Compatibilism: What's that About?

[fromderinside]

2 Logic is not just a "feeling". It is a deterministic operation of thought, employed to help us to succeed in the world.


1 Ironically, Baumeister's conclusion at the end of the article is this: "Hence accepting the reality of choice amid genuinely multiple possibilities seems a more prudent and useful basis for psychological theorizing than deterministic inevitability."

1 Oh goody, Baumeister a psychologist of minor coffee table book note. I'd have expected at least Sperry or Gazzaniga or Licklider, or even Pinker. But no, touchy feely it is. Yawn.

2 Logic is, by necessity, self referencing. It is based on one's impressions of what is lawful in the world rather than on what is lawful in the world. Yes it is formalistically structured. Being so does not make it real. There need be material basis for statements structured formalistically to reflect what has been determined to be real. Logic doesn't require that. Its a declared agreement among participants assumed by the one presenting.

 

[DBT]

''To a determinist, all choice is illusory. ... "

Ironically, Baumeister's conclusion at the end of the article is this: "Hence accepting the reality of choice amid genuinely multiple possibilities seems a more prudent and useful basis for psychological theorizing than deterministic inevitability."

The problem here is that compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism....and determinism is by definition a matter of inevitability, as you define it: no deviation, etc.

So Baumeister's conclusion is irrelevant to the issue at hand, where determinism does not have genuine multiple possibilities.

But Roy's picture of determinism is similar to yours. He sees deterministic inevitability as something that eliminates possibilities. And, as a psychologist, he must side with the possibilities and against the inevitability.

Your definition of determinism is pretty much the same as mine, as with other definitions that have been given.

The only difference being the addition of the compatibilist definition of free will.

Which is not sufficient to prove the proposition for reasons that have already been described numerous times.

I see deterministic inevitability a bit differently. Normally, "inevitability" suggests that something will happen and we cannot do anything about it. But with deterministic inevitability, the mechanism that causes us to choose the Salad instead of the Steak happens to be located within us, specifically our own brain. And it will be our own choosing that causes the Salad to be inevitable.

That contradicts your own definition and its terms by placing the brain outside of the system and giving it the ability to act independently of its evolution or development, which can have no deviations.

If the brain can make something else happen, that is a deviation, therefore we do not have determinism, instead we have autonomy and mastery over the system, and free will is not compatible with determinism, yet is the master or controller over it.

As a couple of other philosophers (Schopenhauer and Kane) have pointed out, determinism is the basis of our wants. Thus, determinism, when metaphorically taken to be the source of our will, can never make us do anything against our will. It is already what we ourselves were going to choose to do. And it would not happen without our choosing to make it happen.

Deterministic inevitability, in regard to us, is still us choosing for ourselves what we will order for dinner. It happens just so, without deviation.

Schopenhauer pointed out that ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Der Mensch kann zwar tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will. - Schopenhauer.


Which is essentially: “It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

Or: ''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. - Cold comfort in Compatibilism.

Namely, that freely performed, uncoerced, unforced actions are also a matter of inner necessity, and must be performed as determined rather than freely willed.

Consequently, free will is not possible within a deterministic system where all outputs proceed without deviation, where the state of the system is equivalent to actions performed.

 

[Jarhyn]

It is based on one's impressions of what is lawful in the world rather than on what is lawful in the world

No, it isn't. It's based on what we have shown again and again and again is fundamentally lawful to the world, because if the universe is deterministic, the universe MUST at it's most basic levels reduce to mathematically precise relationships of function, and a universe of mathematically precise relationships of function demand that it conform to the laws of logic.

Logic is not self-referential. To be self-referential, logic would need to implement an axiom that claims the truth of it's other axioms.

The universe is bound to the laws of logic which come down to "something cannot be both true and false in the same way at the same time."

Of course every statement of physics, including those of DBT in saying "if the universe is deterministic then there are no deviations or randomness" is built on logic.

Every law of physics ever proposed is built on the assumption that the universe does not allow violations of logic.

Even the idea that the universe has laws at all, so as to be Deterministic, is a tacit acceptance that the universe is bound to a set of logical operations, logical truths, at its lowest level.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The problem here is that compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism....and determinism is by definition a matter of inevitability, as you define it: no deviation, etc.

And we've established that there are two definitions of free will.

One free will only requires that our choice is free from coercion and undue influence, which is compatible with deterministic inevitability. Within the context of deterministic inevitability, we have scenarios where it is inevitable that we will be coerced or unduly influenced to make a choice that we would not choose for ourselves. And, also within the context of deterministic inevitability, we have scenarios where it is inevitable that we will be free of coercion and undue influence, and can decide for ourselves what we will do. This second scenario is called "a choice of our own free will" or a "freely chosen will".

The other free will is a choice that is free from cause and effect. And we both agree that there is no such thing as an event that is free from causation.

The first free will is meaningful and relevant, because it is actually used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

The second free will is an irrational notion derived from the delusion that cause and effect is something that we can or need to be free of.

So Baumeister's conclusion is irrelevant to the issue at hand, where determinism does not have genuine multiple possibilities.

And here we disagree as to what constitutes a "genuine" possibility. A genuine possibility is a mental token that is part of the rational causal mechanism of logical thought. Logical thought performs many useful functions. One of these functions is making decisions.

We perform choosing whenever we are presented with two or more options, like deciding what to wear to work, or what to fix for breakfast, or what number to put in the Sudoku square or what word will give us the most points on the Scrabble board, or whether to "hold them or fold them" in poker, or which car or house to buy, or which college to attend, etc., ad infinitum.

The point is that deciding things is a heavily used mental function in human life. And it would be a shame to break it.

How could it be broken? Easy, by pretending that the single actuality is the only genuine possibility. You see, decision making requires multiple genuine possibilities. If an option is not a genuine possibility, then it cannot enter the selection pool, no matter what we are selecting (clothes, meals, Sudoku numbers, Scrabble combinations, poker moves, cars, houses, colleges, etc., ad infinitum).

It is only after we have made our choice that we can know which possibility will be the actual choice. Until then, every possibility must logically be considered genuine.

A "genuine" or "real" or "actual" possibility exists solely within the imagination. An actual/genuine/real possibility does not exist in the actual/genuine/real physical world. It exists solely within the imagination, where it allows our mind to plan, evaluate, choose, invent, create, etc. All of these are valuable human abilities. And they all employ the notion of possibilities.

