COLOUR

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Once again, I was not able to copy and paste certain passages I was able to access in Palmer’s book, so here are several screen shots I feel are pertinent to the distinctions Palmer is making. I’ll post them in order, starting with his definition of “visual perception” from the first chapter, but I did not retain the page numbers.

My intent was to find a clear delineation of the psychological process he’s asserting regarding “color”—which I have not yet been able to find to my satisfaction—but these sections certainly point to Palmer differentiating the science from the psychology (and setting up the fact that his theory hinges on reflected light; meaning that the object may be reflecting red, but may actually intrinsically be some other color).

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

He is VERY clearly making a distinction between how a physicist would describe light and how a psychologist would describe light (i.e, “the experience of”).

Just on this, you're mixing two things up. Palmer's psychologist is describing colour, not light.

To you (and many others perhaps), 'colour' is a valid common descriptor for certain properties of light, and objects (though that one is much less used) and also for the properties of certain brain experiences. Fine. I get that. I understand the distinction you are making and your labelling and that you are not saying they are the same properties in each case. But don't project it onto Palmer, because he is embracing a different model (and set of descriptors) to you, at least for the purposes of his discussion. My guess is he might still say 'what a lovely blue sky today' to his wife when they're on holiday.

I disagree. I think Palmer is doing precisely what Maund said and I believe the screen shots I posted from his book further support it. Palmer is using the terms “light” and “color” to deliberately make differentiations between science and psychology; between wavelength and the experience of wavelengths.

Iow (Palmer's own), he is making a distinction between the "input" information and the "output" information. But that says nothing definitive about the objective condition of the object, other than in most cases, the light we see--the wavelength specifically--is being altered by the bounce off of the object, so what color the object actually is can't be discerned by our eyes, (because additional information is being absorbed by the object); merely the color of the bounced light.

 

[fromderinside]

never mind.

 

[ruby sparks]

I disagree. I think Palmer is doing precisely what Maund said and I believe the screen shots I posted from his book further support it. Palmer is using the terms “light” and “color” to deliberately make differentiations between science and psychology; between wavelength and the experience of wavelengths.

Iow (Palmer's own), he is making a distinction between the "input" information and the "output" information. But that says nothing definitive about the objective condition of the object, other than in most cases, the light we see--the wavelength specifically--is being altered by the bounce off of the object, so what color the object actually is can't be discerned; merely the color of the bounced light.

Both those (in bold) are just clearly the wrong reading of Palmer, imo. He explicitly said there is no colour in light, and I doubt he thinks it's a property of objects, because he clearly said it is only a psychological phenomenon. He explicitly says both those things. Can you refer me to where in the text Palmer actually says either of the things in bold above?

"There is no colour independent of an observer, because colour is a psychological phenomenon that arises only within an observer."

"Color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights."

As for Maund, he is of course correct to say that what Palmer says is not incompatible with other definitions of colour in a different sense. So if someone wants to use the same word for the physical external conditions, that's ok. I wouldn't, at least not in discussions of this sort. I think it's at least very questionable to do so.

 

[skepticalbip]

I am a bit surprised that anyone would argue against Palmer's statement about color. We have no way of knowing what some other person's impression of colors is. We can know is that, whatever sensation they have when seeing "red" or "green", they have been socially conditioned to label those particular sensations of their's as "red" or "green". We can only know that they are capable of sensing and distinguishing specific frequencies of electromagnetic radiation but not specifically how they internally interpret them.

Those who suffer from synesthesia demonstrate an extreme example of how differently people sense the environment. Such people could sense those EM frequencies as taste or sound (and have been socially conditioned to label them "red" or "green").

 

[ruby sparks]

If certain electromagnetic radiation causes colours in human brains, and it’s accurate to say that the radiation is (some form of) colour, then similarly, if other electromagnetic radiation causes pain in humans, it should be accurate to say that that radiation is (some form of) pain.

This is not generally how it is described or modeled.

One possible explanation would involve intuition.

Colours intuitively appear to be generally or much more often external to the organism, pain generally much more often internal to the organism.

