Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.
(2) We observe groups of people making decisions together: legislatures, committees, clubs, parent-teacher associations.

Determinism cannot claim that these events are not happening. If it makes such a claim, it would be foolish for anyone to believe it.

But determinism may make other claims which are reasonable. For example, it may reasonably claim that all events are reliably caused by prior events. This is the notion of "reliable cause and effect", and we observe ourselves and others reliably causing effects in the real world. So, this claim is reasonable.

Determinism cannot claim that free will means "freedom from causal necessity". The notion of "freedom from reliable cause and effect" is paradoxical, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. It is a self-contradiction to require any freedom to be free of the very thing that every freedom requires. Thus, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is fundamentally irrational, paradoxical, and cannot be used as the definition for anything.

Free will can be operationally defined as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. And this is the definition that is applied when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing magical, nothing supernatural, and makes no claim to any uncaused choice.

Determinism, when limited to making reasonable claims, and free will, when defined operationally and stripped of the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", are compatible notions.

...

 

[fromderinside]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.
(2) We observe groups of people making decisions together: legislatures, committees, clubs, parent-teacher associations.

Determinism cannot claim that these events are not happening. If it makes such a claim, it would be foolish for anyone to believe it.

No and those who espouse it don't have to either. You can claim, as a retort, that your statements are what happens in a determinist world.

However you have to show that they do happen as the result of actual determinism.

You don't. You put it on determinists to explain how these happenings are consequent of determinism.

We point out that you fail to show any deterministic basis for the acts you think you see. We also point out that the acts you see are self-defined acts, not objective determined acts.

You reply they are not self defined even though they arise from your observation of what you see.

We determinists respond what you see is not actually determined material evidence.

Rather it is derived from evolved adaptations for sensing anything from the outside world. Those anything's clearly are not the actual events and energies extant. Rather they are secondary this or that adaptation to those events that is good enough for you to get by.

Humans exist thanks to the nature of statistics in the real world. There are a range of responses to reality that are good enough for organisms to continue being.
That clearly is not the same as existence being determined.

So you need to demonstrate why and how a probabilistic existence is proof of any level of determinism.

What is the transformation that leads from reality to probability of existence?

My answer is develop responses that are good enough for continuing existence. As a collateral jaryhn should adapt his 'deterministic' models to being good enough statistical models.

 

[Jarhyn]

However you have to show that they do happen as the result of actual determinism

Oh, we do, and I very much did, and you pulled out a No True Scotsman Determinism.

I showed a will, I showed a choice function, I showed a set of possibilities, I showed things "free" by compatibilist definitions as a result of deterministic functions on a state field.

And you called it subjective because you failed and fail and will again in the future most likely fail to understand the difference between mutability, as describes an object with easily and arbitrarily configured object properties and subjectivity as describes an opinion, emotion, or personal taste.

It is no person's opinion or personal taste or emotion that determines that the transistor is on or off. It may happen, in some bizarre way, to have come to be as result of some absurdity of human emotion, but the thing itself is unarguably an object and unarguably observable, quantifiable and empirically verifiable.

 

[fromderinside]

However you have to show that they do happen as the result of actual determinism

Oh, we do, and I very much did, and you pulled out a No True Scotsman Determinism.

I showed a will, I showed a choice function, I showed a set of possibilities, I showed things "free" by compatibilist definitions as a result of deterministic functions on a state field.

And you called it subjective because you failed and fail and will again in the future most likely fail to understand the difference between mutability, as describes an object with easily and arbitrarily configured object properties and subjectivity as describes an opinion, emotion, or personal taste.

It is no person's opinion or personal taste or emotion that determines that the transistor is on or off. It may happen, in some bizarre way, to have come to be as result of some absurdity of human emotion, but the thing itself is unarguably an object and unarguably observable, quantifiable and empirically verifiable.

What's your problem Jarhyn? I suggested you could do what you did to show how such as humans can get to an understanding of how determinism is different from how humans try to interpret it within human perspectives. All we need do is keep the material experiment as unique and change our perspective from that of subjective to objective without handwaving.

I keep determinism within the scientific method parameters of reality. I insist that what you do and Marvin proposes are illegitimate bastardizations of any logical determinism construction.

But, I offer ways out of your logical quagmires to reconcile what we observe with what is determinism.

We are pretty close to a meeting point here. I keep physics and you shift from statistical interpretations to reductionist interpretations.

 

[Jarhyn]

All we need do is keep the material experiment as unique and change our perspective from that of subjective to objective without handwaving

This is nonsense. Like, it does not parse. complete blueberry waffle tango bella.

