Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Jarhyn]

Causal determinism is the claim that all antecedent events entail or necessitate future events, including human acts, such that:

Given antecedents a, b, and c, I must do x.

This is a modal fallacy. Here’s the corrected argument:

Necessarily (given antecedents a, b, and c, I will [NOT MUST!] do x.) If I do y instead, than a DIFFERENT set of antecedents would have been true. (Free will restored.)

I know, DBT will be spluttering, “But, but, antecedent circumstances WEREN’T different, they COULDN’T have been different, therefore you must do what you do, yada yada. …”

But they could have been different and that is the point! They just WEREN’T different! It COULD have been the case that Hitler died in childbirth and we skip WWII and so on, but he lived and so we got WWII. All that is necessarily true in this case is that there is only ONE history; but that history is always contingent.

I assume this is in response to my concerns.

I'm not sure how this justifies your claim that "A subject does have the ability to do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances". What you say above is that if he does do otherwise then "a DIFFERENT set of antecedents would have been true" - it wouldn't be in exactly the same circumstances.

Just to make sure I'm clear then, you and I are on the same page about "could" operating in the linguistic/mathematical space wherein it assumes some truth of the state which is not a given?

That it is true only of the presumed state, not necessarily the actual future state. This relationship to the state, the relationship of "if (X n U State) == State", is what makes it "could".

"Did" is determined by Could n when (X n U State) = State.

It is always the case that If X n U State == State, then..., Even when X n U State != State.

This is because the statement is not speaking to the current state but this other one being described.

So, I at the very least argue that "could" assumes something of the state and to do so is sensible so as to evaluate and decide of could, which one we will do; and thus we are back at free will: we stand here as the arbiter of this particular choice. We are the choice function and when that choice function fucks up, it either chooses to fix itself or someone will do some fixing upon it.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So by "same circumstances" you mean different circumstances.

No. Within the same circumstances, we happen to encounter a choice that requires us to choose between two things that we can do, say A and B. By logical necessity, "I can choose A" is true. By logical necessity, "I can choose B" is also true. If we choose A, then it is true to say that "I chose A, but I could have chosen B".

"I could have chosen B" is true because it implies that under different circumstances I would have chosen B instead of A.

Within the same circumstances we can imagine different circumstances.

 

[The AntiChris]

Just to make sure I'm clear then, you and I are on the same page about "could" operating in the linguistic/mathematical space wherein it assumes some truth of the state which is not a given?...

I'm afraid I'm struggling to follow the point you're attempting to make. It doesn't help that I don't actually use the word "could" in the piece you quoted. Could you have another go but but pitched at a slightly less technical (layman's terms) level?

 

[The AntiChris]

So by "same circumstances" you mean different circumstances.

No. Within the same circumstances, we happen to encounter a choice that requires us to choose between two things that we can do, say A and B. By logical necessity, "I can choose A" is true. By logical necessity, "I can choose B" is also true. If we choose A, then it is true to say that "I chose A, but I could have chosen B".

"I could have chosen B" is true because it implies that under different circumstances I would have chosen B instead of A.

Within the same circumstances we can imagine different circumstances.

You're not really addressing the points I'm attempting to make (my fault I guess).

Of course, within a set of circumstances I could choose A or B, but that identical set of circumstances will always (if determinism is true) result in the same choice - there exists no ability to do otherwise in identical circumstances. It follows therefore that different actions will never be instantiated given the same circumstances.

That we could contemplate other choices is of no interest to incompatibilists, their focus of concern is that we will always only ever make the same choice and conclude (mistakenly in my view) that we are not truly free.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Of course, within a set of circumstances I could choose A or B, but that identical set of circumstances will always (if determinism is true) result in the same choice

Correct.

- there exists no ability to do otherwise in identical circumstances.

There is the "ability" to do otherwise, however you "will" not do otherwise, even though you "could".

It follows therefore that different actions will never be instantiated given the same circumstances.

Correct. You've used the word "will", which is exactly right. If you had said different actions "can" never be instantiated it would be incorrect. What "can" happen is not the same as what "will" happen.

That we could contemplate other choices is of no interest to incompatibilists, their focus of concern is that we will always only ever make the same choice and conclude (mistakenly in my view) that we are not truly free.

