Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

''Reliably caused'' appears to be a softer way of saying ''fixed.''

The problem with the terms "determined" and "fixed" is that they imply that causation is finished. It gives the impression that everything has already happened (similar to Einstein's Block Universe) . This gives the false impression that there is nothing we can do about anything since it is as if it had "already happened".

In this instance ''fixed'' simply means ''no possibility of an alternate action'' - that in each and every moment in time, each and every state of the system is immutable.

The empirical truth is that things are not "fixed", because events continue to happen, forever. And, no event will ever happen until its final prior causes have played themselves out. This understanding reminds us that our choices and our actions still play a significant role in how things will eventually turn out.

The reference is related to each and every moment in time, initial conditions and the way things go ever after.

When I choose to order the lobster for dinner, I am the most meaningful and relevant cause of that event. The Big Bang is never the meaningful or relevant cause of any human event.

In fact, within the domain of human influence (things we can choose to do), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

While there will be only a single actual future, many possible futures will occur to us via our imagination, one of those functions of the brain.

Human influences are themselves caused and imbedded within the system, a web that began before we were born.

If alternate actions are possible, events are neither 'reliably caused' or 'fixed' - and we are not talking about determinism.

That's incorrect. Alternate actions are considered "possible" if we are physically able to carry them out. We never need to actually carry out those alternate actions in order for them to be "possible". If we never perform those actions we never call them "impossible", they simply are referred to as things we could have done, but which we did not do.

Possible physical actions are not chosen. They are determined. People performing possible actions did not have a realizable alternate action. The action performed by each and every person is the only possible action open for them in that instance in time.

So only one action is possible for any person in any given instance in time. That other people perform other determined actions has no bearing on the matter of 'free choice.'

So, hard determinists are making errors in the logic of language. Errors in the logic lead to incorrect conclusions and false beliefs.

Nope, freedom is simply incompatible with determinism because determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice. The action that is performed in each and every moment in time is the only possible action. It is not a freely chosen action, as if a real alternative can be realized.

The notion of possibilities is irrelevant to individual neurons. But the notion of possibilities is essential to the brain itself as it performs its decision making function. Without alternate possibilities the brain cannot make a decision.

But as the action that is taken is fixed antecedents, proclivities and brain state, there is no possible alternate action, and never a real choice. A real choice entails a real possibility of doing otherwise.

But as we know, determinism doesn't allow anything to 'do otherwise.'

The menu in the restaurant is a list of alternate possibilities. The brain must narrow this list down to a single option, in order to tell the waiter what dinner to bring. If it fails to choose, it will fail to eat.

Yes, information processing. Information processing is not free will.

An information processor is able to select options based on sets of criteria. This is not free will because the outcome is determined by the state of the processor and the given criteria.

Information processing does not equate to free will.

All the neurons involved in the choosing operation are being driven by the brain's need to order a dinner, AND, the experience of this need itself is a deterministic event that was causally necessary from any prior point in time. When you can realize that both of those statements are true, you'll understand compatibilism.

Different functional areas of the brain are interacting in a reliable fashion with each other, performing the choosing and placing the order for dinner. And all of these events were causally necessary from any prior point in eternity.

Sure, rather than the power of will making decisions, we have an intelligent system, information processing, antecedents and proclivities.



''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor

Nice article. But nothing to change the fact that our brains actually do the choosing, which is what I've been saying all along. As I've said before, I have no problem with any of the facts uncovered by neuroscience.

Computers can do as much without the presence of consciousness or will. The ability to process information is the means by which actions are taken.

Your makeup and past makes you what you are, which in turn determines your actions.

Yes, which means it is really me that is choosing what I do. That genetic makeup and those past experiences exist solely within me, and whatever it is you think they are doing, I am doing.

The issue is not who or what, but how.

''Our brain is not a unified structure; instead it is composed of several modules that work out their computations separately, in what are called neural networks. These networks can carry out activities largely on their own. The visual network, for example, responds to visual stimulation and is also active during visual imagery—that is, seeing something with your mind’s eye; the motor network can produce movement and is active during imagined movements. Yet even though our brain carries out all these functions in a modular system, we do not feel like a million little robots carrying out their disjointed activities. We feel like one, coherent self with intentions and reasons for what we feel are our unified actions.''

Cool! Give it up for my guy Gazzaniga. But you only quoted the part that leaves us with the question. The part that provides the answer to that question comes later, here:

"Our best candidate for this brain area is the “left-hemisphere interpreter.” Beyond the finding, described in the last chapter, that the left hemisphere makes strange input logical, it includes a special region that interprets the inputs we receive every moment and weaves them into stories to form the ongoing narrative of our self-image and our beliefs."

