The consequences of that process being that whatever happens must necessarily happen. Which means that all actions are fixed, each and every incremental step of the process of unfolding events fixed by antecedents, ...
Correct.
Incorrect.
The only correct "therefore" is that all things are exactly as they are and all events happen exactly as they do. Period.
For example, people still make choices and people will still be held responsible for they they choose to do. People still go into a restaurant, browse the menu, and place an order. The waiter brings them their meal and a bill that they must pay on the way out.
Every event in this process is reliably caused by a history of prior events. There is a history of prior events that reliably resulted in an entrepreneur buying the land and building the restaurant. There is a history of prior events that led to each customer being born and raised and eventually ending up in that restaurant to have dinner. All of these histories extend into the past as far as anyone can imagine, and all of them are a series of events that were each caused by prior events. Thus, all events at any point in time, are the reliably result of prior events.
So what? So, it was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that those specific people would be in that specific restaurant having their own specific thoughts about what they would order for dinner, and then making their own choices based upon their own goals and interests, and for their own reasons.
It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that it would happen, just so, and in no other way.
Glad you asked. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.
Free will is not free from cause and effect. Every choice is reliably caused by each person's own thoughts and feelings about what they will order for dinner and why they chose to order this dinner rather than that one. And even those thoughts and feelings will have their own reliable histories of cause and effect.
But as long as those thoughts and feelings are the products of that person's own mind and brain, and as long as that brain is mature and healthy, and not subject to coercion or undue influence, that person will be held responsible for what they deliberately choose to do.
Your choice of steak was inevitable.
My choice of the salad was inevitable. It was inevitable because I had already had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. I
could have chosen the steak, of course, but I needed to order the salad for dinner to balance out my lack of vegetables at breakfast and lunch. My choice was reliably caused, and it was reliably caused by my own specific goals and reasoning.
Those goals and that reasoning will also have a history of reliable causes. However, it remains the case that they are my goals and my reasoning, and the choice would only be made by me and no one else at that moment in time. It was inevitable that it would be just so.
No other action was possible for you in that place and moment in time.
That's just silly. I could have ordered any item on the menu. The fact that I would inevitably order the salad does not logically imply that I could not order anything else. It was possible for me to order anything on the menu, even though I would inevitably order the salad.
What "I can do" and what "I will do" are two very different things. I know for a fact that I could have ordered the steak, because I've actually ordered the steak at that restaurant before, and will likely order it again if I have more veggies at breakfast and lunch. It is never impossible for me to order the steak. But, given the fact that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch, it was necessary, to me, to satisfy my own goals and reasons, to have the salad for dinner.
Determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice.
Obviously, determinism
does "allow" freedom of choice. Determinism not only "allows" freedom of choice, but it also "allows" coercion, and it also "allows" undue influence. We know this for a fact because we have observed all three of these conditions occurring in what we all presume to be a world of reliable cause and effect. Any event that we objectively observe must therefore be "allowed" by determinism.
It's not my conclusion. It's just how determinism is defined. If it is determined that you choose steak, not only can you choose steak, you must necessarily choose steak. You cannot do otherwise.
Hard determinism claims I
could not have done otherwise, but it is clearly a false claim. The fact is that I
could have chosen any item on the menu, but I
would only choose the salad that night.
The notion of
possibilities includes all of the things that
I can do, and all of the things that
I could have done.
The notion of possibilities is a
functional part of the
rational causal mechanism. It is how the mind logically manages matters when it is uncertain as to what will happen or what it will choose to do.
When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to better prepare for what does happen.
When we do not know what we will do, we consider the many things that we can do, to choose the one thing that we will do.
And please keep in mind that what we
will do is constrained by what we
can do, because if we
cannot do it then we
will not do it. But what we
can do is
not constrained by what we
will do. The fact that we
will not do it does
not imply that we
cannot do it.
Necessitation does not entail freedom of choice or will.
Causal necessity entails EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS. It entails free choices, coerced choices, and unduly influenced choices. It entails the sun coming up in the morning and us getting out of bed, choosing what we will have for breakfast, choosing what we will wear to work, and every other event that actually happens in the real world.
If it's determined that you select steak on your outing at your favorite restaurant Saturday evening at 8:35 pm, your necessitated action of selecting steak excludes everything else on the menu in that moment in time. The rest of the menu is for the benefit of other diners.
But how do I come to know what was inevitable that I would order?
If I already knew what I
would choose, then I wouldn't even look at the menu. I would simply tell the waiter what I wanted. The problem is that
I do not know what I will choose until
after I choose it!
So, the rest of the menu is
not just for the benefit of the other diners, it is for my benefit as well. The menu tells me what it is possible for me to order. From these multiple possibilities, I will choose the single meal that I will order. And it is only after choosing that I will know what was inevitable,
because my choosing was one of the prior causes that made that choice inevitable.
And part of that choosing was the consideration of the multiple possibilities on the menu. So, those possibilities, those many things that I could have ordered, were also
part of the causal chain that resulted in that choice.
''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.
So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.
Professor Taylor again? Same quote again? Really?
The fact that Taylor suggests that there is no distinction between us tampering with someone's brain to cause him to commit murder versus him deciding for himself that he will murder someone, is an example of Taylor's moral illiteracy. But, what else can you expect from a professor of metaphysics. It's not like he is a professor of Ethics.
But the failure to make relevant distinctions about the causes of a person's action is one of the absurdities that results when we sweep such distinctions under the rug of a vague generality, like causal necessity. But, Taylor's just speaking of a metaphysical world, not the real world. A failure to make these distinctions in the real world would have very bad consequences, as it would justify and excuse every form of harmful behavior
regardless of its cause. I find Taylor's comment to be morally disgusting.
But, as a hard determinist, you may have no existential problems with it, even though as a human being I'm sure that you do.