Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

I'd really like to see DBT's response to this simple but powerful point.

That would require them having an operant understanding of "same rules, arbitrarily different stuff" as a consistent concept.

They keep getting hung up on the "this stuff" of "same rules THIS stuff", and they just can't seem to make that group extension to different stuff on the rules.

For me, I don't really think I had a good handle on that concept until I brought Last Thursday to the table as an "initial condition".

Because while Last Thursdayism is useless insofar as discussing the history of our universe, it is absolutely vital for discussing the concept of 'can' on a deep level.

 

[fromderinside]

You give a definition of determinism, yet you are unable or unwilling to grasp its implications

No, I'm unwilling to step in a logical fallacy you are still apparently blind to.

Would not does not imply could not, because would not does not say anything about the results of the math that conforms perfectly to our physics operating on a momentary condition that does not necessarily conform to the current stat

I am unwilling to permit changing an explicit definition using manufactured supposed extensions in the name of any logic.

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

Either you work with what is explicitly there or you move on. 'Would' is not in the definition of determinism.

 

[bilby]

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

But outcomes are uncertain, and uncertain to different degrees, no matter how inevitable they might be.

If I go to a restaurant with the absolute determination to order a steak, regardless of what else is on the menu, then that is what I will order.

If, on the other hand, I have no preference whatsoever, and flip a coin or roll dice to decide what to order, I might well order steak; And that order might well be completely determined by the fine details of exactly what air currents or other influences affected the coin or the dice.

In both cases, my ordering steak is determined by the prior state of the universe; But still I find myself wanting to differentiate between these cases. The first is my expression of a will to order steak; The second is not - I expressed no preference or will, other than a perverse preference for obeying the dictates of my chosen random outcome generator.

To deny me the option of differentiating between these two scenarios, which I perceive to be very different, simply because they both have an inevitable outcome from a god’s eye perspective is bizarre and unwarranted. When I discuss what I will do, I do so from my own perspective, not that of an omnicognisant hypothetical observer who sees that all events were inevitable from the beginning of time.

 

[fromderinside]

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

But outcomes are uncertain, and uncertain to different degrees, no matter how inevitable they might be.

If I go to a restaurant with the absolute determination to order a steak, regardless of what else is on the menu, then that is what I will order.

If, on the other hand, I have no preference whatsoever, and flip a coin or roll dice to decide what to order, I might well order steak; And that order might well be completely determined by the fine details of exactly what air currents or other influences affected the coin or the dice.

In both cases, my ordering steak is determined by the prior state of the universe; But still I find myself wanting to differentiate between these cases. The first is my expression of a will to order steak; The second is not - I expressed no preference or will, other than a perverse preference for obeying the dictates of my chosen random outcome generator.

To deny me the option of differentiating between these two scenarios, which I perceive to be very different, simply because they both have an inevitable outcome from a god’s eye perspective is bizarre and unwarranted. When I discuss what I will do, I do so from my own perspective, not that of an omnicognisant hypothetical observer who sees that all events were inevitable from the beginning of time.

First the definition I supplied gives you the wiggle room to make such argument. I just interpret inexorable as 'fixed' rather than flip-of-coin We're humans with all that entails. As far as we think it is inevitable that there are options because we evolve through exercising them. The question is "is that reality?"

If the world IS deterministic where outcomes are fixed then reality must be as well. If you can reconcile determinism with how humans operate good for you. I'm sure not going to spin down the rabbit hole of possibility twisting and turning meaning just to reconcile the fact that humans don't work in reality, but in some derivative conditions where choice is relevant.

 

[Jarhyn]

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

But outcomes are uncertain, and uncertain to different degrees, no matter how inevitable they might be.

If I go to a restaurant with the absolute determination to order a steak, regardless of what else is on the menu, then that is what I will order.

If, on the other hand, I have no preference whatsoever, and flip a coin or roll dice to decide what to order, I might well order steak; And that order might well be completely determined by the fine details of exactly what air currents or other influences affected the coin or the dice.

In both cases, my ordering steak is determined by the prior state of the universe; But still I find myself wanting to differentiate between these cases. The first is my expression of a will to order steak; The second is not - I expressed no preference or will, other than a perverse preference for obeying the dictates of my chosen random outcome generator.

To deny me the option of differentiating between these two scenarios, which I perceive to be very different, simply because they both have an inevitable outcome from a god’s eye perspective is bizarre and unwarranted. When I discuss what I will do, I do so from my own perspective, not that of an omnicognisant hypothetical observer who sees that all events were inevitable from the beginning of time.

First the definition I supplied gives you the wiggle room to make such argument. I just interpret inexorable as 'fixed' rather than flip-of-coin We're humans with all that entails. As far as we think it is inevitable that there are options because we evolve through exercising them. The question is "is that reality?"