When the "interpreter" has accurate information, then it can provide an accurate description of what is happening and why. But when its information is inaccurate or incomplete, it will still attempt to explain things using confabulation to fill in the blanks. For example, if a hypnotist gives you a post-hypnotic suggestion that when you hear the word "elephant" you will take off your shoes, and then wakes you and triggers you to take off your shoes, you will come up with a story to explain why you did so.

He goes on to show how people use this feature to accommodate ideas that may at first conflict with their religious beliefs. Nice article, worth the read.

The interpreter function is a part of the narrator function, these are brain functions. Neither the interpreter or narrator make decisions or initiate action, just interpret and report them in conscious form.

No help in establishing freedom of will, sorry to say.

From Michael Gazzaniga:
''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left-brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb. The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving.

The left-hemisphere interpreter is not only a master of belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no matter what. Patients with “reduplicative paramnesia,” because of damage to the brain, believe that there are copies of people or places. In short, they will remember another time and mix it with the present. As a result, they will create seemingly ridiculous, but masterful, stories to uphold what they know to be true due to the erroneous messages their damaged brain is sending their intact interpreter. One such patient believed the New York hospital where she was being treated was actually her home in Maine. When her doctor asked how this could be her home if there were elevators in the hallway, she said, “Doctor, do you know how much it cost me to have those put in?” The interpreter will go to great lengths to make sure the inputs it receives are woven together to make sense—even when it must make great leaps to do so. Of course, these do not appear as "great leaps” to the patient, but rather as clear evidence from the world around him or her.''


Free will? Hardly.

 

[Jarhyn]

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism...

No, the actual definition of determinism, the one you wish to ignore is a mathematical one that discusses "state machines". You definition is merely a test, and doesn't even discuss which property your quality supposedly has.

A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. A stochastic system has a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analysed statistically but may not be predicted precisely.

Henceforth, I'm just not going to accept that you understand determinism at all until you come to understand what this means.

It's much like TGG's treatment of Learner at this point.

This is not something you are incapable of doing the work to learn but it is clearly something you didn't take the time to do the work to learn enough to be able to talk about.

You don't even understand that the Virtual Particle activity of our universe means that to declare our universe deterministic is a declaration of pure faith.

I just don't care enough about this because that is not even germane to choice and free will as concerns game theory.

It's not something I'm arguing and perhaps I'm choosing to avoid the topic inappropriately! This is in fact more a discussion about indeterministic systems (probabilistic, stochastic systems).

So if you want to discuss if the universe is "deterministic", we are using it in language you can't abuse, nice tight language that applies to the mathematical property you are trying to assign upon the universe.

You say that due to this property, that the universe does not meaningfully represent certain graph properties

You will have to prove, mathematically, that the graph properties we are discussing are an incoherent property to assign to the nodes of a graph that represents a deterministic state machine.

If you wish to maintain that "deterministic systems cannot bear a coherent property which can discuss and represent of 'will' and 'freedom of will", you will have to prove, rigorously, that deterministic systems cannot bear such a graph property.

If we wish to prove that they can, all I need to do is produce a single graph of a deterministic sustem that has a property which maps to "free will", because "deterministic systems do not allow 'free will' properties to emerge or be coherent" is a theorem of math, and a bad one at that.

Your goal has been to take this thing of math (really, most of modern physics) and use that to describe the universe with rigor, because math is how you describe things with rigor.

Then you balk at how, when that rigorous language is approached, you run away screaming in fear because you apparently didn't learn discrete math all that well.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

In this instance ''fixed'' simply means ''no possibility of an alternate action'' - that in each and every moment in time, each and every state of the system is immutable.

Then the menu of alternative possibilities was an immutable event, which means that the claim of "no possibility of an alternate action" is false.

The reference is related to each and every moment in time, initial conditions and the way things go ever after.

Right. The moment in time when I faced the menu and had to make a choice was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time where I had two options, the steak and the lobster, was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time where I considered the pros and cons of the steak was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time where I considered the lobster was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time when I decided to flip a coin was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time of the coin landing tails up was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time when I told the waiter, "I will have the lobster, please" was fixed by causal necessity.

And, of course, the fact that there was no one pointing a gun at me, and demanding that I order the steak instead, was also fixed by causal necessity. So, it was fixed by causal necessity that I would be free to decide what to order for myself.

Please note that causal necessity has made no changes at all to what actually happened. It never does.

Human influences are themselves caused and imbedded within the system, a web that began before we were born.

Sure. But all of the meaningful and relevant causes of my choice were right there in the restaurant, the menu, me, and the coin I chose to flip of my own free will. The waiter confirmed it was me when he brought me the bill for the lobster.

Possible physical actions are not chosen. They are determined.

