Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

Yes. It is a matter of what we call things in a given context. When assessing a person's responsibility for criminal behavior, "free will" refers to cases where a person deliberately decides to commit the crime for their own interest at the expense of others. "Coercion" refers to cases where a person is forced to do something against their will.

You see both in the case of a bank robber who points a gun at the bank teller and tells her, "Fill this bag with money or I'll kill you". The robber has deliberately chosen to rob the bank (free will). But the teller would never voluntarily give him the bank's money except under threat (coercion). This distinction leads us to treat the bank teller differently than the bank robber. To correct the bank teller's behavior (handing over the bank's money to the robber) all that is needed is to remove the threat of being shot. To correct the bank robber's behavior will require securing him in prison, so that he doesn't rob anyone else, and attempting to change his future behavior through rehabilitation programs that give him better options for acquiring money in the future.

All of these actions, by the robber, by the teller, and by us, are equally deterministic, and causally necessary from any prior point in time. And one might imagine determinism itself as a causal agent bringing about these events. But that is neither helpful nor correct. There is nothing that we can do about causal necessity.

In order to deal with the problem of crime, we need to deal with the specific causes of specific effects. We need to deal with the causes of the robber's behavior, the social conditions that allow or encourage people to choose to commit crime. And we must have the notion of our own responsibility to motivate us to address the social issues. And even if we could fix society overnight, we would still need to address and correct the bank robber's behavior.

So, yes, it is a matter of what we call things in context.

I hope you've noticed that I have not been "dismissing anything to the contrary". I've repeatedly affirmed that all events, even the thoughts going through our heads right now, are causally necessary from any prior point in time. This is a logical fact derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each event is the reliable result of prior events.

Because causal necessity is a universal fact, a fact that we can do nothing about, it makes little sense to call it the "cause" of anything. A cause is only "meaningful" if it efficiently explains why the event happened. And a cause is only "relevant" if we can actually do something about it. There is clearly nothing that anyone can do about causal necessity. And tracing the cause of any event all the way back to the Big Bang is not meaningful. To say that the Big Bang has already chosen what I will have for breakfast this morning does not help me to make that choice. All of the meaningful and relevant causes of that choice are in my own head.

Context limited to a select set of conditions can fail on a larger context.

What may appear to be real and true from a limited perspective - the sun appears to travel across the sky therefore geocentrism - doesn't necessarily represent the world at large.

That compatibilism chooses a set of select conditions, conditions that affirm the consequent, to support its conclusion disregards the big picture, thus reducing its argument to word play.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

We have already agreed that universal causal necessity is true throughout the largest possible context, the universe, and also within every piece and part of it.

And I've described repeatedly how universal causal necessity is true even throughout the more limited context of simply choosing what we will do. All of the mental events that occur during that process are each causally necessary from any prior point in time.

Now you can switch back and forth between those two contexts as much as you want, and causal necessity remains a constant in each context.

I know you have, and this is going around in circles.

I know that compatibilism does not deny universal causal necessity.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Consequently, compatibilism gives a special dispensation for 'free will' ---- that humans regardless of human behaviour, produced by a bran, essentially functioning no differently to any other animal brain....we humans are deemed by the terms of compatibilism to have 'free will' while other animals, perhaps lacking self awareness, are not. Special dispensation at work.

 

[DBT]

We could quibble over whether it makes sense to call the brain a "rational system", but that would quickly take us off topic. I would prefer to say that we are in repeatedly and fundamentally violent agreement about the physical underpinnings of systemic brain activity. I agree with you that the "will" is determined. I have never stopped agreeing with you on that. That would be a silly thing for a "compatibilist" to do, because I would be fundamentally arguing for an incompatibility with determinism. The disagreement has been largely over whether agents are in some sense "free" to make choices. To you, that freedom is illusory, because it means that they are constrained by causality--that they cannot actually do anything other than they end up doing. (And I resist the temptation to get into a discussion of causality from the perspective of quantum events here, since that would be another distraction.) Fine. However, there is another sense of "freedom" that supervenes on physical causality and has to do with the way agents calculate actions and evaluate consequences from a position of uncertainty about outcomes.

The term 'free will' does not appear to apply to the neural networks of a brain, which work on the principle of a parallel information processor, architecture, inputs, memory function.

Will, be it 'free' or otherwise, having nothing to do with the underlying functionality of the brain.

The term free will tells us nothing about the brain, its evolutionary role, function, purpose, the information it processes or the behaviour it produces.

