Are words immaterial?

[ryan]

These are all physical events, and they are a short summary of the vicissitudes of verbal events (including "words") which explain to a large (if not complete) degree the phenomenon of human meaning in the verbal context, which is what people usually refer to when talking about the supposed immateriality of words and/or concepts. In short and to conclude, the proposition of the immateriality of words is unnecessary, not to mention the problems this would create, fundamentally the problem of explaining the interaction of physical and non-physical entities and--to start off with-- having to give evidential foundation to the existence of non-physical entities.

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

 

[Perspicuo]

These are all physical events, and they are a short summary of the vicissitudes of verbal events (including "words") which explain to a large (if not complete) degree the phenomenon of human meaning in the verbal context, which is what people usually refer to when talking about the supposed immateriality of words and/or concepts. In short and to conclude, the proposition of the immateriality of words is unnecessary, not to mention the problems this would create, fundamentally the problem of explaining the interaction of physical and non-physical entities and--to start off with-- having to give evidential foundation to the existence of non-physical entities.

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

In terms of their gravitational pull towards one another, and other spacetime interactions, yes.
In terms of stimulus events on the relevant sense organs of an observer, also.

Immaterial? I fail to see.

 

[Togo]

I don't see that properties such as meaning, significance, inter-relatedness, and so on, are physical properties or characteristics. Certainly they can't be measured by physical means, or detected as such. On what basis then are they being described as physical?

 

[ryan]

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

In terms of their gravitational pull towards one another, and other spacetime interactions, yes.
In terms of stimulus events on the relevant sense organs of an observer, also.

Immaterial? I fail to see.

First of all, let's assume that a word is an object outside of the brain. Let's also assume that letters are also objects outside of the brain. Now, let's even assume that words exist the way we perceive them.

The word/object "post" can have the exact same material as the word "tops". So I am forced to assume that there is an immaterial difference between words even though they are of the same material.

 

[fast]

Hmmm. Maybe I had it wrong. Perhaps it's a sound.

So then what is in a book?

Well, if I take the road that a word is more akin to a sound than a quasi-abstract object, I would probably be inclined to make a distinction between an unwritten word and a written word. An unwritten word would then be a sound while a written word would then be a representation of a sound, much like the numeral three is a representation of the number three. So, a word would be either a sound or a representation of a sound.

Would we therefore (I'm curious) deny that a sound is immaterial because material is a necessary component to generate sound? See, to me, this is where things get sticky. Why must we be so quick to dismiss the notion that such things are immaterial on such a basis? We do disjustice to language when we narrow the scope of what constitutes immateriality. Suppose the material constituents of what we think is sound isn't actually sound but rather what gives rise to sound, much like the notion that a brain gives rise to a mind, where not the mind but rather the brain is what's made of matter. If a spoken word is the consequence of the material in action to make sound, language affords us the ability to delineate between the material word and that which is immaterial without making it sound mystic. It's apart of our language (not misunderstanding) to speak of things that are consequences of material-bearing events. In other words, the idea that certain material events create things to which we can acceptably be spoken of as immaterial is not being considered. The insatiable desire to deny this is seen in the brain mind distinction where people can't for a moment consider the notion that certain things often regarded as immaterial are not only a function of that which is material but actually a byproduct of language.

Don't hold me to all that. It needs some work.

 

[ryan]

So then what is in a book?

Well, if I take the road that a word is more akin to a sound than a quasi-abstract object, I would probably be inclined to make a distinction between an unwritten word and a written word. An unwritten word would then be a sound while a written word would then be a representation of a sound, much like the numeral three is a representation of the number three. So, a word would be either a sound or a representation of a sound.

Would we therefore (I'm curious) deny that a sound is immaterial because material is a necessary component to generate sound? See, to me, this is where things get sticky. Why must we be so quick to dismiss the notion that such things are immaterial on such a basis? We do disjustice to language when we narrow the scope of what constitutes immateriality. Suppose the material constituents of what we think is sound isn't actually sound but rather what gives rise to sound, much like the notion that a brain gives rise to a mind, where not the mind but rather the brain is what's made of matter. If a spoken word is the consequence of the material in action to make sound, language affords us the ability to delineate between the material word and that which is immaterial without making it sound mystic. It's apart of our language (not misunderstanding) to speak of things that are consequences of material-bearing events. In other words, the idea that certain material events create things to which we can acceptably be spoken of as immaterial is not being considered. The insatiable desire to deny this is seen in the brain mind distinction where people can't for a moment consider the notion that certain things often regarded as immaterial are not only a function of that which is material but actually a byproduct of language.