I can’t think of a better alternative explanation for the apparent ontological inconsistency.

Yet both may involve location illusions (the pain is not really in your toe, the red is not really in the strawberry).

 

[ruby sparks]

I am a bit surprised that anyone would argue against Palmer's statement about color. We have no way of knowing what some other person's impression of colors is. We can know is that, whatever sensation they have when seeing "red" or "green", they have been socially conditioned to label those particular sensations of their's as "red" or "green". We can only know that they are capable of sensing and distinguishing specific frequencies of electromagnetic radiation but not specifically how they internally interpret them.

Those who suffer from synesthesia demonstrate an extreme example of how differently people sense the environment. Such people could sense those EM frequencies as taste or sound (and have been socially conditioned to label them "red" or "green").

It makes sense that we would each experience colour at least slightly differently. The only way it could conceivably seem to be identical would be if the pattern, number and responsiveness of cones and rods in each individual eye were identical, for starters. After that, each arrangement or connectivity of neurons would also need to be identical. This would follow from any currently accepted description of the processes involved.

However, there seem to be sufficient similarities between most human eyes and brains, even allowing for individual, cultural or language differences, for similar colour categorisations and forms of experience to exist, and then there seem to be outliers, such as the varieties of synesthesia, as you say. Ditto cases of colour blindness. Other than that it seems the difference between ‘blue’ and ‘green’ in particular results in some differences in experience, depending on culture and language, but not significantly so (depending on what me mean by significant, if the Himba people can’t readily tell blue from green that’s arguably quite amazing).

Personally, I find the inverted spectrum argument, where my red is your blue for example, to be more than a bit unlikely and far-fetched, even if hypothetically possible. An inversion like that would seem to require a very unusual amount of small-scale physical differences.

So, assuming we both have reasonably ‘normal’ vision, you might see a slightly different red to me, when viewing the exact same light or object, but no more than that.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

I am a bit surprised that anyone would argue against Palmer's statement about color.

It's not about his statements regarding one side of the equation (subjectivity); it's about the other side of the equation (objectivety).

We have no way of knowing what some other person's impression of colors is.

Correct. Which means, once again, that no one--not Palmer, not me, not ruby, not anyone--can prove that the color isn't intrinsic to the object. Once again, all we can do is infer from the available evidence.

This is from a paper Palmer wrote in 2000 that I linked to previously called Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint, where he does just that in fact:

I begin with a brief description of the inverted spectrum problem as posed in classical philosophical terms and then discuss how empirical constraints on the answer can be brought to bear in terms of the structure of human color experience as it is currently understood scientifically. This discussion ultimately leads to a principled distinction, called the isomorphism constraint, between what can and cannot be determined about the nature of experience by objective behavioral means. Finally, I consider the prospects for achieving a biologically based explanation of color experience, ending with some speculation about limitations on what science can achieve with respect to understanding color experience and other forms of consciousness
...
2.1. The subjectivity barrier. It is universally agreed that there is a behaviorally defined subjectivity barrier with respect to how much others can know about our experiences, and color experiences are no exception. Some aspects of experience can be shared across observers, whereas others cannot be. We know that many aspects of color experience must be shared across observers because normal trichromats agree in their linguistic statements and other sorts of discriminative behavior with respect to colors. Color-blind individuals also agree with others having the same form of color deficiency, but they do not agree across color-deficiency classes or with normal trichromats. These aspects of color experience are therefore objectively shared and fully available to behavioral science.
...
Thus it seems that functionalism may succeed in specifying experience as fully as objective science will allow, eventhough I, as a conscious experiencer of colors, may be able to get some further knowledge via attributing my own subjective experiences to my equivalence class as defined by combined evidence from the brain and behavioral sciences. The indeterminacy of the nature of individual experiences within functionalism is a small shortcoming, however,compared to the fact that it fails to discriminate between my experiences and the complete lack of such experiences in an information-processing system that has the same causal relational structure among its processes, but no experiences of any kind.

