According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[peacegirl]

Here is the next part, but I can't leave out sections. If people don't want to read this chapter because they don't like me cutting and pasting, then by all means, they shouldn't read it.

CHAPTER ONE: THE HIDING PLACE

Before I show how it is possible to resolve the implications, it is necessary to repeat that I will proceed in a step-by-step manner. This dragon has been guarding an invisible key and door for many years, and this could never be made visible except for someone who saw these undeniable relations. If, therefore, you would like to learn that Man Does Not Stand Alone, as Morrison understood from his scientific observations, and that God, this Supreme Intelligence, is a mathematical reality of infinite wisdom, then what do you say we begin our voyage that will literally change the entire world. We are not interested in opinions and theories regardless of where they originate, just in the truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own free will (of our own desire because we want to) is done absolutely and positively not of our own free will. Remember, by proving that determinism, as the opposite of free will, is true, we also establish undeniable proof that free will is false. So, without further ado, let us begin.

The dictionary defines free will as the power of self-determination, regarded as a special faculty that enables one to choose good and evil without compulsion or necessity. Made, done, or given of one’s own free choice; voluntary. But this is only part of the definition since it is implied that man can be held responsible, blamed and punished for doing what is considered wrong or evil since it is believed he could have chosen otherwise. In other words, it is believed that man has the ability to do other than what he does if he wants to and therefore can be held responsible for doing what he is not supposed to do. These very words reveal the fallacy of this belief to those who have mathematical perception. Man is held responsible not for doing what he desires to do or considers right, better, or good for himself under his particular set of circumstances, but for doing what others judge to be wrong or evil, and they feel absolutely certain he could have acted otherwise had he wanted to. Isn’t this the theme of free will? But take note. Supposing the alternative judged right for him by others is not desired by himself because of conditions known only to him, what then? Does this make his will free? It is obvious that a great part of our lives offers no choice; consequently, this is not my consideration. For example, free will does not hold any person responsible for what he does in an unconscious state like hypnosis, nor does it believe that man can be blamed for being born, growing, sleeping, eating, defecating, urinating, etc.; therefore, it is unnecessary to prove that these actions, which come under the normal compulsion of living, are beyond control.

Suppose a father is desperately in need of work to feed his family but cannot find a job. Let us assume he is living in the United States and, for various reasons, doesn’t come under the consideration of unemployment compensation or relief and can’t get any more credit for food, clothing, shelter, etc. What is he supposed to do? If he steals a loaf of bread to feed his family, the law can easily punish him by saying he didn’t have to steal if he didn’t want to, which is perfectly true. Others might say stealing is evil, that he could have chosen an option that was good. In this case, almost any other alternative would have sufficed. But supposing this individual preferred stealing because he considered this act good for him in comparison to the evil of asking for charity or further credit because it appeared to him, at that moment, that this was the better choice of the three that were available to him, does this make his will free? It is obvious that he did not have to steal if he didn’t want to, but he wanted to, and it is also obvious that those in law enforcement did not have to punish him if they didn’t want to, but both sides wanted to do what they did under the circumstances.

In reality, we are carried along on the wings of time or life during every moment of our existence and have no say in this matter whatsoever. We cannot stop ourselves from being born and are compelled to either live out our lives the best we can or commit suicide. Is it possible to disagree with this? However, to prove that what we do of our own free will, of our own desire because we want to do it, is also beyond control, it is necessary to employ mathematical (undeniable) reasoning. Therefore, since it is absolutely impossible for man to be both dead and alive at the same time, and since it is absolutely impossible for a person to desire committing suicide unless dissatisfied with life (regardless of the reason), we are given the ability to demonstrate a revealing and undeniable relation.

Every motion, from the beating heart to the slightest reflex action, from all inner to outer movements of the body, indicates that life is never satisfied or content to remain in one position for always, like an inanimate object, which position shall be termed ‘death.’ I shall now call the present moment of time or life here, for the purpose of clarification, and the next moment coming up there. You are now standing on this present moment of time and space called here, and you are given two alternatives: either live or kill yourself; either move to the next spot called there or remain where you are without moving a hair’s breadth by committing suicide.

“I prefer. . .”

Excuse the interruption, but the very fact that you started to answer me or didn’t commit suicide at that moment makes it obvious that you were not satisfied to stay in one position, which is death or here, and prefer moving off that spot to there, which motion is life. Consequently, the motion of life, which is any motion from here to there, is a movement away from that which dissatisfies; otherwise, had you been satisfied to remain here or where you are, you would never have moved to there. Since the motion of life constantly moves away from here to there, which is an expression of dissatisfaction with the present position, it must obviously move constantly in the direction of greater satisfaction. It should be obvious that our desire to live, to move off the spot called here, is determined by a law over which we have no control, because even if we should kill ourselves, we are choosing what gives us greater satisfaction; otherwise, we would not kill ourselves. The truth of the matter is that at any particular moment, the motion of man is not free, for all life obeys this invariable law. He is constantly compelled by his nature to make choices and decisions and to prefer, of whatever options are available during his lifetime, that which he considers better for himself and his set of circumstances. For example, when he found that a discovery like the electric bulb was for his benefit in comparison to candlelight, he was compelled to prefer it, for his motion, just being alive, has always been in the direction of greater satisfaction, which is the direction life is compelled to take. Consequently, during every moment of man’s progress, he always did what he had to do because he had no choice. Although this demonstration proves that man’s will is not free, your mind may not be accustomed to grasping these type relations, so I will elaborate.

Suppose you wanted very much of two alternatives, A, which we shall designate as something considered evil by society, instead of B, the humdrum of your regular routine. Could you possibly pick B at that particular moment of time if A is preferred as a better alternative when nothing could dissuade you from your decision, not even the threat of the law? What if the clergy, given two alternatives, choose A, which shall now represent something considered good, instead of B, that which is judged evil; would it be possible for them to prefer the latter when the former is available as an alternative? If it is utterly impossible to choose B in this comparison, are they not compelled, by their very nature, to prefer A? And how can they be free when the favorable difference between A and B is the compulsion of their choice and the motion of life in the direction of greater satisfaction? To be free, according to the definition of free will, man would be able to prefer one of two alternatives, either the one he wants or the one he doesn’t want, which is an absolute impossibility because selecting what he doesn’t want when what he does want is available as an alternative is a motion in the direction of dissatisfaction. In other words, if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible.

 

[peacegirl]

CHAPTER ONE CONT...

To give you a more familiar example, if it were possible that B could be selected even though A was the desirable choice, it would permit a woman to spend on a dress she doesn’t prefer when a dress she does prefer is available, or to pick from a selection of dresses the one she finds the least desirable. Let us imagine, for a moment, that this woman is late for a business meeting and must quickly choose between two dresses. If both are undesirable, she is compelled to select the dress that is the least undesirable of the two; consequently, her choice in this comparison is the preferable alternative. Obviously, she has other options; she could leave both dresses and wear something from home, continue to shop and call in late, etc. This is a hypothetical situation for the purpose of demonstrating that once she decides to buy a dress as a solution to her problem — and regardless of the factors that contribute to her final decision — she is compelled to prefer the dress that gives every indication of being the best possible choice under the circumstances.

For example, if cost is an important consideration, she may opt for the less expensive dress because it fits within her price range. Though she would find great satisfaction seeing herself in the more expensive dress, she finds greater satisfaction choosing the dress that appeals to her the least; therefore, her preference is based on what is “good” for her in comparison to the “evil” of being short of money. This is where a misunderstanding could arise. Moving toward greater satisfaction does not mean we are always satisfied; it simply means that we are compelled to prefer what we believe to be the best possible choice of the options available to us. [Note: This also does not mean we have considered all possible options, only those that have come to mind or have been brought to our attention at any given moment. Nor does it mean that our choices are unlimited, for the availability of choices depends on a myriad of cultural, economic, and social factors.] After coming home, she may have a change of heart and wish she had splurged on the more expensive dress. She may then decide to go back to the store to make an exchange, or she may decide just to keep the dress because returning it involves too much time and effort making this the least preferable choice. Each moment presents a new set of alternatives, but always in the direction of greater satisfaction.

“Is that it? You mean there is nothing else, and this is supposed to satisfy me? Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that other people are just as confused as me. Frankly, you could never prove by me that man’s will is not free simply because I can’t follow your reasoning. Isn’t there something else you can add to prove your equation, just as we can prove that two from six leaves four because four plus two equals six?”

To satisfy you, I shall put this to a mathematical test for further proof and clarification. Imagine that you were taken prisoner in wartime for espionage and condemned to death but mercifully given a choice between two exits: A is the painless hemlock of Socrates, while B is death by having your head held under water. The letters A and B, representing small or large differences, are compared. The comparison is absolutely necessary to know which is preferable. The difference that is considered favorable, regardless of the reason, is the compulsion of greater satisfaction desire is forced to take, which makes one of them an impossible choice in this comparison simply because it gives less satisfaction under the circumstances. Consequently, since B is an impossible choice, man is not free to choose A. Is it humanly possible, provided no other conditions are introduced to affect your decision, to prefer exit B if A is offered as an alternative?

“Yes, if this meant that those I loved would not be harmed in any way.”

“Well, if this was your preference under these conditions, could you prefer the other alternative?”

“No, I couldn’t, but this is ridiculous because you really haven’t given me any choice.”

