. ]

When making a measurement at a point in time there are physical limits as to how narrow the tie widow can be. Theoretically 'now'' could be expressed as a limit. The present is the the limit as dt goes to zero, dt meaning time in interval. Nothing can change in zero time.

The observed reality is continuous change and motion. Atoms in a 'solid' are in constant change,each atom is moving around in place.

Get rid of causality and you have to explain how an effect can occur without a cause.

And again a deterministic system is not an example e of determinism.

In the last systems text I read the top level system category is chaotic. Under chaotic are deterministic and probabilistic.

Local weather is a chaotic system. Variables can not be known with sufficient accuracy to make long term predictions. There are video examples of chaotic systems, the multiple link pendulum.

Deterministic means given N variables, knowing N-1 variables the last variable is competently determined by the other variables with a single predicable value..

Given distance = velocity x time knowing any two of the three variables the third is completely determined.

Probabilistic is tossing a six sided die. Toss a die and there is no deterministic eqaution to predict exactly what the next result will be. There is a probability of 1/6.

Whether the entire universe seen and unseen is deterministic is unknowable.

As fr as we can tell so far causality does not necessarily infer philosophical determinism.

Chaotic, deterministic, and probabilistic systems heer on Earth are all causal.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Past, present, and future are convenient abstractions. ]

When making a measurement at a point in time there are physical limits as to how narrow the tie widow can be. Theoretically 'now'' could be expressed as a limit. The present is the the limit as dt goes to zero, dt meaning time in interval. Nothing can change in zero time.

The observed reality is continuous change and motion. Atoms in a 'solid' are in constant change,each atom is moving around in place.

Get rid of causality and you have to explain how an effect can occur without a cause.

And again a deterministic system is not an example e of determinism.

In the last systems text I read the top level system category is chaotic. Under chaotic are deterministic and probabilistic.

Local weather is a chaotic system. Variables can not be known with sufficient accuracy to make long term predictions. There are video examples of chaotic systems, the multiple link pendulum.

Deterministic means given N variables, knowing N-1 variables the last variable is competently determined by the other variables with a single predicable value..

Given distance = velocity x time knowing any two of the three variables the third is completely determined.

Probabilistic is tossing a six sided die. Toss a die and there is no deterministic eqaution to predict exactly what the next result will be. There is a probability of 1/6.

Whether the entire universe seen and unseen is deterministic is unknowable.

As fr as we can tell so far causality does not necessarily infer philosophical determinism.

Chaotic, deterministic, and probabilistic systems heer on Earth are all causal.

Every statement in the post above is 100% correct from the perspective of math, science and engineering -- in their current state. And, even from a philosophical perspective, I completely agree with the following statement:

"Whether the entire universe seen and unseen is deterministic is unknowable."​

Aside from the above-quoted sentence, and outside the province of mathematical equations and logic problems, however, very little, if anything, is provably correct to a certainty, and just about anything may be proven to be wrong in the distant future and/or actually be wrong without regard to the ability or inability of anyone to prove it to be so.

While I could go through all of the other sentences in the post in the same manner as below, I will take what I view to be the easiest statement as an example:

Probabilistic is tossing a six sided die. Toss a die and there is no deterministic eqaution to predict exactly what the next result will be. There is a probability of 1/6.​

Again, from a practical perspective, this is a correct statement of the best math, science and engineering currently available. It is, however, not necessarily true forever. How many incredibly complex equations that have been developed in the past 100 years were once perceived to be impossible? How can it be said with certainty that an equation will never be developed that can calculate, to a certainty, the roll of the dice.

Moreover, even if accepted as absolutely true, the statement is about predictability of dice rolls and not about the conditions that actually bring about the results of the roll and/or whether the result is inexorable before it occurs. Indeed, when properly understood, the philosophical concept of Determinism supports the proposition that the future roll of the dice is inherently unknowable (i.e., not predictable to a certainty) despite the fact that the result is inexorable before it occurs.

To repeat, I accept the truth of every statement in the post from the perspective of math, science and engineering. I also see the value of those endeavors and in understanding the truth of the statements from that perspective. This forum, however, is called "Philosophy -- Other Philosophical Discussions" and not "Math, Science and Engineering."

 

[DBT]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.