The term 'free will' appears to be a matter of social convenience - law, ''he wasn't forced,'' casual conversation, etc - or just plain ideology

 

[fromderinside]

... Compatibilism fully embraces the "big picture". It does not contradict it or try to define "free will" in some other way that is incompatible with your position. That is why they call it "compatibilism" and not something else. What I don't think we've been able to get across to you is that there are other contexts in which it means something entirely different from the "big picture" one and that the debate becomes moot when one stops trying look at the issues from that one perspective. It is far more common to use the term in the way that Marvin has elaborated on--where "free" refers to freedom from restraint or undue influence. That does not in any way invalidate your "big picture" point of view, but it does suggest that the debate itself is rather pointless. "Free will" is a fully determined process in your "big picture" scenario, but it is fully predictable from a godlike perspective, where knowledge of all outcomes is perfect. So agents in the system have no freedom to choose an action other than they one they are compelled to choose. That doesn't look like any kind of "freedom". It is still a fully determined process in the "small picture" scenario, but that concept hangs on the perspective of an agent inside the big picture, who has to make choices in an environment that is only partially predictable. So that looks more like "freedom" in the sense that the agent has no perfect knowledge of outcomes.

I've never been a fan of looking from the inside at the system. That is the way one finds loose threads that don't actually exist. They don't exist because the well demonstrated working model, determinism, doesn't permit it.

Let me start by attacking the idea of causal determinism. What is there is regulated by what is there. Physical behavior is regulated by forces inherent in the existence of physical things. What is there is determined by what is there. Where's the causality? For there to be will there needs to be evidence things change by other processes that actually add to the model. Chance is not such.

OK. See any? Me neither.

Show me the exception. Woulda shoulda coulda isn't on the table. Self observation does not an argument make. We abandoned that about 500 years ago.

So let's go back to the physicalist model of behavior let the outcomes of transactions in the brain expressed in the form of overt behavior carry the weight of argument. Stop piling a bunch of attributes on such as mind, self, consciousness, etc. as damsels in distress.

Yeah you might say my POV that sub-vocalization may lie at the base of our subjective observations is not conclusive. It isn't. It's better than hand waving . It permits verification and falsification against existing models.

Bottom line I prefer my likely straw to your possible straw.

No. I'm not angry.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

We have already agreed that universal causal necessity is true throughout the largest possible context, the universe, and also within every piece and part of it.

And I've described repeatedly how universal causal necessity is true even throughout the more limited context of simply choosing what we will do. All of the mental events that occur during that process are each causally necessary from any prior point in time.

Now you can switch back and forth between those two contexts as much as you want, and causal necessity remains a constant in each context.

I know you have, and this is going around in circles.

I know that compatibilism does not deny universal causal necessity.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Consequently, compatibilism gives a special dispensation for 'free will' ---- that humans regardless of human behaviour, produced by a bran, essentially functioning no differently to any other animal brain....we humans are deemed by the terms of compatibilism to have 'free will' while other animals, perhaps lacking self awareness, are not. Special dispensation at work.

There is no special dispensation for free will or for humans in the compatibilism I am describing. The ability to imagine alternative actions and to choose between them is present in every intelligent species. Birds have this ability. And if you've ever tried to keep squirrels out of your bird feeder you know that they are creative creatures that will always find a way (see Mark Rober's YouTube Video).

And I've also described how each thought in the choosing process is causally necessary from any prior point in time. All of these sub-events are causally necessary: encountering the issue, seeing alternative A, seeing alternative B, evaluating possibility A, evaluating possibility B, weighing the two alternative outcomes, and outputting the choice as a deliberate intention, the chosen thing that "I will do", and naming the other options as the things "I could have done, but didn't".

There is no special dispensation for the notion of "free will". It uses the notion of "freedom" the same way as every other type of freedom, by referencing a meaningful and relevant constraint that we are to be free from. And I provide several examples:

1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone opening a new account today.
4. I participated in Libet's experiments of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)

None of these uses of the term "free" require the imaginary "freedom from causal necessity". At least not until the incompatibilist shows up and starts insisting that free will must be treated differently from every other use of the notion of "free". And half of the incompatibilists, the hard determinists, agree with me that there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". To be "free from reliable cause and effect" would obliterate every freedom we have to do anything at all!

The imaginary "freedom from causation", with its embedded self-contradiction, creates the paradox: one cannot be free from reliable causation and still be free to cause stuff.

So, if there is any special usage going on here, it is by the incompatibilists. They apply a special (and impossible) requirement upon free will that is not required by any other use of the terms "free" or "freedom". And it is a requirement that should not apply to any freedom, because once you do, that freedom disappears. Setting the bird free from its cage would be impossible, because without reliable causation, flapping his wings would cause no reliable effect.

Oh, and similar to that special requirement, they also commonly insist that free will must include "freedom from oneself", another impossible freedom. They suggest that a person must be free from their own evolution, free from their own biology, and free from their own brains. Again, they apply none of these special requirements upon the bird when setting the bird "free" from its cage. It's still the same bird, but now it is free to fly away.

The hard determinist chooses to define free will in a way that erases it. The rest of us use the operational definition, which holds, even in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

There is nothing circular here. Either you see the problem with the incompatibilist position or you don't.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Free will only applies to choosing, because free will is a chosen "I will" that is free of coercion and other forms of undue or extraordinary influence. Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations. (It is also performed by the computer systems that we have created to perform logic that carries out our will.)