“You most certainly do have a choice, and if your will is free, you should be able to choose B just as well as A, or A just as well as B. In other words, if B is considered the greater evil in this comparison of alternatives, one is compelled, completely beyond control, to prefer A. It is impossible for B to be selected in this comparison (although it could be chosen over something still worse) as long as A is available as an alternative. Consequently, since B is an impossible choice, you are not free to choose A, for your preference is a natural compulsion of the direction of life over which you have absolutely no control. Let me explain this in another way. Once it is understood that life is compelled to move in the direction of satisfaction, and if two such alternatives were presented to you as in the example above, what choice would you possibly have but to accept the lesser of two evils? Since it is absolutely impossible to prefer something considered still worse in your opinion, regardless of what it is, are you not compelled, completely beyond your control in this set of circumstances, to prefer A? And since the definition of free will states that man can choose good over evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion since B was evil, as the worse alternative, and could not be selected in this comparison of possibilities?

The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences; otherwise, there would be no choice in the matter at all, as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word ‘choice’ is very misleading, for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration, he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved. Choosing, or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature, but to reiterate this important point, he is compelled to prefer of alternatives that which he considers better for himself, and though he chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?”

“I agree with all this, but how many times in your life have you remarked, ‘You give me no choice’ or ‘It makes no difference’?”

 

[BSilvEsq]

This responds to Peacegirl's Post No. 1991 (https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ll-does-not-exist.27739/page-100#post-1326318), which provides an excerpt from her father's book, which is said to present a map of the path to achieving world peace. As stated in the excerpts:

"The first step is to prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, and regardless of any opinions to the contrary, that the will of man is not free.”​

The excerpt in Peacegirl's post consists largely of a fictional colloquy between the author and a rabbi. Aside from the author dubbing himself to be as wise and skillful as Socrates (using the devise of having a third party offer that observation), the colloquy is offered as a proof that it is possible to prove that Free Will does not exist, which the excerpt states to be the first step of the path to world peace.

The way he dialoged has nothing to do with the discovery. You are going to have to separate the two if you are going to get anything out of this book.

Among other problems, the author uses the terms Free Will and Determinism without defining the terms or explaining what the author means by the use of the terms. We all know that different people assign different meanings to these terms, so it is necessary to explain the meanings of the terms in the context of the discussion.

The terms are very clear Steve. If a person could do otherwise given the exact same conditions (which cannot occur because we cannot go back in time), then and only then would his will be free.

Of even greater significance, and separate and apart from the foregoing, the quoted colloquy, if taken at face value, proves that the "first step" of the path to world peace claimed to be shown by the book is impossible to take.

Huh? I don't get what you're saying.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 1​

Without plainly or clearly stating it as a syllogism, the author sets forth the building blocks for the following syllogism:

1. If it is impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is true, it is equally impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false.

2. It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is true.

Therefore

3. It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false.

That is true. We cannot go back in time. If we can, show me how we can do this other than with a time machine.

This syllogism is logically sound based on the stated premises.

Can you put this in a syllogism so I can use it to further the proof? That would be helpful.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 2​

"[A]lthough we can never prove free will true or determinism false, there still exists a possibility of proving determinism true or free will false."

The assertion in Contention No. 2 that is is possible to prove the existence of Free Will is false (putatively by proving that Determinism is true) is a direct contradiction to the conclusion of the syllogism developed in Contention No. 1 that "It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false."

What syllogism is he contradicting? It is possible to prove the existence of free will will always remain a theory. He did not say determinisim, as the opposite of free will, cannot be proven true. These are two separate issues. One, free will cannot be proved because we cannot go back in time. But this does not mean that determinism cannot prove free will, false.

Contention No. 2 also is the result of the fallacy of confusing a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, as explained below with respect to Contention No. 3.

What is a necessary versus a sufficient condition? These are vague terms. This always goes back to the definitions that are conventionally used, which means nothing as far as reality is concerned. Let's concentrate on reality; otherwise, this effort is futile. Anyone can come up with a definition that agrees with their worldview.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 3​

The author offers the following two statements:

“If you could prove that determinism is false, wouldn’t this prove free will, which is the opposite of determinism, true? And didn’t we just prove that it is mathematically impossible to prove free will true, which means that it is absolutely impossible to prove determinism false?”

and

"it is mathematically impossible to prove free will true, which means that it is absolutely impossible to prove determinism false"

Through the foregoing two statements, the author (i) equates the falsification of Determinism with the proof of the truth/existence of Free Will, and (ii) equates the falsification of Free Will with proof of the truth/existence of Determinism. As explained below, the foregoing are both false equivalences -- (i) even within Incompatibilism, which posits the impossibility of the concurrent truth/existence of Determinism and Free Will, and (ii) certainly within Compatibilism, which accepts the possibility of the concurrent truth/existence of Determinism and Free Will.

If you define free will as being able to choose otherwise, and we cannot prove this, then free will will remain a theory. They are not both equivalences. Free will fails to prove itself true. That is not the same thing as determinism proving itself true because it doesn't go back in time, which is necessary for proof. It only suggest that determinism can be proven, which would automatically PROVE FREE WILL, FALSE, considering that they are opposites BY DEFINITION. There is no way that free will is compatible with determinism, even though this pisses compatibilists off. They want to have their cake and eat it too. It's not possible. It's either one or the other BY DEFINITION.

The author bases his false equivalences on the assertion that Free Will "is the opposite" of Determinism. In fact, Free Will and Determinism are not "the opposite" of one another -- not even in Incompatibilism. In logic, A and Not A are the opposite of one another. By the same token, the opposite of Free Will is Not Free Will, and the opposite of Determinism is Not Determinism. But, Free Will is not the opposite of Not Determinism and Determinism is not the opposite of Not Free Will.

Within Incompatibilism, the incompatibility of Determinism and Free Will arises from the fact that the falsity/absence of either is a necessary condition to the truth/existence of the other. But Incompatibilism does not posit that the falsity/absence of Determinism or Free Will is a sufficient condition to the truth/existence of the other. The author's mistake is to equate a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, which is a fallacy that is taught in Logic 101. See, e.g., the discussion at https://www.txst.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/confusion-of-necessary.html and https://www.kaptest.com/study/lsat/...roW87IpgcYFTC8OfNpk5SuzF9FLoq03oQ9l6BnpbbTW8n. As explained in the Kaplan LSAT website:

Understanding Necessary and Sufficient Conditions​

Before delving into the specific characteristics and examples of necessary and sufficient conditions, let’s define and differentiate between the two:

Yes, when discussing this knowledge, the necessary condition is a change in environment, which must be present for these principles to work. Without this environmental condition being applied globally, the desired outcome will be impossible (i.e., world peace) because conflict will continue even though every effort is being made to prevent it.

2. Sufficient Condition: A sufficient condition is a condition that guarantees, by its presence alone, the desired outcome. It is sufficient to bring about the desired result, regardless of any other factors.

Bringng about the desired result may be sufficient in certain instances, but it is insufficient to create the kind of world we all long for on a global scale.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 4​

The author asserts that the path to world peace begins with proof that Free Will does not exist (or is a false construct). Specifically, the author asserts:

"The first step is to prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, and regardless of any opinions to the contrary, that the will of man is not free."​

But, the author has already claimed to provide a mathematical proof that it is impossible to prove the existence of Free Will and has also asserted as an axiom that it is mathematically impossible to disprove something that is incapable of being proved.

We cannot prove that free will exists because we cannot go back in time. Determinism, on the other hand, is capable of being proved.

Thus, whether or not proof of the falsity of Free Will is a necessary condition to achieving world peace (as the author asserts), the author has stated both (i) that such proof is impossible, and (ii) that such proof is possible -- thereby setting his entire thesis upon a foundation that he, himself, has built, which is internally inconsistent and logically incoherent.

Not being able to prove free will is not a necessary condition to achieving world peace. Proving that determinism is true and what this means for our benefit IS a necessary condition. Free will cannot be proven true, but that doesn't mean determinism can't, which has not been demonstrated. It feels to me that you and others are threatened by determinism. No one can even wait to hear the explanation before telling me that the author was inconsistent, which he wasn't.

First, at the conclusion of your comments above, you state:

It feels to me that you and others are threatened by determinism.​

If you have read and understood my posts, you would not make that claim. Indeed, I am confident that the other posters on this thread who vehemently disagree with my posts and chide me for my writing would be among the first to tell you that I am not threatened by Determinism in the least and am one of the most staunch supporters of the possibility of the truth of the paradigm in this thread.

Even, however, if some other person might be threatened by Determinism, they still would be able to evaluate the logic (or lack thereof) of the excerpts from your father's book and offer informed assessments.


Second, as I understand it, your father's argument about the ability to prove that Free Will does not exist turns on the proposition that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another such that the falsity of one necessitates the truth of the other. I further understand that your father views Determinism and Free Will to be the opposite of one another because your father views Determinism and Compatibilism are incompatible with one another. In fact, if Determinism and Free Will are Incompatible (but not opposite), then proof of the truth of one establishes the falsity of the other, but proof of the falsity of one does not establish the truth of the other.

Since you do not understand the point about the the fallacy of confusing a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, it may be helpful if I were to state the fallacy of your father's argument a different way -- namely that it is a fallacy to deduce that two things are the opposite of one another from the fact that they are incompatible with one another. It is valid to deduce that two things are incompatible with one another from the given fact that the two things are the opposite of one another. It is not, however, valid to deduce that two things are the opposite of one another from the given fact that the two things are incompatible with one another. To move from the first proposition to the second proposition is a false equivalence.

