Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

It’s really strange. DBT quoted the opening paragraph of an article that then went on to refute the opening paragraph! How can he not be aware of this?

It reminds me of when religious folks cite studies where one small piece of evolutionary understanding is changed or improved and then use that one small refutation that solidifies the theory as complete disproof.

Not QUITE analogous, as even the paper itself refutes the Chery-Picked section, but it's been a while since I've seen a good "Cherry-Pick Fallacy" and I don't think I've ever seen one quite so shameless before.

 

[pood]

My own theory is that he just read the first paragraph.

 

[The AntiChris]

Some people might agree with you but many others don't. Why should we accept your view to the exclusion of any other view?

Whether you agree or not, the terms and conditions are entailed in the given definition of determinism.

No alternate actions. No choosing otherwise. Everything proceeds as determined by prior states of the system.


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

This definition you provide here only eliminates free will if you start out with the assumption that free will must entail the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. It is this assumption that you don't even attempt to justify.

It's not an assumption. It's the given definition of determinism, the very same definition given by Marvin and Jarhyn.

You haven't understood the problem. The "given definition of determinism" does not mention free will. Your conclusion, that determinism eliminates free will, is dependent on your unargued assumption that free will entails the the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. The "given definition of determinism" alone says nothing about free will - your belief that free will entails the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances is your presupposition

The argument here, in case this still hasn't been understood, is the claim that free will is compatible with that very same definition of determinism.

I don't think anyone is in any doubt about that.

 

[pood]

You haven't understood the problem. The "given definition of determinism" does not mention free will. Your conclusion, that determinism eliminates free will, is dependent on your unargued assumption that free will entails the the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances. The "given definition of determinism" alone says nothing about free will - your belief that free will entails the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances is your presupposition

This is exactly the point. I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, only that this would never happen. On this turns the entire tale. DBT says we MUST do what we do, I hold that we only WILL do, what we do (given antecedents). Unable to distinguish between WILL and MUST, DBT and other hard determinists are caught in that Chinese finger trap that Marvin has so colorfully used as an apt metaphor. I can only guess that DBT thinks libertarian free will is the only free will worth having, so to say, but all of us reject libertarianism. Compatibilists offer a necessary and sufficient account of free will that is compatibile with causal determinism.

 

[The AntiChris]

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, only that this would never happen.

I'm still struggling with this. Are you simply saying that to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is logically possible? If so I think I disagree (given determinism).

It might help if you could tell me what in your view would render something metaphysically impossible.

 

[Jarhyn]

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, only that this would never happen.

I'm still struggling with this. Are you simply saying that to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is logically possible? If so I think I disagree (given determinism).

It might help if you could tell me what in your view would render something metaphysically impossible.

I would say Pood is not necessarily a determinist in that way, insofar as they have several times explained how they reject physical prescription: they don't necessarily invalidate Libertarian free will in their worldview except to say "the past indicates a singular present and we can't go back and try again".

To that end, they do not invalidate compatibilism, but they also do not invalidate Libertarian free will either.

If I understood correctly.

It's just for the purposes of the thread, they are adopting determinism completely, so as to discuss free will from the compatibilist "superdeterministic" perspective.

 

[The AntiChris]

I would say...

Thanks.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, only that this would never happen.

I'm still struggling with this. Are you simply saying that to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is logically possible? If so I think I disagree (given determinism).

It might help if you could tell me what in your view would render something metaphysically impossible.

Doing otherwise is not going to happen. But the possibility of doing otherwise does not require actually doing otherwise. A possibility exists solely within the imagination. A possibility allows us to imagine the likely outcomes of choosing one option over another. A possibility basically enables imagination, such as when the Wright brothers were imagining how to build a flying machine. So, the notion of possibilities plays an important function in the real world.

When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to plan or prepare for what does happen.

Whenever we use a word like "can" or "might" or "possibility" or "option" or "ability" or basically any word ending in -ible or -able, we are speaking in the context of possibilities, and not in the context of actualities.

If "I can choose the salad" and "I can choose the steak" were both true before I made my choice, then, after I have determined that "I will order the salad", it remains true that "I could have chosen the steak". Why is "I could have chosen the steak" considered a true statement? Because "I can choose the steak" was true just a moment ago, and "I could have chosen the steak" is just the past tense of the exact same statement.

The statement that "if I will not order the steak, then it must be that I could not have ordered the steak" is false.