The color machine described above, for example, has the same representational color space as a normal human trichromat but, because of the implications of the color-room argument, it seems highly unlikely that such a machine would have color experiences of any sort. The causal isomorphism of its color representations to those of normal trichromats is sufficient to guarantee that it cannot be distinguished from a normal trichromat by behavioral means, but not that it has color experiences of any sort. This is a problem because it means that, in addition to having no account of the qualities of experience, functionalism has no account of experience at all.

In short and once again, the fact that we recreate literally everything in our brains as a brute fact of our physical makeup DOES NOT PRECLUDE the notion that we are copying/modelling an objective condition. Indeed, it is logical that we do attempt to model--as accurately as we are able--an objective condition. Iow, we (and many other animals) developed the ability to discern colors because colors exist independently of us.

No one (Palmer included) can know whether or not "blue" exists solely as a "brain experience." We can know that it does, but NOT whether or not it ALSO is an intrinsic condition.

So he can make this statement: Color is a brain experience. What he CAN'T state is: Color is ONLY a brain experience. No one can make that assertion. Or, rather, no one can prove that assertion. Not Palmer, not Galileo, not Newton, not Locke, not ANYONE and for the exact same reason that we can't disprove it either.

But that's not what Palmer is about, nor what his book and subsequent writings are about. The book's thrust is regarding the fact that the majority of our vision (including color) is actually the result of a reflection of photons bouncing OFF of objects, so the "input" information is (psychologically) different than the "output" information.

Iow, we aren't acquiring information from the object; we are acquiring information about the object in an indirect and physically distorted manner. The ball may not "be" the wavelength blue; the wavelength blue is what results after trillions of photons bounce (and some get absorbed) off of the particular ball in question, thus changing the wavelengths and our sensory input devices (in this case, "eyes") acquire that information; the altered information, not necessarily the intrinsic information.

Thus is it is even more difficult--so he argues--to break the "subjectivity barrier" to determine the object qua object's "color," so what psychologists are dealing with is "brain experiences," while the scientists are dealing with something else.

NONE of this, however, delves into why we have evolved a cone/rod system to begin with or why we delineate wavelengths into a color spectrum or whether or not there even is a color spectrum independent of our observations. Palmer etal have stated only one side of the equation; that we directly experience color in our brains.

THAT is not in question. What IS in question is whether or not there is ALSO an objective color.

Once again, these are not mutually exclusive conditions. It can BOTH be true that we experience color in our brains AND that objects are objectively/intrinsically colored. Indeed, the very fact that we evolved the ability to discern colors is strong evidence that color is an intrinsic quality and not JUST in our brains.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

If certain electromagnetic radiation causes colours in human brains, and it’s accurate to say that the radiation is (some form of) colour, then similarly, if other electromagnetic radiation causes pain in humans

Once again, category error. Color is not the same type of phenomenon as pain, unless you are talking EXCLUSIVELY about the brain's ability to ASSOCIATE.

What you keep defaulting to is the experience that the acquired information from a given signal triggers in the brain. You are NOT talking about blue; you are talking about the experience of blueness.

Why is this distinction so difficult for you?

Is "love" the word and "love" the feeling the same thing? Are words and feelings in the same category? If I keep talking about "love" when I mean the word and you keep talking about "love" when you mean the feeling are we talking about the same things?

No.

 

[ruby sparks]

Which means, once again, that no one--not Palmer, not me, not ruby, not anyone--can prove that the color isn't intrinsic to the object. Once again, all we can do is infer from the available evidence.

Since proof has never been on the agenda and has in fact been ruled out, you're barking up a straw tree. The matter is unresolved and I bet we're not going to resolve it here.

Once again, category error. Color is not the same type of phenomenon as pain, ....

Since it has been accepted that pain is (a) not the same as colour, and (b) might not be (we don't know and can't assume) in the same category vis-a-vis locations of properties, you're arguably barking up another straw tree. It was explicitly introduced as a comparison or analogy and the point has been made several times that it may be a different matter. In fact, I asked for ways pain could be different that would specifically indicate why it was (presumably or more often presumed to be, or conceived as being) not 'out there' (outside the brain, or the organism in pain, not in the stimuli or inanimate objects themselves in other words) while colour was, because that might be interesting to discuss.

