Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

His actions are not consistent with his beliefs. The beliefs and the actions do not cohere.

What he believes is not a choice within a determined system. Choice implies the possibility of making an different decision when presented with a set of options. There is no such possibility within a determined system, And as some have pointed out, if block time/eternalism is true, time itself is an illusion.

Not only does choice imply the possibility of making a different decision, it logically demands it. In order for choosing to happen, (1) there must be at least two options, for example A and B, and (2) it must be possible to choose either one, "I can choose A" is a true statement and "I can choose B" is also a true statement.

Both of these conditions must be met before the next step: the comparative evaluation of option A versus option B. If "I cannot choose A" is true, then the operation comes to a screeching halt. We simply do B, without any consideration of option A. In the same fashion, if "I cannot choose B" is true, then we exit choosing and simply do A, without any consideration of option B.

Thus, it is a logical necessity that "I can choose A" is true and also "I can choose B" is true. Otherwise, choosing breaks! And, given how our species has gained a significant survival advantage from having the choosing operation, it is best not to break it. So, please don't.

The "ability to do otherwise", that is, the ability to choose A plus the ability to choose B, is built into the operation, right there at the start. And, because it is necessary for the logic of the operation, it true by logical necessity.

And it is built into the logic of our language. What we "can" do is different from what we "will" do. What we "can" do, we may do, or we may never do. It exists in the context of this uncertainty as to what will happen. What we "will" do implies certainty.

Another way to see the distinction is that what "can" happen constrains what "will" happen, but what "will" happen does not constrain what "can" happen.

Now, how does all this fit into a deterministic view of reality? It's simple. Each of the mental events that happen during choosing is reliably caused by previous mental events. The process of choosing is fully deterministic.

Not only is our choice causally necessary, but the issue that caused us to begin the choosing operation was also causally necessary, and each of the possibilities that come to mind were causally necessary, and the thoughts and feelings that occurred to us as we considered out options were also causally necessary, and the result of our evaluation was causally necessary, making our choice causally necessary.

It was causally necessary that there would be more than one possibility. It was causally necessary that "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" would both be true statements.

Thus it was causally necessary that we would have the "ability to do otherwise".

And, assuming we chose A, it was both causally necessary that we "would" have chosen A (past tense of "will") and also causally necessary that we "could" have chosen B (past tense of "can").

That is how the ability to do otherwise shows up as a causal necessity within a fully deterministic universe.

The notion that determinism implies that we "could not" have done otherwise is simply false. The technically correct statement is that we "would not" have done otherwise.

 

[fromderinside]

Independent verification from empirical evidence is how courts of law operate. My understanding is that when someone pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity" that there will be evidence presented from both sides to determine whether the mental disorder related to the crime in a causative way. If so, then that mental illness is held responsible for what happened, and the illness would be subject to corrective measures through psychiatric treatment. The same would apply to matters of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Whether the coercion or undue influence was responsible for the behavior would be matters of empirical evidence. If coercion is involved then the person holding the gun is held responsible and subject to correction. If undue influence, for example, if a parent involves their minor child in a crime, then the parent is held responsible and subject to correction.

...

.

Your first statement isn't true. Your understanding is very incomplete. Courts operate in the worlds of law and subjective data. Nothing really material here not even is there much to which one can refer as empirically determined. Obviously aspects of scientific method are used to analyze data from a scene. That activity does not raise the level of evidence to empirically determined. It is no more than plotting random numbers on a graph illustrating a mathematical function which does not raise the data to material or objective. It is still random data. One may express a probability from it but one cannot show cause from it.

 

[none]

Maybe this is a philosophical argument that I'm just not understanding.
Free noun will noun
Noun noun, doesn't make sense to me.
Maybe it's semantics. Free being an adjective and epistemologic failure.