This has nothing to do with metaphysics. It is a simple matter of the English language, and the words it uses to deal with our common uncertainty as to what will happen next.

When we do not know the single thing that we will choose, we imagine the several things that can choose and how those choices are likely to turn out. Within the logic of choosing, there will always be at least two things that we can choose. The "I can" stands in for the as yet unknown "I will". We are uncertain as to what we will choose, but we are certain as to what we can choose, because that is the function of the notion of "can".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The action - according to your own definition - was determined to happen precisely as it happens before the customers were born or the restaurant built.

To be precise, nothing back then was sitting around drawing up a plan as to how events would eventually play out today. Events simply played out over time as the objects and forces interacted in a reliable fashion from one event to the next.

Nothing back then was planning for me to order the salad instead of the steak. Nothing back then was a meaningful or relevant cause of anything happening today. At best they are incidental causes.

Determinism does not claim that it was the Big Bang, rather than me, that ordered the Chef Salad for dinner. If that were the actual case then the waiter would be giving the Big Bang the bill for my salad.

Determinism only asserts that all of the events in which the objects and forces interacted over time were reliably caused by the events that directly preceded them, such that there would be an unbroken chain of causation from those original events to our current events.

The only causes that concern us today are the meaningful and relevant causes that efficiently explain why a current event happened (meaning), so that we might exercise some control over similar events in the future (relevance).

That is not choice.

Your conclusion not logically follow from determinism. If we assume, as I do, that all of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time, and they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment, then we must conclude that my making the choice for myself, between the steak and the salad, would inevitably be made by me of my own free will.

The choosing was inevitable. Me being the chooser was inevitable. The absence of coercion and undue influence was inevitable. Thus, the fact that it would be a choice of my own free will was inevitable.

The so-called "no-choice principle" fails, because it contradicts the empirical fact that choosing would inevitably happen and I myself would have at least two possibilities to choose from, the steak and the salad.

 

[The AntiChris]

Doing otherwise is not going to happen. But the possibility of doing otherwise does not require actually doing otherwise. A possibility exists solely within the imagination...

Thanks Marvin.

Once again I agree with everything you say but you don't seem to be addressing my main concern - I'm probably not expressing myself clearly.

My bone of contention is with these claims which seem to be accepted by you and Jarhyn:

A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances,

(Apologies to pood, this isn't personal )

I of course accept your (Marvin's) explanation of "could have done otherwise" in your last post but I'm concerned that if we accept "could have done otherwise" and in the same circumstances then we effectively admit we're not adhering strictly to determinism (and therefore not compatibilism).

 

[Jarhyn]

Doing otherwise is not going to happen. But the possibility of doing otherwise does not require actually doing otherwise. A possibility exists solely within the imagination...

Thanks Marvin.

Once again I agree with everything you say but you don't seem to be addressing my main concern - I'm probably not expressing myself clearly.

My bone of contention is with these claims which seem to be accepted by you and Jarhyn:

A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances,

(Apologies to pood, this isn't personal )

I of course accept your (Marvin's) explanation of "could have done otherwise" in your last post but I'm concerned that if we accept "could have done otherwise" and in the same circumstances then we effectively admit we're not adhering strictly to determinism (and therefore not compatibilism).

I don't accept that claim, which should clear it up for you.

I am a determinist of the superdeterministic variety, wherein I fully accept that we cannot do otherwise given the same context. Even so, possibilities on a choice function are possibilities regardless of whether they are ever chosen. They are possibilities for their relevance to the process of choice.

 

[The AntiChris]

I don't accept that claim, which should clear it up for you.

Apologies.

I took your post #1015885 to be a defense of pood's claim (it wasn't clear to me that you were disagreeing with pood).

It's now not clear to me who agrees/disagrees with pood on this specific issue.

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't accept that claim, which should clear it up for you.

Apologies.

I took your post #1015885 to be a defense of pood's claim (it wasn't clear to me that you were disagreeing with pood).

It's now not clear to me who agrees/disagrees with pood on this specific issue.

Yeah that post was more about what the language of "possibilities" referenced. Of course "possibilities" aren't necessarily "actualities of selection", but they are still "possibilities of the choice function" because they are in the physical set of objects presented to the function.

I did not mean to say the bag might pop a different marble, as it were, were you to rewind time. After all, the hidden information that determines which "marble" is popped from the "bag" of a QM determination is going to be considered as "part of the context" in terms of superdeterminism.

