Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

Nobody is responsible for the state of their own brain. Nobody chooses a dysfunctional brain. Nobody chooses a functional brain. You get whatever cards that genes and environment deal you.

Of course. But the brain that chooses to criminally harm someone will be held responsible in one way or the other. If functional, then rehab in a correctional facility. If dysfunctional, then treatment in a secure mental hospital.

The key point here is that the methods of correction are different, so the distinction between a functional versus a dysfunctional brain, is a meaningful distinction, that cannot be erased by the generalization that neither brain is chosen.

The fact that the brain is not chosen does not erase the fact that the brain is choosing, and the dysfunctional brain will be choosing differently than the functional brain.

Those who have a functional brain, a functional brain that produces rational behaviour, a person of reason, able to make rational decisions, are expected to abide by the rules of society.

Exactly!

Keep in mind that decision making within a deterministic system is a matter of entailment, necessity, not choice,

That claim is always going to be false. The logical error is that we're ignoring the fact that choosing is a DETERMINISTICALLY ENTAILED EVENT. Whenever choosing is deterministically entailed, CHOOSING necessarily/inevitably WILL happen, exactly as it does happen, without deviation.

The notion that, "if it is entailed then it cannot be a choice", is false, because they can both be true.

and that a computer can do that without 'will' or consciousness.

A computer is a machine that we have created to help us do OUR WILL, such as tracking our calories, balancing our budgets, filing our taxes, and a wide variety of other things. We definitely do not want our machines to behave as if they had a will of their own, so we avoid programming willfulness into our machines, lest they start doing what they want rather than what we want. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics.

Recall what Martha Farah said:
''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems!'' - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

First, let's point out that Martha Farah, director of the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, is disagreeing with you about choosing. She is clearly stating that choosing is something that actually happens: "that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning". (For example, consider why I chose the Salad instead of the Steak for dinner: too few fruits and veggies in my breakfast and lunch that day).

Second, let's take a look at the definition of free will she is using. She presumes that free will is a non-mechanistic view of the world, when she says, "you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough". But free will, as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is still totally mechanistic. In fact it is deterministically mechanistic -- a point that I have been driving home throughout this discussion.

Third, she points out, as I do, that free will is not the opposite of determinism. The true opposite of determinism is indeterministic randomness.

But she fails to point out the true opposite of free will: coercion and undue influence. If she were using the operational definition of free will, she would be a compatibilist.

''It shows us how limited, even misleading, our introspections are. According to the authors, many seconds before we are aware that we have made a decision, we have -- or at least, our brain has! All of the data of cognitive neuroscience are pushing us to replace the idea of mind-body duality, which is so intuitive, with the idea that mental processes are brain processes. But these results on the neural processes underlying free decisions rub our noses in it! One can assimilate findings about color vision or motor control being brain functions a lot more easily than findings about consciously experienced "free will" being a brain function, and hence physically determined and not free at all!''

Please note that the authors are not claiming that "the system at large" is responsible for our decisions. Instead, it is our own brain choosing what we will order for dinner. Decision making is happening locally, not globally.

They also make the point that unconscious processes can precede conscious awareness of the choice, even as unconscious processes precede conscious visual perception.

And finally, the brain making decisions is us making decisions. They confirm that the mind-brain duality is false.

Whatever our brain decides, we have decided. Which is pretty much how we've always viewed things anyway.


What did you think that determinism was, other than cause and effect?

The critical part: that what happens now is entailed by prior states of the system ...

Your phrase "entailed by prior states of the system" means that prior states of the system cause future states of the system. The "entailment" is by "cause and effect", and nothing else. Causal necessity is the same notion as deterministic entailment.

What is Determinism?
''... Determinism is the idea that everything that happens in the world is determined completely by previously existing causes. We all know that the world runs on cause-and-effect. ...

And your quote reiterates that determinism is based upon the simple notion of cause and effect.

 

[fromderinside]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

Nobody is responsible for the state of their own brain. Nobody chooses a dysfunctional brain. Nobody chooses a functional brain. You get whatever cards that genes and environment deal you.

Of course. But the brain that chooses to criminally harm someone will be held responsible in one way or the other. If functional, then rehab in a correctional facility. If dysfunctional, then treatment in a secure mental hospital.

The key point here is that the methods of correction are different, so the distinction between a functional versus a dysfunctional brain, is a meaningful distinction, that cannot be erased by the generalization that neither brain is chosen.