We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining one or more possible bridges.

That is the true nature of genuine possibilities.

Your definition of determinism is pretty much the same as mine, as with other definitions that have been given.

There are some significant differences between our two views of deterministic causal necessity/inevitability. My determinism has restaurant menus with multiple genuine possibilities. My determinism has real people making real choices from those menus.

My determinism knows the difference between things that "can" happen and things that "will" happen.

My determinism creates no paradoxes.

The only difference being the addition of the compatibilist definition of free will.

The compatibilist definition of free will, a choice free of coercion and undue influence, is the only rational definition of free will. There is no such thing as "freedom from cause and effect", because every freedom we have, to do anything at all, requires us to cause some effect. We cannot be free of that which freedom itself requires.

Which is not sufficient to prove the proposition for reasons that have already been described numerous times.

I think there is a very serious disagreement as to what "the proposition" is.

My proposition is simply that, for practical purposes, we need to distinguish between the cases where a person is coerced or unduly influenced, to do something that they would not ordinarily choose to do, versus the cases where a person is free of coercion and undue influence, and chooses for themselves what they will do.

In both cases, the events are fully deterministic and part of a chain of events reliably causing subsequent events, that goes back as far as anyone cares to imagine. So, determinism is satisfied in either case.

In the specific cases where the person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, free will is satisfied.

Thus, determinism and free will are both satisfied.

Further issues...

Normally, "inevitability" suggests that something will happen and we cannot do anything about it. But with deterministic inevitability, the mechanism that causes us to choose the Salad instead of the Steak happens to be located within us, specifically our own brain. And it will be our own choosing that causes the Salad to be inevitable.

That contradicts your own definition and its terms by placing the brain outside of the system and giving it the ability to act independently of its evolution or development, which can have no deviations.

Nonsense. The brain needs no independence from its evolution or its development. But it does operate independently of the other objects within our universe. The planet Neptune, for example, plays no role in choosing what I will order for dinner. The choosing is all happening within my own brain, regardless of what the other objects in the universe are doing.

If the brain can make something else happen, that is a deviation, therefore we do not have determinism, instead we have autonomy and mastery over the system, and free will is not compatible with determinism, yet is the master or controller over it.

More nonsense. The universe, despite what astrologers may think, exercises no control over the operation of anyone's brain. And there is no need for me to control the universe in order to control what I will order for dinner.

The brain operates deterministically and makes happen what it deliberately chooses to make happen. The brain, as it is now, has a history of prior experiences, including its own prior choices, that are the prior causes of its current state. But it is still the brain, as it is now, that is actually doing the choosing.

Schopenhauer pointed out that ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ - Der Mensch kann zwar tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will. - Schopenhauer.

Which is essentially: “It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

Ah! Thanks for recalling those two quotes for me.

My point, which they both support, is that there is no difference, at all, between what we do by causal necessity/inevitability and what we ourselves want to do and what we ourselves decide that we will do.

As you can see, determinism doesn't actually change anything.

 

[fromderinside]

It is based on one's impressions of what is lawful in the world rather than on what is lawful in the world

No, it isn't. It's based on what we have shown again and again and again is fundamentally lawful to the world, because if the universe is deterministic, the universe MUST at it's most basic levels reduce to mathematically precise relationships of function, and a universe of mathematically precise relationships of function demand that it conform to the laws of logic nature. (Laws of nature are those reduced to precise material conditions forming the functions described in mathematical statements)

Logic is not self-referential. To be self-referential, logic would need to implement an axiom that claims the truth of it's other axioms. (which is common in logic courses depending on the logical system employed)

The universe is bound to the laws of logic which come down to "something cannot be both true and false in the same way at the same time." (which is currently in dispute in physics -multiple places, multiple configurations, multiple likelihoods)

Of course every statement of physics, including those of DBT in saying "if the universe is deterministic then there are no deviations or randomness" is built on logic. (confirming physical observation logical or not see multiple above)

Every law of physics ever proposed is built on the assumption that the universe does not allow violations of logic. (yet there are almost no positrons in the known universe)

Even the idea that the universe has laws at all, so as to be Deterministic, is a tacit acceptance that the universe is bound to a set of logical operations, logical truths, at its lowest level. (again with the positrons)

It's rules of logic (circa Aristotle) and laws of nature (circa Newton). I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton). State of logic is, uh, how I interpret things about me now (Aristotle).

Unless logic is the laws of nature, which it isn't since if that were so there would be no need for logic. (logical statement) Laws of nature are those reduced to precise material conditions forming the functions described in mathematical statements.

As for determinism the statement it is "this then that" without exception as a condition of existence which is different than adhering to a particular logic. One may observe such a state then derive a logic from it. One can not impose a statement of logic on a form of existence. Existence precedes logic. In other words without existence there is no logic.

 

[Jarhyn]

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

I have been pointing out your errors for some time.

No, you've been pointing out things which you claim would constitute errors (you claim there are references which are violations of the requirement of "no randomness" or "no deviation), however you fail to actually point out where you believe I would be making those errors.

That the decision carried out is a matter of necessity or entailment rather than choice

"That the choice carried out is a matter of necessity or entailment rather than choice"

When we apply the synonym replacement, the silliness and contradiction in your thought process is laid bare. Every decision is a fixed, deterministic choice.

This does not ever prevent alternatives from being logically "realizable", it only prevents them from being immediately realized.

The fact is that if our universe is deterministic, it has a general set of laws which can in fact be represented entirely with human language, with a semantic structure, and that this implies the ability to look at those truth relationships with a goal in mind, and reverse through those truths to find a configuration one wishes to have, and then the truth of the human brain is entirely capable of using that as an input to produce an output which will provide the state necessary for creating a transition that yields the goal configuration.

For example, let's say the goal is to have the final output Z=1.

Let's look at some truths of a simple Deterministic system, where C is something whose value is not directly accessible as an output of the "solver" element in the machine, and D is an output of the "solver".

A B Z (Z = A && B)
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1

C A (A = !C)
0 1
1 0

C D B (B = C XOR D)
0 0 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 0

This means, logically, to produce a Z of 1, both an A of 1 and a B of 1 are necessary.

Assuming A is 1, this means that one must look at the truth which determines B.

This means some things can be known about the state of the system: that C is 0, that D is currently 0.