If the world IS deterministic where outcomes are fixed then reality must be as well. If you can reconcile determinism with how humans operate good for you. I'm sure not going to spin down the rabbit hole of possibility twisting and turning meaning just to reconcile the fact that humans don't work in reality, but in some derivative conditions where choice is relevant.

You give a definition of determinism, yet you are unable or unwilling to grasp its implications

No, I'm unwilling to step in a logical fallacy you are still apparently blind to.

Would not does not imply could not, because would not does not say anything about the results of the math that conforms perfectly to our physics operating on a momentary condition that does not necessarily conform to the current stat

I am unwilling to permit changing an explicit definition using manufactured supposed extensions in the name of any logic.

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

Either you work with what is explicitly there or you move on. 'Would' is not in the definition of determinism.

Nothing is being changed. No definition is being manufactured or supposed.

I am literally taking a deterministic system changing it's momentary state through an extension, and then sending it through the progression.

The fact that this is possible at all in any deterministic system means that your desire to say this does not make sense or have mean inf or application in deterministic systems is spurious.

I have done the exercise you claim does not make sense on deterministic systems exactly from the perspective of this omnipotent entity.

I might note that I don't have to be omnicognizant to do that either, or omniscient. All I need to do is be able to use "Last Thursday" style initial conditions and make some changes.

The inevitability of outcomes is "would".

The group extension specifying a "Last Thursday" where "my brain state is such that I shall do X", and the comparison between the LT state and the real state are all logically sound operation.

It's just FDI wants to claim that this logic isn't being done in general rather than specific on account of it being easier to calculate on general universes while accepting error and literally impossible for us to do it on precise whole LT states.

This is of course dumb because we in fact have machines that do this to an extent of mathematically isolating the entire process of doing it, and it clearly works in isolate deterministic mathematical systems, and so it is clearly NOT an illusion.

Rather the illusion is the mistake of believing that human perception isn't a function of something real, that our experience has no existence.

 

[DBT]

When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

I'd really like to see DBT's response to this simple but powerful point.

Why do you ignore my explanation every time it is given? Are you unable to grasp what is being said? What Marvin said contradicts his own definition of determinism.

You don't accept this simple undeniable fact?

Given that determinism permits no deviation, if salad is determined, steak is not. It can't be both.

Given that salad is necessarily ordered, as specified in the given definition: no deviation. to say 'I can order the steak' clearly contradicts the terms of the definition.

Is this too hard to grasp? Or are you unwilling to face the implications?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You give a definition of determinism, yet you are unable or unwilling to grasp its implications

No, I'm unwilling to step in a logical fallacy you are still apparently blind to.

Would not does not imply could not, because would not does not say anything about the results of the math that conforms perfectly to our physics operating on a momentary condition that does not necessarily conform to the current stat

I am unwilling to permit changing an explicit definition using manufactured supposed extensions in the name of any logic.

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

Either you work with what is explicitly there or you move on. 'Would' is not in the definition of determinism.

Let's not go overboard. The "chains and networks" of causes do not operate as a single causal entity with a mind of its own. That would fall into the class of "superstitious nonsense". A more realistic and useful view is that the general notion of causation is used to describe the interaction of individual physical objects upon each other. For example, it is not the universe that causes the earth to revolve around the sun each year, but rather the gravity between the mass of the earth and the mass of the sun plus the earth's trajectory that causes this specific effect. And it is not the universe that cares whether I order the salad or the steak for dinner. That's all me.

The power to cause effects is located in the objects themselves. And any interest in the consequences of these effects is located solely within the living organisms. And the ability to exercise control over what effects we cause resides solely in members of intelligent species.

That's how things actually work.

 

[Jarhyn]

What Marvin said contradicts his own definition of determinism.

No, it only contradicts your inability to parse the difference between "would" and "could"

Would discusses "these rules, this stuff".

Could discusses "these rules, intersection of stuff + assumed state".

"This stuff" not being "intersection of stuff + assumed state" does not ever invalidate a calculation through "these rules".

For instance, "an arrangement of quarks and gluons which is called "a bug" could "be smashed" by a mass of iron with at least an ounce of mass accelerating at 32m/s/s towards a flat immobile surface with flat surfaces parallel, assuming the mass was dropped from a sufficient distance.

This will be true even if the universe were a barren place with no iron or bugs or things producing gravity, and just some black hole kicking around somewhere to keep "nothing" from existing again and spawning everything.

In the same way, if I want to ask "how could a dwarf survive a battle with a titan" I don't need to go into an active normal universe, but rather I spawn a dwarf in the simplified test simulator, and then I spawn a Titan, and then I make changes to these initial conditions until the dwarf survives.

This answers a question.

Then, in the future, I know what "could" allow dwarves in general to survive a run-in with a titan, which really tends to help when you are steering around a dwarf and run into a titan. Without knowing this vital fact of what "could" allow a dwarf to survive this, knowledge gained from such LT explorations in a simplified test simulation, my dwarf could die.