Contemplating other choices is the basis for words like "can", "ability", "possibility", "option", etc. If you use any one of those words we will be no longer talking about actualities, but instead about possibilities. Possibilities exist solely within the imagination (you know, that place where we contemplate things).

And a question for you: What do you mean by the term "truly free"?

 

[fromderinside]

That parcel of BS that does nothing exactly ever

Apparently you did nothing exactly ever than either because where you see nothing happen, ostensibly because you slacked off at your job I see neurons increasing and decreasing charge potentials all over the place: I see objects doing things.

This is because you have FAILED MISERABLY in observing that every "subjective thing" is also an object. Every single one.

"Tall" is "subjective" between people: it means something different to me than you normally.

But when I define "tall", we can objectively say whether something meets that subjective definition. Because while you do not consider the thing subjectively "tall" it is unarguably "3 meters in length".

Fundamentally, we cannot say that there is an objective standard of beauty either, but we can objectively say whether something meets a subjective standard of beauty.

When we get to such precise things as "NAND gate" and "requirement" we are in fact talking about general object types which have objectively met those definitions.

This is what you seem to not want to acknowledge. That it isn't subjective that these objects have these properties.

It's just not up for subjective debate whether the dwarf feels happy. "Happy" for the dwarf is defined to semantic completeness.

What makes him happy is arbitrary, subjective, but the happiness itself is objectively happening.

I actually earned something from the failed notion of introspection. The idea that anything subjective is something objective is ludicrous. That which is subjective is perceived by one, the same one who is receiving second hand evidence of reality by way of evolving senses. Obviously no actual realty there nor real objects. There are only second hand interpretations of only what is sensed.

You need to explain away why there are difference between reality and perceptions to dismiss differences between reality and subjectivity. Unless experiments independent of filtering by a mind are conducted there is no way to achieve such. That is why Introspection or anything involving product of mind isn't science.

 

[The AntiChris]

- there exists no ability to do otherwise in identical circumstances.

There is the "ability" to do otherwise, however you "will" not do otherwise, even though you "could".

I guess this all hangs on "ability".

According to determinism a specific state of affairs (SoA) will only ever produce one outcome - that SoA has no capability (ability) to produce any other outcome. There is no possibility that it "could".

And a question for you: What do you mean by the term "truly free"?

I mean that imaginary state of affairs that exists only in the minds of some incompatibilists (such as DBT) who insist there is no freedom in a deterministic universe. What did you think I meant?

 

[DBT]

Necessity;
Necessity is the idea that everything that has ever happened and ever will happen is necessary, and can not be otherwise. Necessity is often opposed to chance and contingency. In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.

''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.''

And there you go again, cherry-picking an essay you apparently did not read. I have addressed this upthread.

You miss the point. That is the nature of necessitation within a determined system. It's entailed in the definition given by compatibilists on this forum. No deviation from the big bang and ever after means that events proceed precisely what as described in the quote.

There is no wriggle room. Stomp your feet, wail and gnash your teeth, given no possible deviation or alternate action: ''In a necessary world there is no chance. Everything that happens is necessitated.''

That is the point, like it or not.

It is you who misses the point. Why don’t you address the rest of the article, which refutes the opening lines that you chery-picked? It seems strange to invoke an essay or a writer that disagrees with your position, but you’ve done that inthe past, so …

No, it's you. If necessitation is refuted, the compatibilist definition of determinism is also, by default refuted.

In other words, there is no determinism as defined by compatibilists on this forum.

And as the compatibilist claim happens to be that free will is compatible with the given definition of determinism.....which you say is refuted, you have just negated the validity of compatibilism.

You still didn’t read the rest of the article that you cherry-picked? And yet, in this very post to which I’m responding, you cherry pick the essay again.

Let me quote from that essay (among other salient quotes) the following:

Necessity must be limited to its proper use in logic

The problem is that causal determinism does NOT imply “necessity.” That’s an unwarranted add-on of HARD determinists, not CAUSAL determinists.

Are you seriously trying to tell us that it was NECESSARY that Lee Harvey Oswald killed JFK on Nov. 22, 1963, because of the big bang?

That is precisely what the definition of determinism that Marvin gave states and entails. Also entailed in Jarhyn's.

Have you not read it?