This means a truth table of choice in D on AB for Z=1

A B D Success (Z=1)
0 0 D 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 D 0
1 1 1 1

as such as long as A and B are inputs to the solver, the solver can choose, as above, for Z to be 1, by applying the above heuristic, but only when A is already 1.

as such the re are situations where the will will be free (A=1) and situations where the will will be constrained (A=0).

This is of course a proof that regulatory control pursuant to choice of future states is possible within the laws of deterministic logic.

Note that phrase "deterministic logic"

"The universe is deterministic" in fact has a longer form, with more words, which are assumed by context here: "the universe functions by deterministic logic"

If you send logic up the river, you can't claim the universe is deterministic. If you claim the universe is deterministic, you accede that it is bound to a fixed logic*.

Further, it is the case that it MAY be such that instead of absolute discretes, the universe functions on continuous scales, or that large confluences of such granular and so ultimately binary logic create apparent continuous logics, but this changes absolutely nothing about the above demonstrated capability of regulatory control in a system operating by deterministic logic.

Again we are left faced with the fact that given the demonstrated capacity for regulatory control within the scope of deterministic logic, that all remaining arguments against human free will must be founded on the much weaker argument "it is possible, it's just not happening within the human mind"

Of course the issue with that argument is that a human mind managed to construct regulatory control towards Z=1, as above.

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

 

[fromderinside]

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

Unless you have an operational definition for logic your 'synonymous' is meaningless re the state of the world.

 

[Jarhyn]

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

Unless you have an operational definition for logic your 'synonymous' is meaningless re the state of the world.

You really don't know where the phrase "Deterministic" comes from and that's just sad.

It is actually an idea derived, when applied by physicists, as derived from set theory. It's not even really possible to formulate any kind of theory, apply the scientific method at all, without set theory, you know that, right?

That whole "gather data, test conclusions thing"? That's sitting firmly on logic.

We really are at the point where you are hucking logic out the window.

You do realize Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is based on logical conclusion, ya? That all science is?

Or are you that lost?

We're having a discussion here. DBT is up here saying the logical implications of determinism rule out "free will".

I get very much to point how the  logical implications of determinism (namely fixed truths of state transition, really more the pure definition of determinism than implications though) very much yield that regulatory control is possible.

I design deterministic systems. I should think I know what the definition of "deterministic" is, what lives at it's core. It is nothing more than "bound to a fixed logic".

If you want to pretend logic doesn't work you are in the wrong place.

Everything you could possibly argue is driven out of set theory.

So is that stupid little simulation of mine.

And the universe itself, assuming Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is correct, is bound to logical behavior and obeying the axioms of set theory.

Of course I can't prove the axioms of set theory. Moreover it's your responsibility to provide that whatever the fuck your axioms are, that they actually work.

If you have a different set of axioms which allow us to discuss physics, math, spatial fields, pipe up! Your Nobel prize would be awaiting you!

Of course you'll have to describe determinism in terms of those axioms of yours.

 

[DBT]

The problem here is that compatibilism is the argument that free will is compatible with determinism....and determinism is by definition a matter of inevitability, as you define it: no deviation, etc.

And we've established that there are two definitions of free will.

One free will only requires that our choice is free from coercion and undue influence, which is compatible with deterministic inevitability. Within the context of deterministic inevitability, we have scenarios where it is inevitable that we will be coerced or unduly influenced to make a choice that we would not choose for ourselves. And, also within the context of deterministic inevitability, we have scenarios where it is inevitable that we will be free of coercion and undue influence, and can decide for ourselves what we will do. This second scenario is called "a choice of our own free will" or a "freely chosen will".

That's not free will. It's a label applied to a selected set of conditions in order to give the desired impression, an impression of free will where it doesn't actually exist.

The label doesn't apply for the reasons pointed out numerous times: inner necessity, where all actions, including thought and deliberation is fixed by prior states of the system as it unfolds without deviation.

The other free will is a choice that is free from cause and effect. And we both agree that there is no such thing as an event that is free from causation.

The first free will is meaningful and relevant, because it is actually used when assessing a person's responsibility for their actions.

The second free will is an irrational notion derived from the delusion that cause and effect is something that we can or need to be free of.

The first is merely a definition based on semantics and rhetoric. The other has no substance.

Both definitions fail for their own reasons.

So Baumeister's conclusion is irrelevant to the issue at hand, where determinism does not have genuine multiple possibilities.

And here we disagree as to what constitutes a "genuine" possibility. A genuine possibility is a mental token that is part of the rational causal mechanism of logical thought. Logical thought performs many useful functions. One of these functions is making decisions.

A genuine possibility is something that can in fact happen at a given place and time. Determinism means the evolution or development of the system entails precisely what happens in any given place and time.

And in that place and time, where the system determines that action A happens, then action B, C or D not only will not happen, but cannot happen. The stipulation of No Deviation excludes all possibility of alternate actions happening.

That's determinism.

We perform choosing whenever we are presented with two or more options, like deciding what to wear to work, or what to fix for breakfast, or what number to put in the Sudoku square or what word will give us the most points on the Scrabble board, or whether to "hold them or fold them" in poker, or which car or house to buy, or which college to attend, etc., ad infinitum.

There is no choosing. Choosing requires the possibility of taking a different option. In determinism, decision making is a process of entailment. The process of decision making entails a fixed outcome, where no alternatives can be realized (no deviation).

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

The point is that deciding things is a heavily used mental function in human life. And it would be a shame to break it.

Everything that happens, happens necessarily. It can't be any other way (fixed by antecedents/no deviation).

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time.'' - M. Edwards.

How could it be broken? Easy, by pretending that the single actuality is the only genuine possibility. You see, decision making requires multiple genuine possibilities. If an option is not a genuine possibility, then it cannot enter the selection pool, no matter what we are selecting (clothes, meals, Sudoku numbers, Scrabble combinations, poker moves, cars, houses, colleges, etc., ad infinitum).

It is only after we have made our choice that we can know which possibility will be the actual choice. Until then, every possibility must logically be considered genuine.

A "genuine" or "real" or "actual" possibility exists solely within the imagination.

A genuine or actual possibility is something that can in fact happen. Whether it does or not is a matter of where and when it has been determined to happen. Just imagining the possibility of something happening doesn't make it so. Some say it's possible that Jesus will soon return to earth in order to judge the living and the dead, for instance.....sorry if that sounds flippant.

That contradicts your own definition and its terms by placing the brain outside of the system and giving it the ability to act independently of its evolution or development, which can have no deviations.