Actually, "free" is an adjective, not a noun. It modifies the head noun "will". The question at issue here is the nature of the freedom, whether it is fully or partially determined. From the perspective of an external observer, everything that happens in a deterministic system has an identifiable cause. However, an agency within the system can only be aware of what it interacts with in some detectable way. In a chaotic deterministic system, interactions are only knowable in principle. They are internally unpredictable, from the perspective of the elements and components of the system. The concept of "free will" only makes sense when an agent is operating in uncertain circumstances--without conscious knowledge of all the factors that determine its decisions or the outcomes of its future actions. Calculating what move to make next is a free choice. It is free to make whatever choices it believes will most likely effect a desirable outcome.

Thank you for your post. Enlightening.
Chaotic might have too much baggage, maybe stochastic is better?

 

[Copernicus]

Maybe this is a philosophical argument that I'm just not understanding.
Free noun will noun
Noun noun, doesn't make sense to me.
Maybe it's semantics. Free being an adjective and epistemologic failure.

Actually, "free" is an adjective, not a noun. It modifies the head noun "will". The question at issue here is the nature of the freedom, whether it is fully or partially determined. From the perspective of an external observer, everything that happens in a deterministic system has an identifiable cause. However, an agency within the system can only be aware of what it interacts with in some detectable way. In a chaotic deterministic system, interactions are only knowable in principle. They are internally unpredictable, from the perspective of the elements and components of the system. The concept of "free will" only makes sense when an agent is operating in uncertain circumstances--without conscious knowledge of all the factors that determine its decisions or the outcomes of its future actions. Calculating what move to make next is a free choice. It is free to make whatever choices it believes will most likely effect a desirable outcome.

Thank you for your post. Enlightening.
Chaotic might have too much baggage, maybe stochastic is better?

The term "chaotic" implies unpredictability, and that is the point. Choice is a property of agents within a system. In a very real sense, robots have a choice when they encounter and analyze a new environmental condition. AI researchers use well-known  nondeterministic programming techniques to address how a program might respond to an unforeseen event, for example, an obstacle in the path of a moving robot. However, robots have very limited functionality when compared with biological agents, which alter their behavior (or "programming") as they gain more experience and information about their environment. So they can't really acquire new ways to get around obstacles, except in a very rudimentary sense.

Let me give you an example from an experience I had when I once visited a NASA site that was demonstrating a voice-operated "Mars rover" that an astronaut directed to take soil samples. We actually had an "astronaut" dressed up in a space suit who gave voice commands. The astronaut commanded the rover to advance to a location and examine a rock. It didn't budge, even after repeated commands. We all stood around for nearly an hour while the technical team tried to figure out why the robot would not obey a simple command. It turned out that a critical optical sensor was covered with dust, and the robot simply had no way to calculate its path without the information. Unfortunately, it didn't "know" that it was temporarily blinded, and it had no routine for reporting its condition to the human operator. So the solution was to build in a check for such a condition and an ability to explain its poor "health" to the operator. Intelligent biological agents have that ability built in. They are "self-aware", because self-awareness is a survival advantage that evolution would naturally select for over time in complex moving organisms.

My point is not to say that robots have "free will" in a human or animal sense. They are not machines with complex evolved brains. Yet. It is just to say that "free will" is a necessary condition that has actually become a goal in the field of robotics, because autonomous vehicles need to be aware of not just external environmental conditions, but they have to be aware of their own abilities to carry out their goals. Not only is self-awareness a desirable attribute of robots, but the ability to learn from experience and alter their own behavior is also a very desirable attribute. In terms of this discussion, my point is to emphasize the fact that making choice under uncertain, chaotic conditions requires agents, whether artificial or naturally evolved, to be able to analyze, calculate, and plan actions to address unforeseen changes to the environment. Those are fully determined processes, and they are the essence of what we ordinarily mean by "free will".

ETA: My Toyota Prius has a censor that tells me when tire pressure is low in one of the tires. The car itself can't do anything but inform me with a sensor indication in a dash panel display. It is up to me to examine the tires and figure out what to do. I would infinitely prefer the car to be able to change its own flat tire, but technology has not yet advanced to the point where that is feasible.