I am not aware of any definition of Determinism or Free Will by which they are "the opposite" of one another. Compatibilists argue that the truth Determinism and existence of Free Will can occur concurrently, Incompatibilists argue that the concurrent truth of Determinism and existence of Free will is not logically possible, but neither Compatibilists nor Incompatibilists argue that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another. And neither you nor your father offer a definition of Free Will that can be used as a basis for the assertion that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another.

Again, the incompatibility of two things does not make them the opposite of one another. Take, for example, the two assertions that (i) I have one pet, and it is a Dog, and (ii) I have one pet, and it is a Cat. Plainly, the two statements are incompatible and cannot both be correct, as the same animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat -- at least not as we commonly define Dog and Cat. The animal may be either a Dog or a Cat, or the animal may be neither a Dog nor a Cat, but the animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat. The foregoing does not mean, however, that Dog and Cat are the opposite of one another -- they are not. The opposite of Dog is Not a Dog, and the Opposite of Cat is Not a Cat, but Dog and Cat are not the opposite of one another simply because neither is the other. Rather, they are simply sufficiently different that one animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat. Thus, proof that a given animal is Not a Dog does not establish that the animal is Cat, and proof that the animal is Not a Cat does not establish that the animal is Dog. It may be that the animal is both Not a Dog and Not a Cat -- or, stated different, neither a Dog nor a Cat.

The same is true of Determinism and Free Will. Proof that Not Free Will is true establishes that Free Will is false, but does not establish that Determinism is true. Proof that Not Determinism is true establishes that Determinism is false, but does not establish that Free Will is true. It may be the case that both Free Will and Determinism are false. The two concepts are incompatible (to an Incompatibilist at least) but they are not the opposite of one another. And, if you or your father claim differently, you need to put forth definitions of Determinism and Free Will that are both mutually exhaustive and mutually exclusive.


Third, and as alluded to above, I claimed that the excerpts from your father's book did not define Free Will or Determinism. In response, you offer the following:

If a person could do otherwise given the exact same conditions (which cannot occur because we cannot go back in time), then and only then would his will be free.

Without providing a definition of Free Will, you have set forth a necessary condition to Free Will -- that a person must be able to do otherwise given the exact same conditions. I would take it a bit further and say that the definition of Free Will is that it is the ability of a person to make a choice between at least two different alternatives, which requires both (i) the existence of at least two different alternatives, and (ii) agency on the part of the person to make a free and deliberate choice between or among the alternatives. Thus, the mere fact of being able to do otherwise is merely a necessary condition to the existence of Free Will, but it is not a sufficient condition. [There is that logical concept again, which is critical to understand to engage in this dialogue].

Notably, you also slip in the parenthetical that we cannot prove the existence of Free Will because we cannot go back in time. I am not sure I agree that the inability to go back in time precludes the ability to prove the existence of Free Will, but I am willing to accept the truth of the proposition that we cannot prove the existence of Free Will without accepting the asserted reason given for that truth of that proposition.

As best I can tell, you still have not provided a definition of Determinism, which is a term that has more than one meaning to different people -- as you can see from reading various posts on this board. Without that definition, it is not possible to evaluate the claim that Free Will and Determinism are the opposite of one another or even that they are Incompatible. And, without being able to evaluate the claim that Free Will and Determinism are the opposite of one another, it is not possible to evaluate (i) any supposed proof of the truth of Determinism (which is not provided in any of the excerpts or summarized or explained in any of your posts), much less (ii) the truth of the assertion that proof of the truth of Determinism is, in and of itself, proof of the non-existence of Free Will.

As an Incompatibilist, I do agree that proof of the truth of Determinism would, in and of itself, be proof of the non-existence of Free Will, but that is based on the definition of Determinism that I use, and I am relatively confident that your father uses a different definition of Determinism than I use because the truth of Determinism cannot be proved or falsified when the definition I use for Determinism is used.

As I have written elsewhere, because the truth of Determinism cannot be proved or falsified when the definition of Determinism I use is used, the existence of Free Will similarly cannot be proved or disproved using that same definition of Determinism. In a nutshell, if Determinism (as i define it) were true, then there would be no such thing as proof of anything (as explained by Gisin and Zeilenger). Accordingly, because the truth of Determinism cannot be disproved, we cannot trust any putative proof of the existence of Free Will, the non-existence of Free Will, or anything else -- including the truth or falsity of Determinism, itself. I understand this is paradoxical, but it is what it is, and as Niels Bohr said, the identification of the paradox gives us "some hope of making progress." See, e.g., https://www.forbes.com/sites/chador...fer-hope-for-progress-in-quantum-foundations/.

Fourth, you repeatedly claim that your father's work is not taken seriously because he lacked a formal degree. I disagree. Many brilliant people have advanced important discoveries without a formal education, and many formally educated people have advanced arguments that are nonsensical and/or juvenile (as some of the posters on this thread say of me). From what I can tell, the reason your father's work is not taken seriously is because it is too difficult to read (because of the style in which it is written and not because of its complexity or novelty) and it appears from the excerpts you have provided to be based on unstated assumptions about the meaning of undefined words and arguments that contain logical fallacies (at least when the words in the arguments are given their common meaning in the absence of your father offering a contrary definition).

Again, I ask you, in your own words, to provide a summary of the earth-shattering lesson of your father's book with which you are more familiar than anyone else. If you are unable to do that, how do you expect anyone else to be capable of understanding the book and seeing the wisdom of its content?

 

[peacegirl]

CHAPTER ONE CONT.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 1​

Without plainly or clearly stating it as a syllogism, the author sets forth the building blocks for the following syllogism:

1. If it is impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is true, it is equally impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false.

2. It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is true.

Therefore

3. It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false.

That is true. We cannot go back in time. If we can, show me how we can do this other than with a time machine.

This syllogism is logically sound based on the stated premises.

Can you put this in a syllogism so I can use it to further the proof? That would be helpful.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 2​

"[A]lthough we can never prove free will true or determinism false, there still exists a possibility of proving determinism true or free will false."

The assertion in Contention No. 2 that is is possible to prove the existence of Free Will is false (putatively by proving that Determinism is true) is a direct contradiction to the conclusion of the syllogism developed in Contention No. 1 that "It is Impossible to prove the existence of Free Will is false."

What syllogism is he contradicting? It is possible to prove the existence of free will will always remain a theory. He did not say determinisim, as the opposite of free will, cannot be proven true. These are two separate issues. One, free will cannot be proved because we cannot go back in time. But this does not mean that determinism cannot prove free will, false.

Contention No. 2 also is the result of the fallacy of confusing a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, as explained below with respect to Contention No. 3.

What is a necessary versus a sufficient condition? These are vague terms. This always goes back to the definitions that are conventionally used, which means nothing as far as reality is concerned. Let's concentrate on reality; otherwise, this effort is futile. Anyone can come up with a definition that agrees with their worldview.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 3​

The author offers the following two statements:

“If you could prove that determinism is false, wouldn’t this prove free will, which is the opposite of determinism, true? And didn’t we just prove that it is mathematically impossible to prove free will true, which means that it is absolutely impossible to prove determinism false?”

and

"it is mathematically impossible to prove free will true, which means that it is absolutely impossible to prove determinism false"

Through the foregoing two statements, the author (i) equates the falsification of Determinism with the proof of the truth/existence of Free Will, and (ii) equates the falsification of Free Will with proof of the truth/existence of Determinism. As explained below, the foregoing are both false equivalences -- (i) even within Incompatibilism, which posits the impossibility of the concurrent truth/existence of Determinism and Free Will, and (ii) certainly within Compatibilism, which accepts the possibility of the concurrent truth/existence of Determinism and Free Will.

If you define free will as being able to choose otherwise, and we cannot prove this, then free will will remain a theory. They are not both equivalences. Free will fails to prove itself true. That is not the same thing as determinism proving itself true because it doesn't go back in time, which is necessary for proof. It only suggest that determinism can be proven, which would automatically PROVE FREE WILL, FALSE, considering that they are opposites BY DEFINITION. There is no way that free will is compatible with determinism, even though this pisses compatibilists off. They want to have their cake and eat it too. It's not possible. It's either one or the other BY DEFINITION.

The author bases his false equivalences on the assertion that Free Will "is the opposite" of Determinism. In fact, Free Will and Determinism are not "the opposite" of one another -- not even in Incompatibilism. In logic, A and Not A are the opposite of one another. By the same token, the opposite of Free Will is Not Free Will, and the opposite of Determinism is Not Determinism. But, Free Will is not the opposite of Not Determinism and Determinism is not the opposite of Not Free Will.

Within Incompatibilism, the incompatibility of Determinism and Free Will arises from the fact that the falsity/absence of either is a necessary condition to the truth/existence of the other. But Incompatibilism does not posit that the falsity/absence of Determinism or Free Will is a sufficient condition to the truth/existence of the other. The author's mistake is to equate a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, which is a fallacy that is taught in Logic 101. See, e.g., the discussion at https://www.txst.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/confusion-of-necessary.html and https://www.kaptest.com/study/lsat/...roW87IpgcYFTC8OfNpk5SuzF9FLoq03oQ9l6BnpbbTW8n. As explained in the Kaplan LSAT website:

Understanding Necessary and Sufficient Conditions​

Before delving into the specific characteristics and examples of necessary and sufficient conditions, let’s define and differentiate between the two:

Yes, when discussing this knowledge, the necessary condition is a change in environment, which must be present for these principles to work. Without this environmental condition being applied globally, the desired outcome will be impossible (i.e., world peace) because conflict will continue even though every effort is being made to prevent it.