.Adequate Determinism
''Adequate Determinism is the kind of determinism we have in the world. It is the determinism of Newtonian physics, capable of sending men to the moon and back with astonishing accuracy. It is the determinism of those physiologists who think that quantum uncertainty is insignificant in the macromolecular structures of cell biology.
We are happy to agree with scientists and philosophers who feel that quantum effects are for the most part negligible in the macroscopic world. We particularly agree that they are negligible when considering the causally determined will and the causally determined actions set in motion by decisions of that will.''

The question here is whether compatibilism is a sound argument for free will.

 

[Elixir]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality.

Or else God simply favors the saintly intent of scientists over that of the powermongering religion vendors!

 

[BSilvEsq]

Reliably predicting things such as planetary orbits, comets, landing spacecraft on distant planets, etc, supports causality. That events happening now are causally related to past events, where if the links are strong enough, we have causal determinism.....or at least adequate determinism.

I believe your statement gives away too much.

To begin, I believe we both agree that the predictability of given activity is immaterial to the question of whether the given activity could be otherwise than it is as a result of antecedent activity. While some folks argue that predictability follows from Determinism, others disagree. All Incompatibilists agree, however, that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses alternatives without regard to the ability of anyone to predict the determined activity.

Secondly, I have an issue with the words "if the links are strong enough." Antecedent activity that is closest in time and proximity to subsequent activity are simply the most obvious of the nearly infinite antecedent activity that coalesces to cause the activity in question. To credit the activity that is closest in time and proximity is akin to attributing the weight of a single straw to breaking a camel's back, when the fact is that every straw is a causal antecedent, as is the age of the camel, the activities of the camel that contributed to the strength of the camel's back, the strength of the force of gravity at the location in which the came is standing, and innumerable other antecedents that combine to cause the instant of camel back collapse.

Determinism posits that the collapse of the camel's back was inevitable at the precise time and location it occurred as a result of all antecedent activity from the beginning of time (Big Bang?) to the moment of collapse. To characterize the antecedent causes of activity as "adequate" within the paradigm of Determinism denigrates their inevitability.

I understand that you are trying to make a point to folks who refuse to understand, much less appreciate the paradigm, but that is no reason to cater to their ignorance, as it feeds into their contrary and unsupportable contentions.

 

[peacegirl]

I don't quite agree with you here. I believe determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether (IOW, could have done otherwise). This claim isn't about belief or faith. It is about a definition that keeps "doing of one's own desires" intact, which makes it possible to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought in a way that accomplishes what the law could not. Of course, we have to blame and punish people for breaking the law in a free will society, but this natural law goes far beyond what threats of punishment could accomplish. The corollary that follows supports the truth in that we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will. If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about. This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof. I don't know where you know me from, but it seems I must not have given you a good impression because you haven't been curious about this discovery. I hope you stick with me because I like the way you write. You are very clear in your explanations. Maybe you could help me clarify certain points as well, if you're up to it, although I think it's pretty explanatory as it stands. I want to add that prediction is not necessary for determinism to be true, nor is it necessary for the extension of these principles to work.

Hi Janis. I know who you are, and you have not given me a bad impression. To the contrary, I appreciate that your posts (here and elsewhere) are both thoughtful and civil, and I admire your ability to suffer the slings and arrows of some of the buffoons on this board whose posts often obfuscate (deliberately or unwittingly) the point of discussion and tend to break down into childish insults when their nearly-incomprehensible gibberish is refuted. Personally, I am unable to resist the urge to give them back a small taste of the offal they dish out, but you always take the high road and comport yourself with dignity.

I have tried reading your father's book from time-to-time, but I have been unable to get past the initial boasting and proclamations. I find it difficult to get into the book from your comments, as well. It would be really helpful if you were to provide a brief summary or synopsis of your father's idea(s) that does more than assert their value and consequences if pursued.

I'm curious, do you have my father's book? He wrote 7, but the last book was my compilation. I think you are talking about that one. I wonder if people knew his work lived up to his claims, they wouldn't be so hard on him. I'm not sure. He was really not a boaster, but maybe he came off that way. I don't know if you followed my other thread, but I actually cut and pasted the first three chapters. No one read it. They wanted me to give a synopsis in a few paragraphs. Think about it. How can a claim that purports to bring about peace on earth be made in a few paragraphs? That is not fair. I tried to use AI, and it still didn't do it justice. This book is not about asserting its value and the consequences if pursued. It offers a blueprint of how this can actually take place, but it is so far removed from conventional thinking that it sounds utterly impossible for this claim to be true. I have told people that they would never shoot down a book before they even read it. The words of great philosophers are dissected word for word to make positively sure that the works were understood. This is what makes it so difficult for me. People use the fact that I've been to many forums, and because of this, they all mock me. It's been rough. I appreciate that you understand how hard this has really been. Forums are not the best if a book has not been read. That puts me at a disadvantage. I hope that I will be able to reach people who will read the book (hopefully twice), who have a great deal of influence, and can get it recognized for the discovery that it actually is.

