Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Care to make operational argument to that effect rather than just some vague declaration foot stomp.

 

[DBT]

A Foot Stomp it is.

 

[fromderinside]

Consistent outcome given the state is the definer

Again, physics has regular, structured processes, it is not "unknowable fairy mechanics"

'If' is a problem for structural physics. Physics process is simply 'this then that'. 'This' is always materially defined, never conditional. Conditional would imply something other than 'this'. We go from known to unknown not unknown to unknown. If we were to go from unknown to unknown it would be called voodoo physics which is akin to unknowable fairy mechanics.

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Care to make operational argument to that effect rather than just some vague declaration foot stomp.

A Foot Stomp it is.

After 10 months of painstaking and patient explanation of the compatibilist position this is all you get from it?

 

[fromderinside]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Care to make operational argument to that effect rather than just some vague declaration foot stomp.

A Foot Stomp it is.

After 10 months of painstaking and patient explanation of the compatibilist position this is all you get from it?

Patience is required when convoluted non-material assertions are the basis for what is laughingly called a 'compatibilist position.'

 

[DBT]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Care to make operational argument to that effect rather than just some vague declaration foot stomp.

A Foot Stomp it is.

After 10 months of painstaking and patient explanation of the compatibilist position this is all you get from it?

That goes both ways. Incompatibilism is well justified, compatibilism is not.

It has been carefully explained for over ten months precisely why the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.

The compatibilist definition fails for the given reasons. Put simply, once again: nothing is freely willed. Nothing is freely chosen. All events within a determined system must proceed without deviation - the no choice principle.

Thar all events are entailed by prior states of the system negates freedom of will and freedom of choice, actions of course proceed without restriction as determined.

 

[The AntiChris]

It has been carefully explained for over ten months precisely why the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.

I disagree. You haven't provided an explanation.

You constantly repeat your belief that free will cannot exist because it requires a non-deterministic, non-random mystical ability - i.e. the ability to do otherwise given exactly the same circumstances. You simply assert this as though it is a given but at no time do you provide an explanation as to why this must be the case.

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

 

[DBT]

It has been carefully explained for over ten months precisely why the notion of free will is incompatible with determinism.

I disagree. You haven't provided an explanation.

Crock. The explanation is right in front of your eyes. You have not understood the explanation because your faith in compatibilism prevents it.

You constantly repeat your belief that free will cannot exist because it requires a non-deterministic, non-random mystical ability - i.e. the ability to do otherwise given exactly the same circumstances. You simply assert this as though it is a given but at no time do you provide an explanation as to why this must be the case.

It's reasons why free will is incompatible with determinism is entailed in the nature of determinism, as explained.

Acting without coercion is not free will because all actions are necessitated/fixed by prior states of the system.

That is not free will.

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

Whether you agree or not, the terms and conditions are entailed in the given definition of determinism.

No alternate actions. No choosing otherwise. Everything proceeds as determined by prior states of the system.


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Care to make operational argument to that effect rather than just some vague declaration foot stomp.

Sure. The notion of free will is used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions. That is the notion of free will within the operation of assessing responsibility. The notion of reliable causation is included in every event where we cause something to happen. You'll find it in the operation of walking, talking, thinking, chewing gum, etc. Oh, and you'll also find it in the operation of assessing responsibility.

So, compatibilism, rather than uselessly arguing over the realness of two empirically observed operations, pragmatically accepts the roles of both the notions of free will and reliable causation and puts them both to use in the real world.

Operationally, compatibilism works.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Patience is required when convoluted non-material assertions are the basis for what is laughingly called a 'compatibilist position.'

Well, whenever you feel up to it, consider the compatibilist argument and see what you can do with it:

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof goes like this:

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Compatibilism is simple. It begins with the recognition that free will is a deterministic event, just like every other event in the causal chain. However, the meaningful and relevant causes of that freely chosen will happen to be located within us. Our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences. All these things, though each has a history of prior causes, make up who and what we are now. And all of that is the determinant that causally necessitates our chosen intent. In other words, the meaningful and relevant cause of our choice is us, and no other object in the physical universe.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilists tend to carefully mold their own definition of determinism in order support an argument for compatibility.
It doesn't work.

Compatibilism is the only thing that actually does work.

Except that it doesn't. It doesn't work because the given terms and conditions - 'acting without compulsion or undue influence'' - ignore the nature and means of action within a determined system.

Namely, nothing is freely willed. Nothing is freely chosen. All events within a determined system must proceed without deviation - ie - the no choice principle, where all events are entailed by prior states of the system, thereby negating freedom of will and freedom of choice, actions of course proceed without restriction as determined, but not freely willed or freely chosen because it is the non-willed prior states of the system that fix all actions and outcomes.
.
That is the ultimate compulsion. You do what is determined, with nothing else possible. The system evolves without deviation.


free·dom
1: the quality or state of being free: as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action

Determinism is the very essence of necessitation.

''Necessity is the idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and cannot be otherwise. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.''

''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.'


''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The explanation is right in front of your eyes.

Like the restaurant menu, and the people choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner.

It's reasons why free will is incompatible with determinism is entailed in the nature of determinism, as explained.

