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Compatibilism: What's that About?

We have been looking for a cause for radioactive decay for over a century. All our best efforts, and all our best theories, say that it's uncaused - it just happens with a probability that depends only on the isotope under consideration, giving each radioactive isotope a specific and unalterable half life.

We can say with certainty what will happen to a large accumulation of a radioisotope, but can say nothing with certainty about the fate of a single nucleus. A given 238U nucleus has a 50:50 chance of decaying sometime in the next ~4,500,000,000 years. It could be today, or it could be eight eons or more from now. And as far as we know, there's no cause; no event that leads to this decay now rather than then. Lots of effort has been expended on trying to influence decay rates of radionuclides, but short of direct interventions such as neutron bombardment to transmute the nucleus to an isotope with a different half-life, none has been successful.

Assuming that there must be a hidden cause is purely a personal preference; It has no basis in any current physics. Indeed, given our abject failure, it's seeming increasingly likely that radioactive decay is (for individual nuclei) uncaused and random. The randomness aggregates to a predictable probability for very large numbers of events, and as macroscopic quantities of anything contain vast numbers of atoms, this indeterminate system translates to a fairly predictable macroscopic world. But not a fully determined one.

Okay, so it sounds like we do know something about the causes of radioactive decay. You mentioned that neutron bombardment of the nucleus can speed up the decay by converting it to a different isotope with a different half-life. If I may ask, doesn't radioactive decay do the same? I mean, doesn't decay convert the specimen to a new isotope?

I just visited the Wikipedia article on radioactive decay, and it suggested that the weak force interactions are responsible for beta-decay. So, I'm a little confused as to why we would consider these events uncaused. It sounds more like the issue is the unpredictability as to when these events take place. After all, they are happening in the nucleus, and I don't think anyone is observing and taking notes on these events. So, we cannot assume they are not reliably caused, we can only assume that when and where it will happen is unpredictable.
 
Ages ago, when I read about random number generation in Knuth, he pointed out that adding more bells and whistles to a random number generator usually makes the output less random. I'll have to type this from the book: "One of the common fallacies encountered in connection with random number generation is the idea that we can take a good generator and modify it a little, in order to get an "even-more-random" sequence. This quite often is not true..." and he goes on to give a several examples. (Donald E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Volume II, Seminumerical Algorithms, Chapter Three, "Random Numbers"). Knuth was a classic back in the old days when I was a young programmer. But my programming was for business applications, so I didn't get to do much that was technically challenged. Although I did have a Visual Basic application that spoke to Word through DDE and communicated with the IBM mainframe through its terminal emulator program.

I don't think Knuth mentioned hardware generation from a source of electric noise. But here's the thing, doesn't the noise have a cause? (Consider, for example, the noise they were picking up in early radio telescopes, which they eventually concluded came from the Big Bang.)

My theory is that every tick in that noise is reliably caused, perhaps by some quantum level chain of events. But we would call it chaotic, because it is beyond our ability to predict these events. It is indetermistic in that it cannot be be predicted, but it may still be causally deterministic.

So, I believe that even the "true" random number generator's output will be causally deterministic, but certainly random enough to be unpredictable, which is sufficient for its usage in cryptography. Basically, you just want a number that no one else can guess.
If you read Knuth's Semi Numerical algorithms I am impressed, seriously. I used to have a copy.

Keep in mind the proper term is pseudo random number generator, and it is done with digital logic.

Knuth addressed the debate over what 'random is'. As he put it define the term random and anything that matches the definition is random. Mathematically it is a definition.

As to adding compacity leading to less randomness, in the limit as the N gets large, the distribution probably approaches continuous.

You cn buy random number generators based on electrical noise. Using cosmic radiation is another approach.

A Computers are based on a form of formal logic, Boolean Algebra. In a logically consistent system regardless of the path taken the answer must always be the same. Euclidean Geometry is consistent, no matter how you work a problem the result is always the same. As with algebra.

The fundamtal logical operations in a computer are if-then, while, OR,AND, NOT, and so on. Everything reduces t symbolic logic.
 
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response

Everything you've quoted from neuroscience sources so far, seems to corroborate that the brain does make decisions, and that those decisions causally determine what the body will do. You've said as much yourself, "the brain acquires and processes information and generates response". If a man is holding a gun to your head, that is information. The brain processes that information and responds by doing what the guy with the gun orders. If no one is holding a gun to your head, then different information will determine what you will do. Information like your current goals.