You keep overlooking the fact that sometimes it is determined that we will choose that action. So it is false to suggest that all possible physical actions are not chosen.

People performing possible actions did not have a realizable alternate action. The action performed by each and every person is the only possible action open for them in that instance in time.

If you use the word "realizable" you throw us back into the context of uncertainty, where multiple things can happen. The menu is a list of realizable possibilities. The fact that an item on the menu is never realized, because nobody ever orders it, does not make it unrealizable or impossible to realize.

Every item on the menu was a possible order for every person in the restaurant. However, they would, by causal necessity, each pick a single inevitable option. But the fact that one option was inevitable does not logically imply that the other options were impossible. They were as possible as any possibility ever gets to be.

Nope, freedom is simply incompatible with determinism because determinism doesn't allow freedom of choice. The action that is performed in each and every moment in time is the only possible action. It is not a freely chosen action, as if a real alternative can be realized.

Determinism means that either (a) it will be inevitable that I make the choice for myself or (b) it will be inevitable that someone or something else imposes their choice upon me against my will. Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

But as we know, determinism doesn't allow anything to 'do otherwise.'

Correct. I will never actually do otherwise, even though I can.

An information processor is able to select options based on sets of criteria.

Correct. And that is precisely what our brains (and our computers) routinely do.

This is not free will because the outcome is determined by the state of the processor and the given criteria.

It is free will for us, because we come with our own goals, our own interests, and our own reasons. But it is not free will for the computer because we created the computer to do our will, and we get upset when it appears to be acting on its own.

Information processing does not equate to free will.

Information processing, specifically the choosing process, equates to free will when it is free of coercion and undue influence, and equates to unfree will when subject to coercion or undue influence. (We exert an irresistible influence upon our computers, so they never have free will).

Sure, rather than the power of will making decisions, we have an intelligent system, information processing, antecedents and proclivities.

Correct.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist'' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from ''hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.'' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states."

First, it is not necessary for us to control the operation of our brain, because any deliberate control the brain exercises is us exercising deliberate control.

Second, it certainly does make a difference whether an ''ingenious physiologist'" has tampered with our brain, because his brain is now in control of our brain, and he is responsible for what we do.

"So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor

We do not get to choose our wants and desires, but we do get to choose what we will do about them.

From Michael Gazzaniga:

''Experiments on split-brain patients reveal how readily the left-brain interpreter can make up stories and beliefs. In one experiment, for example, when the word walk was presented only to the right side of a patient’s brain, he got up and started walking. When he was asked why he did this, the left brain (where language is stored and where the word walk was not presented) quickly created a reason for the action: “I wanted to go get a Coke.”

Even more fantastic examples of the left hemisphere at work come from the study of neurological disorders. In a complication of stroke called anosognosia with hemiplegia, patients cannot recognize that their left arm is theirs because the stroke damaged the right parietal cortex, which manages our body’s integrity, position, and movement. The left-hemisphere interpreter has to reconcile the information it receives from the visual cortex—that the limb is attached to its body but is not moving—with the fact that it is not receiving any input about the damage to that limb. The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter must, then, create a belief to mediate the two known facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it”—reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving.

The left-hemisphere interpreter is not only a master of belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no matter what. Patients with “reduplicative paramnesia,” because of damage to the brain, believe that there are copies of people or places. In short, they will remember another time and mix it with the present. As a result, they will create seemingly ridiculous, but masterful, stories to uphold what they know to be true due to the erroneous messages their damaged brain is sending their intact interpreter. One such patient believed the New York hospital where she was being treated was actually her home in Maine. When her doctor asked how this could be her home if there were elevators in the hallway, she said, “Doctor, do you know how much it cost me to have those put in?” The interpreter will go to great lengths to make sure the inputs it receives are woven together to make sense—even when it must make great leaps to do so. Of course, these do not appear as "great leaps” to the patient, but rather as clear evidence from the world around him or her.''

Yes, like I said, Gazzaniga has some really fascinating information. Brain injuries and illnesses that alter our behavior (against our will) would be an undue influence upon our reasoning and our choices in very specific ways. So, they are examples of extraordinary influences.

 

[pood]

Being fixed means that your actions are an inevitable part of the system. You can't do otherwise, you can't will otherwise.

This is plainly an assertion fallacy.

It's not a fallacy. Not in the least. It is the very definition of determinism. Check the definition for yourself.

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

You keep quoting this definition of determinism, and it is wrong in every clause. Determinism just means that effects reliably follow causes. That’s it.

It's the standard definition of causal determinism taken from the Stanford article on causal determinism. It's not my definition, or something that I modified.

It has nothing to do with me past the fact that I quoted it from the Stanford Page.