They are only incompatible if you use definitions that make it incompatible. If you define free will as "the opposite of determinism" or you define determinism as "the opposite of free will", then they become incompatible.

All that is required to make them compatible is to use the sensible definition of free will and the sensible definition of determinism.

Free will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.
Determinism is the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by prior events. Determinism is satisfied.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by that person. Free will is satisfied.

 

[Jarhyn]

The explanation is right in front of your eyes.

Like the restaurant menu, and the people choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner.

It's reasons why free will is incompatible with determinism is entailed in the nature of determinism, as explained.

They are only incompatible if you use definitions that make it incompatible. If you define free will as "the opposite of determinism" or you define determinism as "the opposite of free will", then they become incompatible.

All that is required to make them compatible is to use the sensible definition of free will and the sensible definition of determinism.

Free will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.
Determinism is the belief that every event is reliably caused by prior events.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by prior events. Determinism is satisfied.

When a person decides what they will do according to their own goals and their own reasons, the choice is reliably caused by that person. Free will is satisfied.

Not only this, but by defining central elements of systems of knowledge out of existence or declaring such axioms as produce that paradox you keep bringing up, you end up with systems of axioms that are either trivializing or useless.

It's no wonder that someone with such a system of trivializing foundational axioms might argue such nonsense as that objects are not objects, and that there is no "if" in physics, when the entire endeavor of physics is to operate in the realm of "if/then".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It doesn't work because the given terms and conditions - 'acting without compulsion or undue influence'' - ignore the nature and means of action within a determined system.

We've previously discussed the neuroscience in detail, and nothing is left out.

All events within a determined system must proceed without deviation

And they always do, so determinism is always satisfied.

- ie - the no choice principle,

There is no "no choice principle", because choosing is an event within a deterministic system "that must proceed without deviation".

all events are entailed by prior states of the system,

For sure.

thereby negating freedom of will and freedom of choice,

Only if you use a stupid definition of "free will", like "freedom from causal necessity" or "freedom from deterministic causation".

There is no problem at all if you use the commonly understood meaning of the term "free will", a choice that we make for ourselves while free from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

The operational definition of free will is consistent with a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, a deterministic world.

 

[The AntiChris]

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

Whether you agree or not, the terms and conditions are entailed in the given definition of determinism.

No alternate actions. No choosing otherwise. Everything proceeds as determined by prior states of the system.


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

 

[pood]

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

This the core of the matter, but I would put it slightly differently. A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances; however, the subject will not do otherwise, in exactly the same circumstances.

The hard determinist believes, evidently, that every fact about the world is a necessary truth. In fact, as I’ve repeatedly pointed out, the only facts about the world that are necessary truths are truths of logical necessity; e.g., that all triangles have three sides.

Earlier, DBT quoted the opening paragraph of this paper, but then does not seem to have read the entire essay, which concludes:

[Necessity must be limited to its proper use in logic, and disambiguated from its close relatives causality, determinism, certainty, and predictability.]

In practice, when the compatibilist speaks of “could have done otherwise,” he/she means, “would have done otherwise, if …”

If what?

If antecedent circumstances had been different.

This morning I had eggs for breakfast. But using modal logic’s possible worlds heuristic, it’s easy to show that there is a possible world, very “near” the actual world, at which I had pancakes for breakfast. Conversely, there is no possible world at which triangles have four sides.

All actual truths about the world, including its entire history, are contingent truths, unless they are logically necessary truths. Since having eggs is not a logical truth, its a contingent truth. Contingent on what? On my choice to have eggs, which is a free act insofar as no one coerced me to have eggs against my will.

This is my only (minor, mainly terminological) dispute with Marvin, who otherwise has done such an outstanding job in this thread. I do not recognize any such modal category as “causal necessity.” I only recognize “causal determinism,” which is always a set of contingent (could have been otherwise) outcomes.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... This morning I had eggs for breakfast. But using modal logic’s possible worlds heuristic, it’s easy to show that there is a possible world, very “near” the actual world, at which I had pancakes for breakfast. Conversely, there is no possible world at which triangles have four sides. ...

And, there is no possible world in which choosing does not require, by logical necessity, that there be at least two real possibilities to choose from, and also, that we can choose either of those real possibilities.

It is logically impossible to choose between a single possibility. That would be a four-sided triangle.

 

[The AntiChris]

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

This the core of the matter, but I would put it slightly differently. A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

Then we disagree.

It seems to me to be a denial of determinism to claim that a subject could do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (same desires, values, physical environment etc).

 

[pood]

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

This the core of the matter, but I would put it slightly differently. A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

Then we disagree.

It seems to me to be a denial of determinism to claim that a subject could do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (same desires, values, physical environment etc).

But he WILL NOT do otherwise. That is the point.

 

[The AntiChris]

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

This the core of the matter, but I would put it slightly differently. A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

Then we disagree.

It seems to me to be a denial of determinism to claim that a subject could do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (same desires, values, physical environment etc).

But he WILL NOT do otherwise. That is the point.

I don't understand. You claimed he has the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. This ability would be in conflict with determinism.