For balance, the comparison with forms, shapes and lengths was also offered, and unlike pain and fear, it was suggested that these are examples of phenomena which although being experienced in the brain, are not only in the brain.

So pain and fear are candidate precedents of 'phenomena that are only brain experiences', and forms, shapes and lengths are candidates for 'phenomena that are not only brain experiences'. Point being to explore what is it that would make something one or the other of those, in some ways to explore the longstanding division of properties, by some thinkers, into secondary and primary, respectively.

You could perhaps say that in my model, the properties of light are secondary when it comes to colour, in that they can cause colour (in brains) but are not themselves colour. But I am not necessarily using or tying myself to any particular traditional paradigm of primary and secondary properties (eg Locke's).

Note: it has been suggested, not by me, that we could say that even forms, shapes and lengths are purely brain creations, but it wasn't explored and I myself am not yet sure I would say it, though I have been thinking about it, and it might be the case. I'm not sure what I think on that.

....unless you are talking EXCLUSIVELY about the brain's ability to ASSOCIATE.

I think that's referring to how it works in your model, not mine. In some ways, they are similar but opposite models. You can tell me if I get yours wrong. I think you seem to have it that brain colours are associated with (or mimic or copy) actual colours of objects and lights? In a way, you seem to be saying that the external colours (in objects or light) come first, or are primary. If so, I have it the other way around, that supposed colours of objects or lights are in fact either illusory or erroneous associations with actual brain colours (which have been caused, at least in part, by light input that has properties other than colour). I have it that as regards colours, the brain experiences came first (albeit after the various chain of processes involved in their creation in the brain), and are the only, actual, real colours.

What you keep defaulting to is the experience that the acquired information from a given signal triggers in the brain. You are NOT talking about blue; you are talking about the experience of blueness.

Why is this distinction so difficult for you?

Because I'm not using your model or descriptors. In my model, there is only one real, actual colour, and that's the one that's in brains. As such, it's not merely 'the experience of blueness' (although it is that), it's all that blue is and only what it is. That's the model I'm putting forward.

I'm saying the naming of objects (and light) as blue is essentially an error, based on an illusion of location. Other than that it may be a convenient naming convention.

Is "love" the word and "love" the feeling the same thing? Are words and feelings in the same category? If I keep talking about "love" when I mean the word and you keep talking about "love" when you mean the feeling are we talking about the same things?

No.

So it's ok to do different categories after all.

But seriously, I have no objection to comparisons or analogies. The love one is interesting. I have accepted it as an analogy/comparison to explore.

I'm good with saying there's at least some sort of information about love in the word love (or the equivalent word in any shared language). I'd be as happy to say that there is some information about pain in the word pain, and indeed that there is some information about colour in the word colour. So it's ok, imo, to put pain, fear and love in the same general category of 'things that are only brain experiences but about which at least some relevant information can be transmitted in other forms' (be it words, smoke signals or electro-electronic waves or what have you).

But would you ever say that the word green was itself green? I guess you might if you were a synesthesic but not otherwise.

Because that's what you're saying about objects and light, you're saying 'they are green' and you talk about the 'actual colour' of objects or light.

I have some issues with that. To me (better to say, in the model I am suggesting), as I tried to say above, it's cart before horse. I'm proposing that we only call objects green because they merely appear to us to match the only real green that's in our heads, and furthermore that it's an illusion that they are out there on or in the object, or indeed in light (an idea that came much later, and imo an interesting conceptual switch for several reasons, not least that it kept the colour, erroneously imo, 'out there', as if the very idea that it was out there had to be maintained, because it was so strongly intuitive).

By contrast, I might be ok with saying that certain things contain colour information, but that's different from saying that they actually are the colour in question, especially if, as seems to be the case with for example sunlight, the same 'information' also contributes to non-visual phenomena (eg making vitamin D). So there is the interesting question of whether the information is specific to colour production or more general. The more general it is, the less reason there would be to call it colour information, strictly-speaking, let alone calling it an actual colour. We might better say 'it has information (or properties) that are useful for, amongst other things, colour-making'.