 

[none]

Hmm I'm not totally convinced chaotic it's the right word.
To me it implies intent and from what I can tell the world is surrounded by an indifferent soup so to speak where flies emerge.
What year was it when you you saw the demonstration at the NASA facility?

 

[DBT]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

 

[DBT]

Thank you for your post. Enlightening.
Chaotic might have too much baggage, maybe stochastic is better?

The term "chaotic" implies unpredictability, and that is the point. Choice is a property of agents within a system. In a very real sense, robots have a choice when they encounter and analyze a new environmental condition. AI researchers use well-known  nondeterministic programming techniques to address how a program might respond to an unforeseen event, for example, an obstacle in the path of a moving robot. However, robots have very limited functionality when compared with biological agents, which alter their behavior (or "programming") as they gain more experience and information about their environment. So they can't really acquire new ways to get around obstacles, except in a very rudimentary sense.

Let me give you an example from an experience I had when I once visited a NASA site that was demonstrating a voice-operated "Mars rover" that an astronaut directed to take soil samples. We actually had an "astronaut" dressed up in a space suit who gave voice commands. The astronaut commanded the rover to advance to a location and examine a rock. It didn't budge, even after repeated commands. We all stood around for nearly an hour while the technical team tried to figure out why the robot would not obey a simple command. It turned out that a critical optical sensor was covered with dust, and the robot simply had no way to calculate its path without the information. Unfortunately, it didn't "know" that it was temporarily blinded, and it had no routine for reporting its condition to the human operator. So the solution was to build in a check for such a condition and an ability to explain its poor "health" to the operator. Intelligent biological agents have that ability built in. They are "self-aware", because self-awareness is a survival advantage that evolution would naturally select for over time in complex moving organisms.

My point is not to say that robots have "free will" in a human or animal sense. They are not machines with complex evolved brains. Yet. It is just to say that "free will" is a necessary condition that has actually become a goal in the field of robotics, because autonomous vehicles need to be aware of not just external environmental conditions, but they have to be aware of their own abilities to carry out their goals. Not only is self-awareness a desirable attribute of robots, but the ability to learn from experience and alter their own behavior is also a very desirable attribute. In terms of this discussion, my point is to emphasize the fact that making choice under uncertain, chaotic conditions requires agents, whether artificial or naturally evolved, to be able to analyze, calculate, and plan actions to address unforeseen changes to the environment. Those are fully determined processes, and they are the essence of what we ordinarily mean by "free will".

ETA: My Toyota Prius has a censor that tells me when tire pressure is low in one of the tires. The car itself can't do anything but inform me with a sensor indication in a dash panel display. It is up to me to examine the tires and figure out what to do. I would infinitely prefer the car to be able to change its own flat tire, but technology has not yet advanced to the point where that is feasible.

A brain in turn can do nothing that is not enabled by the circuitry of its neural networks, performing its evolutionary function as determined by architecture, memory and inputs. A failure of any of these elements disrupting rational function.

A brain is a rational system. Its function or will is determined.

 

[fromderinside]

Maybe this is a philosophical argument that I'm just not understanding.
Free noun will noun
Noun noun, doesn't make sense to me.
Maybe it's semantics. Free being an adjective and epistemologic failure.

Actually, "free" is an adjective, not a noun. It modifies the head noun "will". The question at issue here is the nature of the freedom, whether it is fully or partially determined. From the perspective of an external observer, everything that happens in a deterministic system has an identifiable cause. However, an agency within the system can only be aware of what it interacts with in some detectable way. In a chaotic deterministic system, interactions are only knowable in principle. They are internally unpredictable, from the perspective of the elements and components of the system. The concept of "free will" only makes sense when an agent is operating in uncertain circumstances--without conscious knowledge of all the factors that determine its decisions or the outcomes of its future actions. Calculating what move to make next is a free choice. It is free to make whatever choices it believes will most likely effect a desirable outcome.