The fact that the brain is not chosen does not erase the fact that the brain is choosing, and the dysfunctional brain will be choosing differently than the functional brain.

Those who have a functional brain, a functional brain that produces rational behaviour, a person of reason, able to make rational decisions, are expected to abide by the rules of society.

Exactly!

Keep in mind that decision making within a deterministic system is a matter of entailment, necessity, not choice,

That claim is always going to be false. The logical error is that we're ignoring the fact that choosing is a DETERMINISTICALLY ENTAILED EVENT. Whenever choosing is deterministically entailed, CHOOSING necessarily/inevitably WILL happen, exactly as it does happen, without deviation.

The notion that, "if it is entailed then it cannot be a choice", is false, because they can both be true.

and that a computer can do that without 'will' or consciousness.

A computer is a machine that we have created to help us do OUR WILL, such as tracking our calories, balancing our budgets, filing our taxes, and a wide variety of other things. We definitely do not want our machines to behave as if they had a will of their own, so we avoid programming willfulness into our machines, lest they start doing what they want rather than what we want. That's why Asimov created the Three Laws of Robotics.

Recall what Martha Farah said:
''I don't think "free will" is a very sensible concept, and you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough, and indeed you could even argue on purely conceptual grounds that the opposite of determinism is randomness, not free will! Most thoughtful neuroscientists I know have replaced the concept of free will with the concept of rationality -- that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning. And there is no conflict between rationality and the mind as a physical system -- After all, computers are rational physical systems!'' - Martha Farah, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience and a prominent neuroethicist.

First, let's point out that Martha Farah, director of the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, is disagreeing with you about choosing. She is clearly stating that choosing is something that actually happens: "that we select our actions based on a kind of practical reasoning". (For example, consider why I chose the Salad instead of the Steak for dinner: too few fruits and veggies in my breakfast and lunch that day).

Second, let's take a look at the definition of free will she is using. She presumes that free will is a non-mechanistic view of the world, when she says, "you don't need neuroscience to reject it -- any mechanistic view of the world is good enough". But free will, as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is still totally mechanistic. In fact it is deterministically mechanistic -- a point that I have been driving home throughout this discussion.

Third, she points out, as I do, that free will is not the opposite of determinism. The true opposite of determinism is indeterministic randomness.

But she fails to point out the true opposite of free will: coercion and undue influence. If she were using the operational definition of free will, she would be a compatibilist.

''It shows us how limited, even misleading, our introspections are. According to the authors, many seconds before we are aware that we have made a decision, we have -- or at least, our brain has! All of the data of cognitive neuroscience are pushing us to replace the idea of mind-body duality, which is so intuitive, with the idea that mental processes are brain processes. But these results on the neural processes underlying free decisions rub our noses in it! One can assimilate findings about color vision or motor control being brain functions a lot more easily than findings about consciously experienced "free will" being a brain function, and hence physically determined and not free at all!''

Please note that the authors are not claiming that "the system at large" is responsible for our decisions. Instead, it is our own brain choosing what we will order for dinner. Decision making is happening locally, not globally.

They also make the point that unconscious processes can precede conscious awareness of the choice, even as unconscious processes precede conscious visual perception.

And finally, the brain making decisions is us making decisions. They confirm that the mind-brain duality is false.

Whatever our brain decides, we have decided. Which is pretty much how we've always viewed things anyway.


What did you think that determinism was, other than cause and effect?

The critical part: that what happens now is entailed by prior states of the system ...

Your phrase "entailed by prior states of the system" means that prior states of the system cause future states of the system. The "entailment" is by "cause and effect", and nothing else. Causal necessity is the same notion as deterministic entailment.

What is Determinism?
''... Determinism is the idea that everything that happens in the world is determined completely by previously existing causes. We all know that the world runs on cause-and-effect. ...

And your quote reiterates that determinism is based upon the simple notion of cause and effect.

Someone should notify the reflexes that the brain is the source of functionality.

 

[DBT]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

They are held responsible not because of free will, but the assumption that they have a functional brain. It is not free will that enables rational behaviour, but a functional brain.

Free will has nothing to do with function.

It is the evolutionary function of a brain to acquire and process information and respond in a rational adaptive manner.

Which is no more a matter of free will than having a dysfunctional brain that is unable to respond rationally.

Again, nothing to do with free will:

''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses.

For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere.

Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual).

Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

They are held responsible not because of free will, but the assumption that they have a functional brain. It is not free will that enables rational behaviour, but a functional brain. Free will has nothing to do with function.

We do not define "free will" as "freedom from how the brain functions".

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Among the influences that can prevent a person from making a rational choice is a significant brain dysfunction due to mental illness or injuries that subject it to hallucinations or delusions, or impair its ability to reason, or subject it to an irresistible impulse.

It is the evolutionary function of a brain to acquire and process information and respond in a rational adaptive manner.

Of course. For example, in the restaurant, we expect the brain to process the information on the menu and respond with a dinner order. This is called "decision-making" or "choosing what I will have for dinner".

On the other hand, if the person begins throwing the silverware and condiments at other customers in the restaurant, we may assume a significant mental dysfunction is responsible for his actions, rather than a rational choice.

Which is no more a matter of free will than having a dysfunctional brain that is unable to respond rationally.

Whether something is a matter of free will is determined by its definition. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence. Whenever this definition describes what is happening, then it is a matter of free will.

For example, we observe the customers in the restaurant, each deciding for themselves what they will order for dinner. Clearly that is a matter of free will.

Again, nothing to do with free will:

''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses.

For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere.

Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual).

Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

I agree that the study you are asking us to read has nothing to do with free will. It is an experiment that maps eye-movements as they follow a group of red dots or a group of blue dots moving across a screen for 1.5 to 5.25 seconds. The subjects are asked to indicate the direction of movement (upper left, upper right, lower left, lower right) either with four buttons (manual) or by moving their eyes to look in the direction of movement (saccade). During the experiment, an fMRI tracked the areas of the brain that became active.

And since it has nothing to do with free will, I suggest you stop asking us to waste our time reading these experiments.

The study's authors suggest in their summary abstract that this study is analogous to a person deciding to stop at a red traffic light. And it may be so. But stopping at a red light is a matter of habit, rather than a matter of choice. The habit was created by prior choices, made long ago, when we were first learning to drive. Note that in the study, the subjects were given 2.5 hours of training prior to beginning the experiment, plenty of time to acquire the appropriate habits.

These studies may be interesting to some, but they have little to do with choices we make for ourselves of our own free will. It is assumed in our definition of free will that it is a functional brain making decisions, by whatever neural mechanisms are involved. And conscious awareness of our choice, in some special cases, may show up a second or two after the fact. None of this alters the fact that it is our own brain, and no other object in the physical universe, that is doing the choosing.

We have a simple, clear example of free will in the restaurant. It is an experiment that anyone can easily repeat, by simply walking in and observing the customers reading the menu and choosing what they will order for dinner. And it clearly shows the link between free will and responsibility, as the waiter brings each customer the bill for their dinner.

 

[fromderinside]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

They are held responsible not because of free will, but the assumption that they have a functional brain. It is not free will that enables rational behaviour, but a functional brain. Free will has nothing to do with function.

We do not define "free will" as "freedom from how the brain functions".

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Among the influences that can prevent a person from making a rational choice is a significant brain dysfunction due to mental illness or injuries that subject it to hallucinations or delusions, or impair its ability to reason, or subject it to an irresistible impulse.

It is the evolutionary function of a brain to acquire and process information and respond in a rational adaptive manner.

Of course. For example, in the restaurant, we expect the brain to process the information on the menu and respond with a dinner order. This is called "decision-making" or "choosing what I will have for dinner".

On the other hand, if the person begins throwing the silverware and condiments at other customers in the restaurant, we may assume a significant mental dysfunction is responsible for his actions, rather than a rational choice.

Which is no more a matter of free will than having a dysfunctional brain that is unable to respond rationally.

Whether something is a matter of free will is determined by its definition. Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and undue influence. Whenever this definition describes what is happening, then it is a matter of free will.

For example, we observe the customers in the restaurant, each deciding for themselves what they will order for dinner. Clearly that is a matter of free will.

Again, nothing to do with free will:

''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses.

For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere.

Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual).

Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

I agree that the study you are asking us to read has nothing to do with free will. It is an experiment that maps eye-movements as they follow a group of red dots or a group of blue dots moving across a screen for 1.5 to 5.25 seconds. The subjects are asked to indicate the direction of movement (upper left, upper right, lower left, lower right) either with four buttons (manual) or by moving their eyes to look in the direction of movement (saccade). During the experiment, an fMRI tracked the areas of the brain that became active.