Coercion and undue influence, forcing a choice upon someone against their will, can apply to any intelligent living species (but not to our computing devices, which lack a will of their own). Coercion and undue influence does not apply to inanimate objects or living organisms without intelligence.

 

[Jarhyn]

Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations.

This is not true. Every thing in the universe with physical form is capable of independent "decision" moments created by that physical form.

In many ways, the study of cause and effect is the study of the machinery of will and decision.

The only difference between a rock seeking its center of gravity and a human seeking food is the graph that mediates and directs the physical forces acting on it.

To maintain that "coercion and undue influence" do not apply to "inanimate" objects, you have to make a LOT of assumptions as to the difference of things that you have not impugned, meaningfully, AS different in the way you claim exists.

The fact that our decisions are a function of our material does not change the fact that we still decide.

It just happens that the behavior of a rock when acted upon by physical forces is a lot less complicated than the behavior of a pile of semi-flexible long chain chemicals.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Compatibilism fully embraces the "big picture". It does not contradict it or try to define "free will" in some other way that is incompatible with your position. That is why they call it "compatibilism" and not something else. What I don't think we've been able to get across to you is that there are other contexts in which it means something entirely different from the "big picture" one and that the debate becomes moot when one stops trying look at the issues from that one perspective. It is far more common to use the term in the way that Marvin has elaborated on--where "free" refers to freedom from restraint or undue influence. That does not in any way invalidate your "big picture" point of view, but it does suggest that the debate itself is rather pointless. "Free will" is a fully determined process in your "big picture" scenario, but it is fully predictable from a godlike perspective, where knowledge of all outcomes is perfect. So agents in the system have no freedom to choose an action other than they one they are compelled to choose. That doesn't look like any kind of "freedom". It is still a fully determined process in the "small picture" scenario, but that concept hangs on the perspective of an agent inside the big picture, who has to make choices in an environment that is only partially predictable. So that looks more like "freedom" in the sense that the agent has no perfect knowledge of outcomes.

I've never been a fan of looking from the inside at the system. That is the way one finds loose threads that don't actually exist. They don't exist because the well demonstrated working model, determinism, doesn't permit it.

Let me start by attacking the idea of causal determinism. What is there is regulated by what is there. Physical behavior is regulated by forces inherent in the existence of physical things. What is there is determined by what is there. Where's the causality? For there to be will there needs to be evidence things change by other processes that actually add to the model. Chance is not such.

OK. See any? Me neither.

Show me the exception. Woulda shoulda coulda isn't on the table. Self observation does not an argument make. We abandoned that about 500 years ago.

So let's go back to the physicalist model of behavior let the outcomes of transactions in the brain expressed in the form of overt behavior carry the weight of argument. Stop piling a bunch of attributes on such as mind, self, consciousness, etc. as damsels in distress.

Yeah you might say my POV that sub-vocalization may lie at the base of our subjective observations is not conclusive. It isn't. It's better than hand waving . It permits verification and falsification against existing models.

Bottom line I prefer my likely straw to your possible straw.

No. I'm not angry.

Physical matter behaves differently when it is organized differently. For example, Oxygen and Hydrogen are gasses that only become liquid at some god-awful low temperature. But if we combine then to build a molecule of H2O, we get a liquid we can drink at room temperature and a solid we can ice skate on in Winter.

There are three broad classes of organization which produce behaviors through distinctly different causal mechanisms:

1. Inanimate matter behaves passively in response to physical forces. Place a bowling ball on a slope and it will always roll down hill. Its behavior is governed by the force of gravity.
2. Living organisms behave purposefully in that they are biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. A squirrel placed on that same slope may go uphill, down, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. While still affected by gravity, his behavior is not governed by it. Instead it is governed by his biological drives.
3. Intelligent species have an evolved neurology capable of imagination, evaluation, and choosing. They can behave deliberately, by calculation and reason. Set a person on that same slope and he will chop down trees to build a house, raise a family, and form a nation. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, the person is not governed by them.

(The only problem with that list is that the squirrel is also an intelligent species. I could have used an amoeba or a shrub, but the squirrel is more fun.)

"Let me start by attacking the idea of causal determinism. What is there is regulated by what is there. "

Amen! Causation never causes anything. Determinism never determines anything. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can cause events. Causation is a concept we use to describe the behavior of the objects and forces as they interact to bring about events, for example, the mass of the Sun and the mass of the Earth and the Earth's original trajectory cause the Earth's current rotation about the Sun. The event is caused, but it is caused by the objects and forces, not by the notion of causation. Determinism is a belief that the causes and their effects are reliable, such that, at least theoretically, any future event could be predicted from full knowledge of past events.

This distinction is significant, because we happen to be one of those objects that actually go about in the world causing things to happen.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations.