 

[skepticalbip]

It's not about his statements regarding one side of the equation (subjectivity); it's about the other side of the equation (objectivety).

Correct. Which means, once again, that no one--not Palmer, not me, not ruby, not anyone--can prove that the color isn't intrinsic to the object. Once again, all we can do is infer from the available evidence.

Objectively there is EM radiation, not redons, blueons, and greenons. We sense specific wavelengths of the EM radiation which creates an electric signal that goes to the brain and is interpreted as color.

It would be analogous to flavor. There aren't sweetons on sugar or sourons on lemons. The chemicals in our food combines with our taste buds which creates an electrical signal that goes to the brain and is interpreted as sweet, sour, etc.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

It's not about his statements regarding one side of the equation (subjectivity); it's about the other side of the equation (objectivety).

Correct. Which means, once again, that no one--not Palmer, not me, not ruby, not anyone--can prove that the color isn't intrinsic to the object. Once again, all we can do is infer from the available evidence.

Objectively there is EM radiation, not redons, blueons, and greenons.

You're getting hung up on loaded terms.

We sense specific wavelengths of the EM radiation which creates an electric signal that goes to the brain and is interpreted as color.

Yes. That, however, does not preclude the notion that the "interpretation" is accurately reflecting an objective condition.

It would be analogous to flavor.

No, it would not, actually, because "flavor" is yet another different category that combines information from several different sensory input devices in much the same way as "pain" (e.g., your nose; the taste buds; etc). With color, however, the only differentiators are the cones/rods.

The chemicals in our food combines with our taste buds which creates an electrical signal that goes to the brain and is interpreted as sweet, sour, etc.

Once again, that this occurs does NOT axiomatically preclude the possibility that there is ALSO an innate "sweetness" or "sourness" to the chemical itself, such that, any tasting machine would register such innate (or objective) structure.

Iow, you can't prove that is the case just as I cannot prove it is not. No one can.

Repeating one side of the equation doesn't change that fact.

EVERYTHING is always a matter of modelling for us. Our brains (re)create literally everything. That is always a given.

The fact that this occurs, however, does not exclude the possibility that it is modelling accurately (more or less) an objective condition.

Iow and once again, BOTH propositions can be true at the exact same time; we subjectively model an objective world. The question becomes, how accurate is that model? That we can't ever know--only infer--cuts both ways.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Since proof has never been on the agenda and has been in fact ruled out, you're barking up a straw tree....I'm proposing that we only call objects green because they appear to us to match the only real green that's in our heads, and furthermore that it's an illusion that they are out there on or in the object, or indeed in light

See why I keep bringing up what can be proved as opposed to what can only be inferred? And the fact that what you are proposing does not exclude the notion that we are ALSO accurately recreating the objective color green in our heads?

It could be an illusion as equally as it could not be an illusion. Or, rather and more to the point, it could be BOTH an illusion (or illusory) AND objectively existing at the exact same time.

By contrast, I might be ok with saying that certain things contain colour information, but that's different from saying that they actually are the colour in question, especially if, as seems to be the case with for example sunlight, the same 'information' also contributes to non-visual phenomena (eg making vitamin D). So there is the question of whether the information is specific to colour production or more general.

And the only way to answer that question is via inference based on the available evidence and we're right back at the fact that we have evolved rods and cones (and technology), whose purpose is translate that information.

So, yet again, why would they translate the information into blue and red and green if those colors/hues are not in some manner contained in the wavelength (if you still won't just accept that they ARE the wavelengths)?

You are still using terms (such as "contain colour information" rather than just "is colour information") that tries to preserve the notion that the message is not the medium; that the message is merely "in" the medium.

McLuhan weeped.

 

[ruby sparks]

Since proof has never been on the agenda and has been in fact ruled out, you're barking up a straw tree....I'm proposing that we only call objects green because they appear to us to match the only real green that's in our heads, and furthermore that it's an illusion that they are out there on or in the object, or indeed in light

See why I keep bringing up what can be proved as opposed to what can only be inferred?

Because it's a straw man?

Otherwise, no.

And the fact that what you are proposing does not exclude the notion that we are ALSO accurately recreating the objective color green in our heads?