From what I have read, I do not follow the logic of the book's thesis. I get that your father and you have lofty and admirable objectives and ideas about how to achieve them, but I do not see their relationship to the debate about Determinism and Free Will -- which is how you couch them.

The entire book rests on the knowledge that man's will is not free and the knowledge that lies behind this hermetically sealed door.

As you might tell from my writing, I am more interested in the theoretical aspects of the debate about Determinism and Free Will than I am interested in justifying or excusing behavior, and I do not profess to have any particularly valuable insight respecting the value of specific behaviors -- other, perhaps, than my distaste for muddled and insulting writing by folks who have no interest in the exercise of honestly examining seemingly competing points of view in an effort to resolve the competition and, if possible, find common ground on which a further discussion might rest.

As I wrote in my last post, I reject that the notion of morality, which I view to be no more nor less than the relative preferences of the majority in a given society. Rather, I look to the law for guiding principles -- i.e., the Social Compact or Leviathan that sets forth the law and maintains order in an otherwise lawless and chaotic society.

He doesn't use the term "morality". He uses the term "evil" to mean the hurt in human relations. Hurt is anything done to you that you don't want done to yourself.

* * *​

In any event, you wrote in your post that I might help to "clarify certain points" that you have been making. Accordingly, without intending any criticism, much less any insult, I offer the following questions and comments in an effort to hep clarify what you have written -- to me, at least.

You begin by stating that you "believe determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether." As I understand it, that is the approach of a Hard Determinist -- but one never knows without knowing what someone means y Determinism and Free Will. Accordingly, for purposes of discussion, it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of Determinism and of Free Will (or "freedom of the will"), as you use those terms in your post. It also would be helpful if you would state how it is that you believe that Determinism has been proven to be true and why you state that the truth of Determinism excludes Free Will altogether.

You also offer the parenthetical "(IOW, could have done otherwise)." I assume that you mean from that parenthetical that it is a correct that the existence of Free Will requires the ability to think or act in at least two ways, with at least one such way being different than the way that a given person does, in fact, think or act -- a state of being that I understand to be incompatible with Determinism.

You next state that "[t]his claim isn't about belief or faith." Based on the antecedent claim in your post, I take your statement at the beginning of this paragraph to mean that you claim to have absolute and/or certain knowledge (as opposed to a belief of faith) of the truth of your claim that "determinism has been proven to be true, excluding freedom of the will altogether." As I understand it, that is an assertion of a truth statement about Determinism (based on your definition of Determinism, which I am hoping you will provide). I have a very difficult time accepting the assertion of any truth statement, much less that particular one, but I am open to hearing your explanation of how it is that you have such knowledge that cannot possibly be wrong (which is different from not possibly be proved to be wrong).

I don't believe this is a work of faith. As the author wrote, we don't have faith that one plus one is two. It's the same thing here. If this is an invariable law, there is no need for faith.

Your next statement is that "It is about a definition that keeps 'doing of one's own desires' intact, which makes it possible to reconcile these two opposing schools of thought in a way that accomplishes what the law could not." I have to confess that you have totally lost me with that sentence. Are you able to elaborate?

It just means that the way these two schools of thought are defined, there can be no reconciliation between the two. I tried to explain that the word "cause" is misleading because it implies that the past makes us do what we do, but this definition is creating great confusion. He wrote that definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned. The past cannot make us do anything, considering that we only have the present. We use our memory to make choices, but this is an important distinction. The reason this is important is that it brings up the other side of his two-sided equation, which is the discovery itself. Determinism is not the discovery; it is the gateway that opens the door to the discovery. But first, I will give you his understanding as to why man's will is not free and move on from there. If will is not free (i.e., we could not have done otherwise), it cannot be free (i.e., we could have done otherwise). Again, this is not easy because no one has cared to read the first three chapters, which are the foundation for the rest of the book. There is a lot to unpack. I hope you stick with me because you are the type of person that, I believe, has the capacity to understand new ideas. It's late now. I will have to resume the conversation tomorrow, hopefully. I may have to cut and paste small excerpts at a time. As I stated, I won't compromise the author's writing just because people want a quick overview so they can look for loopholes and tell me he was wrong without a true understanding.