If something is determined, there is no alternate action possible. If alternate actions are possible, it is neither determinism or 'reliably caused.'

You don't appear to understand the implications of determinism.

Oh, my bad, you didn't even actually define "determinism".

I've lost count of the number of times I have given the standard definition of determinism, quoted and cited from Stanford's causal determinism page;

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

This is NOT “the standard definition of determinism.” In fact, there is no standard definition. That is because determinism, when considered in conjunction with free will, inevitably comes with metaphysical baggage. If we strip down determinism to its bare essentials, void of metaphysical baggage, we are left with empiricism … what we see, sense, experience. And what is that? Just this: we observe, and experience, that effects reliably follow causes. This was pointed out centuries ago by Hume. His empirical description was only two words long: “constant conjunction.”

The articles at the Stanford philosophy site are not Supreme Court rulings or commandments engraved on tablets hauled down from the mountain top. They are the opinions of the individual philosophers who write the individual articles. Other philosophers, like Norman Swartz whom I have cited, disagree entirely with this description.

I would be curious to read this whole article. As it stands, this (non-standard) description of determinism is not only larded with unjustified metaphysical baggage, it plainly begs the question against free will. The things that the author states in the quote must be demonstrated, not assumed. In particular, his description of natural law makes the plain error of supposing that the “laws”of nature are prescriptive, when in fact they are descriptive.

 

[Jarhyn]

there is no standard definition

No, also false. There is a rigorous, specific, mathematical definition of "determinism".

It deals with the treatment of "state machines" and "system state transitions", which are themselves parts of graph theory.

Someone is trying to ascribe a categorical property here upon that rigorous thing of the axioms of math.

They must do so using math.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will is about human commerce, communication, living. It is wat humans think they are doing which has very little to to with how the world is at time = 0 or determinism, reality.

No, free will is about graph properties in deterministic (and stochastic) systems.

It has nothing to do with humans specifically, humans merely have the highest quality models, generally, so they generally have the freest wills.

The way I worked was by using x alternative forced choice procedures. The observer was given mandatory category selection, all determined. The facts of the stimuli were present or not present. Kind of the way nature sets things out for one. What you may want to call choice are irrelevant since the options are yeah, naw.

You have not, in fact, demonstrated that "ya/naw" is not the product of a weighted graph. In fact you have supported that "ya/naw" is the product of a weighted graph.

Free will, and in fact the shape of that free will, is a mappable quality of the graph.

If you would like to demonstrate that there is no mappable quality to this graph that pertains to the "freedom of will", which I'm quickly learning through various discussions that this relates to a "model quality" comparison between the considered graph regions, you will have to prove that, using math and graph theory.

To disprove this assertion, to disprove that the graph of a deterministic system over time must lack any such a quality, all that is necessary is to produce ANY deterministic system which DOES demonstrate such an aspect to it's graph geometry.

 

[pood]

The author whose description of determinism DBT borrowed is Carl Hoefer. I am reading his piece on causal determinism at Stanford. It must be said right away that he fully understands the distinction between the laws of nature as descriptive or prescriptive, and much else besides. He goes on to break down and critique his own definition. I will post more fully on this when I finish his Stanford article.

 

[Jarhyn]

The author whose description of determinism DBT borrowed is Carl Hoefer. I am reading his piece on causal determinism at Stanford. It must be said right away that he fully understands the distinction between the laws of nature as descriptive or prescriptive, and much else besides. He goes on to break down and critique his own definition. I will post more fully on this when I finish his Stanford article.

I don't doubt that Carl Hoefer actually understands what a deterministic system is.

It's just not a definition, it's an application of a definition that was left absent by DBT, at least in the text of said "definition".

Let me know if he dives into graph properties of state machines though

 

[pood]

I will!

 

[Jarhyn]

I will!

My biggest issue here is that the things I understand as "choice" and "will" are things of math and game theory, and graph theory. If someone wants to make a claim about these things as ideas, coherent or not, they would need to define it in those terms, based ultimately on some operation of set theory.

In this world, it is perhaps viewable as "almost as silly as the hard determinist": everything operates choice, everything has a will, and oftentimes what will it has depends on the context of the question. While it is contextual, however, it is still a property of the graph. I can prove that contextual properties of a graph are properties of the graph. It's done right there in the statement.

This should dispense with all that "objective/subjective/self-reference" nonsense!

Self-reference is entirely valid if the self-reference is to a self that maintains the axioms of math, and the reference proves something within those axioms, especially when that property within the axioms is being discussed.

It means the compatibilist might get a little ticked off. They wanted to discuss orders in restaurants kind of free wills and it takes most of physics to extend those little things in graph theory onto the properties this implies of those things which we describe originally and entirely with such set/graph theory.