But note, this is not that world. In this world the dwarf Shall Not die. Instead I DID do the things that COULD save the dwarf and thus the dwarf was, in fact, kept whole and hale.

Because COULD is powerful and our approaches to could, while less perfect and complete than the one I can exert on a universe I'm literally the god of, are still sensible exercises even in Incompleteness.

We don't have to be able to be perfectly correct or be able to be gods creating perfect simulations when we can absolutely be "correct enough". The fact that what we do is a pale facsimile of what a god can do makes it no less useful for the extent we can do it, nor less sensible in it's execution, and it doesn't invalidate the logic of "same rules, different stuff".

It just means that WE are limited to generalizations on sets rather than specific answers of singular instances.

 

[DBT]

Determinism cannot rationally assert that we "could not have done otherwise". That would be a fallacy.

The very essence of determinism entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

Fixed by antecedents entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

Events must necessarily proceed without deviation logically entails ''could have done otherwise.''

Determinism and not determinism is a contradiction. If the world is under the sway of determinism, to say ''I could have done othewise'' contradicts how the system is defined and how it works.

You can't have it both ways, determinisms entailed/fixed events and 'could have done otherwise' is undeniably a contradiction.

It's entailed in your definition;

No. It is not. The fact that all events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time, and they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment, does not entail that I "could" not have ordered the steak. It only entails that I "would" not have ordered the steak.

Here it is;
''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Being causally necessary from any prior point in time excludes any possibility of doing other than what is determined.

Consequently, to say 'would not have' is irrelevant. Given the terms, it was never possible.

If you literally cannot have done otherwise ...

But that is not the case. When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

Let's check the meaning of our words using your own dictionary:

Definition of literally
1: in a literal sense or manner: such as
a: in a way that uses the ordinary or primary meaning of a term or expression "He took the remark literally." a word that can be used both literally and figuratively
b—used to emphasize the truth and accuracy of a statement or description "The party was attended by literally hundreds of people."
c: with exact equivalence : with the meaning of each individual word given exactly "The term "Mardi Gras" literally means "Fat Tuesday" in French."
d: in a completely accurate way "a story that is basically true even if not literally true"

By "literally" we mean the standard meaning of the word itself, in the absence of any figurative sense.

The standard meaning of the term "can" is:

Definition of can​

(Entry 1 of 5)
auxiliary verb
1a: be physically or mentally able to "He can lift 200 pounds."
b: know how to "She can read."
c—used to indicate possibility "Do you think he can still be alive?", "Those things can happen."—sometimes used interchangeably with may
d: be inherently able or designed to "everything that money can buy"
e: be enabled by law, agreement, or custom to "Congress can declare war."
f: be permitted by conscience or feeling to "can hardly blame her"
g: be made possible or probable by circumstances to "He can hardly have meant that."
h: be logically or axiologically able to "2 + 2 can also be written 3 + 1."

I was physically and mentally able to order the steak. So, "I can order the steak" was literally true.

You are trying to have it both ways. ''Determinism'' and ''not determinism.''

By doing so, you contradict your own terms of reference in relation to determinism.

If other possibilities exist, and can be realized at any time, it contradicts the terms of your definition.

There is no contradiction. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination. They allow us to plan and carry out specific actions that will create actualities. But a possibility never implies that it will be actualized, but only that it could be actualized if we chose to do so.

In which case it's irrelevant to your argument.

A moot point.

A point not worthy of raising, or using in defense of compatibilism.

Determinism means that those possibilities will occur to us due to prior mental events that will reliably bring those options to our attention for consideration. It's simple cause and effect, something that we all take for granted in everything we think and do.

The 'prior mental events' are as fixed by antecedents as any of the external events of the world.

Mental events are a physical process of a physical brain.

As conscious entities, we have no access to, or regulative control over what the brain is doing in terms of information processing and generating an experience of 'us' as conscious entities.

A case of free will? Hardly.

Thoughts, calculations, imaginings, etc are not exempt from entailment as the system evolves from prior to current state.

Correct. Every thought we have is entailed by prior thoughts and experiences. That's what determinism is about. And, when those thoughts are engaged in choosing what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, that's what free will is about. Free will is not inconsistent with determinism. And that is the point.

Neither our thoughts or the following actions were chosen. They are entailed by countless elements within the system, neural architecture, inputs, memory function, etcetera, etcetera....

Making a serious mistake, realizing the consequences of a bad decision a moment later illustrates 'could not have done otherwise' -ie, the no choice principle - because if you could have done otherwise it would have avoided a whole lot of misery.

If you could have done otherwise, you surely would have done otherwise.

All you can do is say, 'if only I had not made that decision,' which is regret.