I have quoted it numerous times. Perhaps you don't understand it or its implications.

Here it is again; ''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Do you see the bit where he states that events ''proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.''

Do you understand the implications of this claim? And that it's not just me saying it?

Do you understand the implications of all events proceeding without deviation from the big bang to this moment?

That if all events proceed without deviation from the big bang to this moment without deviation, the big bang is time t and the way things go ever after are fixed by natural law.

Plus, as explained numerous times, the terms hard determinism and soft determinism refers to free will, not the given definition of determinism, which stands as given.

Necessity applies to formal logic. It is necessary that triangles have three sides. it is necessary that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessary that two plus two equals four. And so on.

The article you cherry-picked quotes Leibniz as distinguishing between necessary necessity and contingent necessity. The latter today is also known as physical necessity or more fancily, nomic or nomological necessity. The philosopher whom I’ve quoted previously, Norman Swartz, argues that there is no valid modal category of nomological necessity.

The article that you cherry-picked goes on to state that “…some future events that are possible do not occur by necessity from past external factors alone, but might depend on us. We have a choice to assent or not assent to an action.”

As as been argued forever now, the fact that I WILL do x, given antecedents a, b, and c, does not mean that I MUST do x, only that I WILL do x. That’s it, full stop. To confuse WILL and MUST is a modal fallacy, as I’ve explained umpteen times to no discernible effect.

You miss the point. If all events proceed without deviation from the big bang to this point, as defined by compatibilists, everything that happens, happens necessarily. Without deviation means that every incremental state of the world is entailed by its prior state and id just as fixed as triangles having three sides and two plus two equals four.

The problem here is that you have not grasped the nature and significance of determinism, not according to what I say, but what is entailed in the given definition.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

I did not cherry pick the article. The quote simply represents the given definition of determinism; no deviation, all events entailed by the prior state of the system, no choice, no alternate action....like three sides to a triangle and two plus two equals four....


Necessitation;
''Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation.'' - J. W. N. Watkins, "Between Analytic and Empirical," Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 121, p. 114:

 

[DBT]

How is it choice when all events proceed without deviation from the big bang and how things go ever after?

You're hanging onto the figurative sense. Your argument is based upon the notion that "if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened".

It's not figurative. If determinism is true, as you yourself define it, it is literal and objective.
There is no 'as if' - there are literally, objectively, no alternate actions.

That is what 'no deviation' entails. If there is some deviation, chosen or not, your definition is false.

The problem is that every figurative statement is literally false. Choosing is something that people actually do in the real world. We observe ourselves and others making choices all the time. Making choices is an indisputable event actually happening in physical reality. So, the claim that it does not exist is objectively false.

Again, if the world is determined, that events proceed without deviation from the big bang to the present moment and beyond, what we see are people acting out their determined actions.

We are no privy to the underlying casual activity which is the evolving state of the system, prior state to current state to future state, what we see are the inevitable actions of the process of - ''these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

 

[Jarhyn]

The idea that anything subjective is something objective is ludicrous

Ah, so you then believe "a painting of a pipe" (subjective) is not also a piece of canvas with various materials applied to it stretched over a square frame of wood with several square frames of cardboard laid atop it, a pane of glass laid upon that, and a wooden frame assembled around all of it with a wire across the back?

You deny this is the case?

Again FDI loudly proclaiming that objects aren't objects.

 

[pood]

DBT, don’t you find it ludicrous to quote Marvin Edwards, who is a compatibilist like me and disagrees with you? Why do you quote so many people, inlcluding links offsite, who don’t actually agree with your position?

I’ll attend to the rest of your stuff later, but in the meantime I suggest you cut the condesencsion, which at this point borders on trolling. The fact of the matter is I know far more about all this stuff than you do, whether you like it or not.

 

[Jarhyn]

I guess this all hangs on "ability".

According to determinism a specific state of affairs (SoA) will only ever produce one outcome - that SoA has no capability (ability) to produce any other outcome. There is no possibility that it "could".

So I've been trying to simplify my language for a while, and I will admit, it is HARD because this is a very hard thing to communicate concisely:

"Could", for me and for most, does not operate in the context of "Actual state of affairs".

First we take all the "regular laws" of the universe and keep them.

Then, we take all the state of the universe, copy that, and assume something of it. I will call this "image" of the state of affairs StateB.