This is not true. Every thing in the universe with physical form is capable of independent "decision" moments created by that physical form.

In many ways, the study of cause and effect is the study of the machinery of will and decision.

The only difference between a rock seeking its center of gravity and a human seeking food is the graph that mediates and directs the physical forces acting on it.

To maintain that "coercion and undue influence" do not apply to "inanimate" objects, you have to make a LOT of assumptions as to the difference of things that you have not impugned, meaningfully, AS different in the way you claim exists.

The fact that our decisions are a function of our material does not change the fact that we still decide.

It just happens that the behavior of a rock when acted upon by physical forces is a lot less complicated than the behavior of a pile of semi-flexible long chain chemicals.

My assumption is that we are using words to describe empirical reality more closely than is allowed by metaphor. While figurative statements are often used in human communication, they have one small drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false. For example, rocks do not perform a choosing operation.

 

[fromderinside]

-nm

 

[Copernicus]

We could quibble over whether it makes sense to call the brain a "rational system", but that would quickly take us off topic. I would prefer to say that we are in repeatedly and fundamentally violent agreement about the physical underpinnings of systemic brain activity. I agree with you that the "will" is determined. I have never stopped agreeing with you on that. That would be a silly thing for a "compatibilist" to do, because I would be fundamentally arguing for an incompatibility with determinism. The disagreement has been largely over whether agents are in some sense "free" to make choices. To you, that freedom is illusory, because it means that they are constrained by causality--that they cannot actually do anything other than they end up doing. (And I resist the temptation to get into a discussion of causality from the perspective of quantum events here, since that would be another distraction.) Fine. However, there is another sense of "freedom" that supervenes on physical causality and has to do with the way agents calculate actions and evaluate consequences from a position of uncertainty about outcomes.

The term 'free will' does not appear to apply to the neural networks of a brain, which work on the principle of a parallel information processor, architecture, inputs, memory function.

Will, be it 'free' or otherwise, having nothing to do with the underlying functionality of the brain.

The term free will tells us nothing about the brain, its evolutionary role, function, purpose, the information it processes or the behaviour it produces.

I'm not sure what relevance these comments have to the discussion, since we can both agree that low level brain functions aren't helpful in explaining free will. I have been talking about two very different perspectives or points of view from which to describe "free will"--as a godlike external observer of human actions and as a human or animal agent that makes choices and executes actions. An omniscient observer does not perceive humans as making free choices, because it knows all antecedents and consequences in causal activity. Human agents perceive humans as making free choices, because they do not know all antecedents and consequences of their behavior. In order to survive, they need to build a mental model of reality based on past experiences and mental calculation that predicts consequences of their action. Hence, they weigh goals and objectives against expected outcomes and decide to take actions based on guesses that are more or less rational, more or less certain according to their internal models. That is a different perspective from the omniscient observer.

The term 'free will' appears to be a matter of social convenience - law, ''he wasn't forced,'' casual conversation, etc - or just plain ideology

Well, all linguistic expressions are social conveniences, since they are based on social convention and function to communicate in social situations. There is nothing wrong with acknowledging that terms are ambiguous and can be used to mean different things in different contexts.

The original argument about "free will" had to do with attempts to justify God's judgment of willful behavior by human beings. How could God hold his creations responsible for turning out exactly the way he knew they would and always doing exactly what he knew they would do? How could that possibly be just? OTOH, human beings are not omniscient, so they are justified in judging each other's uncoerced actions, since such judgments are seen to promote desirable "good" behavior and deter undesirable "bad" behavior. We can always take into account the limitations on such behavior--where it is coerced or unduly influenced. In the absence of coercion or undue influence, the behavior is judged to be freely taken. Not surprisingly, people disagree on whether behavior is good or bad, justified or unjustified. That's just human nature. I don't see what your problem is with this concept of free will as a basis for assigning responsibility to human actions.

 

[DBT]

There is no special dispensation for free will or for humans in the compatibilism I am describing. The ability to imagine alternative actions and to choose between them is present in every intelligent species. Birds have this ability. And if you've ever tried to keep squirrels out of your bird feeder you know that they are creative creatures that will always find a way (see Mark Rober's YouTube Video).

And I've also described how each thought in the choosing process is causally necessary from any prior point in time. All of these sub-events are causally necessary: encountering the issue, seeing alternative A, seeing alternative B, evaluating possibility A, evaluating possibility B, weighing the two alternative outcomes, and outputting the choice as a deliberate intention, the chosen thing that "I will do", and naming the other options as the things "I could have done, but didn't".

There is no special dispensation for the notion of "free will". It uses the notion of "freedom" the same way as every other type of freedom, by referencing a meaningful and relevant constraint that we are to be free from. And I provide several examples:

1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone opening a new account today.
4. I participated in Libet's experiments of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)

None of these uses of the term "free" require the imaginary "freedom from causal necessity". At least not until the incompatibilist shows up and starts insisting that free will must be treated differently from every other use of the notion of "free". And half of the incompatibilists, the hard determinists, agree with me that there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". To be "free from reliable cause and effect" would obliterate every freedom we have to do anything at all!