 

[Jarhyn]

The very essence of determinism entails 'could not have done

What Marvin said contradicts his own definition of determinism.

No, it only contradicts your inability to parse the difference between "would" and "could"

Would discusses "these rules, this stuff".

Could discusses "these rules, intersection of stuff + assumed state".

"This stuff" not being "intersection of stuff + assumed state" does not ever invalidate a calculation through "these rules".

For instance, "an arrangement of quarks and gluons which is called "a bug" could "be smashed" by a mass of iron with at least an ounce of mass accelerating at 32m/s/s towards a flat immobile surface with flat surfaces parallel, assuming the mass was dropped from a sufficient distance.

This will be true even if the universe were a barren place with no iron or bugs or things producing gravity, and just some black hole kicking around somewhere to keep "nothing" from existing again and spawning everything.

In the same way, if I want to ask "how could a dwarf survive a battle with a titan" I don't need to go into an active normal universe, but rather I spawn a dwarf in the simplified test simulator, and then I spawn a Titan, and then I make changes to these initial conditions until the dwarf survives.

This answers a question.

Then, in the future, I know what "could" allow dwarves in general to survive a run-in with a titan, which really tends to help when you are steering around a dwarf and run into a titan. Without knowing this vital fact of what "could" allow a dwarf to survive this, knowledge gained from such LT explorations in a simplified test simulation, my dwarf could die.

But note, this is not that world. In this world the dwarf Shall Not die. Instead I DID do the things that COULD save the dwarf and thus the dwarf was, in fact, kept whole and hale.

Because COULD is powerful and our approaches to could, while less perfect and complete than the one I can exert on a universe I'm literally the god of, are still sensible exercises even in Incompleteness.

We don't have to be able to be perfectly correct or be able to be gods creating perfect simulations when we can absolutely be "correct enough". The fact that what we do is a pale facsimile of what a god can do makes it no less useful for the extent we can do it, nor less sensible in it's execution, and it doesn't invalidate the logic of "same rules, different stuff".

It just means that WE are limited to generalizations on sets rather than specific answers of singular instances.

Leave it to DBT to... Wait for the first post to happen in this thread and then post a couple minutes later.

Wait for responses in the thread that answer his bullshit to... Repost his bullshit that this answers

 

[Marvin Edwards]

When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

I'd really like to see DBT's response to this simple but powerful point.

Why do you ignore my explanation every time it is given?

Because you never actually explain why what a person inevitably "will" do limits what a person "can" do. Instead you continue to repeat the claim that it is somehow magically "implied" by the fact of universal causal necessity. But we've shown clearly that it is not.

Are you unable to grasp what is being said?

Hey! Same to you fella.

What Marvin said contradicts his own definition of determinism.

And I've explained over and over the distinction between what we "can" do versus what we "will" do. We "will" do what is causally necessary, and do it with no burden of necessity, because it is precisely what we wanted to do anyway! But what we "can" do is a concept that is broader than what we "will" do. We "can" do many things, even though we "will" do exactly one thing.

We invoke the notion of what we "can" do whenever we are uncertain as to what we "will" do. When we have several options, and have not decided yet what we "will" choose to do, we shift to the context of possibilities, and consider the several things that we "can" choose to do. For example, I "can" choose the salad for dinner and I also "can" choose the steak for dinner.

And as DBT himself would say, "You don't accept this simple undeniable fact?"

Given that determinism permits no deviation, if salad is determined, steak is not. It can't be both.

Only the salad "will" be chosen. And even though the steak "could have" been chosen, it "will not" be chosen.

Given that salad is necessarily ordered, as specified in the given definition: no deviation. to say 'I can order the steak' clearly contradicts the terms of the definition.

There is no way to get to the ordering of the salad without first getting through the consideration of having the steak for dinner (and our recall of the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch). There is no way to get to the consideration of the steak without the notion of "I can order the steak" being true. That's the logical function of the "I can order the steak".

Thus, "I will order the salad" and "I could have ordered the steak" will both by true by logical and causal necessity.

And, again as DBT would say, "Is this too hard to grasp? Or are you unwilling to face the implications?"

 

[The AntiChris]

When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

I'd really like to see DBT's response to this simple but powerful point.

Why do you ignore my explanation every time it is given?

The problem is that you your explanations rarely if ever address what's being asked. And you're doing it again here.

Given that determinism permits no deviation, if salad is determined, steak is not. It can't be both.

Absolutely nothing in the piece quoted could possibly be construed as Marvin claiming that both could be determined. You've ignored what was written and given yet another standard DBT response.

I don't think you misrepresent intentionally, I just think you're so blinkered by the belief in the absolute certainty of your position that you're incapable of comprehending that there might be an alternative way of seeing the free will issue.

It bears repeating that no one here is suggesting any kind of contra-causal, non-deterministic free will.