So, in a lot more words than normal "could" is "in this moment he will IF the SoA is StateB."

Let's assume that this is not the case for the sake of discussion, that SoA is not StateB.

It is a TRUE statement that "in this moment he will IF the SoA is StateB."

It will always a true statement. It will have always have been a true statement. This is because the statement does not say anything about the actuality of the SoA being StateB, it only discusses IF it were. It will always have been true that he "could".

What will not be true is that SoA is StateB, and thus while he could, he will not.

 

[pood]

That is precisely what the definition of determinism that Marvin gave states and entails. Also entailed in Jarhyn's.

Have you not read it?

I have quoted it numerous times. Perhaps you don't understand it or its implications.

Here it is again; ''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

Do you see the bit where he states that events ''proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.''

Do you understand the implications of this claim? And that it's not just me saying it?

DBT,

You ask me this question, and it boggles the mind. My irony meter doth explode.

Have YOU read, what I have written on this subject? Most recently, for chrissake, just upthread — I refer you to my posts numbered 2,956 and 2,959. Astonishingly, here you quote from that first post, which, along with the second post, gives you the answer to the question you are now so ludicrously asking!

Is that you are deliberately obtuse, or just have reading comprehension difficulties? In the spirit of charity I will assume the latter, and in so doing condescend to you as you do to others.

 

[pood]

As I have stated before — many times! — Marvin and I are in almost perfect substantive agreement, but we do have a terminological dispute. As I just explained upthread, and many times before, I do not recognize a modal category called “causal necessity.” Is that clear enough, DBT? You know, I was just talking about that … nomic necessity, nomological necessity, physical necessity … how did you miss that, DBT?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I guess this all hangs on "ability".

Yes. So, what is an "ability"? It is something that you "can" do if you choose to do it. It is not something that you "will" do. You may choose to do it or you may choose not to do it. In either case, whether you do it or not, you retain the ability to do it. The ability does not disappear if you choose not to do it.

According to determinism a specific state of affairs (SoA) will only ever produce one outcome

Correct.

- that SoA has no capability (ability) to produce any other outcome. There is no possibility that it "could".

The fact that only one thing will happen does not logically imply that it was the only thing that was "possible" or the only thing that "could" have happened. The fact that only one thing will happen only implies that it is the only thing that would happen.

Generally speaking, a given state of affairs has no "capabilities" at all to do anything. However, a person (which may in some sense be regarded as a state of affairs) has the ability to perform the choosing function.

Within the rational causal mechanism we find concepts specifically used by different functions to accomplish their work. For example, the addition function inputs a series of numbers, adds them together, and outputs a sum. In a similar fashion, the choosing function inputs a series of options, evaluates and compares them, and outputs a choice.

A first step in the choosing process is to consider what we have the ability to do and what we simply cannot do. If we determine that we do not have the ability to implement a given option, then it is impossible to us, and we exclude it from further consideration.

All of the surviving options are considered real possibilities, because we do have the ability to actually accomplish that option if we choose to do so. The next step would be to estimate the likely result of choosing each option. Finally, we would choose the option that we believe will produce the best result for us.

The choosing operation, like addition, logically requires at least two inputs. For addition, we require at least two numbers. For choosing, we require at least two options. For addition, it must be possible to add the two numbers. For choosing, it must be possible to choose either option. These are true by logical necessity, because they must be true in order for the function to work.

The fact that we will choose only one option does not logically imply that we could not choose the other option. We had the same ability to choose one option as we did to choose the other.

 

[Jarhyn]

DBT,

You ask me this question, and it boggles the mind. My irony meter doth explode.

Have YOU read, what I have written on this subject? Most recently, for chrissake, just upthread — I refer you to my posts numbered 2,956 and 2,959. Astonishingly, here you quote from that first post, which, along with the second post, gives you the answer to the question you are now so ludicrously asking!

Is that you are deliberately obtuse, or just have reading comprehension difficulties? In the spirit of charity I will assume the latter, and in so doing condescend to you as you do to others.

Personally, I assume the former, though I don't think "the DBT that is talking to us" is exactly "the DBT that is being deliberate about the obtuseness."

There are various processes "in other people's minds." Sometimes these processes are "visible to the agent which speaks back to you" and others are not.

