I stick to the given terms and conditions of determinism.
And so do I. Determinism asserts that every event will be reliably caused by prior events, such that each event must necessarily happen exactly as it does happen, without deviation, as if it were fixed from any prior point in time.
Exactly. No deviation. No alternate choice.... not just 'as if fixed,' but absolutely fixed by the prior state of the system
Whoa! You just stepped outside of the definition by claiming "no alternate choice". The restaurant example occurs in a perfectly deterministic universe, where every event is reliably caused and inevitably must happen, just so, without deviation. And there is the restaurant menu, filled with alternate choices. Determinism says that we will inevitably choose a specific alternative, but it does not say that alternate choices will not be staring us in the face from the menu. In fact, determinism says that the menu full of alternate choices was inevitable from any prior point in time, and it must be there, without deviation. And we would also inevitably be there, reading the menu.
Not only will the menu inevitably be there, but we will inevitably consider more than one of those many options. The mental events of our comparing these options to our dietary goals and taste preferences will inevitably happen in physical reality, as inevitable neurological processes within our brain. And the deterministic logic performed by our brain will produce a single inevitable choice, that we communicate to the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".
All of these events are equally deterministic, causally necessary, and inevitably will happen.
As you can see, alternate choices and us choosing between them, are inevitable within a perfectly deterministic system.
A person doesn't choose. The system entails all actions.
The deterministic system entails that the person will inevitably make choices. So "A person doesn't choose" is inconsistent with determinism. Determinism guarantees that every event that happens is causally necessary and inevitably must happen, without deviation, and a person making choices is a real event that actually happens in physical reality.
The claim that "a person doesn't choose" in a deterministic system is demonstrably false. And it has been demonstrated repeatedly for you.
The notion that "a person doesn't choose" is an
illusion created by figurative thinking.
Freedom from coercion is not freedom from necessitation.
CORRECT! There is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity", because that would require being free from reliable cause and effect, and there is no freedom to do anything that does not require us to reliably cause some effect.
Fortunately, causal necessity is never experienced as a constraint, because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us just being us, choosing to do what we choose to do. And that is not a meaningful constraint.
So, when we go about defining "free will", we do not require "freedom from causal necessity", but simply freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.
I'm really tired of this constant but false suggestion that freedom and free will are matters of a person's subjective feelings. Go to any window in your home. Try to open it. If the window moves freely then you are free to open it. If the window has become stuck, then you are not free to open it. This is not a matter of your feelings, but a simple empirical observation of your ability to do what you want, and your freedom to do what you want.
Free will is not a feeling. It is an empirical observation. Did you choose to give some money to the begging man or did the man stick a gun in your ribs and demand that you hand over your wallet? One is free will. The other is coercion. And your feelings have nothing at all to do with it.
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''
That's obviously false. There is a distinction between the event where it was inevitable that I would voluntarily give a dollar to the beggar and the event where a mugger points a gun at me and demands my wallet. The loss of this distinction, by whoever made that stupid comment, is a significant loss of information that is meaningful to everyone.
Necessitation is more restrictive on choice than anything that other people can apply. Necessitation, another word for determinism, fixes all outcomes, eliminating freedom of will.
If it is necessary that I do exactly what I have voluntarily chosen to do, then no meaningful restriction exists. The restriction is an illusion created by bad philosophy.
''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.'' - John Searle.
Obviously, the "no choice principle" is yet another delusional notion. It incorrectly assumes that an event that has prior causes cannot itself be the cause of subsequent events, because those prior causes must be the true causes. The problem with this illogical notion is that no prior cause can pass this test, because every prior cause also has its own prior causes. Thus, no "true" causes would exist, and determinism evaporates into thin air.
The list of things we do not control, however long, does not eliminate a single item from the list of things that we do control. Which simply means that I get to choose what I will have for breakfast, and my prior causes do not.
''Understanding that
free will is an illusion means recognizing that people behave in the only way they know how. As such, it is important to realize that, when people act in harmful ways, it is because they are ignorant of the forces that actually shape their thoughts and behaviors.''
Unfortunately it does not work like that. If free will is an illusion then there is no hope that the criminal offender can be rehabilitated. If we tell the offender that, due to determinism, he had no control over his past behavior, then we must also tell him that, due to determinism, he will have no control over his future behavior. Such a notion would make rehabilitation impossible. Rehabilitation requires that the offender understands that he has within himself the ability to change, to take control of his life, and to live as a better person.
Quote;
''Because most behavior is driven by brain networks we do not consciously control, the legal system will eventually be forced to shift its emphasis from retribution to a forward-looking analysis of future behavior. In the light of modern neuroscience, it no longer makes sense to ask "was it his fault, or his biology's fault, or the fault of his background?", because these issues can never be disentangled. Instead, the only sensible question can be "what do we do from here?" -- in terms of customized sentencing, tailored rehabilitation, and refined incentive structuring.''
Shifting from retribution to rehabilitation is morally sound. The instinctive motive for retribution was to discourage the offender from repeatedly harming others. The instinct likely evolved to encourage the formation of communities by providing shared notions of what is right and wrong to do. Originally, as traveling tribes, we had no prison system, and "an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, life for a life" operated efficiently as both deterrent and penalty. But we can do better than that in modern society, and accomplish the ends of justice (a reduction in overall harm) through rehabilitation of those willing to change through rehabilitation and incarceration of those not willing.
I disagree with the author's suggestion that we can do away with the notion of fault. The fault is the cause. And we need to understand the causes if we are to take steps to correct them. If his thinking is at fault, then counseling might correct it. If his biology is at fault, then medication might correct it. If background is at fault, then we might pursue social changes that are long overdue. It is most likely that multiple factors will be involved.
But it seems the author comes around to the same conclusion. Sentencing, rehabilitation, and incentive structuring would be tailored to the offender, according to our understanding of the specific causes that apply to his case.