 

[pood]

All the pixels devoted to this thread come down to the fact that DBT does not understand the difference between the words “will” and “must.” He constantly commits this big fat modal fallacy, as I have pointed out from day one. A simple dictionary would dispel his confusion.

When the compatibilist says, “could have done otherwise,” he means “would have done otherwise, if antecedent circumstances had been different.” All that is necessary is that someone facing a choice must do one thing; he cannot both do, and not do, the same thing, and he must choose from available options. But the choice he makes is not necessary; all that is necessary is that he choose.

IOW, compatibilist free will means that free will is compatible with determinism because under determinism, we have the counterfactual ability to do otherwise.


The libertarian has a different understanding of free will. His understanding is that if circumstances had been exactly the same, then he could still have wanted to do something different, and threfore he could have done something different.

The compatibilist says: If circumstances had been different, then it follows that I could have wanted to do something different, and therefore I could have done something different.

The compatibilist definition is perfectly coherent, provided one understands the modal concept of couterfactuals; i.e. possible non-actual worlds. But we’ve been over and over this and DBT is impervious to understanding, while consistently condescending to the rest of us about our alleged inability to grasp the point. It’s entirely projection on his part.

Once again, as compatibilists here have stated over and over: True enough, if you rewound the history of the world up to the moment that Marvin orders salad instead of steak, it’s true he WOULD order salad again; it’s not true that he MUST order salad. He has the counterfactual capacity to order anything he wants.

 

[Jarhyn]

All the pixels devoted to this thread come down to the fact that DBT does not understand the difference between the words “will” and “must.” He constantly commits this big fat modal fallacy, as I have pointed out from day one. A simple dictionary would dispel his confusion.

When the compatibilist says, “could have done otherwise,” he means “would have done otherwise, if antecedent circumstances had been different.” All that is necessary is that someone facing a choice must do one thing; he cannot both do, and not do, the same thing, and he must choose from available options. But the choice he makes is not necessary; all that is necessary is that he choose.

IOW, compatibilist free will means that free will is compatible with determinism because under determinism, we have the counterfactual ability to do otherwise.


The libertarian has a different understanding of free will. His understanding is that if circumstances had been exactly the same, then he could still have wanted to do something different, and threfore he could have done something different.

The compatibilist says: If circumstances had been different, then it follows that I could have wanted to do something different, and therefore I could have done something different.

The compatibilist definition is perfectly coherent, provided one understands the modal concept of couterfactuals; i.e. possible non-actual worlds. But we’ve been over and over this and DBT is impervious to understanding, while consistently condescending to the rest of us about our alleged inability to grasp the point. It’s entirely projection on his part.

Once again, as compatibilists here have stated over and over: True enough, if you rewound the history of the world up to the moment that Marvin orders salad instead of steak, it’s true he WOULD order salad again; it’s not true that he MUST order salad. He has the counterfactual capacity to order anything he wants.

Those non-actual worlds, just to clarify, are possible in the mode of "Last Thursday" initial conditions, specifically.

Last Thursdayism is a silly, and non-disprovable hypothesis. Non-disprovable hypotheses are not useful for any explanatory power of history. In fact, accepting "real LT" robs the faithful of any certainty of the past, much in the same way that hard determinism robs the faithful of any power of rational self-control.

Even so, it's non-disprovability is in fact a a sword with a handle, because it's non-disprovability means that it is in fact a powerful philosophical model that necessarily implies the mechanics of "counterfactuals" as mechanically sound.

And not only are they mechanically sound, the principle has been applied physically: I have in my stupid game produced counterfactuals!

Counterfactuals are just group extensions on a Deterministic System's momentary state.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The very essence of determinism entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

That is what many people have traditionally claimed to be the essence of determinism. But it is a false claim, as we've demonstrated.

The "very essence" of determinism is actually causal necessity. Causal necessity is logically derived from simple cause and effect. If A causes B, and B causes C, then, if A happens both B and C will necessarily happen.

So, did A "cause" C? No, not directly. B is the direct cause of C. This distinction is necessary if the notion of causation is to be intelligible. For example, did the Big Bang "cause" me to choose the salad instead of the steak for dinner? Of course not. It was the bacon and eggs I had for breakfast, and the double cheeseburger I had for lunch, and my desire to eat more fruits and vegetables that caused me to choose the salad instead of the steak for dinner. These concerns that caused my choice, were my own concerns.

The Big Bang had no interest in what I would order for dinner. To suggest it "caused" me to order the salad instead of the steak is nonsense.

I could have chosen the steak, but I wouldn't have chosen it under those circumstances. The fact that I would not order the steak never implies that I could not order the steak.

In fact, if I had cantaloupe for breakfast and a salad for lunch, then I definitely would have ordered the steak for dinner.

You see, no matter what I actually ordered, I always had the ability to order the steak, thus it was truly something that I could have done.