Nonsense. The brain needs no independence from its evolution or its development. But it does operate independently of the other objects within our universe. The planet Neptune, for example, plays no role in choosing what I will order for dinner. The choosing is all happening within my own brain, regardless of what the other objects in the universe are doing.

Your wording suggested autonomy of mind and will;

''But with deterministic inevitability, the mechanism that causes us to choose the Salad instead of the Steak happens to be located within us, specifically our own brain. And it will be our own choosing that causes the Salad to be inevitable.'' Marvin Edwards.

It's your stipulation of the 'mechanism within us'' that I was responding to. It is this that strongly suggests autonomy of self, that because it is 'us' that decide, we are somehow exempt from the external elements that shape and form our thoughts and actions, not to mention that the process is unconscious and not subject to will or wish, hence no 'free will, at work, yet the label is applied.

If the brain can make something else happen, that is a deviation, therefore we do not have determinism, instead we have autonomy and mastery over the system, and free will is not compatible with determinism, yet is the master or controller over it.

More nonsense. The universe, despite what astrologers may think, exercises no control over the operation of anyone's brain. And there is no need for me to control the universe in order to control what I will order for dinner.

Nonsense? That is basically what you suggested when you said ''located within us,'' specifically our own brain'' - ''But with deterministic inevitability, the mechanism that causes us to choose the Salad instead of the Steak happens to be located within us, specifically our own brain. And it will be our own choosing that causes the Salad to be inevitable.'' M. Edwards.

As if being specifically our own brain, located within us makes a difference to what must necessarily happen before our brain even receives the information that sets the inevitable actions into motion.

Free will? Nonsense!

 

[Marvin Edwards]

We have established that there are two definitions of free will.

Operational free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free from coercion and undue influence.
Paradoxical free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free from cause and effect.

Operational free will is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.
Paradoxical free will is used to create confusion and interminable philosophic debates.

Operational free will is compatible with deterministic causal necessity.
Paradoxical free will is not compatible with anything, not even itself. It is an irrational concept.

Operational free will makes the practical distinction between the choices we make for ourselves versus the choices imposed upon us against our will, through coercion, insanity, or other forms of undue influence.

Operational free will makes no claims to being "uncaused" and it requires nothing supernatural.

Operational free will is commonly understood and correctly applied by most people to assess a person's responsibility for their actions. For example, the bank teller, forced at gunpoint to hand over the bank's money to the robber, is not held responsible. The robber is held responsible for the bank teller's behavior. Was the person's behavior due to insanity? Then medical and psychiatric treatment in a secure medical facility is used for correction and public safety rather than a prison.

That's not free will. It's a label applied to a selected set of conditions in order to give the desired impression, an impression of free will where it doesn't actually exist.

I disagree. Operational free will is the single correct definition of free will. It is both meaningful and relevant.

The label doesn't apply for the reasons pointed out numerous times: inner necessity, where all actions, including thought and deliberation is fixed by prior states of the system as it unfolds without deviation.

You're speaking of paradoxical "free will", a speculative notion of someone making choices that are not caused by anything, not even the person's own goals and reasons, in a magical universe where choosing never happens. It is a bit of silly nonsense.

Operational free will assumes that our choices are always reliably caused, and usually the cause is our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings. Our own inner deliberation necessitates our choice. And we may assume that the value criteria that we apply when making that choice also has a history of prior causes, including many normal influences, such as our genetic dispositions and our prior life experiences.

So, there is nothing about operational free will that contradicts deterministic causal necessity.

... A genuine or actual possibility is something that can in fact happen. Whether it does or not is a matter of where and when it has been determined to happen. ...

Of course. And it is because we often do not know what will happen that we must consider the possibilities: the things that can happen, even if they never do happen. The traffic light up ahead is red. Will it remain red, or will it change to green when we arrive? We don't know yet what will happen. But we do know what can happen. It can remain red and it can change to green. Those are two genuine possibilities.

It's your stipulation of the 'mechanism within us'' that I was responding to. It is this that strongly suggests autonomy of self, that because it is 'us' that decide, we are somehow exempt from the external elements that shape and form our thoughts and actions ...

I do wish to strongly suggest the autonomy of self. It will be my own brain that chooses what I will have for dinner. The other objects in the universe, such as the planet Neptune, will play no role in my decision making.

... not to mention that the process is unconscious and not subject to will or wish, hence no 'free will, at work, yet the label is applied. ...

How my brain goes about choosing to order the Salad rather than the Steak does not change the fact that it is my own brain that is making this decision. That's why the waiter brings me the salad I ordered and the dinner bill. It was a choice I made for myself, free of coercion and undue influence, therefore of my own free will (operational free will).

 

[Jarhyn]

That's not free will

Why not? "DBI doesn't want to believe it" doesn't get you there.

Entailment of unfolding operations of systemic truth does not in any way invalidate the structure of the truth of the system itself.

Deterministic merely means that in a system, everything unfolds as function of fixed logic.

As I've shown the capability, proven it in fact, to regulate towards Z=1, you've got nothing.

Warning: UNARGUED ASSERTIONS ahead!

That's not free will.

This is a claim, a statement of fact, with no further discussion of it, as such it is a BALD assertion.

It's a label applied to a selected set of conditions in order to give the desired impression, an impression of free will where it doesn't actually exist

This is just yet another, more verbose assertion of the previous.

The label doesn't apply for the reasons pointed out numerous times: inner necessity, where all actions, including thought and deliberation is fixed by prior states of the system as it unfolds without deviation.

So, here you have not sufficiently argued in any way that "inner necessity" is distinct from "us choosing what we will do". Further you have failed to even once actually find where real deviations and randomness are being referenced here.

The first is merely a definition based on semantics and rhetoric

Every definition is built up on semantics. Are you deliberately trying to mislead folks here on this topic?

Your definition of "freedom of will" as requiring "freedom from causal necessity" is built in semantics and rhetoric designed to incapacitate thought around treatable elements of the present which prevent unwanted events in the future.

Thankfully, unlike you, I've come to the table with receipts: pointing out that the common language of "can" and "must" and "will" and "free" in fact correspond for most people not to the bullshit paradox that kneecaps our ability to decide for ourselves what we want (and what we don't want), but rather language which allows people to effectively solve for a desired output to the system, and provide that output:

That "can" means that there is a position in the systemic truth that describes in every moment, based on what is, what will be, and that it is a little bit more granular than "everything all at once changes mysteriously and just to the next frame".