....and determinism by definition does not allow us the option of doing otherwise in any given instance. Everything id fixed as a matter of natural law.

Ironically, one of the things that is fixed as a matter of natural law, is that you will encounter situations where you must make a decision before you can continue (perhaps you'll go to a restaurant where you must decide what to order, or you won't eat).
Also fixed as a matter of natural law, is that you will be faced with two or more possibilities, two different things that you can do.
Also fixed as a matter of natural law, is that when you have made your choice, you will have precisely one thing that you will do, and at least one thing that you could have done, but didn't do.

Will plays no part in freedom.

Actually, since freedom is the ability to do what you want, will plays a key role in marshalling the body's resources to carry out the chosen intent. Without that intent to motivate and direct our actions, we could do nothing.

To simply claim that uncoerced behaviour is free will ignores the role of will, the inevitability or necessity of determinism and the nature of cognition.

There are no uncaused events. Every event, from the motion of the planets to the thoughts going through our heads right now, was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity and inevitably would happen.

Either, it was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity that you would be free to decide for yourself what you would do,
Or, it was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity that some guy with a gun would be telling you what to do.

Both events would be equally causally necessary. As far as causal necessity goes, the two events are indistinguishable.

But it is important for us to distinguish a deliberate act from a coerced act. Because we will treat these cases very differently.

Which reduces compatibilism to mere word play.

The free will "versus" determinism debate was concocted by word play. It was created by a number of false, but believable suggestions. I'm simply trying to unravel the mess that this original word play created.

Again:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

Actually, we do ascribe free will to all intelligent species. If you've ever watched that "Lucky Dog" show, where the trainer takes a dog that has behavior problems, and teaches it to act better, the general assumption is that the dog can learn to choose better behavior.
Quote:
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Personally, I'm pretty sure that there are no uncaused events. So, indeterminism never enters the picture for me.

And, of course, I do accept that regulative control is a necessary part of free will. However, there is no way to control anything without reliable cause and effect. There is reliable causation prior to us encountering an issue that must be decided. There is reliable causation within our brains as we consider our options and decide what we will do. And there will be reliable causation following upon our chosen actions. There is never any break in the reliable chain of events.

Free will happens to be a deterministic event. Our choice is both reliably caused (determinism), and, the most meaningful and relevant cause of our choice is us (free will). There is no incompatibility to be found.
 
Okay, so it sounds like we do know something about the causes of radioactive decay. You mentioned that neutron bombardment of the nucleus can speed up the decay by converting it to a different isotope with a different half-life. If I may ask, doesn't radioactive decay do the same? I mean, doesn't decay convert the specimen to a new isotope?

I just visited the Wikipedia article on radioactive decay, and it suggested that the weak force interactions are responsible for beta-decay. So, I'm a little confused as to why we would consider these events uncaused. It sounds more like the issue is the unpredictability as to when these events take place. After all, they are happening in the nucleus, and I don't think anyone is observing and taking notes on these events. So, we cannot assume they are not reliably caused, we can only assume that when and where it will happen is unpredictable.
Neutron bombardment doesn't trigger decay (which is mediated by Weak and Strong force interactions), it changes the game completely.

Decay is random. Completely random. You can predict very accurately the behaviour of a large number of radioactive atoms (and typically we only handle atoms by the trillions of trillions). But a single atom is completely unpredictable. Nothing has been found that can so much as budge the probability of a decay; It has no known cause.

And this is in an arena where a great deal is known with great certainty. The Standard Model is amongst the best tested and most robust science in history. We know all of the particles and forces involved, and yet we have not been able to use any of them to stimulate or retard decay.

Radioactive decay is a very strong contender for an uncaused event. It just happens, with a characteristic probability, regardless of the surrounding conditions. It's such a strong contender that it would take solid evidence for a cause to persuade me that it's not completely uncaused. And such evidence would be very difficult to find without overturning some very well established physics.

It would be fascinating, and would likely secure a Nobel, if a cause were found. But the smart money says it's just a thing that happens.
 
If you read Knuth's Semi Numerical algorithms I am impressed, seriously. I used to have a copy.