If any of those QM "dice rolls" were resolved differently, given the same apparent context, however, you might see different things, or you might not. I don't fancy that the "dice rolls" might be modifiable, but even if they are, my discussion of superdeterminism assumes that this is all "prerolled".

I think some experiments have been done to restore a particle's state following an event, to see if the event repeats the same way, though, and they turned out that they did? It's been a minute since I saw that article

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Doing otherwise is not going to happen. But the possibility of doing otherwise does not require actually doing otherwise. A possibility exists solely within the imagination...

Thanks Marvin.

Once again I agree with everything you say but you don't seem to be addressing my main concern - I'm probably not expressing myself clearly.

My bone of contention is with these claims which seem to be accepted by you and Jarhyn:

A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances;

I hold as a matter of logic that it is metaphysically possible to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances,

(Apologies to pood, this isn't personal )

I of course accept your (Marvin's) explanation of "could have done otherwise" in your last post but I'm concerned that if we accept "could have done otherwise" and in the same circumstances then we effectively admit we're not adhering strictly to determinism (and therefore not compatibilism).

Here is the single circumstance:

I must choose between the salad and the steak. But I don't know yet which one I will choose. Will I choose the salad? I don't know. Will I choose the steak? I don't know. All I know for certain at this point is that I have the ability ("I can") to choose the salad and I also have the ability to choose the steak. The "ability to do otherwise" is right there, in that moment, under those exact circumstances.

 

[The AntiChris]

Here is the single circumstance:

I must choose between the salad and the steak. But I don't know yet which one I will choose. Will I choose the salad? I don't know. Will I choose the steak? I don't know. All I know for certain at this point is that I have the ability ("I can") to choose the salad and I also have the ability to choose the steak. The "ability to do otherwise" is right there, in that moment, under those exact circumstances.

I'd say that this more accurately describes the ability to contemplate doing otherwise.

I think most people would understand the claim that one has the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances as the claim that different actions could actually be instantiated given the same circumstances. In any event, this is how I'd interpret this claim.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Here is the single circumstance:

I must choose between the salad and the steak. But I don't know yet which one I will choose. Will I choose the salad? I don't know. Will I choose the steak? I don't know. All I know for certain at this point is that I have the ability ("I can") to choose the salad and I also have the ability to choose the steak. The "ability to do otherwise" is right there, in that moment, under those exact circumstances.

I'd say that this more accurately describes the ability to contemplate doing otherwise.

Precisely. A possibility is the contemplation of doing something. It is not the actual doing of something.

I think most people would understand the claim that one has the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances as the claim that different actions could actually be instantiated given the same circumstances. In any event, this is how I'd interpret this claim.

Well, it may surprise you when I say: different actions could actually be instantiated given the same circumstances, but they simply won't actually be instantiated given the same circumstances.

The meaning of "could" overrides the addition of "actually" and "instantiated". It implies that something may or may not become actual or instantiated. It never implies that anything will become actual or instantiated.

To say that something will not happen does not imply that it cannot happen.
On the other hand, to say that something cannot happen does imply that it will not happen.

 

[fromderinside]

can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it

"Reality does not include what reality includes"

So do we pin that up next to "objects are not objects" and "then, which implies 'if', does not imply 'if'"

This is not the first time your confused, addled arguments have amounted to nonsense.

In your language what I wrote was subjective material derived from material reality is different from material reality because it is self referent. Don't work so hard trying to get things wrong sir. It reflects poorly on you.

 

[Jarhyn]

can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it

"Reality does not include what reality includes"

So do we pin that up next to "objects are not objects" and "then, which implies 'if', does not imply 'if'"

This is not the first time your confused, addled arguments have amounted to nonsense.

In your language what I wrote was subjective material derived from material reality is different from material reality because it is self referent. Don't work so hard trying to get things wrong sir. It reflects poorly on you.

Material itself cannot be "subjective". Material merely is what it is. Try again.

Something can be material that contains some interpretable thing the interpretation of which is dependent on the form of the Interpreter, and so we call what happens of this relationship "subjective" with respect to other interpreters but both the objects are just objects with an objective relationship between them when not considering  other objects with different relationships.

Such that 01011101 may make one processor jump and one processor sigill. Even so, it is not the other processor being presented with this objective form of 01011101. It has an objective effect on this specific processor, and there is nothing "subjective" about what that effect is or why it happens.