The imaginary "freedom from causation", with its embedded self-contradiction, creates the paradox: one cannot be free from reliable causation and still be free to cause stuff.

So, if there is any special usage going on here, it is by the incompatibilists. They apply a special (and impossible) requirement upon free will that is not required by any other use of the terms "free" or "freedom". And it is a requirement that should not apply to any freedom, because once you do, that freedom disappears. Setting the bird free from its cage would be impossible, because without reliable causation, flapping his wings would cause no reliable effect.

Oh, and similar to that special requirement, they also commonly insist that free will must include "freedom from oneself", another impossible freedom. They suggest that a person must be free from their own evolution, free from their own biology, and free from their own brains. Again, they apply none of these special requirements upon the bird when setting the bird "free" from its cage. It's still the same bird, but now it is free to fly away.

The hard determinist chooses to define free will in a way that erases it. The rest of us use the operational definition, which holds, even in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

There is nothing circular here. Either you see the problem with the incompatibilist position or you don't.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Free will only applies to choosing, because free will is a chosen "I will" that is free of coercion and other forms of undue or extraordinary influence. Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations. (It is also performed by the computer systems that we have created to perform logic that carries out our will.)

Coercion and undue influence, forcing a choice upon someone against their will, can apply to any intelligent living species (but not to our computing devices, which lack a will of their own). Coercion and undue influence does not apply to inanimate objects or living organisms without intelligence.

This has gone into repeat mode, a causal loop.

I can only point out that compatibilism fails at the point brain agency, that desire is shaped and formed by unconscious processes, upon which 'the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'

As it happens that the presence or consciousness has no bearing within a determined system, the conditions underpinning compatibilism must apply to all things within the system, therefore the universe is an example of free will.

Which is obviously not the case. The Universe doesn't have Will. The brain, while it generated urges and prompts in the form of 'will,' the brain does not function on the principle of will. Will is just another element of the system. Nothing special. Will is not free. Will is simply will.

 

[DBT]

There is no special dispensation for free will or for humans in the compatibilism I am describing. The ability to imagine alternative actions and to choose between them is present in every intelligent species. Birds have this ability. And if you've ever tried to keep squirrels out of your bird feeder you know that they are creative creatures that will always find a way (see Mark Rober's YouTube Video).

And I've also described how each thought in the choosing process is causally necessary from any prior point in time. All of these sub-events are causally necessary: encountering the issue, seeing alternative A, seeing alternative B, evaluating possibility A, evaluating possibility B, weighing the two alternative outcomes, and outputting the choice as a deliberate intention, the chosen thing that "I will do", and naming the other options as the things "I could have done, but didn't".

There is no special dispensation for the notion of "free will". It uses the notion of "freedom" the same way as every other type of freedom, by referencing a meaningful and relevant constraint that we are to be free from. And I provide several examples:

1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone opening a new account today.
4. I participated in Libet's experiments of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)

None of these uses of the term "free" require the imaginary "freedom from causal necessity". At least not until the incompatibilist shows up and starts insisting that free will must be treated differently from every other use of the notion of "free". And half of the incompatibilists, the hard determinists, agree with me that there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". To be "free from reliable cause and effect" would obliterate every freedom we have to do anything at all!

The imaginary "freedom from causation", with its embedded self-contradiction, creates the paradox: one cannot be free from reliable causation and still be free to cause stuff.

So, if there is any special usage going on here, it is by the incompatibilists. They apply a special (and impossible) requirement upon free will that is not required by any other use of the terms "free" or "freedom". And it is a requirement that should not apply to any freedom, because once you do, that freedom disappears. Setting the bird free from its cage would be impossible, because without reliable causation, flapping his wings would cause no reliable effect.

Oh, and similar to that special requirement, they also commonly insist that free will must include "freedom from oneself", another impossible freedom. They suggest that a person must be free from their own evolution, free from their own biology, and free from their own brains. Again, they apply none of these special requirements upon the bird when setting the bird "free" from its cage. It's still the same bird, but now it is free to fly away.

The hard determinist chooses to define free will in a way that erases it. The rest of us use the operational definition, which holds, even in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

There is nothing circular here. Either you see the problem with the incompatibilist position or you don't.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Free will only applies to choosing, because free will is a chosen "I will" that is free of coercion and other forms of undue or extraordinary influence. Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations. (It is also performed by the computer systems that we have created to perform logic that carries out our will.)

Coercion and undue influence, forcing a choice upon someone against their will, can apply to any intelligent living species (but not to our computing devices, which lack a will of their own). Coercion and undue influence does not apply to inanimate objects or living organisms without intelligence.

This conversation has gone into repeat mode, a causal loop.