2. Sufficient Condition: A sufficient condition is a condition that guarantees, by its presence alone, the desired outcome. It is sufficient to bring about the desired result, regardless of any other factors.

Bringng about the desired result may be sufficient in certain instances, but it is insufficient to create the kind of world we all long for on a global scale.

When these principles are applied, they will be sufficient to create the kind of world we want, not just in certain instances, but across the globe.

AUTHOR'S CONTENTION NO. 4​

The author asserts that the path to world peace begins with proof that Free Will does not exist (or is a false construct). Specifically, the author asserts:

"The first step is to prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, and regardless of any opinions to the contrary, that the will of man is not free."​

But, the author has already claimed to provide a mathematical proof that it is impossible to prove the existence of Free Will and has also asserted as an axiom that it is mathematically impossible to disprove something that is incapable of being proved.

That is not what he said. He said it is possible to disprove free will, as the opposite of determinism, if determinism is, in fact, proven true. You should read that tract again.

We cannot prove that free will exists because we cannot go back in time. Determinism, on the other hand, is capable of being proved.

Thus, whether or not proof of the falsity of Free Will is a necessary condition to achieving world peace (as the author asserts), the author has stated both (i) that such proof is impossible, and (ii) that such proof is possible -- thereby setting his entire thesis upon a foundation that he, himself, has built, which is internally inconsistent and logically incoherent.

No it is not. We cannot prove free will true, but we can still prove it false if determinism turns out to be true.
“Let me show you that it is not an opinion. If you could prove that determinism is false, wouldn’t this prove free will, which is the opposite of determinism, true? And didn’t we just prove that it is mathematically impossible to prove free will true, which means that it is absolutely impossible to prove determinism false?”


“I see what you mean, and again, I apologize for thinking this was a matter of opinion.”

“This means that we have arrived at another bit of mathematical knowledge, and that is, although we can never prove free will true or determinism false, there still exists a possibility of proving determinism true or free will false.

Not being able to prove free will is not a necessary condition to achieving world peace. Proving that determinism is true and what this means for our benefit IS a necessary condition. Free will cannot be proven true, but that doesn't mean determinism can't, which has not been demonstrated. It feels to me that you and others are threatened by determinism. No one can even wait to hear the explanation before telling me that the author was inconsistent, which he wasn't.

First, at the conclusion of your comments above, you state:

It feels to me that you and others are threatened by determinism.​

If you have read and understood my posts, you would not make that claim. Indeed, I am confident that the other posters on this thread who vehemently disagree with my posts and chide me for my writing would be among the first to tell you that I am not threatened by Determinism in the least and am one of the most staunch supporters of the possibility of the truth of the paradigm in this thread.

It seemed that you lean toward determinism but still hold onto compatibilism, throwing free will into the mix. That's why I said what I said.

Even, however, if some other person might be threatened by Determinism, they still would be able to evaluate the logic (or lack thereof) of the excerpts from your father's book and offer informed assessments.

You are 100% right.

Second, as I understand it, your father's argument about the ability to prove that Free Will does not exist turns on the proposition that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another such that the falsity of one necessitates the truth of the other.

Yes, that is true. If we could not have done otherwise (determinism), free will would be false because it states we could have done otherwise given the exact same conditions. It is the proof of determinism that makes free will false, as its opposite. The two, given the definitions used in this debate (not the compatibilist definition), one necessitates the falsity of the other.

I further understand that your father views Determinism and Free Will to be the opposite of one another because your father views Determinism and Compatibilism are incompatible with one another.

Since you do not understand the point about the the fallacy of confusing a necessary condition with a sufficient condition, it may be helpful if I were to state the fallacy of your father's argument a different way -- namely that it is a fallacy to deduce that two things are the opposite of one another from the fact that they are incompatible with one another. It is valid to deduce that two things are incompatible with one another from the given fact that the two things are the opposite of one another.

He never said that two things are the opposite of one another from the fact that they are incompatible with one another. He stated the latter.

It is not, however, valid to deduce that two things are the opposite of one another from the given fact that the two things are incompatible with one another. To move from the first proposition to the second proposition is a false equivalence.

He never said the former so I'm not sure what you're getting at. The two things are incompatible with one another from the given fact that the two things are the opposite of one another.

I am not aware of any definition of Determinism or Free Will by which they are "the opposite" of one another. Compatibilists argue that the truth Determinism and existence of Free Will can occur concurrently, Incompatibilists argue that the concurrent truth of Determinism and existence of Free will is not logically possible, but neither Compatibilists nor Incompatibilists argue that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another. And neither you nor your father offer a definition of Free Will that can be used as a basis for the assertion that Determinism and Free Will are the opposite of one another.

Again, the incompatibility of two things does not make them the opposite of one another.

Again, you are accusing him of saying that if two things are incompatible, that means they are the opposite of one another, which he did not say.

Take, for example, the two assertions that (i) I have one pet, and it is a Dog, and (ii) I have one pet, and it is a Cat. Plainly, the two statements are incompatible and cannot both be correct, as the same animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat -- at least not as we commonly define Dog and Cat. The animal may be either a Dog or a Cat, or the animal may be neither a Dog nor a Cat, but the animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat. The foregoing does not mean, however, that Dog and Cat are the opposite of one another -- they are not. The opposite of Dog is Not a Dog, and the Opposite of Cat is Not a Cat, but Dog and Cat are not the opposite of one another simply because neither is the other. Rather, they are simply sufficiently different that one animal cannot be both a Dog and a Cat. Thus, proof that a given animal is Not a Dog does not establish that the animal is Cat, and proof that the animal is Not a Cat establishes does not establish that the animal is Dog. It may be that the animal is both Not a Dog and Not a Cat -- or, stated different, neither a Cat nor a Dog.

The same is true of Determinism Free Will. Proof that Not Free Will is true establishes that Free Will is false, but does not establish that Determinism is true.

He did not say that free will being false establishes that determinism is true. If determinism is found to be true in its own right, it establishes the falseness of free will, as its opposite. I don't know if I answered this to your satisfaction, but I'll keep trying as long as the discussion remains civil.

Proof that Not Determinism is true establishes that Determinism is false, but does not establish that Free Will is true. It may also be the case that both Free Will and Determinism are false. The two concepts are incompatible (to an Incompatibilist at least) but they ate not the opposite of one another. And, if you or your father claim differently, you need to put forth definitions of Determinism and Free Will that are both mutually exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

Both could be false, but he proves that this is not the case. If determinism is proven true, free will, by definition, is false. If you go by the definitions used in the free will/determinism debate, you will see that "could do otherwise" or "could not do otherwise" ARE mutually exclusive. You can disagree all you want, but these are the definitions that set these two worldviews apart in a mutually exclusive way.

Third, and as alluded to above, I claimed that the excerpts from your father's book did not define Free Will or Determinism. In response, you offer the following:

If a person could do otherwise given the exact same conditions (which cannot occur because we cannot go back in time), then and only then would his will be free.

No Steve, that is not what he said. He said that in order to prove free will true, we would have to go back in time to prove that another choice could have been made at that moment in time. Because we cannot go back in time to see if another choice could have been made, free will will always remain a theory.

Without providing a definition of Free Will, you have set forth a necessary condition to Free Will -- that a person must be able to do otherwise given the exact same conditions. I would take it a bit further and simply say that the definition of Free Will is that it is the ability of a person to make a choice between at least two different alternatives, which requires both (i) the existence of at least two different alternatives, and (ii) agency on the part of the person to make a free and deliberate choice between or among the alternatives. Thus, the mere fact of being able to do otherwise is merely a necessary condition to the existence of Free Will, but it is not a sufficient condition. [There is that logical concept again, which is critical to understand to engage in this dialogue].

That is not free will. Being able to do otherwise has never been established, number one, and number two, the very idea that acting on your desires based on the existence of at least two different alternatives does not grant you free will or free agency (this is the compatibilist definition, not the definition given by determinists) when you are under a compulsion to choose the most preferable option under your particular set of circumstances.

Notably, you also slip in the parenthetical that we cannot prove the existence of Free Will because we cannot go back in time. I am not sure I agree that the inability to go back in time precludes the ability to prove the existence of Free Will, but I am willing to accept the truth of the proposition that we cannot prove the existence of Free Will without accepting the asserted reason given for that truth of that proposition.

Try to prove it then. Find free will in the brain or anywhere else. If you do find it, let me know.

As best I can tell, you still have not provided a definition of Determinism -- which is a term that has more than one meaning to different people -- as you can see from reading various posts on this board. Without that definition, it is not possible to evaluate the claim that Free Will and Determinism are the opposite of one another or even that they are Incompatible. And, without being able to evaluate the claim that Free Will and Determinism are the opposite of one another, it is not possible to evaluate (i) any supposed proof of the truth of Determinism (which is not provided in any of the excerpts or summarized or explained in any of your posts), much less (ii) the truth of the assertion that proof of the truth of Determinism is, in and of itself, proof of the non-existence of Free Will.

Are you being serious? You don't see his definition of determinism that was spelled out? Have you read the posts? I really wish you would refrain from interjecting your comments until I'm finished with the chapter. It really breaks up a person's train of thought.

As an Incompatibilist, I do agree that proof of the truth of Determinism would, in and of itself, be proof of the non-existence of Free Will, but that is based on the definition of Determinism that I use (and which may be different from the undisclosed definition your father uses), but I am relatively confident that your father uses a different definition of Determinism than I use because the truth of Determinism cannot be proved or falsified when the definition I use for Determinism is used.