And since it has nothing to do with free will, I suggest you stop asking us to waste our time reading these experiments.

The study's authors suggest in their summary abstract that this study is analogous to a person deciding to stop at a red traffic light. And it may be so. But stopping at a red light is a matter of habit, rather than a matter of choice. The habit was created by prior choices, made long ago, when we were first learning to drive. Note that in the study, the subjects were given 2.5 hours of training prior to beginning the experiment, plenty of time to acquire the appropriate habits.

These studies may be interesting to some, but they have little to do with choices we make for ourselves of our own free will. It is assumed in our definition of free will that it is a functional brain making decisions, by whatever neural mechanisms are involved. And conscious awareness of our choice, in some special cases, may show up a second or two after the fact. None of this alters the fact that it is our own brain, and no other object in the physical universe, that is doing the choosing.

We have a simple, clear example of free will in the restaurant. It is an experiment that anyone can easily repeat, by simply walking in and observing the customers reading the menu and choosing what they will order for dinner. And it clearly shows the link between free will and responsibility, as the waiter brings each customer the bill for their dinner.

DBT showed evidence about how information gets into the nervous system.

Your response was the same old claptrap about since the person believes she's making a choice she is making a choice with no material evidence there is anything in the brain other than responsive units somehow choosing. Of course, you need to find some mechanisms in the brain that convert from input-output into compare then choose. You never do.

You position, unsupported by physical mechanisms, is mute. It didn't work for Descartes and it's definitely not working for you. You need more than 'self evident' woo-woo.

I'm just expressing disappointment that you can go no further than 'just so' rationales. Towards possible remedying that problem I suggest you read a bit of Haggard. https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2017.14

 

[bilby]

you need to find some mechanisms in the brain that convert from input-output into compare then choose

Those are two ways of saying the exact same thing. Compare then choose IS input-output.

How can you possibly not know this?

What on Earth do you imagine the difference to be, between inputs leading to outputs, and comparison leading to choice? The latter is a simple subset of the former.

The mechanisms are neurons. Which are just complicated wetware instances of logic gates.

 

[fromderinside]

you need to find some mechanisms in the brain that convert from input-output into compare then choose

Those are two ways of saying the exact same thing. Compare then choose IS input-output.

How can you possibly not know this?

What on Earth do you imagine the difference to be, between inputs leading to outputs, and comparison leading to choice? The latter is a simple subset of the former.

The mechanisms are neurons. Which are just complicated wetware instances of logic gates.

You should have waited until I had completed my post. As for your I-O claim, not really. More like detect then transmit. If you want to suggest a compare process is the same as detect I think you might want to reconsider. Compare is more like and/or, looking at two states, rather than detecting whether one has sensed a difference from resting state. There is no choosing in the latter. Its even more evident in the wetware which reaches a threshold then transmits. No choosing.

 

[bilby]

You should have waited until I had completed my post.

How do you propose that I determine when that is?

Perhaps you could help in this by not posting it until it's complete? If you post before that point, you do so at your own risk, and just look silly if you complain about others being unaware of your plan to do some editing.

 

[fromderinside]

You should have waited until I had completed my post.

How do you propose that I determine when that is?

Perhaps you could help in this by not posting it until it's complete? If you post before that point, you do so at your own risk, and just look silly if you complain about others being unaware of your plan to do some editing.

I'm way too old to feel silly.

Of course.

I'm also not so old to know when I need to complete a post after I re-read it (edit cycle).

I complained?

Naw. I commented.

I've learned to double clutch.

g'night.

 

[DBT]

If the person's brain is sufficiently dysfunctional to constitute an undue influence upon their behavior, then the dysfunction will be held responsible for the behavior. Otherwise, the person is held responsible for ordering the Salad, and is expected to pay the bill.

That is how it works. If there are no consequences, the behaviour may become widespread. A message must be sent that the consequences of doing this action results in that penalty.

They are held responsible not because of free will, but the assumption that they have a functional brain. It is not free will that enables rational behaviour, but a functional brain. Free will has nothing to do with function.

We do not define "free will" as "freedom from how the brain functions".

I didn't say that. I am pointing out that there is no such thing as free will within a deterministic system.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Among the influences that can prevent a person from making a rational choice is a significant brain dysfunction due to mental illness or injuries that subject it to hallucinations or delusions, or impair its ability to reason, or subject it to an irresistible impulse.