I like what you write.

However we need to account for the fact what what we do at our time t is actually based upon what happened at t- minus something. In that collage of inputs in process since what we are about to do there are contradicting indications we should do what we plan to do which may be practically available to us. We have a window, just like all macroscopic things, to do otherwise.

I argue this is not free will. It is competing input within the scope of action, cause, that brings uncertainty to any action. If there is adequate determinism as suggested by those who argue the influence of uncertainty in quantum behavior isn't relevant to deterministic behavior of large things making up the macroscopic world then any chance for freely choosing is lost rather than possible.

Not only is uncertainty washed out, but deterministic competition in a sense spread window also washes out possibilities of freely choosing. Even if there are mechanisms that permit overrides of planned behavior they are of planned behavior to previous conditions, reflecting more recent previous processing, changing current assessment of best choice to past inputs rather than free choice.

Let me reemphasize. If there is process charting another response it is swamped by the problem of being out of date so certainly would not be free in any normal respect. The above constraints apply to any scheme of being of two minds at any interval in any place.

I hope you get all the convolutions involved. They are clear to me but I'm an old pfart whose senses have eroded.

 

[The AntiChris]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

Compatibilism describes free will as we experience it in the real world.

Hard determinism describes a 'free will' that cannot exist in any possible world.

It seems perverse to insist that compatibilism "fails" (post #69) and, presumably, hard determinism does not.

 

[fromderinside]

Compatibilism describes free will as we experience it in the real world.

Hard determinism describes a 'free will' that cannot exist in any possible world.

It seems perverse to insist that compatibilism "fails" (post #69) and, presumably, hard determinism does not.

Compatibilism cannot exist in the whatever real world you imagine since we don't operate in that real world. We're living in the past.

 

[none]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

Compatibilism describes free will as we experience it in the real world.

Hard determinism describes a 'free will' that cannot exist in any possible world.

It seems perverse to insist that compatibilism "fails" (post #69) and, presumably, hard determinism does not.

Look a squirrel!

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

Yes. It is a matter of what we call things in a given context. When assessing a person's responsibility for criminal behavior, "free will" refers to cases where a person deliberately decides to commit the crime for their own interest at the expense of others. "Coercion" refers to cases where a person is forced to do something against their will.

You see both in the case of a bank robber who points a gun at the bank teller and tells her, "Fill this bag with money or I'll kill you". The robber has deliberately chosen to rob the bank (free will). But the teller would never voluntarily give him the bank's money except under threat (coercion). This distinction leads us to treat the bank teller differently than the bank robber. To correct the bank teller's behavior (handing over the bank's money to the robber) all that is needed is to remove the threat of being shot. To correct the bank robber's behavior will require securing him in prison, so that he doesn't rob anyone else, and attempting to change his future behavior through rehabilitation programs that give him better options for acquiring money in the future.

All of these actions, by the robber, by the teller, and by us, are equally deterministic, and causally necessary from any prior point in time. And one might imagine determinism itself as a causal agent bringing about these events. But that is neither helpful nor correct. There is nothing that we can do about causal necessity.

In order to deal with the problem of crime, we need to deal with the specific causes of specific effects. We need to deal with the causes of the robber's behavior, the social conditions that allow or encourage people to choose to commit crime. And we must have the notion of our own responsibility to motivate us to address the social issues. And even if we could fix society overnight, we would still need to address and correct the bank robber's behavior.

So, yes, it is a matter of what we call things in context.

I hope you've noticed that I have not been "dismissing anything to the contrary". I've repeatedly affirmed that all events, even the thoughts going through our heads right now, are causally necessary from any prior point in time. This is a logical fact derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each event is the reliable result of prior events.