It takes a very massive transform to whip my arms up around something so complicated as people and compare their agencies! It takes a very selective context of observation, being particular which causalities one is concerned with to do so. But relational properties of regions of a graph are properties of that graph, no less so because the state machine it is graphing is complex.

 

[fromderinside]

Free will is about human commerce, communication, living. It is wat humans think they are doing which has very little to to with how the world is at time = 0 or determinism, reality.

No, free will is about graph properties in deterministic (and stochastic) systems.

It has nothing to do with humans specifically, humans merely have the highest quality models, generally, so they generally have the freest wills.

The way I worked was by using x alternative forced choice procedures. The observer was given mandatory category selection, all determined. The facts of the stimuli were present or not present. Kind of the way nature sets things out for one. What you may want to call choice are irrelevant since the options are yeah, naw.

You have not, in fact, demonstrated that "ya/naw" is not the product of a weighted graph. In fact you have supported that "ya/naw" is the product of a weighted graph.

Free will, and in fact the shape of that free will, is a mappable quality of the graph.

If you would like to demonstrate that there is no mappable quality to this graph that pertains to the "freedom of will", which I'm quickly learning through various discussions that this relates to a "model quality" comparison between the considered graph regions, you will have to prove that, using math and graph theory.

To disprove this assertion, to disprove that the graph of a deterministic system over time must lack any such a quality, all that is necessary is to produce ANY deterministic system which DOES demonstrate such an aspect to it's graph geometry.

Of course given that signals are different there will be data that can be mapped. Yet in each instance there is only one possible signal state in only one of the intervals presented. It's all determined. the graph doesn't reflect choice it reflects the readback of the observers best estimates of signal interval. That there are data indicates there is a material condition with many levels to which the observer can respond which tends to reflect the reality of perception of material signal that was presented to the observer.

So you are talking about the conditions of the paradigm rather than the perception response of the observer. One needs to separate the design mechanism from signal and perception. What you call choice reflects design mechanism, not observer output to input, nor what material was presented to the observer. The observer made a response based on likelihood of signal, not a choice.

 

[DBT]

Basically;

Being fixed means that your actions are an inevitable part of the system. You can't do otherwise, you can't will otherwise.

This is plainly an assertion fallacy.

It's not a fallacy. Not in the least. It is the very definition of determinism. Check the definition for yourself.

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

You keep quoting this definition of determinism, and it is wrong in every clause. Determinism just means that effects reliably follow causes. That’s it.

It's the standard definition of causal determinism taken from the Stanford article on causal determinism. It's not my definition, or something that I modified.

It has nothing to do with me past the fact that I quoted it from the Stanford Page.

If something is determined, there is no alternate action possible. If alternate actions are possible, it is neither determinism or 'reliably caused.'

You don't appear to understand the implications of determinism.

Oh, my bad, you didn't even actually define "determinism".

I've lost count of the number of times I have given the standard definition of determinism, quoted and cited from Stanford's causal determinism page;

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

This is NOT “the standard definition of determinism.” In fact, there is no standard definition. That is because determinism, when considered in conjunction with free will, inevitably comes with metaphysical baggage. If we strip down determinism to its bare essentials, void of metaphysical baggage, we are left with empiricism … what we see, sense, experience. And what is that? Just this: we observe, and experience, that effects reliably follow causes. This was pointed out centuries ago by Hume. His empirical description was only two words long: “constant conjunction.”

The articles at the Stanford philosophy site are not Supreme Court rulings or commandments engraved on tablets hauled down from the mountain top. They are the opinions of the individual philosophers who write the individual articles. Other philosophers, like Norman Swartz whom I have cited, disagree entirely with this description.

I would be curious to read this whole article. As it stands, this (non-standard) description of determinism is not only larded with unjustified metaphysical baggage, it plainly begs the question against free will. The things that the author states in the quote must be demonstrated, not assumed. In particular, his description of natural law makes the plain error of supposing that the “laws”of nature are prescriptive, when in fact they are descriptive.

Basically:

''In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

2.5 Fixed​

''We can now put our—still vague—pieces together. Determinism requires a world that (a) has a well-defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times. If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (a)), the world is deterministic. Logical entailment, in a sense broad enough to encompass mathematical consequence, is the modality behind the determination in “determinism.”

Compatibilism is based on the idea that the world has a ''well defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times'' and that ''If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (a)), the world is deterministic.''

The argument here is whether freedom of will is compatible with a deterministic world where and given state of the world is entailed by antecedents.

Compatibilists argue that it is, while incompatibilists argue that freedom of will cannot exist in an entailed system.

 

[DBT]

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism...

No, the actual definition of determinism, the one you wish to ignore is a mathematical one that discusses "state machines". You definition is merely a test, and doesn't even discuss which property your quality supposedly has.

