You think the lecturer would have to conclude turned off cell-phones don't exist?!
As per the scenario, they indeed do not exist
within the discourse domain, which is the lecture room. That happens in nearly all real-life contexts of universal quantification: The claim is meant and understood to hold of a specific context, not the entire universe. If we slightly change the scenario such that 5 of the students in this particular course at MIT do have a phone on them and she starts the class when all five have turned it off, you wouldn't accuse the lecturer of lying because someone in France and someone in California have their phones on? I mean, she did say she won't start until
all phones are turned off. Without restricting the domain of the quantifier to the phones in the room, the condition hasn't been met.
You think the police would have to conclude foreign workers don't exist?!
Again, within the relevant domain, that is
at this particular company, they don't exist.
Even intuitively, a situation where there are no phones qualifies as one where all phones are turned off,
Intuitively, certainly not.
Are you going to accuse the lecturer of lying when she starts the class in a room with no phones, because she earlier said she won't start until all phones are turned off? If so, I think it's fair to say it's your intuition that's broken, not mathematical logic.
or one where there are no foreign workers as one where they've all successfully produced their work permits.
Intuitively, certainly not.
Imagine the following dialogue:
Chief inspector: Have you checked all foreign workers' work permits.
Second inspector, version 1: Yes (well more specifically, there were no foreign workers).
Second inspector, version 2: No (but only because there were no foreign workers).
Second inspector, version 3: You question is meaningless (because there are no foreign workers).
I'm pretty sure that version 3 will get the second inspector fired for being a pain in the ass. Version 2 works with the paranthesised explanation, but without it, version 1 seems most felicitious, whether it's technically correct or not.
The fact that the existential presupposition as an apparent component if the meaning of "all" can be so easily ignored given proper context is actually a telltale sign of its pragmatic nature, making your job of demonstrating that it is semantic rather unfeasible.
I don't have a job here. I asked a question, you provided an opinion that you cannot support from empirical evidence.
EB
It looks like you're confusing at least three different things here: The logical quantifier ALL, the literal meaning of the English word "all", and the speaker intent we attribute when hearing a sentence containing the latter. There's a reason why formal logic, natural language semantics, and natural language pragmatics are three different fields of study: Because they analyse three different domains of phenomena.
Your question was, explicitly so, about logic. I provided an answer to that question, and now you try to make it look like you were asking about something else. It doesn't actually matter to your original question whether an existential presupposition is part of the lexical meaning of the English word "all". What if it's true that English "all" in a sentence like "all X P" means something that can be paraphrased as "there is at least one X, and there is no X for which P doesn't hold"? It would
still be preferable to decompose this conjunctive meaning into two atomic components for the purposes of formal logic to arrive at an overall more elegant system. ETA: And it would be from the existential part, not from the universal part, that the conclusions in your examples follow.
Your notion that logical operators should have a meaning exactly matching that of the English word they most resemble is not founded on any objective argument, and is all the more hilarious given that you don't seem to be equipped to objectively analyse what those English words even
mean (in the sense of their core semantics, abstracting away from the pragmatics of a particular context). When a competent speaker of any human language hears or reads another make a statement, a lot of things happen simultaneously - not just anylising the literal meaning of what has been said, but making a host of assumptions why they would say that, and assumptions about other believes (not expressed by what they said) that would make saying what they did say a meaningful contribution to an exchange of ideas.
It may be the case that "all" has an existential presupposition as part of its meaning. Or it may be the case that it doesn't, but when we hear someone say "all angels have wings" we automatically assume that at least they believe angels exist - because we give them the benefit of the doubt that they are at least trying to tell us something they believe to be true and which we didn't know, and a vacuously true statement doesn't qualify. Either way it is irrelevant to the meaning of the logical operator ALL.