If events happen they are a part of the system and effect the system in specific ways, so it's more than a mere influence. It alters the system in specific ways that collectively contributes to its output, an interaction of opposing thoughts, yet an inevitable outcome, etc.

It is the evolutionary function of a brain to acquire and process information and respond in a rational adaptive manner.

Of course. For example, in the restaurant, we expect the brain to process the information on the menu and respond with a dinner order. This is called "decision-making" or "choosing what I will have for dinner".

Yes, but as pointed out, given determinism, the decision-making process is a matter of entailment, not choice.

If it was choice, any number of things can be chosen in any given moment, yet as you know, determinism doesn't permit this.

Therefore, the process of decision making is fixed by prior states of the system to produce a set outcome and decision making is a process of entailment, not choice, not free choice, not free will.

On the other hand, if the person begins throwing the silverware and condiments at other customers in the restaurant, we may assume a significant mental dysfunction is responsible for his actions, rather than a rational choice.

Of course.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

DBT showed evidence about how information gets into the nervous system. ...

Opening the menu and reading it is how information gets into the nervous system. Neuroscience can break this down into many neurological functions and show brain activity in different functional areas using an fMRI. But nothing they provide changes the fact that opening the menu and reading it is how information gets into the nervous system.

I'm just expressing disappointment that you can go no further than 'just so' rationales. Towards possible remedying that problem I suggest you read a bit of Haggard. https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2017.14

I'm not interested in the "sense" of agency. I'm describing the "observation" of agency, as a physical event taking place in the real world.

We observe the customers in the restaurant, browsing the menu and placing their orders. We observe the waiter bringing each customer their dinner, as ordered, and giving them their bill. How the customers "sense" their agency is irrelevant. We objectively observe their agency.

There is no need to get swamped in neurological detail in order to understand free will as a deterministic event, in which people choose for themselves what they will do from a list of possibilities, while free of coercion and undue influence.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will has nothing to do with function

Freedom merely means that something will happen, in terms of compatibilism.

When we are treating tight "set theoretic" versions of concepts, the really fundamental and granular ones, things look very different.

Wills have everything to do with function of systematic interpreters, and freedom merely discusses which instructions shall be interpreted.

Provisional freedom is a discussion of what 'can' assuming some state or condition in the system that it doesn't necessarily have.

DBT showed evidence about how information gets into the nervous system

But how information gets into the nervous system changes nothing about what it does when it gets there, nor how it does it. When functioning as normal, there is a part that acts to derive true things about the information that it observed.

Once some truth about the information is observed, the truth of the system can be leveraged towards regulating output to steer the state.

Therefore how that information gets there is inconsequential to the question of whether that information can be leveraged towards knowledge of systemic law, and so long as the knowledge can leverage systemic law, regulatory control exists in the future to the extent that knowledge is correct.

Why else do you think we as humans engage in science?

Knowing the rules gives us leverage on the future.

The issue comes down to identifying the sources of force which leverage against such fulcrums and removing the ones whose goals are "unacceptable", whatever that is supposed to mean (it means something but it is outside the scope of this thread).

I'm way too old to feel silly.

To actually be too old to feel silly is to br be too old to participate in any real conversation.

I will, for the moment, disbelieve your claim, and let you be the one to reiterate it or abandon it.

If someone is too old to feel silly, it means they are too old to recognize themselves as wrong.

Of course.

I'm also not so old to know when I need to complete a post after I re-read it (edit cycle).

And when you click post BEFORE doing that, you must accept the consequences of your brash action.

Of course, this goes back again to the power of self-review... But that would be "regulatory control" and you can't be seen admitting to that then can you?

I complained?

You did.

Naw. I commented.

With a complaint.

I've learned to double clutch.

And double-think apparently


G'day.

 

[bilby]

That is how it works. If there are no consequences, the behaviour may become widespread. A message must be sent that the consequences of doing this action results in that penalty.

How does sending such a message have any effect whatsoever?

In a deterministic universe, I am told, there can be no choice or deviation. So these consequences have exactly the same effect on people that perusing the menu has - none at all, because they will choose whatever actions they're determined to choose.

Unless, of course, determinism doesn't prohibit choice, and people choose their actions after considering the options and likely consequences of those options...

 

[fromderinside]

DBT showed evidence about how information gets into the nervous system. ...