As I have written elsewhere, the fact that the truth of Determinism cannot be proved or falsified when the definition of Determinism I use is used, the existence of Free Will similarly cannot be proved or disproved. In a nutshell, if Determinism (as i define it) were true, then there would be no such thing as proof of anything (as explained by Gisin and Zeilenger). Accordingly, because the truth of Determinism cannot be disproved, we cannot trust any putative proof of the existence of Free Will, the non-existence of Free Will, or anything else -- including the truth or falsity of Determinism, itself. I understand this is paradoxical, but it is what it is, and as Niels Bohr said, the identification of the paradox gives us "some hope of making progress." See, e.g., https://www.forbes.com/sites/chador...fer-hope-for-progress-in-quantum-foundations/.

Fourth, you repeatedly claim that your father's work is not taken seriously because he lacked a formal degree. I disagree. Many brilliant people have advanced important discoveries without a formal education, and many formally educated people have advanced arguments that are nonsensical and/or juvenile (as some of the posters on this thread say of me). From what I can tell, the reason your father's work is not taken seriously is because it is too difficult to read (because of the style in which it is written and not because of its complexity or novelty) and it appears from the excerpts you have provided to be based on unstated assumptions about the meaning of undefined words and arguments that contain logical fallacies (at least when the words in the arguments are given their common meaning in the absence of your father offering a contrary definition).

I do not see where there are logical fallacies in the way he demonstrates why man's will is not free. Can you repeat what he wrote so I know you understood? His style was his style, which you don't like, but in all fairness his style is not related to his content. Additionally, there are no unstated assumptions unless you he made an assumption when he said we live in the present. Please show me where there are other assumptions and logical fallacies. You are generalizing, and that's a bad sign on your part. He did offer a different definition, which must have gone over your head. He discusses that nothing causes us to do what we do, as if something other than ourselves is responsible for our actions. You haven't gotten that far before you start telling me he's wrong. You are way too premature in your conclusions. Anyway, if you think this is all a bunch of baloney, then I should stop here. There is so much more to explain, but you obviously have made up your mind. What ashame.

Again, I ask you, in your own words, to provide a summary of the earth-shattering lesson of your father's book with which you are more familiar than anyone else. If you are unable to do that, how do you expect anyone else to be capable of understanding the book and seeing the wisdom of its content?

No. You need to tell me where his assumptions and logical fallacies are before I continue. I won't have you or anyone making things up because you don't like his proof that we have no free will, never did, and never will.

 

[BSilvEsq]

This responds to Peacegirl's Post No. 2024 (https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ll-does-not-exist.27739/page-102#post-1326580), which I am not repeating here to save the page from being inundated by repetitions of large swathes of text.

This has been a helpful dialogue.

Whether we agree or disagree about what you or I have written, it seems to me that we do agree upon the following two propositions:

1. Falsification of either Determinism or Free Will would not establish the Truth of the other, as it is possible that Determinism and Free Will are False.

and

2. Determinism and Free Will are Incompatible, such that proof that either is True Falsifies the other.

Combining the foregoing two propositions on which we agree, you write:

Both could be false, but he proves that this is not the case. If determinism is proven true, free will, by definition, is false. If you go by the definitions used in the free will/determinism debate, you will see that "could do otherwise" or "could not do otherwise" ARE mutually exclusive.

So, let's turn to the contention that it is possible to prove Determinism is true -- in other words, it is possible to prove that "could not do otherwise" is true of any and all human activity -- including the activity of the human brain, which you assuredly are not setting aside as something that can do otherwise than it does.

If the human brain could not do otherwise than howsoever it does, then every thought a person has and every decision a person makes is the only thought they could have or decision they could make -- without regard to the rationality of the thought or decision. Among other things, your father could not have written a single word of his book that is different than he wrote, and you could not find any flaw in your father's writing without regard to whether the flaw exists, because you do not see the flaw and could not do otherwise. If that is the case, how are you able to know whether your view of your father's work is the valid. It is possible that your father never wrote a book or that you never had a father, and you simply believe those things to have occurred because you could not do otherwise.

As I previously have written:

If Determinism were true, it would follow by necessity that there could never be proof of that fact. If Determinism were true, human beings would lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and human thoughts and ideas simply would be meaningless noise in the universe. As such, if Determinism were true, any claim that something evidences or proves the deterministic nature of the universe would be an internally inconsistent and/or self-contradictory claim — because the claimant would have to admit that the assertion of the claim, itself, is nothing more than an determined effect of causes going back to the beginning of time (to the extent there is such a thing as time).

Stated somewhat differently, if Determinism were true, anyone who claims to have evidence or proof of the nature of the universe simply would be following his or her programming — much like a computer that is programmed one day 1 to spit out a particular assertion in day 100, and to also spit out “reasons” for the assertion, and even to purport to perform “experiments” on days 80 through 99 that the computer is programmed to “find” to support the conclusion that the computer is programmed to assert on day 100. That is not proof of anything.

By the same token, if Determinism were false, it plainly could not be proved to be true — at least not by any correct means.

As I understand your posts, you want to assert the undeniable truth of Determinism while still clinging to your ability to have thoughts and make decisions that are not, themselves, simply Determined effects of extrinsic causes. In that sense, you are a Compatibilist even though you vehemently claim to be an Incompatibilist.

As Michael Pearl wrote in Post No. 1,444 (https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ill-does-not-exist.27739/page-73#post-1319441):

it seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness. That sort of indeterminateness is what persons think they experience when they decide/select/choose, and that sort of indeterminateness is actual as logical possibility even if that indeterminateness is not actual as physical possibility.

At the macrophysical level, if the descriptive laws of physicalism physics are as sufficient as physicalists presume them to be, then that is just a way of saying that there never are the assortment of physical possibilities which humans think they experience as being non-subjectively (or not strictly subjectively) actual.

If the macrophysical is such that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness, then the macrophysical is always determinate. If the macrophysical is always determinate and devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness, then any and all macrophysical states are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness. Eternal utter macrophysical determinateness is incompatible with there being any constituent macrophysical indeterminateness. And that is to say that given any macrophysical determinate state and its incompatibility with macrophysical indeterminateness, there is only one possible physical state to follow sequentially.

Do compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness?

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

If compatibilists do not deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is a sense in which compatibilists are not determinists.

I think this is essentially what the incompatibilist determinists are trying to convey in discussions with compatibilist determinists.

If you are a true Incompatibilist, and you truly accept that Determinism means "could not do otherwise" in its fully glory (which you accuse me of shrinking from), then you must also accept that there is no such thing as a free thought or decision, and it is, therefore, impossible to prove the truth of Determinism. In essence, the truth of Determinism paradoxically precludes proof of Determinism. Unless your father has solved that paradox, if his book is built upon the assertion that he has proved the truth of Determinism, his writing is just noise in the universe, as is this post.

 

[steve_bank]

Peacegirl is choosing of her own unconcerned free will to post here.

I accept that as proof that free will exists.

Any flaws in my 'proof'?

My index finger is getting a real workout today scrolling through the long posts.

 

[DBT]

The ability to respond is not an example of free will. The brain as a parallel information processor does not function on the principle of free will. Free will is not the means of response. It is neural architecture and information content that equates to output in terms of thought and action, what we think and what we do.

The nature and function of the brain is the key. Sapolsky is right.

 

[peacegirl]

This responds to Peacegirl's Post No. 2024 (https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ll-does-not-exist.27739/page-102#post-1326580), which I am not repeating here to save the page from being inundated by repetitions of large swathes of text.

This has been a helpful dialogue.

Whether we agree or disagree about what you or I have written, it seems to me that we do agree upon the following two propositions:

1. Falsification of either Determinism or Free Will would not establish the Truth of the other, as it is possible that Determinism and Free Will are False.

and

2. Determinism and Free Will are Incompatible, such that proof that either is True Falsifies the other.

Combining the foregoing two propositions on which we agree, you write:

Both could be false, but he proves that this is not the case. If determinism is proven true, free will, by definition, is false. If you go by the definitions used in the free will/determinism debate, you will see that "could do otherwise" or "could not do otherwise" ARE mutually exclusive.

So, let's turn to the contention that it is possible to prove Determinism is true -- in other words, it is possible to prove that "could not do otherwise" is true of any and all human activity -- including the activity of the human brain, which you assuredly are not setting aside as something that can do otherwise than it does.

If the human brain could not do otherwise than howsoever it does, then every thought a person has and every decision a person makes is the only thought they could have or decision they could make -- without regard to the rationality of the thought or decision. Among other things, your father could not have written a single word of his book that is different than he wrote, and you could not find any flaw in your father's writing without regard to whether the flaw exists, because you do not see the flaw and could not do otherwise. If that is the case, how are you able to know whether your view of your father's work is the valid. It is possible that your father never wrote a book or that you never had a father, and you simply believe those things to have occurred because you could not do otherwise.

Just because will is not free does not turn us into unthinking zombies. Our thinking is indeed determined by what we have learned, which forms the basis for our rational thought (this ability to think rationally doesn't fly out the window). Being able to know whether my view of my father's work is valid is based on whether his reasoning and observations were correct. There are objective standards to determine this.

As I previously have written:

If Determinism were true, it would follow by necessity that there could never be proof of that fact. If Determinism were true, human beings would lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and human thoughts and ideas simply would be meaningless noise in the universe. As such, if Determinism were true, any claim that something evidences or proves the deterministic nature of the universe would be an internally inconsistent and/or self-contradictory claim — because the claimant would have to admit that the assertion of the claim, itself, is nothing more than an determined effect of causes going back to the beginning of time (to the extent there is such a thing as time).