What is subjective is it's meaning  across processors.

Just like there is nothing subjective about the relationship between a protein and a string of DNA: it is a mechanical system with an objective form and predictable function of that form with regards to the surrounding chemistry.

Sure, the DNA might have different effects in the presence of different enzymes and proteins, but it is also an object in it's own right and their behavior is not arbitrary in context.

That you would even try to wave away the objective form of a real system, the predictable and regular function of it, as "subjective" is laughable.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I have considered it and it comes down to whether a being senses the material world or some derivative of it contaminated by on going mental processes together with the derivative senses all of which I categorize as subjective.

Pragmatism suggests we must make do with what we have. We know reality only by our senses and our "making sense" of what they seem to tell us. We assume that if we pour a cup of coffee that there is an actual event in physical reality in which a fluid is pulled by gravity from the tilted pot into the cup.

We can improve our description of events as needed when the predicted outcome is different than our current description. Our description might become more accurate over time. In theory, these improvements would make our descriptions more objective and less subjective.

But there is no escaping the subjective.

One can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it.

I cannot figure out what that statement means.

The rule is that if one uses oneself to determine one isn't practicing determinism.

Fortunately, we don't need to practice determinism. Everything that happens is already deterministic by nature.

Material things need to be considered separate from the experimenter as the Scientific Method dictates.

That is achieved by the restaurant example. The experimenter observes the people walking in, browsing the menu, and placing their order.

I have provided a path forward for those who want to organize what man uses to decide worth and substance that subsumes the subjective verified by the objective as topics for such as good, bad, truth, choice, plan, etc.

Cool. Where would we find a description of this path?

 

[fromderinside]

can't include within reality something that is derived from material reality as part of it

"Reality does not include what reality includes"

So do we pin that up next to "objects are not objects" and "then, which implies 'if', does not imply 'if'"

This is not the first time your confused, addled arguments have amounted to nonsense.

In your language what I wrote was subjective material derived from material reality is different from material reality because it is self referent. Don't work so hard trying to get things wrong sir. It reflects poorly on you.

Material itself cannot be "subjective". Material merely is what it is. Try again.

Something can be material that contains some interpretable thing the interpretation of which is dependent on the form of the Interpreter, and so we call what happens of this relationship "subjective" with respect to other interpreters but both the objects are just objects with an objective relationship between them when not considering  other objects with different relationships.

Such that 01011101 may make one processor jump and one processor sigill. Even so, it is not the other processor being presented with this objective form of 01011101. It has an objective effect on this specific processor, and there is nothing "subjective" about what that effect is or why it happens.

What is subjective is it's meaning  across processors.

Just like there is nothing subjective about the relationship between a protein and a string of DNA: it is a mechanical system with an objective form and predictable function of that form with regards to the surrounding chemistry.

Sure, the DNA might have different effects in the presence of different enzymes and proteins, but it is also an object in it's own right and their behavior is not arbitrary in context.

That you would even try to wave away the objective form of a real system, the predictable and regular function of it, as "subjective" is laughable.

What the receptors receive are partial bits of specific energy types which have evolved over time as options become more clear for being fitness. No way such can be very representative of what is reality is providing as input. So I called what is received and passed through nervous system is derivative of reality. You go off on a tangent.

Fine.

Try again.

As for wave away all I'm doing is cautioning that what is received and processed is a bare minimum of what is the reality possible for each form of sensing. Now if you think that what is received is good enough for one to form decent judgements as to the nature of what one is sensing be my guest. I intend to stick with the Scientific Method for such.

DNA is the thing that permits change to capabilities. It is not the thing that processes what is received. That is left to the resultant being and the machinery and it's genetically evolved nature.

No way mind, or choice, or will, etc, obvious derivative processes based on bad transduction of reality to neural information are material reality. They are convenient constructs, placeholders, based on how we think - another one - we behave.

If you can't see the difference between the material world and the mental world derived from fragments of intersection with bits of reality you are, as they say, in deep doo doo.

One needs more than engineering tables and statistics to cobble together a being. Nor will any comprehensive book of mathematics or chemistry or biology, or computing or information or all of them get the job done.

Think about it. When my dad was born. 1910, mankind was doubling its knowledge every two or three years. Now in June 2022 that is taking place every couple of minutes.