Opening the menu and reading it is how information gets into the nervous system. Neuroscience can break this down into many neurological functions and show brain activity in different functional areas using an fMRI. But nothing they provide changes the fact that opening the menu and reading it is how information gets into the nervous system.

I'm just expressing disappointment that you can go no further than 'just so' rationales. Towards possible remedying that problem I suggest you read a bit of Haggard. https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn.2017.14

I'm not interested in the "sense" of agency. I'm describing the "observation" of agency, as a physical event taking place in the real world.

We observe the customers in the restaurant, browsing the menu and placing their orders. We observe the waiter bringing each customer their dinner, as ordered, and giving them their bill. How the customers "sense" their agency is irrelevant. We objectively observe their agency.

There is no need to get swamped in neurological detail in order to understand free will as a deterministic event, in which people choose for themselves what they will do from a list of possibilities, while free of coercion and undue influence.

My paperboy can do better. We are talking about information here. We are not reading the transcript of what one has been observed to have done. If I want gossip I'll go to my fence.

Obviously in your view free will, whatever you think that may be, is alive and well roaming about in the collective mind. I nod my head a lot too. To be an objective observation your whatever has to be connected to material measured conditions and objects. Substitute gosh for every instance you surmise is free will. It remains as meaningful as your use of will, subjective space filler. I've never been a big fan of either Descartes or Wundt.

 

[fromderinside]

DBT showed evidence about how information gets into the nervous system

But how information gets into the nervous system changes nothing about what it does when it gets there, nor how it does it. When functioning as normal, there is a part that acts to derive true things about the information that it observed.

So how does the functioning system become a knower of truth? Just so again?

Once some truth about the information is observed, the truth of the system can be leveraged towards regulating output to steer the state.

Therefore how that information gets there is inconsequential to the question of whether that information can be leveraged towards knowledge of systemic law, and so long as the knowledge can leverage systemic law, regulatory control exists in the future to the extent that knowledge is correct.

Why else do you think we as humans engage in science?

Knowing the rules gives us leverage on the future.

The issue comes down to identifying the sources of force which leverage against such fulcrums and removing the ones whose goals are "unacceptable", whatever that is supposed to mean (it means something but it is outside the scope of this thread).

Your problem with your if-then-else statement is in the if. Unless you can attribute cause to how one knows truth you have no reason to suggest it is an element.

As for how science. The rules are are finding connectivity with already discovered relationships among things using well defined material to conduct experiments testing what has been found to be known is against what may be.

To actuclly be too old to feel silly is to br be too old to participate in any real conversation.

I will, for the moment, disbelieve your claim, and let you be the one to reiterate it or abandon it.

If someone is too old to feel silly, it means they are too old to recognize themselves as wrong.

Faulty Towers strikes again. To be too old to feel silly is being aware that whether one is or is not silly is of no consequence to one.

Of course.

I'm also not so old to know when I need to complete a post after I re-read it (edit cycle).

And when you click post BEFORE doing that, you must accept the consequences of your brash action.

Of course, this goes back again to the power of self-review... But that would be "regulatory control" and you can't be seen admitting to that then can you?

Actually it goes back to stream of consciousness and its place in requiring review.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I am pointing out that there is no such thing as free will within a deterministic system.

Within a deterministic system, is it still possible for someone to be free to add a column of numbers? I would say yes. A person would not be free to add a column of numbers while driving through heavy traffic, but they could add a column of numbers while sitting at their desk. So, it is clearly possible for a person to be free to add a column of numbers. Determinism does not exclude this freedom.

In the same fashion, within a deterministic system, is it still possible for someone to be free to choose what they will order from the restaurant menu? I would say yes to that as well. A child, with her parents, might not be free to order from the menu, but her parents are free to do so. Determinism does not exclude this freedom.

Determinism excludes only one freedom, freedom from causal necessity. All other freedoms, including the freedom to choose for ourselves the many things that we actually do choose every day, remain unaffected by determinism.

Free will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence. As long as it does not require freedom from causal necessity, it is not excluded by determinism.

All of the freedoms that we enjoy, including the freedom to choose what we will do, are consistent with determinism. Only one freedom, the freedom from causal necessity, is excluded by determinism.

So, I cannot accept your claim that "there is no such thing as free will within a deterministic system". The claim is false.

Yes, but as pointed out, given determinism, the decision-making process is a matter of entailment, not choice.