Keep in mind the proper term is pseudo random number generator, and it is done with digital logic.

Knuth addressed the debate over what 'random is'. As he put it define the term random and anything that matches the definition is random. Mathematically it is a definition.

As to adding compacity leading to less randomness, in the limit as the N gets large, the distribution probably approaches continuous.

You cn buy random number generators based on electrical noise. Using cosmic radiation is another approach.

A Computers are based on a form of formal logic, Boolean Algebra. In a logically consistent system regardless of the path taken the answer must always be the same. Euclidean Geometry is consistent, no matter how you work a problem the result is always the same. As with algebra.

The fundamtal logical operations in a computer are if-then, while, OR,AND, NOT, and so on. Everything reduces t symbolic logic.

My favorite math course was Plane Geometry. I had this great teacher, Ms. Fulcher. We learned by performing new proofs each day, that built upon earlier lessons. She would give hints, but frequently said, "I don't want to let the cat out of the bag", meaning she wanted us to find the answer. At the beginning of each class, she had us write out the proof. I always tried to be the first to turn mine in.
 
Mathematically indeterminate means not enough variables to solve the problem.

If you are working a 3d problem and it is not possible to quantify one of the dimensions the problem is indeterminate.

Like on a test where one of the ansers is 'not enough information'.
 
Responsibility is a matter of capacity to make rational decisions, not will. The architecture and wiring - neural networks, not will - determines capacity.

Mental incapacity is one of the many undue influences that removes a person's responsibility for their action. I think there was a Supreme Court case a few years ago where it was decided that the death penalty cannot be applied to someone who is mentally incompetent.

On the neurology of morals
Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.

I think that "displaying irresponsible behavior" would be a different category than mental incompetence. The question would be why they are displaying irresponsible behavior. It could be a number of factors, like a lack of impulse control.

Neuroscience and the law:
... Our contention is not that neuroscience does (or will) disprove free will; rather, we contend that free will is an antiquated concept that impairs our understanding of human behavior and thereby clouds our thinking about ethics. ...

''We ought to think about decision making in terms of neurological control, not because this is some sort of eternal absolute truth, but because among the options on the table currently, it shows the most promise of coherently unifying the scientific, ethical, judicial, and personal realms of our experience, and because it has the best chance of improving our understanding of ourselves and one another. Research in neuroscience is already well underway, and we can manipulate control across species using conditioning, drugs, and lesions. 4"

The author is not dealing with free will, but only the myths about free will, a strawman argument. Free will is not freedom from cause and effect. Free will is not freedom from ourselves. Free will is not freedom from our brains and our brain's neurology.

Free will is nothing more than a choice we make that is free of coercion and undue influence. And that's the free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Neuroscience and the law:
"Just as we have learned to consider our decisions as “free choices,” we can shift our introspection toward our varying levels of control. A man forced to choose between a hamburger and heroin might be acutely aware that his control is being compromised by an addiction. Insisting that he has (or lacks) free will ads nothing to our understanding of his behavior. Nor does it provide any useful suggestions of what we as a society ought do with him legally. An understanding of the problems that opiate addiction creates for one's self-control and how best to treat these difficulties, along with a knowledge of the user's history, would help a judge or jury make informed decisions based on the likely outcomes of various incarceration and rehabilitation programs.''

An addiction would be another undue influence. Addicts are compelled by their physical need to satisfy their craving. Otherwise, they suffer. I know, because I stopped smoking only after many failed attempts. And, during withdrawal on the first three days, I could not concentrate to even read a book.

I do think that I could successfully resist the hamburger, though, because there are no significant withdrawal symptoms.
 
Neutron bombardment doesn't trigger decay (which is mediated by Weak and Strong force interactions), it changes the game completely.

Decay is random. Completely random. You can predict very accurately the behaviour of a large number of radioactive atoms (and typically we only handle atoms by the trillions of trillions). But a single atom is completely unpredictable. Nothing has been found that can so much as budge the probability of a decay; It has no known cause.

And this is in an arena where a great deal is known with great certainty. The Standard Model is amongst the best tested and most robust science in history. We know all of the particles and forces involved, and yet we have not been able to use any of them to stimulate or retard decay.