"Keep the material experiment as unique"

As I pointed out, you again fail to understand the difference between objectivity and mutability.

The experiment is oh so simple: open up an actual object, see a thing satisfying the definition "series of instructions unto a requirement", and then see that thing meet it's requirement, enter the same situation where the requirement shall be contingently missed instead.

We did that with Urist.

We even did that with listA.

I keep determinism within the scientific method parameters of reality

And again with your butterfly follow green flange.

The scientific method does not in the first place define "parameters of reality". People following it may discover parameters of reality, but they are not defined by the scientific method.

Your inability to keep these straight in your post does not bode well.

illegitimate bastardizations of any logical determinism construction

And there it is!

You pulled out a No True Scotsman Determinism

The fact is, even stupid little dwarves can and do display lists of instructions with requirements, and those requirements may have their requirements met contingently on the basis of the configuration of their physics, which also happens to say things of our physics because it is hosted inside our physics: their "physics" cannot allow anything to happen in our world that our world does not allow! If they can have free will, such may exist for us as well: both are deterministic systems.

The definitions of Free and Will have been satisfied, in the object properties of an empirically observable system.

Now that we have observed little objects in a big object encoding in their material form a thing satisfying the definition "list of possibilities", and that "list of possibilities" having a real observable truth value "whether shall meet requirement".

There is nothing "statistical" about this, it is a hard black and white true/false binary that is determined by an object's state. It is no different than observing the bear trap trigger. Shall the trap close? The trap itself is a will by this definition. The trigger itself is a requirement. The thing that makes the will free to it's requirement is the person objectively stepping on it. There's nothing subjective about what happens there.

"BuT BeAr TrApS DoNt HaVe WiLlS!"

Oh, they do. They WILL close IF the requirement of the trigger is satisfied. This is a function of their structure.

 

[DBT]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.

The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken.

What you see are actions being performed. You have no access to, or awareness of the underlying process that brings people to that point in time and place, each performing their only possible action in each and every instance in time in a progression of determined event (we are talking determinism after all.)

By your own definition of determinism, no alternate possibilities exist for anyone at any given instance in time.

Each person, entailing a different set of conditions, has their own unique set of actions, Bob goes with Steak, his Wife Marge takes Caeser Salad....

Rather than decisions in the sense that they have possible alternatives (being determined, there can be none), they are entailed actions.

The proposition here is determinism, not probabilistic outcomes.

(2) We observe groups of people making decisions together: legislatures, committees, clubs, parent-teacher associations.

No alternatives exist within a determined system. If our four-dimensional deterministic world could be rewound, like a movie, everything would play out precisely as the first time, all the same events, thoughts, words, action with no variation.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Determinism cannot claim that these events are not happening. If it makes such a claim, it would be foolish for anyone to believe it.

Sure, they happen. They must happen. They happen as determined. No deviation, no alternate actions possible.

But determinism may make other claims which are reasonable. For example, it may reasonably claim that all events are reliably caused by prior events. This is the notion of "reliable cause and effect", and we observe ourselves and others reliably causing effects in the real world. So, this claim is reasonable.

Determinism is far more than 'reliable cause and effect' - determinism fixes all actions and all outcomes. Your decision to choose Steak was determined before you were aware of it. Freely willed? Not even willed. Determined.

Determinism cannot claim that free will means "freedom from causal necessity". The notion of "freedom from reliable cause and effect" is paradoxical, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. It is a self-contradiction to require any freedom to be free of the very thing that every freedom requires. Thus, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is fundamentally irrational, paradoxical, and cannot be used as the definition for anything.

Without possible alternatives, where is freedom of choice? You 'choose' what you must necessarily choose. You can't do otherwise. Is that free will? It's not even a matter of will.

Free will can be operationally defined as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. And this is the definition that is applied when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing magical, nothing supernatural, and makes no claim to any uncaused choice.

Free will is an ideological notion, one that is not compatible with determinism, where all actions are fixed by initial conditions and how things go ever after as a matter of natural law...

Determinism, when limited to making reasonable claims, and free will, when defined operationally and stripped of the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", are compatible notions.

There is no freedom from natural causality, and it is natural causality/determinism that fixes all events - including brain, mind, thoughts, feelings, deliberations, etc, from initial conditions until the end of time.

That is the point.

 

[Jarhyn]

The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken

No, this abandons the definition of "possibility", or steps away from the context of determinism into imagination (in which case you are using a non-sequitur as what you think of in your imagination rightly has nothing to do with determinism).

A "possibility" is "an object in a set presented to a choice function".