Fixed by antecedents entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

I'm afraid not. Fixed by antecedents entails only that we "would not have done otherwise, even though we could".

Determinism and not determinism is a contradiction.

Exactly. So stop drawing false implications and let determinism simply be determinism, the reasonable belief that all events are reliably caused by preceding events. And stop pretending that we are not among the events that reliably cause future events.

If the world is under the sway of determinism...

Obviously the world is not "under the sway" of determinism. The world simply operates deterministically, that is, by the reliable and natural interactions of the physical objects and forces that make up the world.

Determinism itself is neither an object nor a force. It exercises no control. It simply "sits in the corner taking notes on our behavior", such as the fact that my earlier choices for breakfast and lunch made my choice for dinner inevitable. Determinism itself never determines anything. But we determine lots of things.

You can't have it both ways, determinisms entailed/fixed events and 'could have done otherwise' is undeniably a contradiction.

I DENY that there is any contradiction between determinism and the ability to have done otherwise. Hmm. That was simple. I guess you're wrong again about it being "undeniably a contradiction". I chose the salad even though I could have chosen the steak.

I'll leave the dictionary definitions here in case you want to read them again.

Definition of literally
1: in a literal sense or manner: such as
a: in a way that uses the ordinary or primary meaning of a term or expression "He took the remark literally." a word that can be used both literally and figuratively
b—used to emphasize the truth and accuracy of a statement or description "The party was attended by literally hundreds of people."
c: with exact equivalence : with the meaning of each individual word given exactly "The term "Mardi Gras" literally means "Fat Tuesday" in French."
d: in a completely accurate way "a story that is basically true even if not literally true"

By "literally" we simply mean the standard meaning of the word itself, in the absence of any figurative sense.

The standard meaning of the term "can" is:

Definition of can
1a: be physically or mentally able to "He can lift 200 pounds."
b: know how to "She can read."
c—used to indicate possibility "Do you think he can still be alive?", "Those things can happen."—sometimes used interchangeably with may
d: be inherently able or designed to "everything that money can buy"
e: be enabled by law, agreement, or custom to "Congress can declare war."
f: be permitted by conscience or feeling to "can hardly blame her"
g: be made possible or probable by circumstances to "He can hardly have meant that."
h: be logically or axiologically able to "2 + 2 can also be written 3 + 1."

I was physically and mentally able to order the steak. So, "I can order the steak" was literally true.

Definition of could
past tense of CAN
—used in auxiliary function in the past "We found we could go.", in the past conditional "We said we would go if we could.", and as an alternative to can suggesting less force or certainty or as a polite form in the present "If you could come, we would be pleased."

I was physically and mentally able to order the steak. So, "I could have order the steak" was literally true.

 

[Jarhyn]

The very essence of determinism entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

That is what many people have traditionally claimed to be the essence of determinism. But it is a false claim, as we've demonstrated.

The "very essence" of determinism is actually causal necessity. Causal necessity is logically derived from simple cause and effect. If A causes B, and B causes C, then, if A happens both B and C will necessarily happen.

So, did A "cause" C? No, not directly. B is the direct cause of C. This distinction is necessary if the notion of causation is to be intelligible. For example, did the Big Bang "cause" me to choose the salad instead of the steak for dinner? Of course not. It was the bacon and eggs I had for breakfast, and the double cheeseburger I had for lunch, and my desire to eat more fruits and vegetables that caused me to choose the salad instead of the steak for dinner. These concerns that caused my choice, were my own concerns.

The Big Bang had no interest in what I would order for dinner. To suggest it "caused" me to order the salad instead of the steak is nonsense.

I could have chosen the steak, but I wouldn't have chosen it under those circumstances. The fact that I would not order the steak never implies that I could not order the steak.

In fact, if I had cantaloupe for breakfast and a salad for lunch, then I definitely would have ordered the steak for dinner.

You see, no matter what I actually ordered, I always had the ability to order the steak, thus it was truly something that I could have done.

Fixed by antecedents entails 'could not have done otherwise.'

I'm afraid not. Fixed by antecedents entails only that we "would not have done otherwise, even though we could".

Determinism and not determinism is a contradiction.

Exactly. So stop drawing false implications and let determinism simply be determinism, the reasonable belief that all events are reliably caused by preceding events. And stop pretending that we are not among the events that reliably cause future events.

If the world is under the sway of determinism...

Obviously the world is not "under the sway" of determinism. The world simply operates deterministically, that is, by the reliable and natural interactions of the physical objects and forces that make up the world.

Determinism itself is neither an object nor a force. It exercises no control. It simply "sits in the corner taking notes on our behavior", such as the fact that my earlier choices for breakfast and lunch made my choice for dinner inevitable. Determinism itself never determines anything. But we determine lots of things.