Radioactive decay is a very strong contender for an uncaused event. It just happens, with a characteristic probability, regardless of the surrounding conditions. It's such a strong contender that it would take solid evidence for a cause to persuade me that it's not completely uncaused. And such evidence would be very difficult to find without overturning some very well established physics.

It would be fascinating, and would likely secure a Nobel, if a cause were found. But the smart money says it's just a thing that happens.

From the description, it sounds to me that the causal mechanism is the interaction of the particles. The fact that this interaction is not affected by external macro events is not important. There is plenty of activity going on at the particle level, and apparently that activity reliably causes the material to change and also to eject specific particles. I'm still going to bet that quantum events are deterministic.
 
Philosophy thread turns into "Gee, I didn't fucking know that" thread.
 
Hmm, DNA is code.. 'ya know..
Nah, DNA is just Chemistry.

People use an analogy to code to remember which base sequences cause which amino acids to be added to a new protein chain, but the 'code' is a human construct.

DNA is no more a 'code' in the sense of a cipher, than sediment layers are an encoding of the age of fossils.

I have an allergy to that analogy.
 
Nah, DNA is just Chemistry.

People use an analogy to code to remember which base sequences cause which amino acids to be added to a new protein chain, but the 'code' is a human construct.

DNA is no more a 'code' in the sense of a cipher, than sediment layers are an encoding of the age of fossils.

I have an allergy to that analogy.
Oh come on. the holes in the pavement are code for puddles. A caused by intelligence code... come on
 
From the description, it sounds to me that the causal mechanism is the interaction of the particles. The fact that this interaction is not affected by external macro events is not important. There is plenty of activity going on at the particle level, and apparently that activity reliably causes the material to change and also to eject specific particles. I'm still going to bet that quantum events are deterministic.
Then I am doing a poor job of describing.

Take a single atom of 238U. Unless it is destroyed by some external calamity, such as a neutron collision, it will just sit there until it spontaneously emits an alpha particle. On average, this takes 4,500,000,000 years. But it could happen tomorrow; Or it could still not have happened in 20 billion years time.

And absolutely nothing we have ever attempted has succeeded in altering that average life before decay by one iota. No known particles or forces have any effect, other than in the exceptional case of influences so destructive that the atom is destroyed without having undergone alpha decay at all.
 
Responsibility is a matter of capacity to make rational decisions, not will. The architecture and wiring - neural networks, not will - determines capacity.

Mental incapacity is one of the many undue influences that removes a person's responsibility for their action. I think there was a Supreme Court case a few years ago where it was decided that the death penalty cannot be applied to someone who is mentally incompetent.

On the neurology of morals
Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.

I think that "displaying irresponsible behavior" would be a different category than mental incompetence. The question would be why they are displaying irresponsible behavior. It could be a number of factors, like a lack of impulse control.

Neuroscience and the law:
... Our contention is not that neuroscience does (or will) disprove free will; rather, we contend that free will is an antiquated concept that impairs our understanding of human behavior and thereby clouds our thinking about ethics. ...

''We ought to think about decision making in terms of neurological control, not because this is some sort of eternal absolute truth, but because among the options on the table currently, it shows the most promise of coherently unifying the scientific, ethical, judicial, and personal realms of our experience, and because it has the best chance of improving our understanding of ourselves and one another. Research in neuroscience is already well underway, and we can manipulate control across species using conditioning, drugs, and lesions. 4"

The author is not dealing with free will, but only the myths about free will, a strawman argument. Free will is not freedom from cause and effect. Free will is not freedom from ourselves. Free will is not freedom from our brains and our brain's neurology.

Free will is nothing more than a choice we make that is free of coercion and undue influence. And that's the free will that is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Neuroscience and the law:
"Just as we have learned to consider our decisions as “free choices,” we can shift our introspection toward our varying levels of control. A man forced to choose between a hamburger and heroin might be acutely aware that his control is being compromised by an addiction. Insisting that he has (or lacks) free will ads nothing to our understanding of his behavior. Nor does it provide any useful suggestions of what we as a society ought do with him legally. An understanding of the problems that opiate addiction creates for one's self-control and how best to treat these difficulties, along with a knowledge of the user's history, would help a judge or jury make informed decisions based on the likely outcomes of various incarceration and rehabilitation programs.''