ListA listA();//listA = ∅;
listA.push(1); //possibilities of listA = {[1,1]};
listA.push(2); //possibilities of listA = {[1,2], [2,1]};
Real result = listA.pop(); //result = 2; possibilities of listA = {[1,1]}

It does not matter that this construction will never return with result = 1. 1 is a "possibility" because listA contains, in it's set, [n,1], because "a possibility" is what it is owing to it's containment in the set presented to the choice function.

Failure to observe this is failure to observe the definitions of such within compatibilism and so a failure to argue in good faith against it. A possibility does not need to be selected to be a possibility of the choice function.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.
(2) We observe groups of people making decisions together: legislatures, committees, clubs, parent-teacher associations.

Determinism cannot claim that these events are not happening. If it makes such a claim, it would be foolish for anyone to believe it.

However you have to show that they do happen as the result of actual determinism.

Actually, no. There are no "results of actual determinism", because determinism doesn't actually do anything.

Determinism is simply the belief (-ism) that all events are reliably caused by prior events. Determinism is not some causal agent that goes about in the world making things happen in a certain way. Determinism is never itself a prior event.

Determinism itself is just us taking note of the fact that we can actually explain why most events happen in terms of specific causes that naturally resulted in those specific effects. And, it makes the hopeful assertion that there are likely to be reliable causes for any events for which we have not yet discovered the causes.

You put it on determinists to explain how these happenings are consequent of determinism.

Determinism itself has no consequences. Punching a guy in a bar has consequences; most likely the guy will punch back. But it was the choice to throw the first punch that reliably causes the return punch. Determinism simply makes note of the fact, by asserting "I told you that would happen!".

We also point out that the acts you see are self-defined acts, not objective determined acts.

Both the first punch and the retaliatory punch are commonly defined as "acts where one person forms a fist and presses that first, hard and fast, into someone else's body".

These are not self-defined acts, but acts which are well defined and understood by everyone (with the possible exception of a philosopher of metaphysics).

You reply they are not self defined even though they arise from your observation of what you see.

And you give us no reasonable alternative to our own observations of what we see. After all, we can duplicate this experiment in pretty much any laboratory that creates the conditions of drunken people making each other angry. We can even have a researcher, as a plant, to spur them on (this technique of having a plant is not uncommon in psychological or sociological experiments).

We determinists respond what you see is not actually determined material evidence. Rather it is derived from evolved adaptations for sensing anything from the outside world. Those anything's clearly are not the actual events and energies extant. Rather they are secondary this or that adaptation to those events that is good enough for you to get by.

And this problem is solved the same way that we solve the solipsism problem or the brain-in-a-vat problem: with Pragmatism. If that is the only reality to which we have any access, then that is as real as our reality ever gets to be.

Humans exist thanks to the nature of statistics in the real world. There are a range of responses to reality that are good enough for organisms to continue being. That clearly is not the same as existence being determined.

The thing to be clear about is that determinism never determines anything. One actual thing actually determines another actual thing. Determinism itself is not an actual thing. Believing determinism to be an actual thing is what gets everyone into trouble and makes them say very silly things.

The punch in the bar was an actual event caused by one actual guy's actual arm pushing his actual fist into the actual face or actual body of another actual guy. Determinism merely sat in the corner, taking notes. It did not actively participate.

So you need to demonstrate why and how a probabilistic existence is proof of any level of determinism.

The only proof that is ever offered that we live in a world of reliable cause and effect is the formal (scientific method) and informal (the rest of us) observations of one thing reliably causing another thing to happen.

What is the transformation that leads from reality to probability of existence? My answer is develop responses that are good enough for continuing existence.

Hallelujah for Pragmatism!

 

[pood]

DBT writes:

No alternatives exist within a determined system. If our four-dimensional deterministic world could be rewound, like a movie, everything would play out precisely as the first time, all the same events, thoughts, words, action with no variation.

And this is the whole point.

Notice, first, that we cannot run this experiment. We can run no experiment to prove your hard determinism. We can run plenty of experiments that show determinism, but none that show hard determinism. And yes, they are different, no matter how much you insist otherwise. Your hard determinism is the secular equivalent of Calvinistic predestination, with Mr. Hard Determinism taking over the supernatural celestial robes from Mr. God.

But suppose could run this experiment.

In the first iteration, from the big bang to the present moment, Marvin orders salad for dinner.

The second iteration is an exact replay of the first. And once again we find … Marvin orders salad.

Third iteration, Marvin orders salad. Fourth iteration, Marvin orders salad. Fifth iteration … on to infinity.

What have we proved? Have we proved hard determinism?