Skipping ahead just a bit, you refer to "natural law." Do you mean by that term (i) the physical laws of nature that govern cause and effect, (ii) Jeffersonian inherent moral principles that are claimed to be divinely endowed, or (iii) something else. If something else, please elaborate.

Next further state that "we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will" -- which I understand to be one of the conclusions of your father's work. This statement confuses me. If we accept that humans lack Free Will and are governed by the laws of nature such that all human thought and activity at any given instant is the result of all antecedent activity at that given instant, then how can anyone do anything other than whatever it is that the antecedent activity causes -- which may or may not include engaging in war. Stated different, if you "know" that Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can "we" "prevent" (or mandate) anything other than whatever it is that nature compels? Indeed, if Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can anything humans think or do have any meaning whatsoever.

Finally, you conclude the summary of your position with the following two assertions: (i) "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about" and (ii) "This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof." With respect to those two assertions, I offer the following questions and observations.

First of all, and addressing only the statement "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about", are you arguing that because you believe that the existence of Free Will would preclude the peaceful existence you strive to attain, it must be that the peaceful existence is attainable as a consequence of truth of Determinism? If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

 

[BSilvEsq]

As I stated, I won't compromise the author's writing just because people want a quick overview so they can look for loopholes and tell me he was wrong without a true understanding.

Thanks for the quick and limited reply.

To respond to your one sentence quoted above, I assure you that I am not looking for loopholes or an opportunity to prove you wrong. I would be pleased to come to the view that you are correct if you are correct. I just cannot tell at this point, which is why I have asked the questions I have asked.

 

[Jarhyn]

Based on my understanding of the debate in this thread, I believe (i) Incompatibilism is logically sound and Compatibilism is logically fallacious if the Incompatibilist's classic definitions of Determinism and Free Will are used, and (ii) Incompatibilism is logically fallacious and Compatibilism is logically sound if the Compatibilist's modernly modified definition of Determinism and description of Free Will are used

And yet again, the definitions used in (i) are not logically sound. They require the statement of "necessity" or "god", are based entirely on the ideas of such from antiquity either way. That people try to drop the omniscient god from the reason and keep the flawed

As long as you stick with "classical" ideas of things deserving treatment with formal, mathematical logic, you will find yourself running into nonsense.

Either way, as I have said before, we have proven in this thread for a fact that pseudo-probabilistic events do clearly happen, observably, all the goddamn time. I have described the nature of a system which allows them to happen.

I will now go on a fairly long discussion about such events as are documented and which are metaphysically handled within math.

Such events as are observed in a "pseudo-probabilistic" manner each represent a surrender of agency to whatever produces enough "noise" to trigger "signalling on the noise".

These are used in engineering, principally, to enforce uncertainty of action on relatively distant autonomous systems over the behavior being performed, and have nothing to do with the freedom of things other than in the sense that these mechanisms can be used to encrypt and force strategic elements in "unsolved" game theory to come into play.

As I have said to Mike a few times now, maybe this is the macrophysical probabilistic element that he is looking for!

An abstract example would be if your opponent can make a suboptimal play in "perfect play terms" that is not well mapped by an opponent rather than taking an optimal play where the opponent has an easily known "win", however this requires chaos and entropy to occur, and good "active strategy"; in a setting where both sides have "full depth" of all play branches, there ends up being "unbeatable" play for games of finite depth, or at least "guarantee of win or draw" regardless of opponent play.

Because we know a large class of problems that arise in real life have very large search spaces such that the tree cannot be mapped, or where the "tree" can't be mapped at all without something quite literally "quantum" acting to generate calculations and where even THAT space is large, we know that there are situations where such entropy being added to a decision making process allows "gaming" someone except through "strategic" rather than "mapped" play. Some games have strategic solutions no matter how large the board becomes -- such as Nim.

Making the external reading of a system more complicated than the logical truth of the system can be useful to prevent 'gaming the player'.

This is textbook graph theory and game theory, but it is a feature of deterministic systems writ large, especially of systems exceeding a certain amount of complexity, or of particular sorts of component parts (such as transistors or neurons or what-have-you).

It's not actually a feature requiring "indeterminism" or rather "probabilistic systems", it's a feature of fully deterministic ones, too.