It is deterministically entailed that choosing will happen. It is just another event in the causal chain, that is guaranteed, by causal necessity, to happen whenever it does happen.

If it was choice, any number of things can be chosen in any given moment, yet as you know, determinism doesn't permit this.

That claim is also false. Determinism constrains what will happen, but not what can happen. What will happen is not the same as what can happen. There are many options on the restaurant menu. We can order any dinner listed. But we will order a specific dinner.

There is no way to get to the single thing that we will order without first dealing with the many things that we can order.

Confusing what we can do with what we will do creates a paradox. There is no way to choose between a single possibility. Multiple options are required, and, there they are, listed on the restaurant menu. We are able to choose any one of them, even though it is causally necessary that we will choose only one.

The notion of possibilities evolved to deal with our uncertainty as to what will happen. When we do not know for certain what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to prepare ourselves for what does happen.

The notion of possibilities also serves us by providing a logical workspace for invention, creativity, and progress.

Equating what can happen to what will happen destroys the notion of possibilities, the logical operations that depend upon them, and the survival advantage that we humans possess by having an intelligent brain.

So, let's stop making that error of equating what can happen to what will happen and what does happen. An evolved human mind is a terrible thing to waste through illogical thinking.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Obviously in your view free will, whatever you think that may be, is alive and well roaming about in the collective mind.

An event does not roam about. It happens in a specific time and place. Free will is the event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. When we observe such an event, we may point it out, and say "there is a restaurant full of people deciding what they will order for dinner of their own free will". It's like seeing a car drive by and saying, "there was a car that just drove by".

 

[steve_bank]

An asteroid strikes the Earth, it has no active choice.

The question is whether or not the way our brains are wired and works a choice does not neccesarily be predetermined.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

An asteroid strikes the Earth, it has no active choice.

The question is whether or not the way our brains are wired and works a choice does not necessarily be predetermined.

How would you know the difference between what you choose to do by causal necessity and what you choose to do of your own free will?

 

[Jarhyn]

So how does the functioning system become a knower of truth

"The system" is not ever a knower of truth. It may contain knowers of truth but it does not itself know truth as a system. It HAS truth, but if you want to know how the system comes to have truth, well, that's a different discussion, and which has an answer which nobody seems to like.

As to how knowers of truth come to exist in the system, as long as there is some concept of 'goal' that might exist (such as replication or repetition of some thing), there will be survival value to the subset of the system which has such "goals".

Imperfect replicators will come to find whatever truth exists in a system, whether it's "turn towards more chemical" -> "survival" or something a little more exotic.

Nothing more, nothing less, is required for a knower of truth.

You already believe this can happen without direction or agency, or at least you should if you call yourself a proper atheist or agnostic.

Your problem with your if-then-else statement is in the if. Unless you can attribute cause to how one knows truth you have no reason to suggest it is an element

I mean, I did attribute cause to the rise of knowledge of truth: the retention of imperfect replicators.

As to what you mean by "an element"... Who the fuck knows.

Science is all about determining causes.

Your declaration of determinism is based on the assumption that every effect has causes. It's based on the assumption that there is in fact a subset of the system which can know truth. Where that comes from is unimportant to the discussion, but to answer it anyway, see the top of my response.

As for how science. The rules are are finding connectivity with already discovered relationships among things using well defined material to conduct experiments testing what has been found to be known is against what may be.

I ordered the steak not the salad. This is just verbal vomit.

Maybe try again.

Science is observation of a system by a system, and the extraction of true relationships within the observation through experimentation.

Academics is the secondary analysis of experimentation for logical errors which would invalidate the conclusions or render the conclusions as "statistically weak".

To be too old to feel silly is being aware that whether one is or is not silly is of no consequence to one.

This is again, being silly, regardless of whether you feel it (and you ought).

Feelings are in fact the identities of the levers which adjust various node networks in various ways. If one cannot feel silly combined with joy or shame when one is silly, it becomes difficult to become more or less silly.

Sometimes old fools I have encountered in my life make some attempt at removing their ability to feel silly and so to remove their ability to temper that silliness in whatever way they deem appropriate through the operation of silliness and shame or joy.

Sometimes this is operation automatic yes, but sometimes it takes effort and empathy to hear "you are acting silly" and identify some way in which the person speaking to you may be right in identifying your silliness, if you can find such a thing, and if you don't feel it, think on that until you can associate it with the silliness you have identified.

Of course, this is yet again an act of self-regulation.