Certainly not. What we have proved is that Marvin orders salad for reasons of his own based on antecedent circumstances. In all the iterations, for example (since they are exactly alike), Marvin had a big breakfast, and so for dinner he decides to eat light — to eat salad instead of steak, say.

This is why I have emphasized throughout this thread that one must avoid the modal fallacy — one must not confuse WILL do x (order salad, in this case) with MUST do x. The hard determinist illicitly conflates contingency (WILL) with necessity (MUST). Marvin does not HAVE TO order salad in all the iterations, he just DOES (of his own free will, provided there is no outside coercion) because he WANTS to.

I will finish up by adding that in your most recent post, you yet again made the mistake of saying that future events are “fixed by natural law.” In addition to constantly making the modal fallacy, as just described, you constantly and without even thinking about it, it seems, invoke “natural law” as PREscriptive, whereas in fact it is DEscriptive. There is no law that makes it be the the case that two bodies in space orbit their common barycenter. In fact they just do that very thing, and general relativity (and to less approximation Newton) DESCRIBE that behavior.

There is no such thing as a Mr. Natural Law and a Mr. Hard Determinism serving as secular stand-ins for the Mr. God of Calvinistic predestination. Your hard determinism and mistaken notion of the role of natural law in the world is just God updated for the modern world. It is not and can never be supported by science or empiricism in any form. Just the opposite — empiricism shows people freely making choices every moment of every day.

Marvin wrote:

The thing to be clear about is that determinism never determines anything. One actual thing actually determines another actual thing. Determinism itself is not an actual thing. Believing determinism to be an actual thing is what gets everyone into trouble and makes them say very silly things.

Exactly. Like believing God is an actual thing.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.

The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken.

You are scrambling the context of actualities with the context of possibilities. They are like oil and water. They do not mix. You are free to use one or the other, and alternate between them, according to well established grammatical rules, but if you conflate their meaning you will destroy their meaning, and end up with nonsense.

Let me sort them out for you. Within the context of deterministic reality, we have people in a restaurant who are uncertain what they will choose for dinner. They face a menu of alternate possibilities and find that they must choose what they will order before they will get anything to eat.

They are initially uncertain as to what they will choose. So, they cannot yet tell the waiter "I will have this" or "I will have that". They simply do not know at this time what they will inevitably choose. They are uncertain about the deterministic reality of what they "will" do.

So, they leave the grammatical context of things that they will do and enter the grammatical context of things that they can do. Within the context of things they can do, they will think about different items on the menu that they might enjoy. Each item on the menu is something they "can" choose. But none of them are as yet something that they "will" choose.

Within the context of deterministic reality, what they will choose has not yet been meaningfully caused. No event is ever fully determined (caused to happen) until its final prior causes have played themselves out (and that play will not be over until the fat lady sings, "I will have the Chef Salad, please").

In the meantime, we are considering the steak and the salad. We "can" order the steak. We "can" order the salad. While considering the steak we recall that we had the bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. So, we decide to order the salad.

Now, finally, we know for certain what we "will" do. We tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please."

Note that we do not tell the waiter, "I can have the Chef Salad". If we said, "I can have the Chef Salad" the waiter would assume we were asking a question, and answer "Yes", and still wait for us to tell him what we will have. "I can" and "I will" mean two entirely different things, and we need to retain those two distinct meanings.

So, when you say something like, "The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken", you are confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen, and creating nonsense.

The nonsense is in suggesting that, in the context of deterministic reality, ordering the salad was the only "possible" action, the only thing that "could" have happened.

The only correct assertion we can make in the context of deterministic reality is that ordering the salad was the only "actual action", and the only thing that "would" happen under those same circumstances.

You see, it was causally necessary that, in the context of deterministic reality, we would enter the context of possibilities during the choosing operation. Within the context of possibilities there are always multiple possibilities and multiple things that we can do.

Within the context of deterministic reality, one cannot use the term "possibility" without immediately shifting to the context of possibilities!

Do you see this yet?

What you see are actions being performed. You have no access to, or awareness of the underlying process that brings people to that point in time and place, each performing their only possible action in each and every instance in time in a progression of determined event (we are talking determinism after all.)

But we do have access to that knowledge in a general sense. We know, for instance, that the brain is performing our decision making, and the brain is composed of neurons grouped into areas according to their specialized functions with the brain. And we know that these areas work together, in some fashion, to present itself to us and the world as a single person.

In the restaurant, we presume that each person has their own goals and interests, and their own reasons for the choices they make. And these goals, interests, and reasons reliably cause the choice they make, and what they end up telling the waiter to serve them for dinner.