You seem to want to change the rules. Basically, if events are not entailed by preceding causes, they are not determined events. In which case, we have no 'reliable causality' or determinism.....the very principles that Compabilists base their argument on.

Basically:

''In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

2.5 Fixed​

''We can now put our—still vague—pieces together. Determinism requires a world that (a) has a well-defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times. If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (a)), the world is deterministic. Logical entailment, in a sense broad enough to encompass mathematical consequence, is the modality behind the determination in “determinism.”

Compatibilism is based on the idea that the world has a ''well defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times'' and that ''If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (a)), the world is deterministic.''

The argument here is whether freedom of will is compatible with a deterministic world where and given state of the world is entailed by antecedents.

Compatibilists argue that it is, while incompatibilists argue that freedom of will cannot exist in an entailed system.

A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. A stochastic system has a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analysed statistically but may not be predicted precisely.

Henceforth, I'm just not going to accept that you understand determinism at all until you come to understand what this means.

It's much like TGG's treatment of Learner at this point.

This is not something you are incapable of doing the work to learn but it is clearly something you didn't take the time to do the work to learn enough to be able to talk about.

You don't even understand that the Virtual Particle activity of our universe means that to declare our universe deterministic is a declaration of pure faith.

I just don't care enough about this because that is not even germane to choice and free will as concerns game theory.

It's not something I'm arguing and perhaps I'm choosing to avoid the topic inappropriately! This is in fact more a discussion about indeterministic systems (probabilistic, stochastic systems).

So if you want to discuss if the universe is "deterministic", we are using it in language you can't abuse, nice tight language that applies to the mathematical property you are trying to assign upon the universe.

You say that due to this property, that the universe does not meaningfully represent certain graph properties

You will have to prove, mathematically, that the graph properties we are discussing are an incoherent property to assign to the nodes of a graph that represents a deterministic state machine.

If you wish to maintain that "deterministic systems cannot bear a coherent property which can discuss and represent of 'will' and 'freedom of will", you will have to prove, rigorously, that deterministic systems cannot bear such a graph property.

If we wish to prove that they can, all I need to do is produce a single graph of a deterministic sustem that has a property which maps to "free will", because "deterministic systems do not allow 'free will' properties to emerge or be coherent" is a theorem of math, and a bad one at that.

Your goal has been to take this thing of math (really, most of modern physics) and use that to describe the universe with rigor, because math is how you describe things with rigor.

Then you balk at how, when that rigorous language is approached, you run away screaming in fear because you apparently didn't learn discrete math all that well.

I don't 'balk,' I use the very same definition of determinism as Compatibilists.

Again, if events proceed probabilistically, this is not determinism.

If events are random, we don't have determinism.

If events are subject to human will, we have Libertarian Free Will.

The argument here is the compatibility of free will with determinism, which in essence means that events are fixed by prior conditions and not subject to probability or randomness.

''Compatibilism is based on the idea that the world has a ''well defined state or description, at any given time, and (b) laws of nature that are true at all places and times'' and that ''If we have all these, then if (a) and (b) together logically entail the state of the world at all other times (or, at least, all times later than that given in (a)), the world is deterministic.''

 

[DBT]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

In this instance ''fixed'' simply means ''no possibility of an alternate action'' - that in each and every moment in time, each and every state of the system is immutable.

Then the menu of alternative possibilities was an immutable event, which means that the claim of "no possibility of an alternate action" is false.

In a determined world, the possibility of doing otherwise is an illusion. Each and every diner is restricted to the option that was determined. We are not talking about a probabilistic world, or random events, but a determined world.

''If Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism. Based on the foregoing, Determinism and Free Will are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As I see it, however, watering down either or both definitions does justice to neither concept, and is a cowardly approach to dealing forthrightly with the full implications of either concept being true.'' - Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

The reference is related to each and every moment in time, initial conditions and the way things go ever after.

Right. The moment in time when I faced the menu and had to make a choice was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time where I had two options, the steak and the lobster, was fixed by causal necessity.

Given a determined world, the 'choice' you made was determined before you entered the room.

As you said yourself;

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").
''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards Post #887

The moment in time where I considered the pros and cons of the steak was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time where I considered the lobster was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time when I decided to flip a coin was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time of the coin landing tails up was fixed by causal necessity. The moment in time when I told the waiter, "I will have the lobster, please" was fixed by causal necessity.

And, of course, the fact that there was no one pointing a gun at me, and demanding that I order the steak instead, was also fixed by causal necessity. So, it was fixed by causal necessity that I would be free to decide what to order for myself.

Please note that causal necessity has made no changes at all to what actually happened. It never does.