Steve, did you read my posts at all? I'm really curious. Do you understand this author's definition that was tweaked for clarity?

Stated somewhat differently, if Determinism were true, anyone who claims to have evidence or proof of the nature of the universe simply would be following his or her programming — much like a computer that is programmed one day 1 to spit out a particular assertion in day 100, and to also spit out “reasons” for the assertion, and even to purport to perform “experiments” on days 80 through 99 that the computer is programmed to “find” to support the conclusion that the computer is programmed to assert on day 100. That is not proof of anything.

By the same token, if Determinism were false, it plainly could not be proved to be true — at least not by any correct means.

Of course it can, and he proved it. Please go over my posts again and please let me know if you understand why will is not free, and why this is not an opinion.

As I understand your posts, you want to assert the undeniable truth of Determinism while still clinging to your ability to have thoughts and make decisions that are not, themselves, simply Determined effects of extrinsic causes. In that sense, you are a Compatibilist even though you vehemently claim to be an Incompatibilist.

Let me clarify. Just because I am not compelled to do what I do by the past (which does not exist except in our memory) does not mean determinism is false. It only means that the way determinism is presently defined is causing a schism between these two opposing schools of thought. The fact that nothing external (e.g., God, our parents, our environment, etc.) can force us to do what we do, which implies that something other than ourselves is responsible for our actions, and what compatibilists rightly disagree with, does not prove that determinism is false or can't be proven true. To repeat: determinism, the way it's defined, makes it appear as if we are being forced to do something even if it is against our will; therefore, it would not be our will making the decision and not our responsibility. But this thinking is flawed based on a definition that has created a split between these two worldviews that can now be reconciled, opening us up to new possibilities. The fact that the past does not cause the present is important to understand as I proceed. If there is still any interest, I will continue, and if I'm not cut off before I'm finished each chapter. I will allow time for questions after each chapter (three in all; I'm not going beyond to post the whole book). He was very clear when he wrote:

We are not interested in opinions and theories regardless of where they originate, just in the truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own free will (of our own desire because we want to) is done absolutely and positively not of our own free will. Remember, by proving that determinism, as the opposite of free will, is true, we also establish undeniable proof that free will is false. So, without further ado, let us begin.

As Michael Pearl wrote in Post No. 1,444 (https://iidb.org/threads/according-...ill-does-not-exist.27739/page-73#post-1319441):

it seems that the issue boils down to or starts with the question of whether determinism is such that determinists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness. That sort of indeterminateness is what persons think they experience when they decide/select/choose, and that sort of indeterminateness is actual as logical possibility even if that indeterminateness is not actual as physical possibility.

There is obviously indeterminateness when contemplating the pros and cons of a given choice. The whole point of contemplation is to determine which option is best, or humans wouldn't have been given this attribute. This attribute is included in the chain of causation (please use his definition or we won't make progress) that does not need or include freedom of the will based on our best decision at the time. It is also true that you can use the word "free" to mean that when making a decision, nothing was constraining that decision, such as a gun to your head, but once a decision was acted upon, you were never free to choose otherwise. His definition, if you followed him, goes beyond making decisions. Every movement in life can only go in one direction, which is away from dissatisfaction to what offers greater satisfaction. We change positions because we are uncomfortable and are dissatisfied with how we feel, so we naturally move off the spot of feeling uncomfortable, which pushes us to change positions. This movement is occurring every day, all day, because it is the movement of life itself.

At the macrophysical level, if the descriptive laws of physicalism physics are as sufficient as physicalists presume them to be, then that is just a way of saying that there never are the assortment of physical possibilities which humans think they experience as being non-subjectively (or not strictly subjectively) actual.

If the macrophysical is such that there is no macrophysical indeterminateness, then the macrophysical is always determinate. If the macrophysical is always determinate and devoid of macrophysical indeterminateness, then any and all macrophysical states are eternally states of utter macrophysical determinateness. Eternal utter macrophysical determinateness is incompatible with there being any constituent macrophysical indeterminateness. And that is to say that given any macrophysical determinate state and its incompatibility with macrophysical indeterminateness, there is only one possible physical state to follow sequentially.

Do compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness?

If compatibilists deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is this obvious sense in which compatibilists are incompatibilists.

If compatibilists do not deny that there is any macrophysical indeterminateness, then there is a sense in which compatibilists are not determinists.

I think this is essentially what the incompatibilist determinists are trying to convey in discussions with compatibilist determinists.

Your reasoning only tells us what compatibilism means according to definition, but it does nothing to prove that we have the compatibilist kind of free will.

If you are a true Incompatibilist, and you truly accept that Determinism means "could not do otherwise" in its fully glory (which you accuse me of shrinking from), then you must also accept that there is no such thing as a free thought or decision, and it is, therefore, impossible to prove the truth of Determinism. In essence, the truth of Determinism paradoxically precludes proof of Determinism. Unless your father has solved that paradox, if his book is built upon the assertion that he has proved the truth of Determinism, his writing is just noise in the universe, as is this post.

I urge you to stop using the standard definition of determinism, which will get us nowhere. Just because our thinking is based on thought that is not free, because we can only choose --- based on what we have learned through our life experience --- what we think is the best decision at the time, does not make for gibberish or the inability to prove determinism true.

 

[steve_bank]

PG
I urge you to stop using the standard definition of determinism, which will get us nowhere. Just because our thinking is based on thought that is not free, because we can only choose --- based on what we have learned through our life experience --- what we think is the best decision at the time, does not make for gibberish or the inability to prove determinism true.

The old Abbot and Costello routine Who's On First comes to mind.

If Peacegirl would fill in brief definitions to avoid confusion.

Papergirl Free Will to be called PGFW is ....
Peacegirl Determinism to be called PGD is .....

Of course we make decisions based on experience and knowledge. A;so subconscious condition.

Is Peacegirl posting here by her own free will and volition? Or is it inevitable based on her knowledge and experience, and conditioning? Doe she have any control over actions?

That we are all conditioned by experience and kn wedge which affects decisionis not exactly a revolutionary discovery.

 

[steve_bank]

Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions. Questions concerning the nature and existence of this kind of control (e.g., does it require and do we have the freedom to do otherwise or the power of self-determination?), and what its true significance is (is it necessary for moral responsibility or human dignity?) have been taken up in every period of Western philosophy and by many of the most important philosophical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant. (We cannot undertake here a review of related discussions in other philosophical traditions. For a start, the reader may consult Marchal and Wenzel 2017 and Chakrabarti 2017 for overviews of thought on free will, broadly construed, in Chinese and Indian philosophical traditions, respectively.) In this way, it should be clear that disputes about free will ineluctably involve disputes about metaphysics and ethics. In ferreting out the kind of control at stake in free will, we are forced to consider questions about (among others) causation, laws of nature, time, substance, ontological reduction vs emergence, the relationship of causal and reasons-based explanations, the nature of motivation and more generally of human persons. In assessing the significance of free will, we are forced to consider questions about (among others) rightness and wrongness, good and evil, virtue and vice, blame and praise, reward and punishment, and desert. The topic of free will also gives rise to purely empirical questions that are beginning to be explored in the human sciences: do we have it, and to what degree?

Here is an overview of what follows. In Section 1, we acquaint the reader with some central historical contributions to our understanding of free will. (As nearly every major and minor figure had something to say about it, we cannot begin to cover them all.) As with contributions to many other foundational topics, these ideas are not of ‘merely historical interest’: present-day philosophers continue to find themselves drawn back to certain thinkers as they freshly engage their contemporaries. In Section 2, we map the complex architecture of the contemporary discussion of the nature of free will by dividing it into five subtopics: its relation to moral responsibility; the proper analysis of the freedom to do otherwise; a powerful, recent argument that the freedom to do otherwise (at least in one important sense) is not necessary for moral responsibility; ‘compatibilist’ accounts of sourcehood or self-determination; and ‘incompatibilist’ or ‘libertarian’ accounts of source and self-determination. In Section 3, we consider arguments from experience, a priori reflection, and various scientific findings and theories for and against the thesis that human beings have free will, along with the related question of whether it is reasonable to believe that we have it. Finally, in Section 4, we survey the long-debated questions involving free will that arise in classical theistic metaphysics.

A debate as old as human civilizations.

Free Will

Free will is the idea that humans can make their own choices and determine their own fates. Is a person’s will free, or are people's lives in fact shaped by powers outside of their control? The question of free will has long challenged philosophers and religious thinkers, and scientists have...

www.psychologytoday.com

Scientists have investigated the concept of human agency at the level of neural circuitry, and some findings have been taken as evidence that conscious decisions are not truly “free.” Free will skeptics argue that the subjective sense of free will is an illusion. Yet many scholars, as well as ordinary people, still profess a belief in free will, even if they acknowledge that choices are partly shaped by forces outside of one's control.


What are some reasons to question free will?

Behavioral science has made plain that individuals’ behavioral tendencies are influenced by genetics, as well as by factors in the environment that may be outside of a person’s control. This suggests that there are, at least, some constraints on the range of decisions and behaviors a person will be inclined to make (or even to consider) in any given situation. Challengers of the idea that people act the way they do due to conscious, unconstrained choices also point to evidence that unconscious brain activity can partly predict a choice before a conscious decision is made. And some have sought to logically refute the argument that choices necessarily demonstrate free will.

I do not think free will as an absolute ability to make an unconditioned choice exists.

Without experience and knowledge we have no basis for a choice.