A genuine possibility is something that can in fact happen at a given place and time

So close.

A genuine possibility something that would happen at a given place and time IF the state of the universe at that given place and time IS AS GIVEN.

This is about as close as you get to "deviation", but it's not actually areal deviation, as once someone has isolated "something relatively true" about the system, one can apply that truth to provide regulatory control towards desired outputs as has been proven.

Determinism means the evolution or development of the system entails precisely what happens in any given place and time

As pointed out this is inconsequential to your argument as at no point has it been required for the compatibilist position that it not be.

in that place and time, where the system determines that action A happens, then action B, C or D not only will not happen, but cannot happen

This is of course built on a modal fallacy, and a failure to properly understand and operate the word "can". As discussed, this failure certainly SEEMS deliberate.

"in that place and time, where the system determines that action A happens, then action B, C or D not only will not happen, but cannot happen {even if something specific about the system was different}".

I have added a bolded, implied, but omitted part to your statement above.

EVERY operation of "can" assumes "if something specific about the system was different"

Are things about the system ever actually going to be different? No. But that still doesn't change the fact that the system would resolve in this different way IF it were.

Every particle everywhere is different but the whole conclusion of the attempt to describe physics at all was "while no two particles share all quantum numbers", it is nonetheless true that "every particle everywhere is bound by the same set of state transition laws".

We literally call such universalities "universal laws".

See also this discussion for a good example of "can" vs "will" as relates to neutron stars.

Can a neutron star ever be less than about 1.44 solar masses (the Chandrasekhar limit)? Why not?

I learned about the Chandrasekhar limit as being the UPPER limit, in terms of mass, for a white dwarf... But, I have never heard of a neutron star being BELOW that mass, so I have wondered, recentl...

astronomy.stackexchange.com

The stipulation of No Deviation excludes all possibility* of alternate actions happening.

*(Strike through mine)

And then you just slide this unargued assertion in.

It excludes the possibility reality of alternate actions happening. It does not exclude the possibility. It does not exclude possibility for the same reason the Chandrasekhar limit (that which excludes the reality of small neutron stars, except in very unlikely and unobserved situations) does not exclude the "logical possibility" of a neutron star at .1 solar masses.

All this would require is a neutron star passing close enough to a singularity or other neutron star to yeet off a big enough chunk of it's solar mass. This in fact implies a leveragable path to synthesis of such a star, however ridiculously unlikely.

It may even be such that such neutron stars are simply not possible in this time epoch of our universe.

Owing to tunneling and neutron radiation, this limit will potentially be reached, eventually, but it will not anywhere we can see it. It probably hasn't.

"It can, according to what is true of the system, but it won't according to the configuration of the system in this moment" is this a true statement, as pertains to the above.

Anyway, I've gotten bored of exhaustively dealing with your claptrap.

All the rest of your bullshit is just repeats of the above cycle. Go ahead, try and prove me wrong, I can demonstrate your bald assertions, and actually provide substantive argument against them.

You apparently cannot.

 

[fromderinside]

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

Unless you have an operational definition for logic your 'synonymous' is meaningless re the state of the world.

You really don't know where the phrase "Deterministic" comes from and that's just sad.

It is actually an idea derived, when applied by physicists, as derived from set theory. It's not even really possible to formulate any kind of theory, apply the scientific method at all, without set theory, you know that, right?

That whole "gather data, test conclusions thing"? That's sitting firmly on logic.

We really are at the point where you are hucking logic out the window.

You do realize Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is based on logical conclusion, ya? That all science is?

Or are you that lost?

We're having a discussion here. DBT is up here saying the logical implications of determinism rule out "free will".

I get very much to point how the  logical implications of determinism (namely fixed truths of state transition, really more the pure definition of determinism than implications though) very much yield that regulatory control is possible.

I design deterministic systems. I should think I know what the definition of "deterministic" is, what lives at it's core. It is nothing more than "bound to a fixed logic".

If you want to pretend logic doesn't work you are in the wrong place.

Everything you could possibly argue is driven out of set theory.

So is that stupid little simulation of mine.

And the universe itself, assuming Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is correct, is bound to logical behavior and obeying the axioms of set theory.

Of course I can't prove the axioms of set theory. Moreover it's your responsibility to provide that whatever the fuck your axioms are, that they actually work.

If you have a different set of axioms which allow us to discuss physics, math, spatial fields, pipe up! Your Nobel prize would be awaiting you!

Of course you'll have to describe determinism in terms of those axioms of yours.

There is a large variety of positions on interpretations of quantum mechanics

Interpretations of quantum mechanics - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The interpretation I gravitate toward, naturally, is one that holds it as deterministic.

De Broglie–Bohm theory​

Main article: De Broglie–Bohm theory
The de Broglie–Bohm theory of quantum mechanics (also known as the pilot wave theory) is a theory by Louis de Broglie and extended later by David Bohm to include measurements. Particles, which always have positions, are guided by the wavefunction. The wavefunction evolves according to the Schrödinger wave equation, and the wavefunction never collapses. The theory takes place in a single spacetime, is non-local, and is deterministic. The simultaneous determination of a particle's position and velocity is subject to the usual uncertainty principle constraint. The theory is considered to be a hidden-variable theory, and by embracing non-locality it satisfies Bell's inequality. The measurement problem is resolved, since the particles have definite positions at all times.[40] Collapse is explained as phenomenological.[41]

Interpret	Year publis	Authors	Det	Ont wav fun ctio	Uni hist	Hi var	Collapsing wavefunct	Obs role	Loc dyn mic	Co fac def	Ext uni wav fun

de Brog Bohm

1927– 1952

Louis de Bro David

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Phenomen logical

No

No

Yes

Yes

So you find set or any of your other claims in the article? Of course not because they are .....

Oh, wait. To be fair there is a bit of math around discussions of the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function

 

[DBT]

We have established that there are two definitions of free will.

Operational free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free from coercion and undue influence.
Paradoxical free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while free from cause and effect.

Operational free will is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.
Paradoxical free will is used to create confusion and interminable philosophic debates.

Operational free will is compatible with deterministic causal necessity.
Paradoxical free will is not compatible with anything, not even itself. It is an irrational concept.

Operational free will makes the practical distinction between the choices we make for ourselves versus the choices imposed upon us against our will, through coercion, insanity, or other forms of undue influence.