Thus, their dinner orders are both reliably caused (deterministic) and reliably caused by them (chosen by them while free of coercion and undue influence, which is to say, a "freely chosen will").

By your own definition of determinism, no alternate possibilities exist for anyone at any given instance in time.

Not by my definition, but only by your own false assumption that, in coming to the single actuality, we never consider multiple possibilities. That is a false assumption, not justified by the facts of our deterministic reality.

We even observe groups of people making decisions together: legislatures, committees, clubs, parent-teacher associations.

There is a group decision making technique called "brainstorming", where everyone is encourage to suggest alternative possibilities, however strange, within a non-judgmental context, on the theory that even a crazy idea may spur a different idea that is actually practical.

That is how things actually work within our deterministic reality.

... determinism fixes all actions and all outcomes.

That's worse than nonsense. That is superstitious nonsense. You've assigned causal agency to an abstract concept. No sir. You do not understand what determinism is really about. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can cause events.

And, as to free will, determinism cannot claim that free will means "freedom from causal necessity". The notion of "freedom from reliable cause and effect" is paradoxical, because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable cause and effect. It is a self-contradiction to require any freedom to be free of the very thing that every freedom requires. Thus, the notion of "freedom from causal necessity" is fundamentally irrational, paradoxical, and cannot be used as the definition for anything.

Free will can be operationally defined as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. And this is the definition that is applied when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It requires nothing magical, nothing supernatural, and makes no claim to any "uncaused" choice.

Free will is an ideological notion ...

Only if we stupidly define free will as "freedom from causal necessity". That, my friend, is an ideological notion. And, unfortunately, it is a notion held by many otherwise intelligent people. But, that's what a paradox can do, drive people crazy.

Determinism, when limited to making reasonable claims, and free will, when defined operationally and stripped of the irrational notion of "freedom from causal necessity", are compatible notions.

There is no freedom from natural causality,

And, fortunately, no "freedom from natural causality" is required by the operational definition of free will. All that is required is freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

 

[Jarhyn]

DBT writes:

No alternatives exist within a determined system. If our four-dimensional deterministic world could be rewound, like a movie, everything would play out precisely as the first time, all the same events, thoughts, words, action with no variation.

And this is the whole point.

Notice, first, that we cannot run this experiment. We can run no experiment to prove your hard determinism. We can run plenty of experiments that show determinism, but none that show hard determinism. And yes, they are different, no matter how much you insist otherwise. Your hard determinism is the secular equivalent of Calvinistic predestination, with Mr. Hard Determinism taking over the supernatural celestial robes from Mr. God.

But suppose could run this experiment.

In the first iteration, from the big bang to the present moment, Marvin orders salad for dinner.

The second iteration is an exact replay of the first. And once again we find … Marvin orders salad.

Third iteration, Marvin orders salad. Fourth iteration, Marvin orders salad. Fifth iteration … on to infinity.

What have we proved? Have we proved hard determinism?

Certainly not. What we have proved is that Marvin orders salad for reasons of his own based on antecedent circumstances. In all the iterations, for example (since they are exactly alike), Marvin had a big breakfast, and so for dinner he decides to eat light — to eat salad instead of steak, say.

This is why I have emphasized throughout this thread that one must avoid the modal fallacy — one must not confuse WILL do x (order salad, in this case) with MUST do x. The hard determinist illicitly conflates contingency (WILL) with necessity (MUST). Marvin does not HAVE TO order salad in all the iterations, he just DOES (of his own free will, provided there is no outside coercion) because he WANTS to.

I will finish up by adding that in your most recent post, you yet again made the mistake of saying that future events are “fixed by natural law.” In addition to constantly making the modal fallacy, as just described, you constantly and without even thinking about it, it seems, invoke “natural law” as PREscriptive, whereas in fact it is DEscriptive. There is no law that makes it be the the case that two bodies in space orbit their common barycenter. In fact they just do that very thing, and general relativity (and to less approximation Newton) DESCRIBE that behavior.

There is no such thing as a Mr. Natural Law and a Mr. Hard Determinism serving as secular stand-ins for the Mr. God of Calvinistic predestination. Your hard determinism and mistaken notion of the role of natural law in the world is just God updated for the modern world. It is not and can never be supported by science or empiricism in any form. Just the opposite — empiricism shows people freely making choices every moment of every day.

Marvin wrote:

The thing to be clear about is that determinism never determines anything. One actual thing actually determines another actual thing. Determinism itself is not an actual thing. Believing determinism to be an actual thing is what gets everyone into trouble and makes them say very silly things.

Exactly. Like believing God is an actual thing.