Because causal necessity is a universal fact, a fact that we can do nothing about, it makes little sense to call it the "cause" of anything. A cause is only "meaningful" if it efficiently explains why the event happened. And a cause is only "relevant" if we can actually do something about it. There is clearly nothing that anyone can do about causal necessity. And tracing the cause of any event all the way back to the Big Bang is not meaningful. To say that the Big Bang has already chosen what I will have for breakfast this morning does not help me to make that choice. All of the meaningful and relevant causes of that choice are in my own head.

 

[OLDMAN]

When I think of free will debate, I often think of the term "Snowball's chance in hell." Children who grow up in poor household conditions with bad parental examples have those experiences to draw upon to make decisions. It isn't a slam dunk that they will make bad decisions, but it certainly would have to be offset by other influences. If we have free will it is certainly tainted by imput.

 

[Swammerdami]

The conflict between free will and determinism has always confused me. I think OP does a good job of addressing this conflict.

Do Calvinists believe in determinism? My ancestor John Brown was a Calvinist lay preacher who became one of America's greatest heroes and a martyr. Rather than just laying in bed and day-dreaming ("Ho hum; it's all pre-ordained anyway!"), he went out and committed acts of great heroism and self-sacrifice.

 

[none]

The conflict between free will and determinism has always confused me. I think OP does a good job of addressing this conflict.

Do Calvinists believe in determinism? My ancestor John Brown was a Calvinist lay preacher who became one of America's greatest heroes and a martyr. Rather than just laying in bed and day-dreaming ("Ho hum; it's all pre-ordained anyway!"), he went out and committed acts of great heroism and self-sacrifice.

It's all context.
In a theoretical context maybe it does work , I really don't care because practically there is something out there in a practical context and between myself and it there is something.
Maybe that is too cryptic. Or practical.
I tried to illustrate this principle of context in a thread about "Absolute Truth", sure people rejected it because in theory it just wasn't practical or it was practical but not theoretical.
It doesn't matter.
To me what matters is the "If" in Einstein's quote.

 

[WAB]

OK, I said I would not return to this topic again - but I have changed my mind. My mind, being my personal film version of a silly battle between Bill and William (will explain later), has decided to once again step into the fray.

All I want to do right now is say that no, Calvinists do not teach fatalism. While they teach predeterminism (fore-ordination), a person is emboldened to witness to the truth that Christ is the Savior and the Only way to God and Heaven, the ONLY way to salvation. Faith, not works. However, one must still evangelize, and be a witness to Christ. And one must still do good works. One must not just be a wanton hedonist and stumble through life drunk and horny, being a wretched nuisance to society and no good to one's self: rather, one must be upright and forthright and even fifthright, and tell everyone about the good news, especially loved ones. A father who does not witness to his child and allows the child to be a wanton profligate and wayward sinner will have his comeuppance! For he is a coward and a sloth and a dastardly doer of evil by neglect and a deleterious lack of gratitude!, etc, etc, etc&...

Come along, Concord, for we must marry the free with the imprisoned, and free the bird from its cage so that Lynyrd Skynyrd shall rise to glory!

 

[DBT]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

Compatibilism describes free will as we experience it in the real world.

Hard determinism describes a 'free will' that cannot exist in any possible world.

It seems perverse to insist that compatibilism "fails" (post #69) and, presumably, hard determinism does not.

Compatibilism takes a selected slice of our experience and declares this selected slice of reality to be 'free will' without regard to what it happens to contradict. There lies the problem.

 

[DBT]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

Yes. It is a matter of what we call things in a given context. When assessing a person's responsibility for criminal behavior, "free will" refers to cases where a person deliberately decides to commit the crime for their own interest at the expense of others. "Coercion" refers to cases where a person is forced to do something against their will.

You see both in the case of a bank robber who points a gun at the bank teller and tells her, "Fill this bag with money or I'll kill you". The robber has deliberately chosen to rob the bank (free will). But the teller would never voluntarily give him the bank's money except under threat (coercion). This distinction leads us to treat the bank teller differently than the bank robber. To correct the bank teller's behavior (handing over the bank's money to the robber) all that is needed is to remove the threat of being shot. To correct the bank robber's behavior will require securing him in prison, so that he doesn't rob anyone else, and attempting to change his future behavior through rehabilitation programs that give him better options for acquiring money in the future.