Generally, in signal processing math, a signal that has nothing to do with some problem space of interest, is called "noise".

There are many different kinds of "noise" in the world, from "random noise", which is noise that has nothing to do with anything observed in any other system at all, anywhere (which arguably does not exist), all the way to "simple noise" like a sine wave interacting with the problem space information.

If the argument is that you need NOISE for free will, it's all over everywhere, from simple deterministic noise to three body problems.

The problem here is that while noise can hide or stir up a decision making process for adversarial purposes, it can't actually make "good" decisions except in an adversarial strategic "confuse the other guy" sense, or in the sense of "we need to try a new direction, might as well try this one...".

We consider the parts of systems which access such noise as responsible for being vulnerable to the interference, as much as the source is responsible for producing it, especially when the thing held responsible for its vulnerability can directly alter the gain on that signal.

When the gain is a physical knob on a fairly "dumb" machine, we respond to the responsibility of the system's vulnerability by moving the knob ourselves, since it can't or won't.

When the "gain" is the function of whether an eyelid is open or not, for example, we can say "quit being a psychopath, open your eyes, and look at the goddamn road, get your hands on the wheel, and actually start driving before you get us all killed", where we directly can observe the responsibility as stated by the request for a change. But we should never have needed to say it and the fact we did may indicate a deeper problem and a more pressing responsibility.

While noise is useful for maintaining autonomy in very complex and potentially rare circumstances, it isn't really important to the discussion of high level autonomous action.

In fact, when noise is generated by some intentionally wacky source at sufficiently high levels to completely drown out problem-space information, this directly prevents processing in the system from taking place, preventing rational decision making. A direct and easy example of this would be when a human gets tazed or drugged.

Indeed, we can recognize this is not what we mean when we say "free will" because each of these things explicitly is an attack on free will.

Oftentimes we allow the influence on our agency of information (and often noisy information) relating to some problem space. In fact in the earlier example with the guy failing to drive; we kind of have to be influenced by information to make informed decisions. Still, we choose those influences, especially if we are driving and are not psychopaths.

Hopefully at this point we can put to rest whether and what role noise and "interference" and "randomness" play in human cognition: preferably as little as is necessary.

Instead, of you want to know what the will of a human is, you will have to reverse engineer the statements their brain is currently making, and how differences in how it is interacting modify those statements it makes to itself in regular ways.

The "freedoms" of the will, for which it is responsible for in its expression through structure, correspond to the logical "truth" states of the system, just as much as the expression through structure of transistors creates a logical truth, though the neuron is much more analog-ish, as this averages the quantification errors of its components over a large number of component parts.

In total, however, you can assess the momentary freedom of the will by looking at what goals and activities are scheduled at what priority level in the system.

If major goals are being constrained by some external momentary force, in that moment you can observe the responsibility there by reaching the exchange of forces, however subtle.

It is really no different from observing the responsibility of one process in a simulator putting together a message and sending it on, and tracing the message back to where it came from through a block view of system time.

But let's return back to this idea that compatibilist free will is not sufficient...

We can observe the admission that things are perfectly consistent when compatibilist definitions are used.

We can observe that none of that clearly sensible mathematical discussion of the role of noise, or of signaling, or of the "truth" of the system having substantive responsibility in the outcome in a directly describable way exist when you use Fatalist definitions. Instead, you get the notion that the infringement of noise is freedom rather than "literally having a seizure or being tazed or drugged" or some other loss of control.

Finally, reality itself contradicts the account in which infringing noise, or chaotic action within a system grants or upholds responsibility or responsible action except when trying to defeat some adversary too similar to yourself; all of these theories bear fruit in applications all across the world. Experimental proof with the role of noise in computation directly invalidates the Fatalist and Libertarian conclusions as to how things really end up working. When we observe in reality, "unasked-for noise on the line" is "having your decisions rendered by a guy with a tazer such that you shit your pants", not "making decisions for yourself".

The complete disconnect from what would be suggested by atheist mathematical notions being assembled and engineered, vs the completely inverse view that Libs and Fatalists present offers a strong reason to suspect a major logical flaw in a foundational aspect of the construction of the Lib and Fatalist accounts.

In conclusion...

Noise is a thing. Noise interferes with signals when not collected with the sole intent of being a confounding signal for an adversary. It doesn't render "best" decisions outside of that context, and it is easily and suitably generated even in deterministic systems. Instead, cognition is visibly the product of "signals", generated and exchanged through switch actions that resist noise -- though signals may be hidden "under" noise or incorporate it so as to be inscrutable.