You can't have it both ways, determinisms entailed/fixed events and 'could have done otherwise' is undeniably a contradiction.

I DENY that there is any contradiction between determinism and the ability to have done otherwise. Hmm. That was simple. I guess you're wrong again about it being "undeniably a contradiction". I chose the salad even though I could have chosen the steak.

I'll leave the dictionary definitions here in case you want to read them again.

Definition of literally
1: in a literal sense or manner: such as
a: in a way that uses the ordinary or primary meaning of a term or expression "He took the remark literally." a word that can be used both literally and figuratively
b—used to emphasize the truth and accuracy of a statement or description "The party was attended by literally hundreds of people."
c: with exact equivalence : with the meaning of each individual word given exactly "The term "Mardi Gras" literally means "Fat Tuesday" in French."
d: in a completely accurate way "a story that is basically true even if not literally true"

By "literally" we simply mean the standard meaning of the word itself, in the absence of any figurative sense.

The standard meaning of the term "can" is:

Definition of can
1a: be physically or mentally able to "He can lift 200 pounds."
b: know how to "She can read."
c—used to indicate possibility "Do you think he can still be alive?", "Those things can happen."—sometimes used interchangeably with may
d: be inherently able or designed to "everything that money can buy"
e: be enabled by law, agreement, or custom to "Congress can declare war."
f: be permitted by conscience or feeling to "can hardly blame her"
g: be made possible or probable by circumstances to "He can hardly have meant that."
h: be logically or axiologically able to "2 + 2 can also be written 3 + 1."

I was physically and mentally able to order the steak. So, "I can order the steak" was literally true.

Definition of could
past tense of CAN
—used in auxiliary function in the past "We found we could go.", in the past conditional "We said we would go if we could.", and as an alternative to can suggesting less force or certainty or as a polite form in the present "If you could come, we would be pleased."

I was physically and mentally able to order the steak. So, "I could have order the steak" was literally true.

Asked and answered: I predict that it is fated from prior conditions, time immemorial, that you will in fact receive as a function of your order a (word) salad from our talented(?) chef(s).

 

[fromderinside]

You give a definition of determinism, yet you are unable or unwilling to grasp its implications

No, I'm unwilling to step in a logical fallacy you are still apparently blind to.

Would not does not imply could not, because would not does not say anything about the results of the math that conforms perfectly to our physics operating on a momentary condition that does not necessarily conform to the current stat

I am unwilling to permit changing an explicit definition using manufactured supposed extensions in the name of any logic.

Determinism is defined as the inevitability of causation. Everything that happens is singular. The chains and networks of causes are so powerful and inexorable that every outcome is inevitable.

Either you work with what is explicitly there or you move on. 'Would' is not in the definition of determinism.

Let's not go overboard. The "chains and networks" of causes do not operate as a single causal entity with a mind of its own. That would fall into the class of "superstitious nonsense". A more realistic and useful view is that the general notion of causation is used to describe the interaction of individual physical objects upon each other. For example, it is not the universe that causes the earth to revolve around the sun each year, but rather the gravity between the mass of the earth and the mass of the sun plus the earth's trajectory that causes this specific effect. And it is not the universe that cares whether I order the salad or the steak for dinner. That's all me.

The power to cause effects is located in the objects themselves. And any interest in the consequences of these effects is located solely within the living organisms. And the ability to exercise control over what effects we cause resides solely in members of intelligent species.

That's how things actually work.

Ah minds are required else there is no world. I suggest you close your eyes and consider what you wrote.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... When the compatibilist says, “could have done otherwise,” he means “would have done otherwise, if antecedent circumstances had been different.” All that is necessary is that someone facing a choice must do one thing; he cannot both do, and not do, the same thing, and he must choose from available options. But the choice he makes is not necessary; all that is necessary is that he choose.

It is causally necessary, but it is not something that I am forced to do against my will. That's the nice thing about causal necessity. It never can make you do something that you weren't already going to do anyway.

IOW, compatibilist free will means that free will is compatible with determinism because under determinism, we have the counterfactual ability to do otherwise.

I consider "I could have ordered the steak" to be a fact, not a counterfactual, because all that it logically implies is factual. For example, "I could have ordered the steak" logically implies:
1. That "I did not order the steak", which is a fact.
2. That "I would not have ordered the steak under those actual circumstances", another fact.
3. That "I would have ordered the steak had circumstances favored the steak", which is another fact.
4. That "The steak was one of the options that was available to me on the menu", yet another fact.

The "ability to do otherwise" does not logically imply that we ever actually did otherwise. Therefore, it is not stating anything that is counter to the facts.

The compatibilist says: If circumstances had been different, then it follows that I could have wanted to do something different, and therefore I could have done something different.

Exactly.

The compatibilist definition is perfectly coherent, provided one understands the modal concept of counterfactuals; i.e. possible non-actual worlds.