Don't hold me to all that. It needs some work.

I think I understand what you're saying. Is this an argument for emergent properties?

 

[Under the Rose]

So then what is in a book?

Well, if I take the road that a word is more akin to a sound than a quasi-abstract object, I would probably be inclined to make a distinction between an unwritten word and a written word. An unwritten word would then be a sound while a written word would then be a representation of a sound, much like the numeral three is a representation of the number three. So, a word would be either a sound or a representation of a sound.

Would we therefore (I'm curious) deny that a sound is immaterial because material is a necessary component to generate sound? See, to me, this is where things get sticky. Why must we be so quick to dismiss the notion that such things are immaterial on such a basis? We do disjustice to language when we narrow the scope of what constitutes immateriality. Suppose the material constituents of what we think is sound isn't actually sound but rather what gives rise to sound, much like the notion that a brain gives rise to a mind, where not the mind but rather the brain is what's made of matter. If a spoken word is the consequence of the material in action to make sound, language affords us the ability to delineate between the material word and that which is immaterial without making it sound mystic. It's apart of our language (not misunderstanding) to speak of things that are consequences of material-bearing events. In other words, the idea that certain material events create things to which we can acceptably be spoken of as immaterial is not being considered. The insatiable desire to deny this is seen in the brain mind distinction where people can't for a moment consider the notion that certain things often regarded as immaterial are not only a function of that which is material but actually a byproduct of language.

Don't hold me to all that. It needs some work.

Not bad, for shooting from the hip...or rather, the lip.

 

[Juma]

These are all physical events, and they are a short summary of the vicissitudes of verbal events (including "words") which explain to a large (if not complete) degree the phenomenon of human meaning in the verbal context, which is what people usually refer to when talking about the supposed immateriality of words and/or concepts. In short and to conclude, the proposition of the immateriality of words is unnecessary, not to mention the problems this would create, fundamentally the problem of explaining the interaction of physical and non-physical entities and--to start off with-- having to give evidential foundation to the existence of non-physical entities.

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

what is the point of using the word "immaterial"? The difference is in the structure and structure is definitely part of what we call material.

 

[Juma]

I don't see that properties such as meaning, significance, inter-relatedness, and so on, are physical properties or characteristics. Certainly they can't be measured by physical means, or detected as such. On what basis then are they being described as physical?

I cant se any reason for calling them non-physical. And why do you say that "they cannot be measured"?

 

[GenesisNemesis]

Every thing is somewhere, but not everything is somewhere.

OK. Evidence? So far I only see a massive assertion.

 

[Speakpigeon]

In short and to conclude, the proposition of the immateriality of words is unnecessary, not to mention the problems this would create, fundamentally the problem of explaining the interaction of physical and non-physical entities and--to start off with-- having to give evidential foundation to the existence of non-physical entities.

Let's just cut to the chase, shall we?

Your final sentence summarizes what this topic is all about...discussing whether or not words are immaterial. In your opinion, this proposition is unnecessary and would be problematical to provide evidence for 'non-physical entities', yet science has designed means of measuring all manner of things which were not even concepts centuries ago and which we cannot observe directly, only the effects thereof.

I respectfully recognize your opinion and look forward also to the perspectives of others.

The idea of the immateriality of words is strongly related to the idea that concepts are shared and both these ideas are strongly related to the notion of universals, whereby the existence (or being, i.e. existence outside time and space) of something common to different particular material objects, called a universal, is deemed necessary to explain the known facts convincingly. An articulate expounding of this old idea of universals has been produced by Bertrand Russell in Problems of Philosophy (1912), Chapter IX The world of Universals, available at Problems of Philosophy, Chapter IX.

AT the end of the preceding chapter we saw that such entities as relations appear to have a being which is in some way different from that of physical objects, and also different from that of minds and from that of sense-data. In the present chapter we have to consider what is the nature of this kind of being, and also what objects there are that have this kind of being. We will begin with the latter question.

The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to be advocated in what follows is largely Plato's, with merely such modifications as time has shown to be necessary.

I disagree that this explanation is at all necessary but at least it's a straightforward explanation delivered in good English!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

Structures and shapes can be regarded as material to the extent that they have a causal effect. That's what is meant by "material". For example, the fact that a key fits a lock and can therefore turn inside it is dependent on both the shape of the key and the shape of the lock. Turning a key requires energy so there is an obvious connection between shape and energy. Similarly, many phenomena are dependent on shape and structure, for example the processes taking place in DNA strands where broadly structure gives code and shape gives molecule folding. If this connection is accepted then the choice to call shapes and structures material or immaterial is a cosmetic, not essential, one.