I can only point out that compatibilism fails at the point brain agency, that desire is shaped and formed by unconscious processes, upon which 'the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'

As it happens that the presence or consciousness has no bearing within a determined system, the conditions underpinning compatibilism must apply to all things within the system, therefore the universe is an example of free will.

Which is obviously not the case. The Universe doesn't have Will. The brain, while it generated urges and prompts in the form of 'will,' the brain does not function on the principle of will. Will is just another element of the system. Nothing special. Will is not free. Will is simply will.

1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone opening a new account today.
4. I participated in Libet's experiments of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)

Semantics.
1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There is no special dispensation for free will or for humans in the compatibilism I am describing. The ability to imagine alternative actions and to choose between them is present in every intelligent species. Birds have this ability. And if you've ever tried to keep squirrels out of your bird feeder you know that they are creative creatures that will always find a way (see Mark Rober's YouTube Video).

And I've also described how each thought in the choosing process is causally necessary from any prior point in time. All of these sub-events are causally necessary: encountering the issue, seeing alternative A, seeing alternative B, evaluating possibility A, evaluating possibility B, weighing the two alternative outcomes, and outputting the choice as a deliberate intention, the chosen thing that "I will do", and naming the other options as the things "I could have done, but didn't".

There is no special dispensation for the notion of "free will". It uses the notion of "freedom" the same way as every other type of freedom, by referencing a meaningful and relevant constraint that we are to be free from. And I provide several examples:

1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from censorship).
3. The bank is offering a free toaster (free of charge) to anyone opening a new account today.
4. I participated in Libet's experiments of my own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)

None of these uses of the term "free" require the imaginary "freedom from causal necessity". At least not until the incompatibilist shows up and starts insisting that free will must be treated differently from every other use of the notion of "free". And half of the incompatibilists, the hard determinists, agree with me that there is no such thing as "freedom from causal necessity". To be "free from reliable cause and effect" would obliterate every freedom we have to do anything at all!

The imaginary "freedom from causation", with its embedded self-contradiction, creates the paradox: one cannot be free from reliable causation and still be free to cause stuff.

So, if there is any special usage going on here, it is by the incompatibilists. They apply a special (and impossible) requirement upon free will that is not required by any other use of the terms "free" or "freedom". And it is a requirement that should not apply to any freedom, because once you do, that freedom disappears. Setting the bird free from its cage would be impossible, because without reliable causation, flapping his wings would cause no reliable effect.

Oh, and similar to that special requirement, they also commonly insist that free will must include "freedom from oneself", another impossible freedom. They suggest that a person must be free from their own evolution, free from their own biology, and free from their own brains. Again, they apply none of these special requirements upon the bird when setting the bird "free" from its cage. It's still the same bird, but now it is free to fly away.

The hard determinist chooses to define free will in a way that erases it. The rest of us use the operational definition, which holds, even in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect.

There is nothing circular here. Either you see the problem with the incompatibilist position or you don't.

The objection here the selection of wording which affirms the consequent, that to act without compulsion or coercion or compulsion is an instance of free will when the whole universe operates without coercion or compulsion, that the simplest of animals, perhaps not self aware, can act without coercion or compulsion.

Free will only applies to choosing, because free will is a chosen "I will" that is free of coercion and other forms of undue or extraordinary influence. Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations. (It is also performed by the computer systems that we have created to perform logic that carries out our will.)

Coercion and undue influence, forcing a choice upon someone against their will, can apply to any intelligent living species (but not to our computing devices, which lack a will of their own). Coercion and undue influence does not apply to inanimate objects or living organisms without intelligence.

This has gone into repeat mode, a causal loop.

I can only point out that compatibilism fails at the point brain agency, that desire is shaped and formed by unconscious processes, upon which 'the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'

As it happens that the presence or consciousness has no bearing within a determined system, the conditions underpinning compatibilism must apply to all things within the system, therefore the universe is an example of free will.

Which is obviously not the case. The Universe doesn't have Will. The brain, while it generated urges and prompts in the form of 'will,' the brain does not function on the principle of will. Will is just another element of the system. Nothing special. Will is not free. Will is simply will.

Yes, I think that between the two of us we have covered the issue pretty well. Including these points ...

A desire is something we want to do. A will is a specific intention to do something. When faced with more than one thing that we want to do, we must choose from among our multiple options the single thing that we will do. Wherever within the brain this choosing happens (usually some combination of conscious and unconscious processing), we become aware of the choice as a conscious intent to do what we have chosen. This intent then motivates and directs our subsequent actions.

Free will is a freely chosen "I will". It has no meaning outside of a choosing operation. It is the subset of those choosing operations where the choosing was neither coerced nor unduly influenced. Thus, the universe does not have free will. Only the objects within the universe that perform choosing operations have, or don't have, free will in a given choice.

The brain of an intelligent species performs choosing. No other objects within the physical universe perform choosing, except for the computing machines that the brains of intelligent species have created.