So, you're not entirely right. We can take a causal determinism with fixed rules, start it from Last Thursday, and watch what something does.

We can watch them walk into the room to install the statue. You can watch them choose their need to FIGHT as one to resolve, of the set of their current needs. You can watch the path get calculated, and you can watch them start executing steps. You can watch them try to open the door. You can look at the return result of that operation.

You could do it a million times and still Urist would be standing at that door, holding a will to open it that is in the very process of being determined "unfree".

You can watch the tantrum happen as a result too.

Every time, you get to open the debugger and look at the list of "possibilities", watch the choice function return one of those "possibilities", and watch as that "possibility" becomes "an actual will" and then as that will becomes, as it would always become, unfree.

It's almost like when you can actually be a god, you can actually answer the question directly.

But as always, I would certainly hope I'm not the god of this; I really don't expect there to be one.

 

[DBT]

(1) We observe people in a restaurant making choices from a literal menu of realizable alternatives.

The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken.

You are scrambling the context of actualities with the context of possibilities. They are like oil and water. They do not mix. You are free to use one or the other, and alternate between them, according to well established grammatical rules, but if you conflate their meaning you will destroy their meaning, and end up with nonsense.

I am not scrambling a thing.

Based on the given and accepted definition of determinism, alternate actions do not exist within a deterministic system.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no freedom to select between options.

The action that is taken is necessarily taken.

Let me sort them out for you. Within the context of deterministic reality, we have people in a restaurant who are uncertain what they will choose for dinner. They face a menu of alternate possibilities and find that they must choose what they will order before they will get anything to eat.

There is nothing to sort out.

Determinism can have no uncertainty, each and every step of each and every action within a determined system proceeds as determined.

We are not discussing probabilistic systems.

That people feel a sense of uncertainty is the state of the system in that instance in time, insufficient information in relation to the means of production. There is no feedback loop between consciousness and its neural information processing substrata.

The brain is processing information and the exchange of information between cells and regions creates a sense of uncertainty during the transition between input and action taken.

An illusion of consciousness, insufficient information, but never the possibility of an alternate action.

You can't have it both ways.

You can't have determinism, yet claim that alternate actions are possible can indeed be chosen.

That is contravening the very definition of determinism that you gave.

They are initially uncertain as to what they will choose. So, they cannot yet tell the waiter "I will have this" or "I will have that". They simply do not know at this time what they will inevitably choose. They are uncertain about the deterministic reality of what they "will" do.

Again, the given your definition of determinism, there can be no alternative actions, therefore any sense of uncertainty is an illusion formed during the transition between sensory inputs and determined action, ie, the brain has not fully processed its inputs.

If actual rather than perceptual uncertainty exists within a determined system, it is not - by definition - determinism.

''Each state of the universe and its events are the necessary result of its prior state and prior events. ("Events" change the state of things.)

However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

So, when you say something like, "The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken", you are confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen, and creating nonsense.

The nonsense is in suggesting that, in the context of deterministic reality, ordering the salad was the only "possible" action, the only thing that "could" have happened.

The only correct assertion we can make in the context of deterministic reality is that ordering the salad was the only "actual action", and the only thing that "would" happen under those same circumstances.

Not merely 'would' it happen as determined, but it must necessarily happen precisely as determined.

This is not nonsense. It's precisely how determinism is defined. You appear to be drifting into probabilistic territory.

The issue is agency; 'freely chosen' versus 'necessarily chosen'

Freely chosen implies that alternate actions are possible, that you could have gone with tea instead of coffee, for instance (something that is not permitted by the given definition of determinism.)

Necessarily chosen allows no alternatives, the action that is taken is necessarily taken, with no possibility of 'choosing' otherwise.

'Freely chosen' is something that cannot - based on the given definition - exist within a deterministic system.

All actions must necessarily proceed as determined, not freely chosen.

Without realizable alternatives or alternate actions, nothing is freely willed or chosen, everything within a determined system is necessitated, making free will incompatible with determinism.


Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no freedom to select between options.

"Without being able to do BOTH you cannot do either" is abject nonsense.

The freedom to select between objects, by the definitions offered of "freedom" "possibility" and "choice" is proven out by the fact that a set was presented to the choice function and one of that set happened.

You seem to have a really big issue with figuring this out.

You are stepping off the definitions, yet again.

The action that is taken by each and every diner in the restaurant is the only possible action in the instance that it is necessarily taken

No, this abandons the definition of "possibility", or steps away from the context of determinism into imagination (in which case you are using a non-sequitur as what you think of in your imagination rightly has nothing to do with determinism).

A "possibility" is "an object in a set presented to a choice function".

