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Analytic Idealism

There is an eerie unreal quality to this tread. As if it is a reality or dimension all unto itself.
 
Pre-emptive dismissal of an idea is often warranted, such as when someone argues that the eye is not a sense organ or that we see in real times. But we can pre-emptively dismiss such claims because we already possess mountains of evidence that the claims not only are not true, but cannot be true.

I think metaphysical idealism is in different category that is not worthy of such a response. Analytic idealism is a modern variant of a strain of philosophy that goes back to antiquity. Of course that doesn’t make any of it right, it just makes it not obviously wrong. Kastrup offers plenty of evidence-based arguments for his position. Those who care to can read the linked paper and evaluate his philosophy on its own merits. Of course those who dismiss philosophy in its entirety are devoted to a philosophy called scientism, and thereby pre-empitvely refute their own dismissal.
 
Pre-emptive dismissal of an idea is often warranted, such as when someone argues that the eye is not a sense organ or that we see in real times. But we can pre-emptively dismiss such claims because we already possess mountains of evidence that the claims not only are not true, but cannot be true.

I think metaphysical idealism is in different category that is not worthy of such a response. Analytic idealism is a modern variant of a strain of philosophy that goes back to antiquity. Of course that doesn’t make any of it right, it just makes it not obviously wrong. Kastrup offers plenty of evidence-based arguments for his position. Those who care to can read the linked paper and evaluate his philosophy on its own merits. Of course those who dismiss philosophy in its entirety are devoted to a philosophy called scientism, and thereby pre-empitvely refute their own dismissal.
Kastrup offers many ideas that are not easily dismissed, IMO. OTOH, acceptance of those arguments also is logically more than difficult. Discussion of those arguments, based on the world we observe, is also difficult. IDK, the choices we are offered are not that easy to decide upon. Many people of the highest intellectual category have offered many such flawed solutions in the past, as their best effort and guess. What I do here, therefore, seems to be to make my own choice. Based on my own best guesses, and what I see as evidence, and those whom I see as those providing evidence worthy of taking seriously.
 
Analytic Idealism is a theory of the nature of reality that maintains that the universe is experiential in essence. That does not mean that reality is in your or our individual minds alone, but instead in a spatially unbound, transpersonal field of subjectivity of which we are segments.

In general, I do not see anything new in that.

What is reality? There is physical reality as it is. There is our working paradigms of reality that exist in our brains that may or may not reflect true physical reality.

Psychologically yiu7 can say 'it is all one mind' because lal thoughts are stagnated by the same caliphs reality.

That leads to the traditional debates over the nature of knowledge, and subjecve vs objectve.






Kastrup is best known for the development of analytic idealism, a metaphysical and ontological framework that posits phenomenal consciousness is the fundamental "reduction base" of reality as a whole, and that individual minds are dissociations of the monist universal mind.

In philosophy, "monism" refers to the belief that reality is ultimately composed of one single substance or principle, contrasting with dualism (two substances) or pluralism (multiple substances).

Panpsychism posits that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of nature, while analytic idealism suggests that reality is fundamentally experiential, though not necessarily confined to individual minds, but rather a transpersonal field of subjectivity.

Analytic Idealism looks like another synthetic mix of metaphysics new and old..

Code words for the supernatural, IMO. I look at it as a kind of secular religion. Hope for something beyond our finite physical existence.

'mind as a hyerdimenional membrane' ? A mix of science and the mystical. It sounds like dialogue form Stargate SG1.


Depak Chopra is a medical doctor who weaves traditional eastern mysticism and science. He used to appear on PBS weaving an enthralling narrative about concessions and mind.
 
Oh and I decided and external reality exists so it exists. Suck it y'all.
 
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I had a little wine so I typed an as and. That's my excuse.
 
Or maybe I am having a psychotic break and that convinced me an is to be spelled as and.
 
Kastrup is not a supernaturalist. He is a naturalist. However, as noted, he subdivides naturalism into two metaphysical categories: naturalist/physicalist and naturalist/idealist. He identifies as the latter.

The physicalist argues that mental events, qualia, are an emergent property of underlying physical processes, in the same way that water is an emergent property of underlying molecular properties. However, while we have a stepwise account of how water emerges from underlying molecular activity, we have no such account for how subjective experience emerges from underlying neuronal activity. The point here is that such emergence is assumed, because physicalism is also assumed. On the idealist assumption, the hard problem of consciousness is not so much resolved as dissolved. There is no problem because under idealism, neuronal activity and experience are correlated, rather than causative.
 
we have no such account for how subjective experience emerges from underlying neuronal activity
Yes we do, in IIT.