I should probably add that all living organisms are biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. This may be viewed as a "biological will" that does not involve rational choosing, but only reflexive responses. With intelligence, we get the process of deliberation and a deliberately chosen will.

 

[Jarhyn]

Only intelligent species like us, the birds, the squirrels, etc., perform choosing operations.

This is not true. Every thing in the universe with physical form is capable of independent "decision" moments created by that physical form.

In many ways, the study of cause and effect is the study of the machinery of will and decision.

The only difference between a rock seeking its center of gravity and a human seeking food is the graph that mediates and directs the physical forces acting on it.

To maintain that "coercion and undue influence" do not apply to "inanimate" objects, you have to make a LOT of assumptions as to the difference of things that you have not impugned, meaningfully, AS different in the way you claim exists.

The fact that our decisions are a function of our material does not change the fact that we still decide.

It just happens that the behavior of a rock when acted upon by physical forces is a lot less complicated than the behavior of a pile of semi-flexible long chain chemicals.

My assumption is that we are using words to describe empirical reality more closely than is allowed by metaphor. While figurative statements are often used in human communication, they have one small drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false. For example, rocks do not perform a choosing operation.

Then humans do not perform choosing operations, humans do not choose, therefore humans don't have whatever you call free will.

This is not a metaphor. I am being absolutely literal. It is not "figurative" it is "set theoretical".

There is no real difference in quality between the activities of various electromagnetic charges whacking through a rock such that these pull and these creat pushes which define in a real sense which surface the stone ends on.

If the stone has been cut to a perfect cube, this operation changes. It's graph structure changes and different things happen.

Humans are fundamentally no different, we just have more complicated materials that squish in different ways from more complicated physical inputs. Instead of the mediating chemical structure of the reaction being the cohesive forces created by mere similar silica, aluminum, and oxygen in a tightly packed lump, it is the much more flexible nuclear forces which pump energy along sodium ion channels.

It's just force filtering through the object. We call the process of forces being translated by any given unit of material "decision".

It may not be that you like this reality for the fact of it's deterministic behavior. Determinism is certainly a philosophy full of failures of agency!

It is most certain that if some physical force includes peculiar waves that dent their material in such a way to deprive the entity of it's notion of agency, things go badly. Just because your decisions are made by a complicated network of much squishier chemistry does not change any of this.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

My assumption is that we are using words to describe empirical reality more closely than is allowed by metaphor. While figurative statements are often used in human communication, they have one small drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false. For example, rocks do not perform a choosing operation.

Then humans do not perform choosing operations, humans do not choose, therefore humans don't have whatever you call free will.

But we walk into a restaurant and observe other people who walk in, sit at a table, browse the menu, and place their order. This activity of inputting multiple options and outputting a single choice is what we call "choosing". So, in empirical reality, people actually do choose. And, at the end of their meal, the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

"This is not a metaphor. I am being absolutely literal. It is not "figurative" it is "set theoretical"."

People are literally choosing.

You seem to be saying that, due to determinism, it is AS If they were not choosing. Thus the figurative nature of the statement. But there they are, right in front of us, choosing from a literal menu of options what they will eat.

I don't know what "set theoretical" means.

There is no real difference in quality between the activities of various electromagnetic charges whacking through a rock such that these pull and these creat pushes which define in a real sense which surface the stone ends on.
If the stone has been cut to a perfect cube, this operation changes.

Right. If we change the shape of the rock, from round to cube, then it will no longer roll downhill easily.

It's graph structure changes and different things happen.

I only know "graph" as a two dimensional depiction of data. I don't think that affects the shape of the rock. But I'm open to learning something new.

Humans are fundamentally no different, we just have more complicated materials that squish in different ways from more complicated physical inputs. Instead of the mediating chemical structure of the reaction being the cohesive forces created by mere similar silica, aluminum, and oxygen in a tightly packed lump, it is the much more flexible nuclear forces which pump energy along sodium ion channels.

I have to disagree. In empirical reality, humans are fundamentally, different than rocks. You seem to be stretching to create a very broad metaphor, but I think it stretches a bit too far.

It's just force filtering through the object. We call the process of forces being translated by any given unit of material "decision".

I don't call forces being filtered through material, "decisions". You seem to be trying to build a likeness between two very unlike objects, the rock and the human brain.

It may not be that you like this reality for the fact of it's deterministic behavior. Determinism is certainly a philosophy full of failures of agency!

I have no problem with determinism. I'm a compatibilist. And I'm pretty sure that human agency is deterministic. But it is deterministic due to the fact that the process of rational choosing is deterministic. We logically evaluate our options when we make a choice. And we settle upon the option that best suits our own purposes, our own reasons, and our own interests.

When we perform this deterministic operation of "choosing what we will do", while "free of coercion and undue influence", then we call this "a freely chosen 'I will'", or simply "free will".