I reject Libertarian

Libertarian free will is the philosophical belief that humans possess genuine freedom to make choices, meaning their actions aren't fully determined by prior events or external forces, allowing them to truly "do otherwise," which is seen as essential for moral responsibility. It's an incompatibilist view, asserting that free will and determinism (the idea that all events are necessitated by causes and conditions) cannot both be true. Proponents argue we have "agent-causation," where the agent (person) initiates a new causal chain, rather than just being a link in one.

It all coes down to whether or not we can reach a point to be able to chose between right and wrong. I think we do.

 

[Elixir]

the philosophical belief that humans possess genuine freedom to make choices, meaning their actions aren't fully determined by prior events or external forces, allowing them to truly "do otherwise,"

What they never consider is the possibility that rather than "allowing", their so-called free will is "compelling" them to do as they think they are choosing to do.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Let me clarify. Just because I am not compelled to do what I do by the past (which does not exist except in our memory) does not mean determinism is false. It only means that the way determinism is presently defined is causing a schism between these two opposing schools of thought. The fact that nothing external (e.g., God, our parents, our environment, etc.) can force us to do what we do, which implies that something other than ourselves is responsible for our actions, and what compatibilists rightly disagree with, does not prove that determinism is false or can't be proven true. To repeat: determinism, the way it's defined, makes it appear as if we are being forced to do something even if it is against our will; therefore, it would not be our will making the decision and not our responsibility. But this thinking is flawed based on a definition that has created a split between these two worldviews that can now be reconciled, opening us up to new possibilities.

OMG

It now seems that your avowed belief in Incompatiblism is, in fact, a belief in Compatibilism, your explanation of what it means to lack Free Will is a description of what it means to have Free Will, and your explanation of what it means for Determinism to be true is a rejection of the truth of Determinism. It is like Alice's Wonderland, where

Sometimes, up is down.

Sometimes, down is up.

Sometimes, when you're lost, you're found.​

William James famously wrote of Determinism and Free Will that "The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.” James also wrote that every attempt to harmonize Determinism and Free Will is a "quagmire of evasion." James could just as easily have been writing about your posts, which bob and weave and stand on shifting sand when it comes to explaining Free Will, Determinism and their relationship.

Absent your provision of very clear and defined definitions (as Steve Bank, too, requests), I am done trying to make heads or tails of this.

 

[Jarhyn]

So, to understand why momentary "external forces" fail to "compel" relatively "autonomous" things in an absolute way, one needs to understand the idea of a "gain mechanism".

A gain mechanism is a mechanism that increases a signal by some factor (math). This can be accomplished many ways, in many contexts, but the factor itself is arbitrary based on the gain mechanism itself.

In this discussion, the restriction of gain mechanisms that we care about is the "set of variable gain mechanisms".

I brought this up in the discussion of the eyelid, because the eyelid is the final mediator of a light-based binary gain mechanism.

When it opens, it multiplies the amount of light coming in by a factor of 1.

When it closes, it multiplies that same amount of light by 0, and scatters the remainder about for good measure.

We can modify the gain on our hearing by putting hands over our ears, or cupping them and pointing a direction in a roughly parabolic way.

It is a reasonably simple sort of thing to construct, so almost certainly has evolved in numerous contexts.

Most importantly, if I build a wall and put the gain control, let's imagine a simple gain on a microphone and speaker assembly, I can establish a means where one side, the other, or any third party could control what forces "external" to any region may "compel" of any side.

For instance, if we imagine a jail phone visitation booth, and put the button or knob for the gain on my side, all control over what forces may compel whom is on my side.

In more abstract ways, systems can control not merely whether to receive, or to continue to receive, a signal, but also what to do with the signal and where to route it or how to "frame" it, and whether to reduce it or even throw it away so it doesn't bother parts later on.

So clearly, forces "external" to a thing might in some contexts have a rather difficult time "compelling" some outcome on whatever remains inside and out of that external stuff's reach or power to modify short of destroying it.

Instead, the outcome is compelled by whatever might be "internal" or on that side of whatever partition has access to the controls.

It should be as simple as identifying all the times and reasons you might have fought with your sibling over a game controller for power over who decides what in that moment, but for some reason it's not.

 

[steve_bank]

Two American philosophers Abbot and Costello illustrating communications and definitions'

Metaphor for philosophical and political debate?

Google Search

 

[peacegirl]

Let me clarify. Just because I am not compelled to do what I do by the past (which does not exist except in our memory) does not mean determinism is false. It only means that the way determinism is presently defined is causing a schism between these two opposing schools of thought. The fact that nothing external (e.g., God, our parents, our environment, etc.) can force us to do what we do, which implies that something other than ourselves is responsible for our actions, and what compatibilists rightly disagree with, does not prove that determinism is false or can't be proven true. To repeat: determinism, the way it's defined, makes it appear as if we are being forced to do something even if it is against our will; therefore, it would not be our will making the decision and not our responsibility. But this thinking is flawed based on a definition that has created a split between these two worldviews that can now be reconciled, opening us up to new possibilities.

OMG

It now seems that your avowed belief in Incompatiblism is, in fact, a belief in Compatibilism, your explanation of what it means to lack Free Will is a description of what it means to have Free Will, and your explanation of what it means for Determinism to be true is a rejection of the truth of Determinism. It is like Alice's Wonderland, where

Let me say again that this is not compatibilism, for if determinism is true, we do not have true free will (i.e., the kind that would allow us to do otherwise); therefore, it doesn't even enter into the picture. That being said, we can use the phrase, "I did this of my own free will," to mean nothing external was putting constraints on my choice (like a gun to my head or threats of any kind). I chose it because I wanted to. He clarified this, but I never got that far.

Sometimes, up is down.

Sometimes, down is up.

Sometimes, when you're lost, you're found.​

William James famously wrote of Determinism and Free Will that "The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.” James also wrote that every attempt to harmonize Determinism and Free Will is a "quagmire of evasion." James could just as easily have been writing about your posts, which bob and weave and stand on shifting sand when it comes to explaining Free Will, Determinism and their relationship.

Absent your provision of very clear and defined definitions (as Steve Bank, too, requests), I am done trying to make heads or tails of this.

You have been too impatient, Steve. That is why you interjected your refutation before I even got halfway through the first chapter. I suggest that you keep an open mind until you see how these principles work in practice (Chapter Three). Until then, you won't be able to make heads or tails of this. How could you when half the equation is missing?

 

[steve_bank]

A lifetime of conditioned responses and denial maybe going back to when she was a kid.

Some may have a potential to change, some may not.

I was always a reader and sought out different people and ideas. I maximized the diversity of my experiences. It made me better at what I did. It enabled me to relate to most anyone.

Being o narrowly fixated is foreign to me.

If you would Peacegirl fill in the definitions I asked for. Keep it simple, no quotes from the book. In your own words.

Are you choosing not to answer of your own free will or is your decision not to do it predetermined by experiencing and knowledge?.

Lets see your revolutionary philosophy at work.

 

[peacegirl]

A lifetime of conditioned responses and denial maybe going back to when she was a kid.

Some may have a potential to change, some may not.

I was always a reader and sought out different people and ideas. I maximized the diversity of my experiences. It made me better at what I did. It enabled me to relate to most anyone.

Being o narrowly fixated is foreign to me.

If you would Peacegirl fill in the definitions I asked for. Keep it simple, no quotes from the book. In your own words.

Are you choosing not to answer of your own free will or is your decision not to do it predetermined by experiencing and knowledge?.

Lets see your revolutionary philosophy at work.

I gave the definition that I'm using. Go back to posts 2,021 and 2,022. You'll find it there. For anyone who is trying to understand what this thread is about, please scroll up to posts 2,021 and 2,022, and you will be caught up. I'm going to post another excerpt unless I get voted down. Speak your minds or forever hold your peace.

 

[peacegirl]

CHAPTER ONE CONT...

Although the definition of free will states that man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable alternative each and every moment of time?”

“I agree with all this, but how many times in your life have you remarked, ‘You give me no choice’ or ‘It makes no difference’?”

“Just because some differences are so obviously superior in value where you are concerned that no hesitation is required to decide which is preferable, while other differences need a more careful consideration, does not change the direction of life which always moves towards greater satisfaction than what the present position offers. You must bear in mind that what one person judges good or bad for himself doesn’t make it so for others, especially when it is remembered that a juxtaposition of differences in each case presents alternatives that affect choice.”

“But there are many times when I have been terribly dissatisfied with things that I have done, and at that exact moment, isn’t it obvious that I am not moving in the direction of satisfaction because I am very dissatisfied? It seems to me that it is still possible to give an example of how man can be made to move in the direction of dissatisfaction. If I could do this, all your reasoning would be shot to hell.”

“That’s true, but I defy you or anyone else to give me an example of this. Go ahead and try.”

“Let us imagine that of two apples, a red and a yellow, I prefer the yellow because I am extremely allergic to the red; consequently, my taste lies in the direction of the latter, which gives me greater satisfaction. In fact, the very thought of eating the red apple makes me feel sick. Yet in spite of this, I am going to eat it to demonstrate that even though I am dissatisfied and prefer the yellow apple, I can definitely move in the direction of dissatisfaction.”

In response to this demonstration, isn’t it obvious that regardless of the reason you decided to eat the red apple, and even though it would be distasteful in comparison, this choice at that moment of time gave you greater satisfaction; otherwise, you would have definitely selected and eaten the yellow one? The normal circumstances under which you frequently ate the yellow apple in preference were changed by your desire to prove a point; therefore, it gave you greater satisfaction to eat what you did not normally eat in an effort to prove that life can be made to move in the direction of dissatisfaction. Consequently, since B (eating the yellow apple) was an impossible choice (because it gave you less satisfaction under the circumstances), you were not free to choose A.

