According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[BSilvEsq]

Appreciate the follow up and feedback.

My pleasure.

I am just stating what I learned in college 40 years ago and have continued to read in various philosophy texts and source materials for the past 40 years.

Ok. You say:

(iv) Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

This isn't just wrong, it's utter nonsense and demonstrates that you really don't understand the terms you're using.

To try and clarify:

1) do you accept that compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism,

AND

2) you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with free will

If you think that either of these statements is not in line with current mainstream thinking/debate then please provide supporting evidence.

Without commenting upon, much less agreeing with the unwarranted and disrespectful preamble to the two questions posed above, my answer to the two questions is the following:

1. Yes

2. No

My turn to apologise. I mis-typed my question #2. It should have said:

2) do you accept that libertarian free will is not compatible with determinism

On the assumption that you do accept that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism, it follows that compatibilist free will and libertarian free will are mutually exclusive. That being the case, how are we to make sense of your previous claim that:

Compatibilists believe that Libertarian Free Will and Hard Determinism can coexist

Bearing in mind that  Hard Determinism is the view that determinism is true and that it is incompatible with free will (in other words, the hard determinist doesn't believe any form of free will can exist), your statement above makes contradictory claims and I can't make any sense of it.

Thanks for the ongoing dialogue. I also appreciate from your reply that I need to be more crisp in my terminology.

To begin, my answer to your corrected second question is "Yes" -- which is the sole point I have been making throughout my time on this board.

While I accept that you and I may assign different meanings to the terms we have been using, I am trying my best to adhere to the historical definitional descriptions found in philosophical discourse respecting these subjects (as opposed to the newly crafted definitions of popular media and social media that have more recently crept into the discussion).

As I understand the historical philosophical inquiry, the terms "Determinism" and "Free Will" have the same meaning when applied to Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Hard Determinism, and Libertarianism. The only difference between Incompatibilism, on the ne hand, and Hard Determinism and Libertarianism, on the other hand, is that Incompatibilism is agnostic as to whether Determinism is true or Free Will Exists, while Hard Determinism incorporates the factual beliefs that Determinism is true and Free Will does not exist and Libertarianism incorporates the factual beliefs that Determinism is false and Free Will does exist. Again, however, all four "isms" utilize the same definitions of Determinism and Free Will, and all but Compatibilism posit that Determinism and Free Will are incompatible.

As I understand the historical philosophical inquiry, the only "ism" that utilizes a different definition of Determinism and Free Will is Soft Determinism, which seeks to harmonize the two concepts by refining them in a way that does not violate the laws of logic.

Incompatibilists, Hard Determinists and Libertarians disagree with the propriety of the definitions of Determinism and Free Will employed by Soft Determinists. In principle, however, Incompatibilists, Hard Determinists and Libertarians ought not to have any problem with the logic of Soft Determinism if the definitions of of Determinism and Free Will employed by Soft Determinists are accepted as correct for purposes of the discussion.

The only irreconcilable difference among the five "isms" is the logical divide between Compatibilism, on the one hand, and the other four "isms," on the other hand, because Compatibilism is the only paradigm that claims that Determinism and Free Will -- as defined by all "isms" other than Soft Determinism -- can be harmonized without changing their definitions (as does Soft Determinism to avoid the logical conundrum).

The following chart from the introductory chapter of the 2003 book "Freedom and Determinism" by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier," published by M.I.T., crystalizes the distinctions I have been trying to explain:



It is necessary to read the book (and other historical philosophical works on this subject) to see that the meaning of Determinism and Freedom is the same for all but Soft Determinism, which employs different definitions in order to bridge the logical division between Compatibilism, on the one hand, and Incompatibilism, Hard Determinism and Libertarianism, on the other hand -- and, in so doing, satisfies none of the other four "isms" any more than my aunt used to satisfy her guests who were divided over their preferences for caffeinated or decaffeinated coffee by offering only one urn that contained a blend of the two that satisfied nobody but my aunt.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

I'm struggling to follow your train of thought here. You seem to be saying that a compatibilist that holds that determinism is true is in some (obvious?) sense an incompatibilist? Is this what you're saying? If so, can you explain further?

Does the following help?

If determinism denies that there is macrophysical indeterminateness (such as the macrophysical indeterminateness which persons think they experience/sense/observe when they decide/select/choose), then determinism is incompatible with macrophysical indeterminateness.

If compatibilism is a determinism, then compatibilism denies that there is macrophysical indeterminateness (such as the macrophysical indeterminateness which persons think they experience/sense/observe when they decide/select/choose), and compatibilism is incompatible with macrophysical indeterminateness.

If compatibilism is incompatible with macrophysical indeterminateness, then compatibilists are incompatibilists with regards to the matter of macrophysical indeterminateness.

The stage is now set for considerations into whether or in what way(s) determinism is or is not compatible with what gets referred to as human will.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

It really is a modal fallacy to assign eternalness to momentary phenomena.

The non-static spacetime viewpoint does no such thing.

Per the non-static spacetime viewpoint, there is no eternal is.

It is the assumption of there being no macrophysical indeterminateness at any spacetime location which renders determinateness eternal. The conjoining of the non-static spacetime viewpoint with the determinateness that is eternally devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness leaves all "momentary phenomena" as being non-eternal although never not-determinate before, while, and after each phenomenon is actual.

 

[Jarhyn]

The non-static spacetime viewpoint does no such thing.

Yes. It does.

It is the literal taking of a metaphysical view, and as we have discussed, that's taking it outside the mode of actuality and into the mode of possibility.

It. Is. A. Modal. Fallacy. (Specifically to apply eternalness to momentary instances of phenomena).

A better label might be trying to assign "positionlessness" to a position.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

(Specifically to apply eternalness to momentary instances of phenomena).

That is NOT being done.

The viewpoint at hand has it that no phenomena are eternal; no phenomena within spacetime are eternally actual. If you think that there is never any macrophysical indeterminateness, then you posit eternal determinateness - wittingly or otherwise.

Eternal determinateness in no sense necessitates that phenomena are eternally actual. For that matter, eternal determinateness in no way necessitates any actuality whatsoever. Determinateness describes; it does not do or necessitate. Utter and/or eternal determinateness describes the assumption which holds that there never is actual macrophysical indeterminateness; that determinateness also does not do or necessitate.

Do you think that there is ever actual macrophysical indeterminateness?