It is most certain that if some physical force includes peculiar waves that dent their material in such a way to deprive the entity of it's notion of agency, things go badly. Just because your decisions are made by a complicated network of much squishier chemistry does not change any of this.

The causal agency, of deciding for ourselves what we will do, is only impaired by coercion and other forms of undue influence. The fact that all of this takes place within a squishy human brain does not change any of this.

 

[none]

Marvin, it seems the input isn't options to me but stimulus.

 

[Jarhyn]

[failure to understand what graph means here]

"Graph" as used here is a highly technical term. It does not merely mean a "[n]-D depiction of data". In this term a graph is a definition of a set of relationships which ultimately define the sum total of action-reaction pathways.

It's not something that is easily picked up as an understanding.

For instance, I could provide the graph of a circuit. This would then imply a truth table, and that truth table describes behavior. The graph is determinant to the behavior.

Just because you don't consider the graph filtering and redirecting forces in particular ways "decision" does not change the fact of what is happening in reality. You have to meaningfully prove how these are different if you claim they are.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

[failure to understand what graph means here]

"Graph" as used here is a highly technical term. It does not merely mean a "[n]-D depiction of data". In this term a graph is a definition of a set of relationships which ultimately define the sum total of action-reaction pathways.

It's not something that is easily picked up as an understanding.

For instance, I could provide the graph of a circuit. This would then imply a truth table, and that truth table describes behavior. The graph is determinant to the behavior.

Just because you don't consider the graph filtering and redirecting forces in particular ways "decision" does not change the fact of what is happening in reality. You have to meaningfully prove how these are different if you claim they are.

The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality. It manipulates this model to imagine, evaluate, and choose. The choice reflects our own purposes and reasons, our own wants and desires, our own interests and goals.

The rock has no purposes. The rock cannot imagine or reason. The rock has no interests or goals. These differences suggest that the rock and the brain are functionally distinct.

While the rock is governed by the force of gravity, the brain is able to put its knowledge of gravity to use, catapulting rocks accurately against castle walls, and landing humans on the Moon. We can use physics, but physics cannot use us.

 

[skepticalbip]

[failure to understand what graph means here]

"Graph" as used here is a highly technical term. It does not merely mean a "[n]-D depiction of data". In this term a graph is a definition of a set of relationships which ultimately define the sum total of action-reaction pathways.

It's not something that is easily picked up as an understanding.

For instance, I could provide the graph of a circuit. This would then imply a truth table, and that truth table describes behavior. The graph is determinant to the behavior.

Just because you don't consider the graph filtering and redirecting forces in particular ways "decision" does not change the fact of what is happening in reality. You have to meaningfully prove how these are different if you claim they are.

The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality. It manipulates this model to imagine, evaluate, and choose. The choice reflects our own purposes and reasons, our own wants and desires, our own interests and goals.

The rock has no purposes. The rock cannot imagine or reason. The rock has no interests or goals. These differences suggest that the rock and the brain are functionally distinct.

While the rock is governed by the force of gravity, the brain is able to put its knowledge of gravity to use, catapulting rocks accurately against castle walls, and landing humans on the Moon. We can use physics, but physics cannot use us.

The ancient Greek philosophers would stringently disagree with that. Rock, being the element, "earth", seeks its level of tranquility below the elements of water, air, and fire... thus explaining why rocks fall or sink when dropped.

 

[none]

Didn't Caussius Clay murder a rock?

 

[Jarhyn]

The brain does not organize data into a model of reality.

The proper ordering of words which you seek, and which makes your earlier statement wrong is:

The brain is an organization of matter which instantiates a model of reality.

That organized model of reality is a function of chemistry, and physics. Note that phrase "function of". I use it in exactly the mathematical meaning.

We have no purposes either. Nothing has "purpose", other than to be what it is, though sometimes what it is is "something which applies vector against its current trajectory". Sometimes it is not. The process by which that happens can be great and complicated or small and mean.

The process is still defined by the relationship of the matter and particles and waves and things not quite either mostly "there" but not exactly but being as such in fixed ways; and by the ways in which the matter and other stuff may in fixed ways be.

This is, when deconstructed, nothing more than a very complicated graph. Rocks when graphed as such are "rigid". Humans have a lot more mess in their matter, is all, and that mess does some really complicated shit as the forces of nature interact with it but it's still that mess doing the shit it does in response to the forces of nature. That the graph is LARGE and REALLY fucking complicated does not change that fact.

The more interesting part of it is the way that graphs of smaller but more chaotic ("meaningless") complexity are incorporated into graphs of much more consistent form with much more "directed" behavioral truth... but this does not change the fact that it is still "just" a graph.

Now, when that graph has a shape that, when projected into behavior that acknowledges that forethought and understanding and the like have value, that just tends to preserve important aspects of the graph!

Saying "the universe is deterministic" does not change the reality of that "survival value" of "acknowledging that one is an agency in the world, and a powerful one, even and especially unto tomorrow."