What it excludes is that colour is anywhere else other than in brains.

Accuracy in other ways is a slightly different issue. The colour does not necessarily accurately reflect the input (the colours vary when the properties of light or objects don't, for example). Other examples have been given.

So, yet again, why would they translate the information into blue and red and green if those colors/hues are not in some manner contained in the wavelength ....

I know this is giving you an ongoing problem, but it really shouldn't. The cones and rods respond to energy or information, and energy or information itself does not necessarily have to be the thing is plays a part in making. Quite apart from anything else, colours being produced without light have been cited. Sunlight doesn't need to be vitamin D to make vitamin D in humans. Pain and fear don't have to be in the external stimuli. Etc.

(if you still won't just accept that they ARE the wavelengths)?

That the colours are the wavelengths? No, that's not my model. It's yours. I like mine much better. I think yours is possibly an illusion of location and/or an error.

 

[ruby sparks]

That, however, does not preclude the notion that the "interpretation" is accurately reflecting an objective condition.

For the umpteenth time, no one has said otherwise, about there being objective conditions. Literally no one has said there aren't objective conditions that are being responded to.

As to accuracy, it's not always a completely accurate process. See: illusions.

For the most part, the processes and capacities have evolved to greatly assist the organism.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

What it excludes is that colour is anywhere else other than in brains.

THE OBJECTIVE CONDITION IS THAT THE OBJECT IS COLORED. YOU CAN'T PROVE IT IS NOT. YOU CAN'T PROVE THAT IT IS.

NOR CAN PALMER. NOR CAN ANYONE.

Fucking hell.

ETA: So, no, nothing anyone asserts can exclude that "colour is anywhere else other than in brains." It does not matter what Palmer says, he cannot prove that the object is not colored or that color ONLY exists in the brain.

 

[skepticalbip]

THE OBJECTIVE CONDITION IS THAT THE OBJECT IS COLORED. YOU CAN'T PROVE IT IS NOT. YOU CAN'T PROVE THAT IT IS.

NOR CAN PALMER. NOR CAN ANYONE.

Fucking hell.

And unicorns are objectively real because I can mentally imagine them in fine detail... and you can't prove that they aren't real.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

This is a fucking Twilight Zone episode.

ETA: Read Dennett's Quining Qualia.

Palmer cannot prove that the object is not colored, thus he cannot claim that colors ONLY exist in the brain. That's a non sequitur.

He can claim that colors exist in the brain, but he cannot claim that colors ONLY exist in the brain. That is NOT established, nor can it be established due to the hard problem of consciousness.

Is that perfectly fucking clear now?

 

[fromderinside]

OK. So is "in the brain" to mean receptors? They aren't in the brain. They are bringing information into the brain, nervous system. What the brain receives are reports from sensors which are elements sensitive to subsets of the visible spectrum.

What the brain, nervous system, receives are only colors, those segments of light spectrum transduced by receptors evolved to provide proper interface with the world to remain fit.

One can't really argue that something that produces specific information about light isn't material. Nor can they argue that what is produced is not color, since the receptors are using frequency selective material to produce that information. The brain uses transduced color information into neural processes for turning color into competitive advantage.

OK. Now argue that color is not presented to the brain and that color is only a product of the brain.

PS All that woo woo about the brain interpreting such differently by sentient circumstance falls by the wayside as simple argument about how the brain uses and interprets color. It has no bearing on source of color.

Gonna be fun.

 

[ruby sparks]

THE OBJECTIVE CONDITION IS THAT THE OBJECT IS COLORED. YOU CAN'T PROVE IT IS NOT. YOU CAN'T PROVE THAT IT IS.

NOR CAN PALMER. NOR CAN ANYONE.

Fucking hell.

ETA: So, no, nothing anyone asserts can exclude that "colour is anywhere else other than in brains." It does not matter what Palmer says, he cannot prove that the object is not colored or that color ONLY exists in the brain.

There's that proof straw man again.

It was accepted as far back as the very first post that the matter is unresolved, koy.

But at least now you're not misreading Palmer.