But you were not free to choose. Choice entails the possibility of an alternative. Necessitation ensures that that no alternative is possible.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Human influences are themselves caused and imbedded within the system, a web that began before we were born.

Sure. But all of the meaningful and relevant causes of my choice were right there in the restaurant, the menu, me, and the coin I chose to flip of my own free will. The waiter confirmed it was me when he brought me the bill for the lobster.

Given determinism, your decision to flip a coin was necessitated by antecedents, and the coin landed precisely as it must. That, given your own definition of determinism, is how it works.

Yes, like I said, Gazzaniga has some really fascinating information. Brain injuries and illnesses that alter our behavior (against our will) would be an undue influence upon our reasoning and our choices in very specific ways. So, they are examples of extraordinary influences.

The point is that brain state equals output. That the state and condition of a brain in any given instance in time determines thought and action. That we as conscious entities do not have access to the underlying mechanisms and actions of 'our' brain.

Brain conditions expose the illusion of conscious control.

''In neuroscientific circles, it is simply commonsense physicalism that the brain conducts business on its own. It doesn’t need a further, non-physical agent to orchestrate the dauntingly complex operations that constitute awareness, cognition, and control of behavior. Nevertheless, it’s also become clear that for us to successfully navigate the world, the brain must conjure a stable sense of a self, acting within an environment represented as distinctly non-self. Even though there’s no one in charge of its operations, the brain generates a strong intuition of personal agency, borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways.''

 

[Jarhyn]

all determined

No shit. This is the thread on compatibilism.

the graph doesn't reflect choice

The graph contains exactly the relationships of contains as a function of it's math. Some of those are descriptive of "free will", and some of the geometries of the graph are descriptive of "choice" which is here a SYNONYM for "decision events" based on local availability of information.

the conditions of the paradigm

Yeah, kinda important looking at the conditions of the system to understand what the geometry of the system is.

One needs to separate the design mechanism from signal and perception

No, and while not relevant, designed geometry is still real geometry.

choice reflects design mechanism

No, choice merely reflects material structure. The rock has no choice over being affected by gravity but the shape of the rock drives decision and this choice as to how it accomplishes moving down any given hill.

The observer made a response based on

This is, here, the definition of choice.

"The observer made a choice"

 

[Jarhyn]

You seem to want to change the rules

No, you ARE changing the rules.

A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. A stochastic system has a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analysed statistically but may not be predicted precisely.

This is then applied to our world as a statement.

If you do not understand what this means and why determinism must be approached from the level of state machines and math, you are hopelessly lost.

 

[Jarhyn]

And, the forum lost most of my reply, whatever.

You don't even understand that the Virtual Particle activity of our universe means that to declare our universe deterministic is a declaration of pure faith.

So, there are still arguments being made, I guess, from ignorance.

P1 Deterministic systems do not allow local free will
P2 The Universe is a deterministic system
C The universe does not allow local free will

You will need to prove P1.

P1 is a mathematical hypothesis.

To prove 1 you will need to provide a mathematical proof.

To disprove 1 we just need to find ANY deterministic system with a well defined property of "local free will" existing on its graph.

An interesting thing here is that this still doesn't answer the fact that P2 is also plainly being taken on your faith and only tolerated here so we can have a debate at all: the universe is possibly stochastic (not deterministic).

Then you have to also prove that "free will" is not a property of stochastic systems because deterministic systems may contain locally stochastic systems.

So really, your goal is to prove that no property within all of math and graph and systems theory is describable by the phrase "free will."

 

[Marvin Edwards]

P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

In a determined world, the possibility of doing otherwise is an illusion.

A "possibility" exists solely within the imagination. We cannot drive a car across the possibility of a bridge. We can only drive across an actual bridge.

But a possibility is not an illusion, because we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge. The notion of a possibility serves an essential mental function, enabling us to plan our deliberate actions to accomplish some deliberate intent. The thought of a possibility has empirical functionality, that is, it causes things to happen in the real world.

The thought of a possibility is an empirical event, and just like every other event, it is causally necessary from any prior point in time.

Each and every diner is restricted to the option that was determined.

Each and every diner will necessarily consider multiple possibilities from the menu as they decide for themselves what they will order for dinner. The multiple possibilities are just as inevitable as the single option that was finally chosen.

Determinism changes nothing. Everything happens in precisely the same way.

''If Determinism is true, human beings lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, and thereby lack Free Will. By the same token, if human beings have Free-Will, they are capable of thinking in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, which rules out Determinism." ,,, - Bruce Silverstein, B.A. Philosophy

Nope. If you start out with false assumptions you will end with false conclusions, as Mr. Silverstein does. The assumption that our thoughts are 100% caused by things that are not our thoughts is false. Thinking, like walking, is something we do. It is not done for us by some external entity. It is actually us doing the walking. It is actually us doing the thinking.