An addiction would be another undue influence. Addicts are compelled by their physical need to satisfy their craving. Otherwise, they suffer. I know, because I stopped smoking only after many failed attempts. And, during withdrawal on the first three days, I could not concentrate to even read a book.

I do think that I could successfully resist the hamburger, though, because there are no significant withdrawal symptoms.

The author is dealing with free will. The problem is, as I'm sure you know, there are more than a few versions of the term 'free will' - Libertarian, compatibilist, incompatibilist, the common perception of making decisions, to choose from a set of options, etc, etc...
 
We know that traffic lights have different cycle times, that a busy road gets a longer run, etc. We understand that approaching a busy highway when the light ahead has just turned red means a longer wait, and most likely a shorter green light, with perhaps another cycle if you are at the back of the line.

This understanding and ability to estimate and predict is enabled by experience and memory function.

Except as the prompt or urge to act (go now, do it quickly) none of this the role of will. The state and condition of a brain in any given instance in time determines response.

Agent/environment interaction;
''A fundamental paradigm to understand this agent environment interaction is the cybernetic notion of feedback control, which is also known as error-controlled regulation. A goal-directed agent, such as an ant or a human, tries to achieve its goals by eliminating any difference between its present situation (perception) and its desired situation (goal). A goal here should not be understood as a completely specified objective or end-state, but merely as an (explicit or implicit) preference for certain situations over others. For every perceived difference between the present situation and the goal, an action is performed to reduce that deviation, i.e. bring the situation closer to the preferred one. If the result as perceived is not sufficient, a next action is performed to again bring the situation closer to the goal, and so on, until the agent is satisfied.'' (Powers, 1973; Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001)

The role of "will" has already been established. It is the intent to do something specific, like slowing down as you approach the red light, because you do not know for certain when it will turn green.


Yes, that is the role of will. But unfortunately for those who argue for free will, will itself doesn't run the show. The role that will plays is the prompt, the will to act.

That doesn't make our will free. It's just another cognitive function.

Nothing special in the scheme of things.


Now, we can expand this explanation, as Powers et al did, by describing the human as a "goal-directed agent", adjusting its behavior from moment to moment to achieve that goal. In this case, our goal is to arrive safely at our destination without getting arrested (or killed) by driving through a red light. We know that there are two real possibilities: (1) the light may still be red when we get to it, and, (2) the light may turn to green. We do not know which of these two possible futures will be the actual future. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine what can happen, to better prepare for what does happen. So, we choose to slow down, because the light could remain red.

The hard determinist, confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen, insists that, since the light actually turned green, it was never possible that the light could have remained red. He insists, "Since it would not have been otherwise, this must mean it could not have been otherwise. So, Why did you slow down?"

Obviously, the fact that something would not happen does not imply that it could not happen.

The implication that, in a world of causal necessity, we could not have done otherwise, is a false statement.
The true statement is that, in a world of causal necessity, we would not have done otherwise.


Anything with a functional brain is a ''goal directed agent'' - fulfilling needs and wants; food, shelter, a mate, play....

The hard determinism is right when he says the light cannot possibly have stayed red if the lights were functioning as designed and cycling normally and events proceed as determined.

Lights can jam on red, green, amber or fail entirely. It happens. But whatever happens is determined. If the light stays red, antecedent events brought that set of lights to that state in that instance in time with no other outcome possible within that instance in time. In another time or place, events can be different, different condition/antecedents.

But each and every event within a determined system in any given instance in time allows no alternative, everything proceeds/unfolds as a matter of natural law and necessity.
 

Decay is random. Completely random. You can predict very accurately the behaviour of a large number of radioactive atoms (and typically we only handle atoms by the trillions of trillions). But a single atom is completely unpredictable. Nothing has been found that can so much as budge the probability of a decay; It has no known cause.
That turns out not to be the case -- there are a number of radioactive species for which we know ways to change the decay probability using environmental changes. For radioisotopes that decay by "electron capture", you can cause a big change in the half-life by moving electrons closer or further from the nucleus. Completely ionize the atom -- get rid of all its electrons -- and it won't decay at all. But even normal decay modes can be altered just a little -- usually a fraction of a percent. For instance, if you dope a crystal with francium-221, an alpha-emitter, its half-life depends on what kind of crystal the francium is embedded in.