Operational free will makes no claims to being "uncaused" and it requires nothing supernatural.

Operational free will is commonly understood and correctly applied by most people to assess a person's responsibility for their actions. For example, the bank teller, forced at gunpoint to hand over the bank's money to the robber, is not held responsible. The robber is held responsible for the bank teller's behavior. Was the person's behavior due to insanity? Then medical and psychiatric treatment in a secure medical facility is used for correction and public safety rather than a prison.

That's not free will. It's a label applied to a selected set of conditions in order to give the desired impression, an impression of free will where it doesn't actually exist.

I disagree. Operational free will is the single correct definition of free will. It is both meaningful and relevant.

The label doesn't apply for the reasons pointed out numerous times: inner necessity, where all actions, including thought and deliberation is fixed by prior states of the system as it unfolds without deviation.

You're speaking of paradoxical "free will", a speculative notion of someone making choices that are not caused by anything, not even the person's own goals and reasons, in a magical universe where choosing never happens. It is a bit of silly nonsense.

Operational free will assumes that our choices are always reliably caused, and usually the cause is our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings. Our own inner deliberation necessitates our choice. And we may assume that the value criteria that we apply when making that choice also has a history of prior causes, including many normal influences, such as our genetic dispositions and our prior life experiences.

So, there is nothing about operational free will that contradicts deterministic causal necessity.

... A genuine or actual possibility is something that can in fact happen. Whether it does or not is a matter of where and when it has been determined to happen. ...

Of course. And it is because we often do not know what will happen that we must consider the possibilities: the things that can happen, even if they never do happen. The traffic light up ahead is red. Will it remain red, or will it change to green when we arrive? We don't know yet what will happen. But we do know what can happen. It can remain red and it can change to green. Those are two genuine possibilities.

It's your stipulation of the 'mechanism within us'' that I was responding to. It is this that strongly suggests autonomy of self, that because it is 'us' that decide, we are somehow exempt from the external elements that shape and form our thoughts and actions ...

I do wish to strongly suggest the autonomy of self. It will be my own brain that chooses what I will have for dinner. The other objects in the universe, such as the planet Neptune, will play no role in my decision making.

... not to mention that the process is unconscious and not subject to will or wish, hence no 'free will, at work, yet the label is applied. ...

How my brain goes about choosing to order the Salad rather than the Steak does not change the fact that it is my own brain that is making this decision. That's why the waiter brings me the salad I ordered and the dinner bill. It was a choice I made for myself, free of coercion and undue influence, therefore of my own free will (operational free will).

Everything that exists has its own makeup and determined relationship with its environment.

That it is the object that functions within its environment does qualify it for free will.

That it 'is us' who think does not qualify for free will because we do not choose what we are, who we are, how or what we think. All of this happens in the context of our environment and the world at large.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

And of course, actions must proceed as determined.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Everything that exists has its own makeup and determined relationship with its environment. That it is the object that functions within its environment does qualify it for free will.

When a person adds a column of numbers and tells you their sum, it is called "adding".

When a person considers the restaurant menu and tells the waiter, "I will have the Greek Salad, please", it is called "choosing".

When a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "free will".

Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will" (as in "I will have the Greek Salad, please").

The fact that all of the above take place in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect does not change anything.

Causal necessity does not eliminate adding. It only makes adding causally necessary.
Causal necessity does not eliminate choosing. It only makes choosing causally necessary.
Causal necessity does not eliminate free will. It only makes free will causally necessary.

That it 'is us' who think does not qualify for free will because we do not choose what we are, who we are, how or what we think. All of this happens in the context of our environment and the world at large.

Despite the many things that we did not choose, we actually did choose the Greek Salad. That is why the waiter brought the salad, and the bill for our dinner, to us, and not to "our environment and the world at large".

Your view of the world, operating as a whole entity, is not supported by the facts.

And of course, actions must proceed as determined.

Your view that the world is an entity that determines what I will order for dinner is superstitious nonsense.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

And that is why no one ever experiences determinism as a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do.

Determinism is not an external entity controlling us. That is superstitious nonsense. Our choices are certainly determined, but they are determined by our own brains, by our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences.

Our choices are legitimately our own. And that is why the waiter brings us the Salad and the bill.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

That's a very good example of how to weave a paradox using false, but believable, suggestions. When I count to three you will wake up. One, however you got here, you are here now.
Two, and while you were here in the restaurant, you chose to order a Greek Salad.
Three, here is your Salad and your bill. Please pay the cashier on the way out. After all, you did order this Salad of your own free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

There is a large variety of positions on interpretations of quantum mechanics

And all of them sit on set theory.

Particles

Discrete "values" of "fields".. you realize that these are discussions of Algebras, Groups, Rings, yeah? It's set theory.

You're not making your case strongly here.

All of this is a claim that there is a functional rather than relational relationship between state and outcome: it is yet again a description of a theory, built on set theory, to describe the fixed patterns of deterministic resolution.

In other words it is again another post synonymous with "the university is bound to a deterministic logic.

And so we are back full circle to me pointing out your error:

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

Unless you have an operational definition for logic your 'synonymous' is meaningless re the state of the world.

You really don't know where the phrase "Deterministic" comes from and that's just sad.

It is actually an idea derived, when applied by physicists, as derived from set theory. It's not even really possible to formulate any kind of theory, apply the scientific method at all, without set theory, you know that, right?

That whole "gather data, test conclusions thing"? That's sitting firmly on logic.

We really are at the point where you are hucking logic out the window.

You do realize Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is based on logical conclusion, ya? That all science is?

Or are you that lost?

We're having a discussion here. DBT is up here saying the logical implications of determinism rule out "free will".

I get very much to point how the  logical implications of determinism (namely fixed truths of state transition, really more the pure definition of determinism than implications though) very much yield that regulatory control is possible.

I design deterministic systems. I should think I know what the definition of "deterministic" is, what lives at it's core. It is nothing more than "bound to a fixed logic".

If you want to pretend logic doesn't work you are in the wrong place.

Everything you could possibly argue is driven out of set theory.

So is that stupid little simulation of mine.

And the universe itself, assuming Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is correct, is bound to logical behavior and obeying the axioms of set theory.

Of course I can't prove the axioms of set theory. Moreover it's your responsibility to provide that whatever the fuck your axioms are, that they actually work.

If you have a different set of axioms which allow us to discuss physics, math, spatial fields, pipe up! Your Nobel prize would be awaiting you!