All of these actions, by the robber, by the teller, and by us, are equally deterministic, and causally necessary from any prior point in time. And one might imagine determinism itself as a causal agent bringing about these events. But that is neither helpful nor correct. There is nothing that we can do about causal necessity.

In order to deal with the problem of crime, we need to deal with the specific causes of specific effects. We need to deal with the causes of the robber's behavior, the social conditions that allow or encourage people to choose to commit crime. And we must have the notion of our own responsibility to motivate us to address the social issues. And even if we could fix society overnight, we would still need to address and correct the bank robber's behavior.

So, yes, it is a matter of what we call things in context.

I hope you've noticed that I have not been "dismissing anything to the contrary". I've repeatedly affirmed that all events, even the thoughts going through our heads right now, are causally necessary from any prior point in time. This is a logical fact derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each event is the reliable result of prior events.

Because causal necessity is a universal fact, a fact that we can do nothing about, it makes little sense to call it the "cause" of anything. A cause is only "meaningful" if it efficiently explains why the event happened. And a cause is only "relevant" if we can actually do something about it. There is clearly nothing that anyone can do about causal necessity. And tracing the cause of any event all the way back to the Big Bang is not meaningful. To say that the Big Bang has already chosen what I will have for breakfast this morning does not help me to make that choice. All of the meaningful and relevant causes of that choice are in my own head.

Context limited to a select set of conditions can fail on a larger context.

What may appear to be real and true from a limited perspective - the sun appears to travel across the sky therefore geocentrism - doesn't necessarily represent the world at large.

That compatibilism chooses a set of select conditions, conditions that affirm the consequent, to support its conclusion disregards the big picture, thus reducing its argument to word play.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Yes. It is a matter of what we call things in a given context. When assessing a person's responsibility for criminal behavior, "free will" refers to cases where a person deliberately decides to commit the crime for their own interest at the expense of others. "Coercion" refers to cases where a person is forced to do something against their will.

You see both in the case of a bank robber who points a gun at the bank teller and tells her, "Fill this bag with money or I'll kill you". The robber has deliberately chosen to rob the bank (free will). But the teller would never voluntarily give him the bank's money except under threat (coercion). This distinction leads us to treat the bank teller differently than the bank robber. To correct the bank teller's behavior (handing over the bank's money to the robber) all that is needed is to remove the threat of being shot. To correct the bank robber's behavior will require securing him in prison, so that he doesn't rob anyone else, and attempting to change his future behavior through rehabilitation programs that give him better options for acquiring money in the future.

All of these actions, by the robber, by the teller, and by us, are equally deterministic, and causally necessary from any prior point in time. And one might imagine determinism itself as a causal agent bringing about these events. But that is neither helpful nor correct. There is nothing that we can do about causal necessity.

In order to deal with the problem of crime, we need to deal with the specific causes of specific effects. We need to deal with the causes of the robber's behavior, the social conditions that allow or encourage people to choose to commit crime. And we must have the notion of our own responsibility to motivate us to address the social issues. And even if we could fix society overnight, we would still need to address and correct the bank robber's behavior.

So, yes, it is a matter of what we call things in context.

I hope you've noticed that I have not been "dismissing anything to the contrary". I've repeatedly affirmed that all events, even the thoughts going through our heads right now, are causally necessary from any prior point in time. This is a logical fact derived from the notion of a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Each event is the reliable result of prior events.

Because causal necessity is a universal fact, a fact that we can do nothing about, it makes little sense to call it the "cause" of anything. A cause is only "meaningful" if it efficiently explains why the event happened. And a cause is only "relevant" if we can actually do something about it. There is clearly nothing that anyone can do about causal necessity. And tracing the cause of any event all the way back to the Big Bang is not meaningful. To say that the Big Bang has already chosen what I will have for breakfast this morning does not help me to make that choice. All of the meaningful and relevant causes of that choice are in my own head.