I get the notion, but I personally would not use those words: "counterfactual" or "possible non-actual worlds".

Once again, as compatibilists here have stated over and over: True enough, if you rewound the history of the world up to the moment that Marvin orders salad instead of steak, it’s true he WOULD order salad again; it’s not true that he MUST order salad. He has the counterfactual capacity to order anything he wants.

To me, causal necessity would be synonymous with causal must, but this is a "must" that has no external force behind it. All of the meaningful and relevant "must-ness" is integral to who and what I am. It's me deciding what I "must" do, which is identical to what I willingly do of my own accord.

 

[DBT]

The very essence of determinism entails 'could not have done

What Marvin said contradicts his own definition of determinism.

No, it only contradicts your inability to parse the difference between "would" and "could"

Would discusses "these rules, this stuff".

Could discusses "these rules, intersection of stuff + assumed state".

"This stuff" not being "intersection of stuff + assumed state" does not ever invalidate a calculation through "these rules".

For instance, "an arrangement of quarks and gluons which is called "a bug" could "be smashed" by a mass of iron with at least an ounce of mass accelerating at 32m/s/s towards a flat immobile surface with flat surfaces parallel, assuming the mass was dropped from a sufficient distance.

This will be true even if the universe were a barren place with no iron or bugs or things producing gravity, and just some black hole kicking around somewhere to keep "nothing" from existing again and spawning everything.

In the same way, if I want to ask "how could a dwarf survive a battle with a titan" I don't need to go into an active normal universe, but rather I spawn a dwarf in the simplified test simulator, and then I spawn a Titan, and then I make changes to these initial conditions until the dwarf survives.

This answers a question.

Then, in the future, I know what "could" allow dwarves in general to survive a run-in with a titan, which really tends to help when you are steering around a dwarf and run into a titan. Without knowing this vital fact of what "could" allow a dwarf to survive this, knowledge gained from such LT explorations in a simplified test simulation, my dwarf could die.

But note, this is not that world. In this world the dwarf Shall Not die. Instead I DID do the things that COULD save the dwarf and thus the dwarf was, in fact, kept whole and hale.

Because COULD is powerful and our approaches to could, while less perfect and complete than the one I can exert on a universe I'm literally the god of, are still sensible exercises even in Incompleteness.

We don't have to be able to be perfectly correct or be able to be gods creating perfect simulations when we can absolutely be "correct enough". The fact that what we do is a pale facsimile of what a god can do makes it no less useful for the extent we can do it, nor less sensible in it's execution, and it doesn't invalidate the logic of "same rules, different stuff".

It just means that WE are limited to generalizations on sets rather than specific answers of singular instances.

Leave it to DBT to... Wait for the first post to happen in this thread and then post a couple minutes later.

Wait for responses in the thread that answer his bullshit to... Repost his bullshit that this answers

The BS lies in your denial of the implications of your own definition of determinism.

You don't have a clue. Stick to your computers are conscious BS, at least that can give the readers a laugh.

You whine about repetition, yet you yourself - unable to grasp the nature of determinism - engage with mindless repetition and displays of childish petulance.

 

[DBT]

When considering whether to order the salad or the steak, both "I can order the salad" and "I can order the steak" were "literally" true. Thus, even after ordering the salad, "I could have ordered the steak" was literally true (past tense of "I can order the steak").

I'd really like to see DBT's response to this simple but powerful point.

Why do you ignore my explanation every time it is given?

The problem is that you your explanations rarely if ever address what's being asked. And you're doing it again here.

Given that determinism permits no deviation, if salad is determined, steak is not. It can't be both.

Absolutely nothing in the piece quoted could possibly be construed as Marvin claiming that both could be determined. You've ignored what was written and given yet another standard DBT response.

Sour grapes.

What you conveniently overlook is 'could have' is totally irrelevant. As there is no 'could have' within a deterministic system, it is pointless to even mention it, yet alone use it as an argument for free will.

Nor has anything to do with the given definition of compatibilism, which is 'acting without force, coersion or undue influence' and has nothing to do with 'could have.'

I don't think you misrepresent intentionally, I just think you're so blinkered by the belief in the absolute certainty of your position that you're incapable of comprehending that there might be an alternative way of seeing the free will issue.

I'm not the one misrepresenting determinism or its relationship to the notion of free will.

But, given that you have yet to grasp the basics of incompatibilism, I don't expect you to understand.

It bears repeating that no one here is suggesting any kind of contra-causal, non-deterministic free will.

That shows that you have yet to grasp incompatibilism, the implications of determinism, the nature of the brain, cognition, decision making or the notion of free will.

Your love of the idea of free will prevents you from considering the problems with compatibilism....which has been thoroughly explained by me and numerous authors, researchers and philosophers, which I have quoted and cited.

Which of course you dismiss without consideration or counterargument.