ListA listA();//listA = ∅;
listA.push(1); //possibilities of listA = {[1,1]};
listA.push(2); //possibilities of listA = {[1,2], [2,1]};
Real result = listA.pop(); //result = 2; possibilities of listA = {[1,1]}

It does not matter that this construction will never return with result = 1. 1 is a "possibility" because listA contains, in it's set, [n,1], because "a possibility" is what it is owing to it's containment in the set presented to the choice function.

Failure to observe this is failure to observe the definitions of such within compatibilism and so a failure to argue in good faith against it. A possibility does not need to be selected to be a possibility of the choice function.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Based on the given and accepted definition of determinism, alternate actions do not exist within a deterministic system.

And yet there they are, right in front of our noses. Which ice cream would you like? Chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry? Who will you be voting for in the upcoming races, Republicans or Democrats? Which necktie goes best with this shirt?

Within a fully deterministic system, there is only one thing that actually "will" happen. But there are many different things that actually "can" happen.

We will necessarily choose the single thing that we will do from among the many things that we can do. "I better have a salad for dinner considering what I've already eaten for breakfast and lunch today".

The context of possibilities provides the logic and the grammar required by the rational causal mechanism in order to do its job. And we cannot break this mechanism without threatening the survival advantage that it has provided to our species.

Insisting upon a single actuality is perfectly fine. But insisting upon a single possibility is totally irrational. So, get the fork over it.

Determinism can have no uncertainty, ...

Determinism can neither have certainty nor uncertainty, because it lacks a brain, not to mention lacking a body, and lacking any interests in any outcomes, etc. Determinism is simply the belief that all events are reliably caused by prior events. It is a rational belief, at least until people start drawing all kinds of false conclusions about its implications.

That people feel a sense of uncertainty is the state of the system in that instance in time, insufficient information in relation to the means of production.

Exactly! Thus the grammatical and logical context of possibilities, abilities, things that can happen, may happen, might happen, etc.

There is no feedback loop between consciousness and its neural information processing substrata.

That's scientifically false. Consciousness is not a free floating spiritual entity, operating outside the brain.

Consciousness is just another function, connected to the many other functions, within the same neural apparatus.

The brain is processing information and the exchange of information between cells and regions creates a sense of uncertainty during the transition between input and action taken.

And what do you think this "sense" of uncertainty is for, if not to reflect our logical uncertainty prior to completing our own choosing? The rational causal mechanism deals with uncertainty by shifting to the context of multiple possibilities until choosing is complete, and we have resolved the question: "What will we do?".

An illusion of consciousness, ...

An illusion is incapable of performing a function. Conscious awareness performs a function. It manages attention to a given task. It reinforces neural pathways during the recall of information. It explains the reasons for our chosen actions. It is certainly not an illusion. It is as real as any other function within the brain.

In order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for dinner.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.' Included in these events are the possibilities that appeared on the restaurant menu, my considering the steak, my considering the salad, and finally my own decision, free of coercion and undue influence, to order the salad.

You appear to be drifting into probabilistic territory.

Not at all! But you appear to be grasping at straws.

The issue is agency;

Indeed. For example, determinism has no agency. But you and I have plenty of agency, as witnessed by this very long thread.

 

[Jarhyn]

Ok, so, let's consider a second choice function on listA: sort_top_2

bool ListA.sort_top_2(real &a, real &b)
{
 bool success = false;
 a = ∅;
 b = ∅;
 If (this.size > 2)
 {
  real temp1 = this.pop();
  real temp2 = this.pop()

  If (temp1 > temp2)
  {
    a = temp1;
    b = temp2;
  }
  else
  {
    a = temp2;
    b = temp1;
  }
  success=true;
 }
 return success;
}

An interesting facet of this particular choice function is that it incorporates other choice functions.

Another interesting fact about this choice function is that it REQUIRES more than a single possibility to be "free". If it does not have them, it will fail to select at all.

Not only does determinism not rule out possibilities, sometimes for a choice function to be "free" at all, it needs more than a "single possibility".

Observe it is still absolutely deterministic on the list.

listA needs two possibilities and returns two actualities in the operation of this choice function.

You could as easily do "top_2_of_3", and have a choice function that takes three possibilities, returns 2 of them as actualities, and then necessarily re-inserts the remaining popped element as a possibility again: A deterministic choice function that requires remaining possibilities for to be "free" at all.

