Analytic Idealism

[pood]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

 

[Jarhyn]

But none of that explains why any of it should be accompanied by subjective experience.

Except that it does, in the very nature of the words "subjective experience".

You could better frame it as "local experience".

Locations experience phenomena, and phenomena are experienced at locations is one of the most basic parts of physics.

Why does something that is "more", get reported as "more" when measured as "more"? Because of the fact that "more" is "more" no matter where you measure it from, even if where you measure it from means it looks (relatively) different.

Yes, it seems rather tautological when viewed that way, but that's really what it comes down to.

 

[NoHolyCows]

But none of that explains why any of it should be accompanied by subjective experience.

Except that it does, in the very nature of the words "subjective experience".

You could better frame it as "local experience".

Locations experience phenomena, and phenomena are experienced at locations is one of the most basic parts of physics.

Why does something that is "more", get reported as "more" when measured as "more"? Because of the fact that "more" is "more" no matter where you measure it from, even if where you measure it from means it looks (relatively) different.

Yes, it seems rather tautological when viewed that way, but that's really what it comes down to.

You’re now equating “subjective experience” with “local experience,” but this move conflates where something happens with what it’s like for something to happen. Locality in physics tells us about the position of events in spacetime and how information flows—it doesn’t explain why any of that should be accompanied by conscious presence.

Seager puts this clearly: physical descriptions give us structure, causal relations, and dispositions—but not intrinsic character. As he notes, physics only tells us how things relate, not what anything is like from the inside. And Kastrup builds on this: the physical world is the extrinsic appearance of mental processes. The structure is what mind looks like from the outside. If you reduce “experience” to location or measurement, you’ve stripped it of exactly what needs explaining: why anything is felt at all.

A camera or sensor undergoes “local phenomena.” It registers differences. But we don’t say it’s conscious. It has outputs, not experience. So when you say, “locations experience phenomena,” you’re either:

• using “experience” metaphorically, in which case there’s no consciousness,
• or using it literally, in which case you’re assuming mind is already fundamental—and you’ve stepped into idealism or panpsychism.

So yes, it may sound tautological to say “more is more,” or “events happen where they happen.” But that tautology only holds at the level of structure, not subjectivity. The real mystery is why any local structure is accompanied by awareness—unless, as idealism proposes, awareness is not something generated by structure, but what structure is the outer form of.

That’s the gap that neither locality nor complexity bridges. And unless your model explains why there’s something it’s like to be a point in spacetime, it hasn’t yet explained experience.

NHC

 

[lostone]

If every system you describe—quantum gates, neurons, circuits—can be fully accounted for in terms of structure, function, and causal relations, then why does anything need to feel like something from the inside at all

Because of locality and the existence of those self-same phenomena. It sounds almost stupid and trite like all the best, prettiest proofs in math, though: if something is undergoing a local phenomena, if the subject experiences the phenomena, there will be some report, should that phenomena produce a report, expressing some nature of that phenomena to an outside observer, but the perspective of the immediate observers to the interaction is relatively different.

The existence of "phenomenal experience" is a prediction of relativity and locality with a fixed speed of light.

I appreciate the creative direction you’re going, but I don’t think this answers the core issue.

You’re talking about local phenomena, reportability, and relative perspectives—which all describe how information or signals propagate through spacetime. But none of that explains why any of it should be accompanied by subjective experience.

Relativity and locality constrain the structure of interactions, sure—but they don’t predict that anything should feel like anything. A camera or sensor also responds to local phenomena and produces reports—but we don’t say it’s conscious. So the real question remains:

Why does any structure—local or not, complex or not—give rise to the intrinsic presence of experience at all? Why isn’t the entire system just a perfectly silent, unconscious machine?

Unless you’re willing to say that subjective experience is just what structure looks like from the inside—which starts to sound a lot like idealism—it seems like you’re describing behavior, not explaining consciousness.

NHC

idealism and materialism are not necessarily in conflict, as long as they approached from a monistic POV. Albeit Kastrup is an opponent of panpsychism. IMO, consciousness could arise from the interactions of physical systems containing multiple interactive sensing devices, those including self-sensing devices. What I cannot see is justification for dualism, in any form. In the case of living organisms, they arose as systems that wanted to survive and propagate, and their sensing systems, necessary for survival and propagation, do just that.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

 

[pood]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

 

[pood]

Some here have characterized analytic idealism as “drug-induced woo” or a “drug-fueled episode.” This is false and unjust, because as I have explained, his own use of psychedelics has been entirely orthogonal to his metaphysics, and therefore certainly not its foundation.

That said, Kastrup does address bodily death from an idealist perspective, in this paper. He distinguishes idealism from metaphysical supernaturalism (dualism holds; the soul somehow “survives” bodily death) and from metaphysical naturalism/physicalism (mind supervenes on the underlying physical; no subjectivity can survive physical/body/brain death).

The key issue here, it seems to me, is that while naturalism/physicalism claims to be a form of monism as opposed to dualism, it does not explain, does not even attempt to explain, how subjective experience arises from underlying physical primitives. In this sense it remains obdurately dualist despite its monist assertions.

Idealism accounts for a true monism. Since on this metaphysics reality is entirely subjective/phenomenal, the implication for Kastrup is that on bodily/brain death consciousness does not vanish but expands. This is because the dissociative alter dissolves and personal consciousness rejoins universal consciousness. It should be recalled that on his metaphysics, the body, the brain, all of “us” is merely an exteriorized phenomenal representation of our particular dissociate alters. This will only sound far-etched to those who beg the question for physicalism, and has nothing to do with a rejection of science.