(None of this changes the situation with respect to determinism, though -- as far as we can tell, when the nucleus decays is random. It's just that one of the factors that determine half-life is how much lower the total energy of the decay products is than the energy of the original nucleus, and changing the environment changes the energy of the decay products. An alpha particle in a silicon crystal has more energy than an alpha particle in a tungsten crystal.)
 
Yes, that is the role of will. But unfortunately for those who argue for free will, will itself doesn't run the show. The role that will plays is the prompt, the will to act.

That doesn't make our will free. It's just another cognitive function.

Nothing special in the scheme of things.

The brain chooses what it will do. The chosen intent then motivates and directs the body as it carries out that will.

The "free" part of free will simply means that, during the choosing of the will, we were not coerced or unduly influenced.

Anything with a functional brain is a ''goal directed agent'' - fulfilling needs and wants; food, shelter, a mate, play....

Yes, but I'm hungry, and, I'm building a house, and, my mate is signaling me that she is ready for sex. What will I do? Will I continue working on the house? Or, will I fix a sandwich? Or, will I mate with my mate? Life is full of choices. And we have to decide for ourselves when we will fulfill each of these needs. Which of these goals will I pursue now? What will I do?

I must first choose what I will do. And then that choice will motivate and direct my subsequent actions.

The hard determinism is right when he says the light cannot possibly have stayed red if the lights were functioning as designed and cycling normally and events proceed as determined.

Lights can jam on red, green, amber or fail entirely. It happens. But whatever happens is determined. If the light stays red, antecedent events brought that set of lights to that state in that instance in time with no other outcome possible within that instance in time. In another time or place, events can be different, different condition/antecedents.

But each and every event within a determined system in any given instance in time allows no alternative, everything proceeds/unfolds as a matter of natural law and necessity.

Whether the light remains red, or, the light turns green, it will be causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time.

The problem is, we do not know which result, red or green, is causally necessary. When we don't know what will happen, we consider the two things that can happen: the light could remain red, and, the light could change to green. We decide that our safest choice is to slow down so that we will have time to stop if the light remains red. As causal necessity would have it, the light changes to green as we arrive, so we resume speed.

The hard determinist asks us "Why did you slow down?" We respond, "Because the light could have remained red." The hard determinist objects, "Due to causal necessity, there was only one possibility. So, it was never the case that the light could have remained red. So, why did you slow down?" We respond, "BECAUSE THE LIGHT COULD HAVE REMAINED RED." "No, it could not have remained red", says the hard determinist, "So, why did you slow down?"

To avoid this absurdity, it is essential that we preserve the meaning of "what could have happened" as a distinct notion from the meaning of "what would happen" and "what did happen". Within the context of our uncertainty as to what will happen, we imagine what can happen to prepare ourselves for what does happen. AND, if "can happen" was true in the past, then "could have happened" will also be true later, because "could have" is just the past tense of "can".

To say that "the light could have remained red" always implies that the light did not remain red. So, "the light could have remained red" is consistent with the truth of what actually happened.
 
From the description, it sounds to me that the causal mechanism is the interaction of the particles. The fact that this interaction is not affected by external macro events is not important. There is plenty of activity going on at the particle level, and apparently that activity reliably causes the material to change and also to eject specific particles. I'm still going to bet that quantum events are deterministic.
Then I am doing a poor job of describing.

Take a single atom of 238U. Unless it is destroyed by some external calamity, such as a neutron collision, it will just sit there until it spontaneously emits an alpha particle. On average, this takes 4,500,000,000 years. But it could happen tomorrow; Or it could still not have happened in 20 billion years time.

And absolutely nothing we have ever attempted has succeeded in altering that average life before decay by one iota. No known particles or forces have any effect, other than in the exceptional case of influences so destructive that the atom is destroyed without having undergone alpha decay at all.

I am suggesting that there is an internal cause of the alpha particle emission, a natural cause within the element. We presume there is a lot of motion going on, both inside the nucleus with the protons and neutrons bumping and shifting, as well as outside, with the electrons circling. Some specific combination of these events is bringing about the emission of the alpha particle. It seems likely that we will never have a tool that would allow us to finely manipulate these events within the atom in order to bring about the event in a controlled experiment. The inability to demonstrate the causal mechanism should not be taken as the absence of such a mechanism within the element.
 
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