 

[fromderinside]

Ok, so, let's consider a second choice function on listA: sort_top_2

bool ListA.sort_top_2(real &a, real &b)
{
 bool success = false;
 a = ∅;
 b = ∅;
 If (this.size > 2)
 {
  real temp1 = this.pop();
  real temp2 = this.pop()

  If (temp1 > temp2)
  {
    a = temp1;
    b = temp2;
  }
  else
  {
    a = temp2;
    b = temp1;
  }
  success=true;
 }
 return success;
}

An interesting facet of this particular choice function is that it incorporates other choice functions.

Another interesting fact about this choice function is that it REQUIRES more than a single possibility to be "free". If it does not have them, it will fail to select at all.

Not only does determinism not rule out possibilities, sometimes for a choice function to be "free" at all, it needs more than a "single possibility".

Observe it is still absolutely deterministic on the list.

listA needs two possibilities and returns two actualities in the operation of this choice function.

You could as easily do "top_2_of_3", and have a choice function that takes three possibilities, returns 2 of them as actualities, and then necessarily re-inserts the remaining popped element as a possibility again: A deterministic choice function that requires remaining possibilities for to be "free" at all.

Please explain how more than one possibility conforms to determinism. No if-then or else please. Such would be entirely human in origin, showing clearly the derivative nature of human interaction with deterministic world which I put in 'good enough' theory.

 

[Jarhyn]

Ok, so, let's consider a second choice function on listA: sort_top_2

bool ListA.sort_top_2(real &a, real &b)
{
 bool success = false;
 a = ∅;
 b = ∅;
 If (this.size > 2)
 {
  real temp1 = this.pop();
  real temp2 = this.pop()

  If (temp1 > temp2)
  {
    a = temp1;
    b = temp2;
  }
  else
  {
    a = temp2;
    b = temp1;
  }
  success=true;
 }
 return success;
}

An interesting facet of this particular choice function is that it incorporates other choice functions.

Another interesting fact about this choice function is that it REQUIRES more than a single possibility to be "free". If it does not have them, it will fail to select at all.

Not only does determinism not rule out possibilities, sometimes for a choice function to be "free" at all, it needs more than a "single possibility".

Observe it is still absolutely deterministic on the list.

listA needs two possibilities and returns two actualities in the operation of this choice function.

You could as easily do "top_2_of_3", and have a choice function that takes three possibilities, returns 2 of them as actualities, and then necessarily re-inserts the remaining popped element as a possibility again: A deterministic choice function that requires remaining possibilities for to be "free" at all.

Please explain how more than one possibility conforms to determinism. No if-then or else please. Such would be entirely human in origin, showing clearly the derivative nature of human interaction with deterministic world which I put in 'good enough' theory.

I already did. "Possibility" in compatibilism is "a member of the set upon which the choice function operates".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Please explain how more than one possibility conforms to determinism.

Possibilities exist solely in the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive a car across an actual bridge.

However, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, the notion of a "possibility" serves an essential function in our logical reasoning.

In deterministic reality, we encounter problems or issues where we must make a choice before we can continue. Will I turn left or right? Will I order the steak or the salad? Will I wear the red tie or the blue tie?

The logic of decision making is fully deterministic. Each step is causally necessary. And, from any prior point in eternity it will have been causally necessary that I would have two neckties to choose from, and that I, and I alone, would be making that choice.

 

[fromderinside]

Please explain how more than one possibility conforms to determinism.

Possibilities exist solely in the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive a car across an actual bridge.

However, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, the notion of a "possibility" serves an essential function in our logical reasoning.

In deterministic reality, we encounter problems or issues where we must make a choice before we can continue. Will I turn left or right? Will I order the steak or the salad? Will I wear the red tie or the blue tie?

The logic of decision making is fully deterministic. Each step is causally necessary. And, from any prior point in eternity it will have been causally necessary that I would have two neckties to choose from, and that I, and I alone, would be making that choice.

Imagination, as far as I know, exists only in the brains of some mammals. Pretty pathetic rationale for what requires logical concrete.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Please explain how more than one possibility conforms to determinism.

Possibilities exist solely in the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive a car across an actual bridge.

However, we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. So, the notion of a "possibility" serves an essential function in our logical reasoning.

In deterministic reality, we encounter problems or issues where we must make a choice before we can continue. Will I turn left or right? Will I order the steak or the salad? Will I wear the red tie or the blue tie?

The logic of decision making is fully deterministic. Each step is causally necessary. And, from any prior point in eternity it will have been causally necessary that I would have two neckties to choose from, and that I, and I alone, would be making that choice.

Imagination, as far as I know, exists only in the brains of some mammals. Pretty pathetic rationale for what requires logical concrete.

Ironically, the concrete logic also exists only in the brains of some mammals. Your gun appears to shoot backward as well as forward.