Of course you'll have to describe determinism in terms of those axioms of yours.

 

[fromderinside]

There is a large variety of positions on interpretations of quantum mechanics

And all of them sit on set theory.

Particles

Discrete "values" of "fields".. you realize that these are discussions of Algebras, Groups, Rings, yeah? It's set theory.

I accept as material state of the world as deterministic (Newton)

*"Is bound to a fixed logic" is in fact synonymous with "is deterministic".

Unless you have an operational definition for logic your 'synonymous' is meaningless re the state of the world.

That whole "gather data, test conclusions thing"?

You do realize Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is based on logical conclusion, ya? That all science is?

Everything you could possibly argue is driven out of set theory.

So is that stupid little simulation of mine.

And the universe itself, assuming Sabine Hossenfelder's Superdeterminism is correct, is bound to logical behavior and obeying the axioms of set theory.

Of course I can't prove the axioms of set theory. Moreover it's your responsibility to provide that whatever the fuck your axioms are, that they actually work.

If you have a different set of axioms which allow us to discuss physics, math, spatial fields, pipe up! Your Nobel prize would be awaiting you!

Of course you'll have to describe determinism in terms of those axioms of yours.

My error is failing to point out that material measures are required for any examination of determinism. Replacing one amorphous term with another amorphous term doesn't get the job done. A logical construct, set theory, says no more about this-then-that than does calling it determinism.

One necessarily has to connect physical measure evidence via controlled experiment first into a coherent relational description, text or symbol thense into a theory to make it materially more useful, meaningful. Once there is organized material evidence there is substance for use of such as set theory constructs or any other math or logically consistent associative tool for organizing or representing some model of what has been measured. All maths were developed in response for the need to represent what has been materially demonstrated coherently as a basis for further investigation.

You should know you're the gamer. I know Sabine Hossenfelder does she's one of my favorite physicists.

 

[DBT]

Everything that exists has its own makeup and determined relationship with its environment. That it is the object that functions within its environment does qualify it for free will.

When a person adds a column of numbers and tells you their sum, it is called "adding".

When a person considers the restaurant menu and tells the waiter, "I will have the Greek Salad, please", it is called "choosing".

When a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "free will".

Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will" (as in "I will have the Greek Salad, please").

The analogy is flawed. Adding numbers is simply an action performed for a reason. The issue of compatibilist free will is the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism.

The compatibilist definition is founded on will related action while ignoring the nature of will and its means of production through unconscious processes and inner necessitation.

That neglect of the consideration of means of production and inner necessity being the compatibilists point of failure.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

The fact that all of the above take place in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect does not change anything.

Causal necessity does not eliminate adding. It only makes adding causally necessary.
Causal necessity does not eliminate choosing. It only makes choosing causally necessary.
Causal necessity does not eliminate free will. It only makes free will causally necessary.

Causal necessity means that everything that happens must necessarily happen, therefore it's not a matter of freedom of choice (no realizable alternatives) or freedom of will because what is willed is fixed by prior states of the system.

If will is to be free, it should be make a difference to fixed outcomes. Determinism doesn't have different outcomes.

That it 'is us' who think does not qualify for free will because we do not choose what we are, who we are, how or what we think. All of this happens in the context of our environment and the world at large.

Despite the many things that we did not choose, we actually did choose the Greek Salad. That is why the waiter brought the salad, and the bill for our dinner, to us, and not to "our environment and the world at large".

Your view of the world, operating as a whole entity, is not supported by the facts.

Decisions are necessary actions, actions fixed by the evolution or development of the system.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

And of course, actions must proceed as determined.

Your view that the world is an entity that determines what I will order for dinner is superstitious nonsense.

At no point have I said or suggested that determinism is an entity that acts upon the system.

The word Determinism stands for how a system works, its features, attributes and properties.

Just as you yourself put it;

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

And that is why no one ever experiences determinism as a meaningful or relevant constraint. It is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do.

If the world is deterministic and we are aspects of this deterministic world, we are by nature deterministic.

Determinism is not an external entity controlling us. That is superstitious nonsense. Our choices are certainly determined, but they are determined by our own brains, by our own goals and reasons, our own thoughts and feelings, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences.

I have never said or implied that it was. I don't know where you got that from.

 

[Jarhyn]

material measures

FDI, once you are taking measurements at all, you are entering the domain of set theory. To take a thing and quantify it is to operate set theory.

You write down a number? Welcome to set theory.

You speak about a quantity of stuff? Welcome to set theory.

You

physical measure evidence

You operate set theory to collect sets.

text or symbol

Strangely enough this is set theory.

meaningful

Representation Theory.

organized

Set theory.

You really do seem lost here.

Even the very idea of measuring a meter is standing in the concept of the set

Even the idea of measuring the mass of an object is operating by set theory.

Do you really not understand where the foundation of set theory exists in the hierarchchy of thought, reason, and scientific exploration?

There's a reason why Langlands program, a mathematical pursuit, is considered the endgame GUT.

The fact is that "deterministic system" really means "a system bound to a fixed logical truth in it's transition model."

All of science is in fact applied set theory.


Fucking pigeon chess...

The compatibilist definition is founded on will related action while ignoring the nature of will and its means of production through unconscious processes and inner necessitation.

No, it isn't. The compatibilist definition is founded on observed facts: that the universe does not allow material contradictions.

This has been demonstrated so often it is in fact the foundation of the very idea of logic.

But moreover you again commit a genetic fallacy: where it came from does not change what it is.

This is a really important thing to understand and why I kept saying that you should learn to not step in genetic fallacies.

The machine that did not build itself may still build other things. Those things are not built "by that which built the machine", they were built by the machine. The machine is still itself regardless of what made it.

If will is to be free, it should be make a difference to fixed outcomes

This, more than anything, is your problem.

You are talking here about a specific fixed outcome which your will made no difference to change. We could talk about that, but I expect that's too painful or fearful or terrible for you.

The issue is that no, that's not how it works. There is no ought from the is, there, just a childish desire to get a do-over.

In my previous proof, there is regulatory control towards Z=1, but not when A=0 while Z=0.

as such we are left with "if the will is to be be free, it shall be causal to the fixed outcome, with relation to a goal statement of the will specific to the freedom being measured".

When all the words are operated correctly it makes sense. When the words are not operated correctly, you just get nonsense.