 

[peacegirl]

Skipping ahead just a bit, you refer to "natural law." Do you mean by that term (i) the physical laws of nature that govern cause and effect, (ii) Jeffersonian inherent moral principles that are claimed to be divinely endowed, or (iii) something else. If something else, please elaborate.

The laws of nature refer to the immutable laws that do not change with time. This is not about moral principles that are either unspoken or spoken agreements of what is considered right and wrong within a particular culture.

Next further state that "we can prevent war and crime BECAUSE we don't have free will" -- which I understand to be one of the conclusions of your father's work. This statement confuses me. If we accept that humans lack Free Will and are governed by the laws of nature such that all human thought and activity at any given instant is the result of all antecedent activity at that given instant, then how can anyone do anything other than whatever it is that the antecedent activity causes -- which may or may not include engaging in war. Stated different, if you "know" that Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can "we" "prevent" (or mandate) anything other than whatever it is that nature compels? Indeed, if Determinism is true and that humans lack Free Will, how can anything humans think or do have any meaning whatsoever.

It is true that at any given instant a person cannot do other than whatever it is that they are compelled to do (for now, I want to leave out the phrase "antecedent activity" which goes back to the conventional definition of past causes present, which is the definition that is being tweaked to make it more accurate.

Finally, you conclude the summary of your position with the following two assertions: (i) "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about" and (ii) "This can be empirically tested, which is the ultimate proof." With respect to those two assertions, I offer the following questions and observations.

First of all, and addressing only the statement "If man's will was free, this world I talk about could not come about", are you arguing that because you believe that the existence of Free Will would preclude the peaceful existence you strive to attain, it must be that the peaceful existence is attainable as a consequence of truth of Determinism?

Yes, that is true. As a consequence of our understanding of the MEANING OF DETERMINISM, we can prevent from coming back that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary. The belief in free will has been the cornerstone of our entire criminal justice system. How could we justify just desert (justice served) if we believed that a person had no choice but to do what he did? We use blame and punishment as a means to control behavior, but so far, it's only been a partial deterrent. It's no surprise people would be resistant to hearing how we can better our world when this "better world" lies beyond the framework of modern-day thinking. The author could only hope that people could contain their skepticism enough to learn what his discovery was all about. to be cont...

If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

 

[steve_bank]

Past, present, and future are convenient abstractions. ]

When making a measurement at a point in time there are physical limits as to how narrow the tie widow can be. Theoretically 'now'' could be expressed as a limit. The present is the the limit as dt goes to zero, dt meaning time in interval. Nothing can change in zero time.

The observed reality is continuous change and motion. Atoms in a 'solid' are in constant change,each atom is moving around in place.

Get rid of causality and you have to explain how an effect can occur without a cause.

And again a deterministic system is not an example e of determinism.

In the last systems text I read the top level system category is chaotic. Under chaotic are deterministic and probabilistic.

Local weather is a chaotic system. Variables can not be known with sufficient accuracy to make long term predictions. There are video examples of chaotic systems, the multiple link pendulum.

Deterministic means given N variables, knowing N-1 variables the last variable is competently determined by the other variables with a single predicable value..

Given distance = velocity x time knowing any two of the three variables the third is completely determined.

Probabilistic is tossing a six sided die. Toss a die and there is no deterministic eqaution to predict exactly what the next result will be. There is a probability of 1/6.

Whether the entire universe seen and unseen is deterministic is unknowable.

As fr as we can tell so far causality does not necessarily infer philosophical determinism.

Chaotic, deterministic, and probabilistic systems heer on Earth are all causal.

Every statement in the post above is 100% correct from the perspective of math, science and engineering -- in their current state. And, even from a philosophical perspective, I completely agree with the following statement:

"Whether the entire universe seen and unseen is deterministic is unknowable."​

Aside from the above-quoted sentence, and outside the province of mathematical equations and logic problems, however, very little, if anything, is provably correct to a certainty, and just about anything may be proven to be wrong in the distant future and/or actually be wrong without regard to the ability or inability of anyone to prove it to be so.