This is what I keep saying: we have a very strong model for how internal states, and a "mental/logical space" arises from underlying switch activity, and it's just plain enforced ignorance to divorce our understanding of this initial emergence of virtuality and this initial emergence of mind.

We have NO philosophical justification to say these cannot be the same thing, other than our anthropocentric biases.
 
As to death, Kastrup’s idealism holds that our ego will perish — our individual “I” — but subjective experience will persist, because subjectivity is all that there is. He seems to anticipate some sort of re-emerging with the universal consciousness, but his view could just as well accommodate that espoused by Tom Clark at naturalism.org, by Wayne Stewart, and peacegirl’s writer, that our field of subjectivity will simply shift to that of another person. I remarked discussing this in another thread that this shift of subjectivity could only, in my view, be accounted for by some universal consciousness that allows for a shift in subjective perspective. After that I stumbled upon Kastrup, which is one reason I find his views intriguing if not persuasive.
 
we have no such account for how subjective experience emerges from underlying neuronal activity
Yes we do, in IIT.

That’s interesting, because Kastrup espouses IIT.

I see no strong model of how neuronal activity generates subjective experience. Maybe you could clarify how IIT provides it, since Kastrup talks about IIT but sees no solution to the hard problem in it.
 
As to death, Kastrup’s idealism holds that our ego will perish — our individual “I” — but subjective experience will persist, because subjectivity is all that there is. He seems to anticipate some sort of re-emerging with the universal consciousness, but his view could just as well accommodate that espoused by Tom Clark at naturalism.org, by Wayne Stewart, and peacegirl’s writer, that our field of subjectivity will simply shift to that of another person. I remarked discussing this in another thread that this shift of subjectivity could only, in my view, be accounted for by some universal consciousness that allows for a shift in subjective perspective. After that I stumbled upon Kastrup, which is one reason I find his views intriguing if not persuasive.
Whereas I would say subjectivity is accounted for by locality.

Stuff happens in places. You are stuff happening in a place. Where does the happening-ness of the stuff in the computer go when you shut it off? It localizes upstream in the wire where the energy is now stopped and flowing in a different direction.

With YOU, it dissolves out to where all that chemical energy/potential does, and the interaction itself spins out into heat and various artifacts.

It goes the same place as the "crowd" goes when the people in it go home.

It doesn't jump, more it just dissolves into chaotic motion once more.
 
we have no such account for how subjective experience emerges from underlying neuronal activity
Yes we do, in IIT.

That’s interesting, because Kastrup espouses IIT.

I see no strong model of how neuronal activity generates subjective experience. Maybe you could clarify how IIT provides it, since Kastrup talks about IIT but sees no solution to the hard problem in it.
I mean, we have a model right there of the subject (the AND gate), and we have a model of what it experiences (switch behaviors on potentials), and we have a diagram that well discusses how and why this creates a "logical state machine".

We have a full diagram of the mechanism and the structure of its experience owing to the biases generated by the switches.

That's literally all there is to it, where experience comes from: there's some matter (a subject), and it "experiences change", and we have a strong model for the change it experiences.

Whatever the switches report what it is "like" being what they are, they will report something they measure through their own actions, regardless of how naively they do so, just as when we report what it is like to be us, we are likewise reporting on a measurement of an internal state.

These states are constructed just as the internal states of the circuit, though biases and potentials in places on structures.

To that end, I would like you some time to ask yourself how you can make a machine report an experience of activation on a sensor.

It's experience of the sensor will likely be a naive repetition of an ADC out to a DAC out. It's experience of ADC will be a digital value.

I just don't see why this is at all mysterious?

Then, I don't see Kastrup having the necessary background in systems organization and the underlying mechanism of logic and state machines to really grok how form actually begets that experience of function through integration of signals within the network.

The mistake comes in treating it as a metaphor for mind rather than the actuality of it.

After all, Occam's razor would recommend that you not assume difference exists when difference is not demonstrated.
 
In defense of integrated information theory. In this essay, Kastrup defends IIT and argues it does not, as he himself had initially supposed, carry a metaphysical commitment to naturalism/physicalism.
I mean, I already posed a drug-fuelled woo which allows IIT in a stage of metaphysical idealism, however the metaphysical idealism would have, in such a setting, *become* physicalism.
 
In fact, Kastrup contends IIT provides the first scientific model of Kant’s noumena.
 
"Mind did it" is no different than "god did it".
Hence why I tend to just observe "internality of the computer is internality of the mind; these are the same thing. Mystery solved. Let's just get back to building cool shit, even if that means there's a mind in there; let's just be careful to treat it well IFF the mind is one that could potentially care how it is treated."
 
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