Kastrup does cite psychedelic experiences and near-death experiences as perhaps pointing to what the early stages of alter dissolution feels like. But it can’t be stressed strongly enough that his metaphysics in no way depends on any appeal to psychedelics or NDEs.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

Oh so he's allowed to be dismissive of evolution but I'm not allowed to be dismissive of idealism? That's weird.

 

[NoHolyCows]

idealism and materialism are not necessarily in conflict, as long as they approached from a monistic POV. Albeit Kastrup is an opponent of panpsychism. IMO, consciousness could arise from the interactions of physical systems containing multiple interactive sensing devices, those including self-sensing devices. What I cannot see is justification for dualism, in any form. In the case of living organisms, they arose as systems that wanted to survive and propagate, and their sensing systems, necessary for survival and propagation, do just that.

That’s a fair and open-minded position—monism can certainly be a common ground. But the real pressure point isn’t whether we use “material” or “mental” language; it’s which direction the explanation flows: is consciousness a derivative phenomenon that arises from complex arrangements of matter, or is it the ground from which matter itself appears?

You suggest that consciousness could arise from the interaction of physical systems with multiple sensing devices. But the key question is: why should sensing, or self-sensing, ever give rise to felt experience? Why should any arrangement of sensors, even recursive ones, ever cross the threshold into subjectivity—into what-it’s-like-ness?

Kastrup’s objection to panpsychism isn’t that it posits a mental foundation—that’s exactly what he supports—but that it smuggles consciousness into tiny parts and then struggles to explain how those parts combine into a unified subject. He argues that it’s more coherent to begin with a single field of consciousness from which all differentiation arises through dissociation—not combination.

Also, invoking evolution and survival pressure explains why organisms behave as if they’re conscious—but not why they are. If consciousness has no causal role, it’s epiphenomenal; if it does, we’ve slipped outside standard physicalism. Either way, we’re back at the hard problem.

So monism may be common ground—but we still need to ask: monism of what? If we stick to structure and function, we never explain presence. But if we start with consciousness, structure becomes its appearance—not its cause.

NHC

 

[pood]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

Oh so he's allowed to be dismissive of evolution but I'm not allowed to be dismissive of idealism? That's weird.

Um … dismissive of evolution? Where you got that, I’ve no idea.

 

[pood]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

Oh so he's allowed to be dismissive of evolution but I'm not allowed to be dismissive of idealism? That's weird.

As I think about it, it appears again you did not read the linked material, though you feel free to dis it as you did with Kastrup’s stuff. The phrase “evolution drives truth to extinction” does not mean what you apparently think it means, and Hoffman does not dismiss evolution.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

Oh so he's allowed to be dismissive of evolution but I'm not allowed to be dismissive of idealism? That's weird.

Um … dismissive of evolution? Where you got that, I’ve no idea.

You expect a singular universal consciousness to act sane? Wild, dude.

 

[pood]

Hoffman has published in the Journal of Theoretical Biology. From the abstract, with respect to natural selection:

We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Oh and it's not evolution that leads to the extinction of truth, but entropy. That's basic physics.

 

[pood]

NoHolyCows brought up Hoffman, whose ideas are very similar to those of Kastrup. Both of them also talk about what we can derive from quantum mechanics. Hoffman stresses his claim that evolution drives “truth” to extinction. See this interview with him in Quanta Magazine: The Evolutionary Argument Against Reality.

Neurons, brains space ... these are just symbols we use, they’re not real. It’s not that there is a classical brain that does some quantum magic. It’s that there’s no brain!

Nothing more than anti-science BS. Yawn. I've seen enough.

None of this is the least bit anti-science, but you seemed determined to misunderstand the whole discussion. That’s your privilege.

Oh so he's allowed to be dismissive of evolution but I'm not allowed to be dismissive of idealism? That's weird.

Um … dismissive of evolution? Where you got that, I’ve no idea.

You expect a singular universal consciousness to act sane? Wild, dude.

No idea what you are even getting at here. Do you have an argument?

 

[pood]

Oh and it's not evolution that leads to the extinction of truth, but entropy. That's basic physics.

This is irrelevant to what Hoffman is saying. I suggest you read the linked interview and the linked paper for details.

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Oh and it's not evolution that leads to the extinction of truth, but entropy. That's basic physics.

This is irrelevant to what Hoffman is saying. I suggest you read the linked interview and the linked paper for details.

It is entirely relevant to the notion of the "extinction of truth". Again you seem oddly dismissive of anything that isn't pro-Idealism.

 

[Jarhyn]

You’re now equating “subjective experience” with “local experience,” but this move conflates where something happens with what it’s like for something to happen

Not really, no. It equates the "localness", not the "location".

That it has a location does grant it localness, but this statement of yours confuses "has coordinates" with "the coordinates it has are 2,4"

It's the possession of a quality "location" and not "the location itself" that I equate to the "quality" of subjective experience.

 

[bilby]

I really don't care about respecting old Greek linguistic rules to that extent.

Me either. I just want to be able to understand what you wrote without doing mental gymnastics.

This would be helped considerably if you were to write in the same language I am trying to read in, in which phenomena is the plural of phenomenon. You can abandon singular forms of words altogether if you like - just don't expect me to try bother to try to understand you if you do.

 

[Jarhyn]

I really don't care about respecting old Greek linguistic rules to that extent.

Me either. I just want to be able to understand what you wrote without doing mental gymnastics.

All thing happen in place, why be confused when stuff that measure stuff happen in place and report measurement report measurement as of "stuff happen in place"?