In your example, only the apples arranged in a straight-line structure could all be hit by an arrow in just one shot.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

First of all, let's assume that a word is an object outside of the brain. Let's also assume that letters are also objects outside of the brain. Now, let's even assume that words exist the way we perceive them.

The word/object "post" can have the exact same material as the word "tops". So I am forced to assume that there is an immaterial difference between words even though they are of the same material.

Here you would agree that a computer can be made to react differently to the two words "post" and "tops", so spelling has a causal effect as structure.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Every thing is somewhere, but not everything is somewhere.

OK. Evidence? So far I only see a massive assertion.

The opposite view is just as big an assertion... unless you could articulate what's different?
EB

 

[GenesisNemesis]

OK. Evidence? So far I only see a massive assertion.

The opposite view is just as big an assertion... unless you could articulate what's different?
EB

Does that somehow make fast's view more valid? I'm mainly focusing on the view expressed by fast.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Does that somehow make fast's view more valid?

No. Of course not.

I'm mainly focusing on the view expressed by fast.

Well, that was my point. You did say "massive" and this inevitably suggested that Fast was obviously on shaky grounds and this makes yours a more controversial statement to make and one therefore that you would need to articulate and justify.

We can all see that Fast made an assertion which he didn't proceed to justify. But was that a massive assertion? Why not just an unsupported assertion?

Also, I would say myself that there is necessarily something which is (trivially) not somewhere making his assertion true but I suspect Fast had a different idea in mind when he made his assertion so we will have to wait and see if he wants to explain his view at all or remain cryptic.
EB

 

[Perspicuo]

In terms of their gravitational pull towards one another, and other spacetime interactions, yes.
In terms of stimulus events on the relevant sense organs of an observer, also.

Immaterial? I fail to see.

First of all, let's assume that a word is an object outside of the brain. Let's also assume that letters are also objects outside of the brain. Now, let's even assume that words exist the way we perceive them.

The word/object "post" can have the exact same material as the word "tops". So I am forced to assume that there is an immaterial difference between words even though they are of the same material.

"Forced" or "prefer"?

'P-O-S-T' is objectively, physically different from 'T-O-P-S'. So much, that when you typed those letters in that order on your keyboard, it affected your PC and the TalkFreethought servers in exactly that way, that order. When you attempt to make a call, if you type 8787-1419 instead of 8787-1491, the system connects your call to two different phones. So, verbal elements, from small phonemes to long phrases and sentences, behave, according to the example you suggested, in much the same way as physical systems do.

 

[ryan]

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

what is the point of using the word "immaterial"? The difference is in the structure and structure is definitely part of what we call material.

I said that there is an immaterial aspect to the material.

 

[ryan]

From a countless number of hours spent on this subject, I did learn that there is an immaterial aspect to processes and structures. For example, there can be 4 apples positioned in a line, or the same 4 apples can be positioned into the shape of a square. There is no difference in the material of the two configurations, but there is an immaterial difference in the positions of the apples relative to one another.

Structures and shapes can be regarded as material to the extent that they have a causal effect. That's what is meant by "material". For example, the fact that a key fits a lock and can therefore turn inside it is dependent on both the shape of the key and the shape of the lock. Turning a key requires energy so there is an obvious connection between shape and energy. Similarly, many phenomena are dependent on shape and structure, for example the processes taking place in DNA strands where broadly structure gives code and shape gives molecule folding. If this connection is accepted then the choice to call shapes and structures material or immaterial is a cosmetic, not essential, one.

In your example, only the apples arranged in a straight-line structure could all be hit by an arrow in just one shot.
EB

That is my point. The exact same material can have different effects on what interacts with it. There seems to be both material and immaterial qualities to the arrangements of the apples.

 

[ryan]

First of all, let's assume that a word is an object outside of the brain. Let's also assume that letters are also objects outside of the brain. Now, let's even assume that words exist the way we perceive them.

The word/object "post" can have the exact same material as the word "tops". So I am forced to assume that there is an immaterial difference between words even though they are of the same material.

"Forced" or "prefer"?

'P-O-S-T' is objectively, physically different from 'T-O-P-S'. So much, that when you typed those letters in that order on your keyboard, it affected your PC and the TalkFreethought servers in exactly that way, that order. When you attempt to make a call, if you type 8787-1419 instead of 8787-1491, the system connects your call to two different phones. So, verbal elements, from small phonemes to long phrases and sentences, behave, according to the example you suggested, in much the same way as physical systems do.

Like told everyone else, "tops" has both a material and an immaterial aspect. We know this because the exact same material is causing two different kinds of effects.