There are plenty of common references to freedom that are not to the underlying nature of reality, a determined world.
Common references are the source of definitions. People outside of these discussions do not reference "a determined world" at all, because it has no meaning and no significance to any practical human matter. The notion of "a determined world" is a disease spread through false but believable suggestions that trap people in a paradox.
The truth is that all events are the natural result of prior events. This notion goes by the name "History".
As pointed out, George swings his golf club freely, the bird flies freely, you are free to watch TV or read a book, says absolutely nothing about the nature of the mechanisms and means of these freely performed actions.
Freedom is our ability to do things. If George can no longer swing his golf club freely, because he has a pulled muscle in his shoulder, the mechanism will be examined by an Orthopedist, who will recommend treatment. And all of George's golfing buddies will sympathize, and share their own stories of injuries on the golf course.
The nature of the mechanism is not some hidden philosophical secret. We just take them for granted until they stop working. Then we see a doctor, who knows all about the mechanism and how to restore its function, so that George is free once more to swing his golf club.
The references are based on surface appearances, not determinism, not neurology, not chemistry, not physics or causality, just shallow observations and references.
Well, not everyone is a neurologist, and a chemist, and a physicist.
On the other hand, everyone is quite aware of causality! They tell George, "You've done something to strain your shoulder", showing that they assume a world of reliable cause and effect. Then they tell him "You should see your orthopedist", showing that they assume a physical causal mechanism involving muscles and tendons.
Common language. You can say George acted according to his will, or you could say George acted according to his free will, but given the nature of cognition, the former is a more accurate description and the latter includes 'free' as a redundancy.
It is only necessary to add "free" to will when there is some question as to whether someone acted voluntarily versus being forced to act against their will, for example, by coercion, manipulation, or insanity.
That is a very important distinction. So, no, we cannot drop the adjective "free" from free will without losing that significant distinction.
The problem here is not with common usage. The problem is the nonsensical definition created by philosophy, "freedom from causal necessity". Nobody uses that definition outside of philosophy, because it is irrational and paradoxical. But academic philosophy loves paradoxes, no matter the damage that they cause.
The question of free will relates not to actions performed without coercion, but how will and action is produced. Determined actions are not coerced, proceed unimpeded, yet not freely willed.
The fact is that no actions are ever free of prior causes.
If the action is freely chosen, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is coerced, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is accidental, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
If the action is insane, then it will still be "causally" necessary.
To say that the action is causally determined blurs all meaningful distinctions. And, we humans become very dumb and incompetent when we fail to make meaningful distinctions. (The book, "The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat", comes to mind).
Not freely willed because freedom is defined by absence of necessity, yet will is necessitated by nature.
"Necessitated by nature" is the same thing as causally necessary, and it swallows up all meaningful distinctions in a generality.
Free will is when it is our own nature that decides what we will do, rather than the nature of the guy with a gun that decides what we will do. You would bury this significant distinction in your generality.
Will is not free to do otherwise. What it does is necessitated. In other words, we lack the right kind of control.
Everything is always causally necessitated. But there are meaningful distinctions as to who or what is doing the causing. If we are deciding for ourselves what we will do, then we are controlling what we do. If someone holding a gun to our head is deciding what we will do, then he is controlling us against our will.
It seems that we are either caused, and our actions are caused events, or we are free. The middle, compatibilism, is excluded. - Dr Craig Ross 2007
A false, but believable suggestion. It sounds true, so we are drawn into the mental trap, but it is empirically false. This is how the paradox of determinism "versus" free will is spread and sustained.
When we are the most meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, then we are held responsible.
When someone with a gun is the most meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, then he is held responsible.
Either we are free to decide for ourselves what we will do, or the guy with the gun is controlling us against our will and he is deciding for us what we will do.
In either case, all of the events will be reliably caused. But in one case we are acting of our own freely chosen will (free will).
The fact that the free will event was caused does not negate the fact that the meaningful and relevant cause was our own choice.
What the bird does depends on what is going in its brain. The bird as a conscious entity has no awareness of what is going on its brain or what is driving its impulses or desires.
Despite the bird's lack of self-knowledge, if the cage door is open, he is free to fly away, and if the cage door is closed, he is not free.
The same applies to George's golf swing. If his shoulder is in good working order then he is free to swing his club. If not, then he is no longer free to play golf, and he will seek professional help for his shoulder. George's freedom to swing his club does not rely upon an intimate understanding of what his neurons are doing, or even how his should works. He is either objectively free to swing his golf club or he is objectively not free to swing the club.
It's not just 'laws of nature,' but ''given a specified way things are at a time t'' - which means the causal relationship between the objects and events of the world. In this instance, the bird's genetic makeup, brain state, past experience, circumstances, how long its been in the cage, how it got there, etc, etc...
Yes, the current state of all things at time t and its events will reliably cause the next state of all things at time t+1 and its events. But we humans cannot deal with the state of all things at either of those points in time. So, that fact, though logically true, is not meaningful or relevant to any significant human events, like deciding what I will have for breakfast.
The meaningful and relevant cause of what I will have for breakfast is my own choosing from my available options. And free will is about whether I am free to make this choice for myself, or whether someone else is deciding what I will eat whether I like it or not. In either case, it will always be causally necessitated by someone or something. Here's hoping it will be me.
''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.''
Another professor professing nonsense. How can he fail to see that IT IS VERY IMPORTANT WHETHER AN ''INGENIOUS PHYSIOLOGIST'' HAS TAMPERED WITH ONE'S BRAIN versus a person deciding for themselves what they will do.
Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.
Another false, but believable suggestion. The truth is that our cognitive states will themselves be the causes of other cognitive states. (It's that state at t and state at t+1 thing that causal necessity implies). And that is what we experience. One thing being the cause of the next thing. (For example, my breakfast is now ready, so I'll finish up and go eat it now).
So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor -Metaphysics.
And this is the common you can't have free will because unless you can be "free from yourself" argument. Whose will would it be if you were free from yourself? Someone else's.