Context limited to a select set of conditions can fail on a larger context.

What may appear to be real and true from a limited perspective - the sun appears to travel across the sky therefore geocentrism - doesn't necessarily represent the world at large.

That compatibilism chooses a set of select conditions, conditions that affirm the consequent, to support its conclusion disregards the big picture, thus reducing its argument to word play.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

We have already agreed that universal causal necessity is true throughout the largest possible context, the universe, and also within every piece and part of it.

And I've described repeatedly how universal causal necessity is true even throughout the more limited context of simply choosing what we will do. All of the mental events that occur during that process are each causally necessary from any prior point in time.

Now you can switch back and forth between those two contexts as much as you want, and causal necessity remains a constant in each context.

But, the choosing event is certainly a smaller context than the whole universe of events. And free will only exists within the context of those choosing events, because it happens to be the name of a specific type of choosing event. Free will refers to that subset of choosing operations in which the intelligent species imagines two or more options, estimates the likely outcomes of each option, and chooses for itself the option that it believes is best. Coercion refers to a different subset of all choosing events, where the intelligent species is forced to do something against its will. Other forms of undue influence would fill out the remaining set of "all choosing events".

The universal context simply overlooks the details. So, ironically, it turns out to be the view that limits information, the view that fails to take in all of the information available. I would not go so far as to suggest, as you do, that the selective universal view is "thus reducing its argument to word play." But if it fits one then it fits the other. The universal context hides the details. The detailed context is actually closer to the truth.

Choosing only happens when we want to do multiple things, and must decide which of those things we will do. Free will is literally a freely chosen "I will". The wants may be causally determined by other prior causes, but the prior cause of the chosen "I will" is the choosing operation.

If you wish to address the specifics of the article you linked to, then please feel free to specify any of the issues raised there, and I'll be happy to try and answer any of your questions.

 

[Copernicus]

Nonsense. Words have no significance outside of a discourse contexts. The same string of words can mean entirely different things in different contexts. All you seem to be doing here is insisting on your linguistic usage for the term "free will", and that is why you can't understand compatibilism. It is grounded in recognition of the ambiguity of a term that collapses into one unambiguous sense only in different contexts.

But that is essentially what I am saying.

I said, words are symbols used to communicate information. What words happen to be used in reference to matters, how the premises are selected matters, what they refer to matters. The compatibilist argument sets out a set of conditions for what it calls 'free will' that makes it inevitable that these conditions are met, at which point it follows that these are examples of free will.

The problem being that the conditions as laid out (premises) do not account for the big picture, they do not account for a number of critical factors, the nature of determinism and that determinism acts equally upon all things, instead, compatibilism selects a set of conditions that suit the conclusion, that this equals free will while dismissing anything to the contrary.

Compatibilism is in a sense a form of self-fulfilling prophesy, affirming the consequent: “If it’s a dog, then it growls. It growls. Therefore, it’s a dog.” Or perhaps - X → Y ; I don't like Y; therefore X"

DBT, I continue to believe that you miss the point completely, and I think that Marvin has been saying essentially the same thing, albeit a little differently. Compatibilism fully embraces the "big picture". It does not contradict it or try to define "free will" in some other way that is incompatible with your position. That is why they call it "compatibilism" and not something else. What I don't think we've been able to get across to you is that there are other contexts in which it means something entirely different from the "big picture" one and that the debate becomes moot when one stops trying look at the issues from that one perspective. It is far more common to use the term in the way that Marvin has elaborated on--where "free" refers to freedom from restraint or undue influence. That does not in any way invalidate your "big picture" point of view, but it does suggest that the debate itself is rather pointless. "Free will" is a fully determined process in your "big picture" scenario, but it is fully predictable from a godlike perspective, where knowledge of all outcomes is perfect. So agents in the system have no freedom to choose an action other than they one they are compelled to choose. That doesn't look like any kind of "freedom". It is still a fully determined process in the "small picture" scenario, but that concept hangs on the perspective of an agent inside the big picture, who has to make choices in an environment that is only partially predictable. So that looks more like "freedom" in the sense that the agent has no perfect knowledge of outcomes.