This is a simple empirical observation that cannot be dismissed by metaphysical abstractions.

Given a determined world, the 'choice' you made was determined before you entered the room.

The choice was determined by the choosing. The choosing did not occur until I entered the restaurant, sat at the table, and scanned the menu to see what possibilities were available. Determinism does not mean that any events happen before they happen.

As you said yourself;
''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation").
''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards Post #887

Yes, but the Big Bang happened when it happened, and not a moment before. And my choosing happened when it happened, and not a moment before.

The illusion you're experiencing is another result of figurative speaking. Because my choice was inevitable, it is AS IF it had been already made at the time of the Big Bang. But all figurative statements are literally false. Empirically and objectively, the choice was made by me in the restaurant. The Big Bang played no meaningful role in my decision. That's why the waiter brought me the bill, rather than bringing the bill to the Big Bang.

But you were not free to choose.

And yet I did choose. So, you are mistaken. In fact, deterministically speaking, it was causally necessary that I, and no one else, would be doing the choosing.

Choice entails the possibility of an alternative. Necessitation ensures that that no alternative is possible.

Repeatedly wrong. Causal necessitation ensured that there would be a menu of alternatives that I would choose from!

All of these events, including the menu of alternate possibilities, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.

Given determinism, your decision to flip a coin was necessitated by antecedents, and the coin landed precisely as it must. That, given your own definition of determinism, is how it works.

Of course. However, the Big Bang was not the meaningful or relevant antecedent of my choice to flip the coin. I decided to flip the coin because I had two equally desirable options, the steak and the lobster (not just a single possibility, but two real possibilities). And I was fully aware of my indecisiveness, and I was fully aware that the coin would decide what I would order.

And, given the deterministic nature of the universe, all of these events were inevitable. It was inevitable that my own interests would control everything that happened, except, of course, for the coin flip.

The point is that brain state equals output. That the state and condition of a brain in any given instance in time determines thought and action. That we as conscious entities do not have access to the underlying mechanisms and actions of 'our' brain.

You keep repeating that, as if it meant something special. We all have brains. Our decision making is performed by our own brains. That is common knowledge.

''In neuroscientific circles, ... "Even though there’s no one in charge of its operations, the brain generates a strong intuition of personal agency, borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways.''

No surprises here either. The last sentence though is the key. The brain's sense of self is "borne out by the obvious fact that persons accomplish all sorts of things in all manner of ways." Our sense of self simply comes from empirically observing ourselves choosing to do all sorts of things, like ordering a dinner from the restaurant menu.

We see ourselves doing it, and oddly enough, we conclude that we did it.

 

[Jarhyn]

And, the forum lost most of my reply, whatever.

You don't even understand that the Virtual Particle activity of our universe means that to declare our universe deterministic is a declaration of pure faith.

So, there are still arguments being made, I guess, from ignorance.

P1 Deterministic systems do not allow local free will
P2 The Universe is a deterministic system
C The universe does not allow local free will

You will need to prove P1.

P1 is a mathematical hypothesis.

To prove 1 you will need to provide a mathematical proof.

To disprove 1 we just need to find ANY deterministic system with a well defined property of "local free will" existing on its graph.

An interesting thing here is that this still doesn't answer the fact that P2 is also plainly being taken on your faith and only tolerated here so we can have a debate at all: the universe is possibly stochastic (not deterministic).

Then you have to also prove that "free will" is not a property of stochastic systems because deterministic systems may contain locally stochastic systems.

So really, your goal is to prove that no property within all of math and graph and systems theory is describable by the phrase "free will."

I'm going to just point out that "freedom" does have leverage in math. So really, it comes down to whether objects can have a will as a property.

 

[fromderinside]

all determined

No shit. This is the thread on compatibilism.

the graph doesn't reflect choice

The graph contains exactly the relationships of contains as a function of it's math. Some of those are descriptive of "free will", and some of the geometries of the graph are descriptive of "choice" which is here a SYNONYM for "decision events" based on local availability of information.

the conditions of the paradigm

Yeah, kinda important looking at the conditions of the system to understand what the geometry of the system is.

One needs to separate the design mechanism from signal and perception

No, and while not relevant, designed geometry is still real geometry.

choice reflects design mechanism

No, choice merely reflects material structure. The rock has no choice over being affected by gravity but the shape of the rock drives decision and this choice as to how it accomplishes moving down any given hill.

The observer made a response based on

This is, here, the definition of choice.

"The observer made a choice"

The observer responded to sensed material conditions. Choosing is something talking organisms say as they sense what their what their responding systems are doing. Got to keep up appearances.