Regardless of how many examples you experiment with, the results will always be the same because this is an immutable law. From moment to moment all through life, man can never move in the direction of dissatisfaction, and his every motion, conscious or unconscious, is a natural effort to get rid of some dissatisfaction or move to greater satisfaction; otherwise, as has been shown, not being dissatisfied, he could never move from here to there. Every motion of life expresses dissatisfaction with the present position. Scratching is the effort of life to remove the dissatisfaction of the itch, as urinating, defecating, sleeping, working, playing, mating, walking, talking, and moving about in general are unsatisfied needs of life, pushing man always in the direction of satisfaction. It is easy, in many cases, to recognize things that satisfy, such as money when funds are low, but it is extremely difficult at other times to comprehend the innumerable subconscious factors often responsible for the malaise of dissatisfaction. Your desire to take a bath arises from a feeling of unseemliness or a wish to be refreshed, which means that you are dissatisfied with the way you feel at that moment, and your desire to get out of the bathtub arises from a feeling of dissatisfaction with a position that has suddenly grown uncomfortable. This simple demonstration proves conclusively that man’s will is not free because satisfaction is the only direction life can take, and it offers only one possibility at each moment of time.

The government holds each person responsible for obeying the laws and then punishes those who do not while absolving itself of all responsibility. But how is it possible for someone to obey that which, under certain conditions, appears to him worse? It is quite apparent that a person does not have to steal if he doesn’t want to, but under certain conditions he wants to, and it is also apparent that those who enforce the laws do not have to punish if they don’t want to, but both sides want to do what they consider better for themselves under the circumstances. The Russians didn’t have to start a communist revolution against the tyranny that prevailed; they were not compelled to do this; they wanted to. The Japanese didn’t have to attack us at Pearl Harbor; they wanted to. We didn’t have to drop an atomic bomb among their people; we wanted to. It is an undeniable observation that man does not have to commit a crime or hurt another in any way if he doesn’t want to. The most severe tortures, even the threat of death, cannot compel or cause him to do what he has made up his mind not to do. Since this observation is mathematically undeniable, the expression “free will,” which has come to signify this aspect, is absolutely true in this context because it symbolizes what the perception of this relation cannot deny, and here lies in part the unconscious source of all the dogmatism and confusion since MAN IS NOT CAUSED OR COMPELLED TO DO TO ANOTHER WHAT HE MAKES UP HIS MIND NOT TO DO — but that does not make his will free.

In other words, if someone were to say — “I didn’t really want to hurt that person but couldn’t help myself under the circumstances,” which demonstrates that though he believes in freedom of the will, he admits he was not free to act otherwise; that he was forced by his environment to do what he really didn’t want to do, or should he make any effort to shift his responsibility for this hurt to heredity, God, his parents, the fact that his will is not free, or something else as the cause, he is obviously lying to others and being dishonest with himself because absolutely nothing is forcing him, against his will, to do what he doesn’t want to do, for over this, as was just shown, he has mathematical control.

“It’s amazing; all my life I have believed man’s will is free, but for the first time I can actually see that his will is not free.”

Another friend commented, “You may be satisfied, but I’m not. The definition of determinism is the philosophical and ethical doctrine that man’s choices, decisions, and actions are decided by antecedent causes, inherited or environmental, acting upon his character. According to this definition, we are not given a choice because we are being caused to do what we do by a previous event or circumstance. But I know for a fact that nothing can make me do what I make up my mind not to do, as you just mentioned a moment ago. If I don’t want to do something, nothing, not environment, heredity, or anything else you care to throw in, can make me do it because over this I have absolute control. Since I can’t be made to do anything against my will, doesn’t this make my will free? And isn’t it a contradiction to say that man’s will is not free, yet nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to do?”

“How about that? He brought out something I never would have thought of.”

 

[steve_bank]

What exactly does saying you gave no choice prove?

Look son, you gave me no choice by what you did to ground you for a week.

How is that demonstrating anytime?

Theists use the Teleological Argument as a proof god exists. The universe can not possibly exist without god, therefore god exists.

Attempted philosophical proofs for or againjsy free will and determinism as I see it are of similar nature

Gben my subjectvee assertion it obvisly true.

DBT made a refernce to neoroscine andI posed a link. Neiroscnce and free wil,.

Free will is an abstrction, an illusion. Sounds Buddhist. The answer is in how the brain works.

Given your experience and understanding will a choice always be predicable?

Known in 1 hour you have to choose between a and b what do you think you will choose? Will it always be what you thought thought would choose?

You get a call just before the decision has to be made saying your kid just got killed in a crash. Can that affect the decision? Doe emotional state matter? It does, it is biochemistry.

Our brains are not computers.

Post 2021 is more cut and paste from the book. You are clearly unable to articulate a brief definition. You fail the closed book quiz. A test of material comprehension.

 

[peacegirl]

CHAPTER ONE CONT...

“All he said was that you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink, which is undeniable; however, though it is a mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to another what he makes up his mind not to do — this is an extremely crucial point — he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment of his existence to do everything he does. This reveals, as your friend just pointed out, that man has absolute control over the former but absolutely none over the latter because he must constantly move in the direction of greater satisfaction. It is true that nothing in the past can cause what occurs in the present, for all we ever have is the present; the past and future are only words that describe a deceptive relation. Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the opposite, that man was not caused or compelled; he did it of his own accord; he wanted to do it; he didn’t have to. The term ‘free will’ contains an assumption or fallacy, for it implies that if man is not caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not mathematical, conclusions. The expression ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted due to the general ignorance that prevailed, for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because they wanted to, this in no way indicates that their will is free. In fact, I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself, which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?”

“You must be kidding! Here you are in the process of demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

“This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true that man has to make choices, he must always prefer that which he considers good, not evil, for himself when the former is offered as an alternative. The words ‘cause’ and ‘compel’ are the perception of an improper or fallacious relation because in order to be developed and have meaning it was absolutely necessary that the expression ‘free will’ be born as their opposite, as tall gives meaning to short. But these words do not describe reality unless interpreted properly. Nothing causes man to build cities, develop scientific achievements, write books, compose music, go to war, argue and fight, commit terrible crimes, pray to God, for these things are mankind already at a particular stage of his development, just as children were sacrificed at an earlier stage. These activities or motions are the natural entelechy of man, who is always developing, correcting his mistakes, and moving in the direction of greater satisfaction by better removing the dissatisfaction of the moment, which is a normal compulsion of his nature over which he has absolutely no control. Looking back in hindsight enables man to evaluate his progress and make adjustments when necessary, as he is always learning from previous experience. The fact that will is not free demonstrates that man, as part of nature or God, has been unconsciously developing at a mathematical rate, and during every moment of his progress was doing what he had to do because he had no free choice. But this does not mean that he was caused to do anything against his will, for the word ‘cause,’ like ‘choice’ and ‘past,’ is very misleading, as it implies that something other than man himself is responsible for his actions. Four is not caused by two plus two; it is that already. As long as history has been recorded, these two opposing principles have never been reconciled until now. The amazing thing is that this ignorance, this conflict of ideas, ideologies, and desires, theology’s promulgation of free will, and the millions that criticized determinism as fallacious, was exactly as it was supposed to be. It was impossible for man to have acted differently because the mankind system is obeying this invariable law of satisfaction, which makes the motions of all life just as harmonious as the solar system, but these systems are not caused by these laws; they are these laws.”

“Can you clarify this a little bit more?”

“Certainly. In other words, no one is compelling a person to work at a job he doesn’t like or remain in a country against his will. He actually wants to do the very things he dislikes simply because the alternative is considered worse, and he must choose something to do among the various things in his environment or else commit suicide. Therefore, when any person says he was compelled to do what he did against his will, that he didn’t want to but had to — and innumerable of our expressions say this — he is obviously confused and unconsciously dishonest with himself and others because everything man does to another is done only because he wants to do it, done to be humorous, of his own free will, which only means that his preference gave him greater satisfaction at that moment of time, for one reason or another. But remember, this desire for one thing over another is a compulsion beyond control for which he cannot be blamed. All I am doing is clarifying your terms so that you are not confused, but make sure you understand this mathematical difference before proceeding further.”

“His reasoning is perfect. I can’t find a flaw, although I thought I did. I think I understand now. Just because I cannot be made to do something against my will does not mean my will is free because my desire not to do it appeared to be the better reason, which gave me no free choice, as I would have received greater satisfaction. Nor does the expression, ‘I did it of my own free will, nobody made me do it,’ mean that I actually did it of my own free will — although I did it because I wanted to — because my desire to do it appeared to be the better reason, which would have given me no free choice since I got greater satisfaction.”

“He does understand.”

“Does this mean you are also in complete agreement so I can proceed?”

“Yes, it does.”

Then let me summarize by taking careful note of this simple reasoning that proves conclusively (except for the implications already referred to) that will is not free. Man has two possibilities that are reduced to the common denominator of one. Either he does not have a choice because none is involved, as with aging, and then it is obvious that he is under the compulsion of living regardless of what his particular motion at any moment might be, or he has a choice and then is given two or more alternatives of which he is compelled, by his nature, to prefer the one that appears to offer the greatest satisfaction, whether it is the lesser of two evils, the greater of two goods, or a good over an evil. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible for will to be free because man never has a free choice, though it must be remembered that the words good and evil are judgments of what others think is right and wrong, not symbols of reality.