Thank you for your post. Enlightening.
Chaotic might have too much baggage, maybe stochastic is better?

The term "chaotic" implies unpredictability, and that is the point. Choice is a property of agents within a system. In a very real sense, robots have a choice when they encounter and analyze a new environmental condition. AI researchers use well-known  nondeterministic programming techniques to address how a program might respond to an unforeseen event, for example, an obstacle in the path of a moving robot. However, robots have very limited functionality when compared with biological agents, which alter their behavior (or "programming") as they gain more experience and information about their environment. So they can't really acquire new ways to get around obstacles, except in a very rudimentary sense.

Let me give you an example from an experience I had when I once visited a NASA site that was demonstrating a voice-operated "Mars rover" that an astronaut directed to take soil samples. We actually had an "astronaut" dressed up in a space suit who gave voice commands. The astronaut commanded the rover to advance to a location and examine a rock. It didn't budge, even after repeated commands. We all stood around for nearly an hour while the technical team tried to figure out why the robot would not obey a simple command. It turned out that a critical optical sensor was covered with dust, and the robot simply had no way to calculate its path without the information. Unfortunately, it didn't "know" that it was temporarily blinded, and it had no routine for reporting its condition to the human operator. So the solution was to build in a check for such a condition and an ability to explain its poor "health" to the operator. Intelligent biological agents have that ability built in. They are "self-aware", because self-awareness is a survival advantage that evolution would naturally select for over time in complex moving organisms.

My point is not to say that robots have "free will" in a human or animal sense. They are not machines with complex evolved brains. Yet. It is just to say that "free will" is a necessary condition that has actually become a goal in the field of robotics, because autonomous vehicles need to be aware of not just external environmental conditions, but they have to be aware of their own abilities to carry out their goals. Not only is self-awareness a desirable attribute of robots, but the ability to learn from experience and alter their own behavior is also a very desirable attribute. In terms of this discussion, my point is to emphasize the fact that making choice under uncertain, chaotic conditions requires agents, whether artificial or naturally evolved, to be able to analyze, calculate, and plan actions to address unforeseen changes to the environment. Those are fully determined processes, and they are the essence of what we ordinarily mean by "free will".

ETA: My Toyota Prius has a censor that tells me when tire pressure is low in one of the tires. The car itself can't do anything but inform me with a sensor indication in a dash panel display. It is up to me to examine the tires and figure out what to do. I would infinitely prefer the car to be able to change its own flat tire, but technology has not yet advanced to the point where that is feasible.

A brain in turn can do nothing that is not enabled by the circuitry of its neural networks, performing its evolutionary function as determined by architecture, memory and inputs. A failure of any of these elements disrupting rational function.

A brain is a rational system. Its function or will is determined.

We could quibble over whether it makes sense to call the brain a "rational system", but that would quickly take us off topic. I would prefer to say that we are in repeatedly and fundamentally violent agreement about the physical underpinnings of systemic brain activity. I agree with you that the "will" is determined. I have never stopped agreeing with you on that. That would be a silly thing for a "compatibilist" to do, because I would be fundamentally arguing for an incompatibility with determinism. The disagreement has been largely over whether agents are in some sense "free" to make choices. To you, that freedom is illusory, because it means that they are constrained by causality--that they cannot actually do anything other than they end up doing. (And I resist the temptation to get into a discussion of causality from the perspective of quantum events here, since that would be another distraction.) Fine. However, there is another sense of "freedom" that supervenes on physical causality and has to do with the way agents calculate actions and evaluate consequences from a position of uncertainty about outcomes.