While I could go through all of the other sentences in the post in the same manner as below, I will take what I view to be the easiest statement as an example:

Probabilistic is tossing a six sided die. Toss a die and there is no deterministic eqaution to predict exactly what the next result will be. There is a probability of 1/6.​

Again, from a practical perspective, this is a correct statement of the best math, science and engineering currently available. It is, however, not necessarily true forever. How many incredibly complex equations that have been developed in the past 100 years were once perceived to be impossible? How can it be said with certainty that an equation will never be developed that can calculate, to a certainty, the roll of the dice.

Moreover, even if accepted as absolutely true, the statement is about predictability of dice rolls and not about the conditions that actually bring about the results of the roll and/or whether the result is inexorable before it occurs. Indeed, when properly understood, the philosophical concept of Determinism supports the proposition that the future roll of the dice is inherently unknowable (i.e., not predictable to a certainty) despite the fact that the result is inexorable before it occurs.

To repeat, I accept the truth of every statement in the post from the perspective of math, science and engineering. I also see the value of those endeavors and in understanding the truth of the statements from that perspective. This forum, however, is called "Philosophy -- Other Philosophical Discussions" and not "Math, Science and Engineering."

What is sound?

A sound argument is a syllogism with no logical fallacies and the concussion follows from premises.

Given the validity of premises the concision follows as true but not absolute truth. Truth only in context of stated premises.

As free will, determinism, compatabilism are arbitrary definitions with no 'practical' demonstration possible the arguments are all hypothetical.

I was responding to your repeated referral 'how deterministic systems work'.

That the universe is deterministic is hmmm... let me think .. 'facts not in evidence'?

Sop, what I look for is soetgng like

Definition 1 is xxx with yyy consequences.
Definition 2 is xxx with yyy consequences.

To me that is good reasoning. You ed use ill defined terms, poor reasoning.

As to refusing to engage with some because they are beneath you Esquire the old saying 'Well, la de da'

As to hypothetical debate your posts arer exceersvely wordy and lack substance. To me whimsy.

And in engineering hypothetical debate is part of the game at times. Quite routine.


But then this is an informal forum.

 

[peacegirl]

BSilvEsq said:
If so, I believe there is a logical fallacy in that reasoning, as it could be the case that the peaceful existence is not attainable no matter what. In other words, it may be that the absence of Free Will is a necessary, but insufficient condition to the attainment of peace. It may be that there also is some other condition that is other that the truth of Determinism. That is aside from the fact that I do not follow the basis for the truth statement that a peaceful condition is not attainable if humans have Free Will -- though I do tend to agree that is the case.

In any event, if I can trouble you to do so, could you please answer the following three questions:

1. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), how can humans bring about anything other than whatever it is determined to occur by antecedent activity that already has occurred, is the only activity that could have occurred, and cannot be otherwise?

2. If Determinism is true and humans lack Free Will (as you claim to know to a certainty and not simply believe), what does it even mean to empirically test a hypothesis? As Anton Zeilenger has written (and I agree -- without agreeing that Free Will does, in fact, exist):

[W]e always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform. In the experiment on the entangled pair of photons, Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles. It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.”

Nicolas Gisin has similarly written:

[N]ot only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought.

Within my own conceptualization of Determinism (if true):

If Causal Determinism is true, we cannot trust our thoughts to be representative of reality, because our thoughts are simply the inexorable effects of antecedent activity in the universe, and are the only thoughts we can have. If our thoughts happen to correlate with reality, it is purely by happenstance. If Causal Determinism is true, what seem to be our thoughts are meaningless noise in the universe.

Moreover. even within science, there are the combined limitations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems, the observer effect, and other human and inherent limitations of empirical observation, which acknowledge the theoretical impossibility of obtaining a certain, complete, and precise understanding of the universe — at least from within the universe. Yet another way to consider the issue is through the mystical eyes of Swami Vivekananda, who wrote that “[e]very attempt to solve the laws of causation, time, and space would be futile, because the very attempt would have to be made by taking for granted the existence of these three.”

More fundamentally, in order for science (or any other human endeavor) to prove anything, there must be the possibility of something being right or wrong, correct or incorrect, true or false, or valid or invalid. Indeed, science is based on the notion that there is a discernible reality that can be observed through empirical endeavors. But, in a universe that is entirely deterministic, there is no right or wrong, no correct or incorrect, no true or false, and no valid or invalid. In a deterministic universe, there Just Is What There Is and There Is Not What There Is Not.

3. All right, I am game -- what is the empirical proof of which you speak?

With hope, your answer to my questions will provide some further clarity that will be of help to me in understanding what you have posted.

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