This can as Marvin observed be seen in a restaurant, when the waiter is asking the customer to encode their will on the airwaves so it can propagate through the system, such that the person whose will is reified is also the one who finds a reified bill for dinner.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

When a person adds a column of numbers and tells you their sum, it is called "adding".
When a person considers the restaurant menu and tells the waiter, "I will have the Greek Salad, please", it is called "choosing".
When a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "free will".
Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will" (as in "I will have the Greek Salad, please").

The analogy is flawed. Adding numbers is simply an action performed for a reason.

Choosing, like adding numbers, is simply an action performed for a reason. Here we are in the restaurant and we must choose what we will order for dinner.

The issue of compatibilist free will is the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism.

And that compatibility is easily demonstrated in the restaurant. Every customer is choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner, thus free will. Every customer's choice is the inevitable result of the customer's own goals and reasons (all reliably caused by prior events), thus determinism.

Determinism + free will = compatibilism, thus addition. ()

The compatibilist definition is founded on will related action while ignoring the nature of will and its means of production through unconscious processes and inner necessitation.

The unconscious processes and inner necessitation are being performed by the person's own brain. Thus, it is actually them choosing what they will have for dinner.

That neglect of the consideration of means of production and inner necessity being the compatibilists point of failure.

Nothing has been neglected. Neuroscience confirms that decision making is a normal function of the human brain. Decision making is how each customer reduces the restaurant menu to a single dinner order. It's quite simple.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Is that correct or incorrect? If I choose to order the Salad instead of the Steak, does that imply that I could not have ordered the Steak? Of course not. Does it imply that it was impossible for me to order the Steak? Of course not.

When we say that we "could have" ordered the Steak, we are simply pointing out that it was on the menu of things that we could order. It never implies that we ordered the Steak. In fact, it logically implies that we definitely did not order the Steak. And it also implies that we only would have ordered the Steak under different circumstances.

That is what "we could have ordered the Steak" means. And all those things were true: the Steak was actually on the menu, the Steak was not ordered, and we only would have ordered the Steak if circumstances were different.

Thus, "we could have ordered the Steak" is a true statement.

The fact that all of the above takes place in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect does not change anything.

Causal necessity means that everything that happens must necessarily happen

Of course. And everything that was necessary to happen actually did happen: It was necessary to open the menu. It was necessary to consider our options. It was necessary for us to choose what we would order. Etc.

, therefore it's not a matter of freedom of choice

Each customer was free to choose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Nobody was holding a gun to their head. None of them were insane. Nor was there any other evidence of undue influence. Thus, they were free to choose for themselves what they would order.

It was deterministically necessary and inevitable that it would be just so, without any alternate path of events, without any deviations. Thus, it was causally necessary that each would make the choice of their own free will.

(no realizable alternatives)

The menu was inevitable. Every item on that menu was a "realizable alternative". But one, and only one, of these realizable alternatives, would inevitably be realized. The other realizable alternatives would not be realized, even though they were always realizable.

or freedom of will because what is willed is fixed by prior states of the system.

Free will is a deterministic event that is causally necessary from any prior point in time, and inevitably must happen.

If will is to be free, it should be make a difference to fixed outcomes. ...

That is where you are mistaken. All events are reliably caused by prior events, including the event in which the customer chooses for himself, of his own free will, what he will order for dinner.

You are still insisting that free will must be free of cause and effect. Why?

 

[DBT]

When a person adds a column of numbers and tells you their sum, it is called "adding".
When a person considers the restaurant menu and tells the waiter, "I will have the Greek Salad, please", it is called "choosing".
When a person chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "free will".
Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will" (as in "I will have the Greek Salad, please").

The analogy is flawed. Adding numbers is simply an action performed for a reason.

Choosing, like adding numbers, is simply an action performed for a reason. Here we are in the restaurant and we must choose what we will order for dinner.

Necessity doesn't establish free will. Just the opposite. Necessity is not freedom. Actions freely performed, as determined, do not qualify as free will.

Nothing within a deterministic system is freely willed. Will itself is entailed by its own antecedents.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'' - Cold comfort in Compatibilism.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

The issue of compatibilist free will is the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism.

And that compatibility is easily demonstrated in the restaurant. Every customer is choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner, thus free will. Every customer's choice is the inevitable result of the customer's own goals and reasons (all reliably caused by prior events), thus determinism.

Determinism + free will = compatibilism, thus addition. ()

Nobody acts in isolation. Nobody thinks in isolation. Nobody chooses what they are, who they are, how they think or what they think.

Everything that happens, happens in relation to the development or evolution of the system from prior to present and future states....which includes the thoughts and actions of all the customers in your restaurant.

No exemptions.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.

The compatibilist definition is founded on will related action while ignoring the nature of will and its means of production through unconscious processes and inner necessitation.

The unconscious processes and inner necessitation are being performed by the person's own brain. Thus, it is actually them choosing what they will have for dinner.

Makes no difference. It's not freely willed. There is no regulative control/choosing. All thoughts and actions necessitated by the evolution of the system.

Decision making is a matter of entailment, not choice.

That neglect of the consideration of means of production and inner necessity being the compatibilists point of failure.

Nothing has been neglected. Neuroscience confirms that decision making is a normal function of the human brain. Decision making is how each customer reduces the restaurant menu to a single dinner order. It's quite simple.

Decision making within a deterministic system does not have possible alternatives. The mechanisms of a brain produce output in terms of thought and action according to an interaction of neural architecture, condition, memory function, and inputs, not free will;

''My position is that free will is only a perception—our interpretation of how we experience our actions in the world. No evidence can be found for the common view that it is a function of our brains that causes behavior. I will make my argument based on research about making “voluntary” movements for two reasons. First, I am a neurologist, specifically a motor physiologist. Second, movements are easily measured. While other, more complex decisions, such as what I choose for dinner, also can be viewed as influenced by free will, I suspect that they will turn out to be analogous to movement. Anyway, such decisions often eventually manifest in movement of some kind, perhaps reaching for the cookbook or a take-out menu.'' - Mark Hallet.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Is that correct or incorrect? If I choose to order the Salad instead of the Steak, does that imply that I could not have ordered the Steak? Of course not. Does it imply that it was impossible for me to order the Steak? Of course not.

Determinism means just that. It means that you cannot do anything other than what you must necessarily do. Necessity does not permit alternate thoughts or actions. Hence, as Brittanica says, ''determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''