To exemplify this, I will use an immediate example:

I have an employee.

This employee was interacting with a coworker.

This employee was flirting with the coworker.

This employee did not know that they were flirting.

It in fact took them some time to figure out that they ever had been flirting with their coworker.

The process that sought to flirt, wanted to flirt, and flirted was visible in the basis and nature of this intent, to their active conscious agent, the one which if you ask "what is it you are doing right now?" Would respond with perfect honesty in all it's awareness "talking about ___".

This piece, this "ego", of course, has the ability to reason and learn. It has the ability to observe the state of the senses and memory, if not the state of this other process whose existence is "to flirt" and which is being "given the horn" so to speak in this event of flirtation.

After a little while and several mentions of a boyfriend already existing, though, the coworker figured out what they were doing.

While this process of "FLIRT" was exerting control, it was not visible to the ego that it was happening at all.

Of course, he can learn to keep a better eye on "flirt". And he better, or he's not going to remain an employee.

As such, I think a much more powerful and buried element of DBT operates here. I think it's a piece born of an existential crisis resolved only through dissolution of the ego and the ignoring of their power to control their actions.

This piece directs their response and also a large measure of their attention, I gather, namely refusing to contribute some necessary element of attentive weighting to even allow consideration of such. Perhaps it has even severed attentive control, or he has never first established it but it is only all the more his loss.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Your argument is based upon the notion that, if the choice was inevitable since the big bang, then it is AS IF choosing never really happened.

It's not figurative. If determinism is true, as you yourself define it, it is literal and objective.

The test between literal and figurative is simply to objectively observe what is actually happening in the real world. For example, we watch people in the restaurant reading the menu and placing their orders. This corresponds to the definition of "choosing". From the Oxford English Dictionary: "To take by preference out of all that are available; to select; to take as that which one prefers, or in accordance with one's free will and preference."

Each customer in the restaurant, who orders the dinner they prefer from those available on the menu, is choosing. That is what is literally happening.

To claim that it is not really happening is objectively false. Thus the only way to account for your claim is figurative thinking.

 

[The AntiChris]

I guess this all hangs on "ability".

Yes. So, what is an "ability"? It is something that you "can" do if you choose to do it.

This is a possible sense of "ability" but I would have thought the context in which I've used the word made it quite clear this is not how I've used it (the stipulation "in exactly the same circumstances" should have left you in no doubt that I was deliberately eliminating any possibility of alternative choosings).

Variations on the expression "ability to do otherwise under identical conditions" are quite common in hard incompatibilist criticisms of free will so I don't think my use of the word is particularly idiosyncratic.

The problem for me is that when you claim that we can do otherwise and DBT insists that we can't you're not talking about the same thing.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So, what is an "ability"? It is something that you "can" do if you choose to do it.

This is a possible sense of "ability" but I would have thought the context in which I've used the word made it quite clear this is not how I've used it

Do you have any specific definition of "ability" that is different from the one I gave?

(the stipulation "in exactly the same circumstances" should have left you in no doubt that I was deliberately eliminating any possibility of alternative choosings).

How is choosing possible without at least two real possibilities to choose from?

Whenever a choosing event shows up in the causal chain, there will always be at least two real possibilities to choose from, and it will always be possible to choose either one.

The method by which the incompatibilist eliminates possibilities is by claiming that anything that will not happen cannot happen.

The problem for me is that when you claim that we can do otherwise and DBT insists that we can't you're not talking about the same thing.

Then it sounds like you must make a choice. Think it over. Perhaps you'll find better words than mine.

 

[The AntiChris]

So, what is an "ability"? It is something that you "can" do if you choose to do it.

No, it's not. I don't have the ability to run a 4 minute mile. Of course, if I'd trained hard and were a little younger... I can't just choose an ability into existence.

(the stipulation "in exactly the same circumstances" should have left you in no doubt that I was deliberately eliminating any possibility of alternative choosings).

How is choosing possible without at least two real possibilities to choose from?

This doesn't seem to follow from I said. I'm not eliminating choices, I'm eliminating multiple choosings. A single choosing is still a choice.

The method by which the incompatibilist eliminates possibilities is by claiming that anything that will not happen cannot happen.

You surely can see that the difference between 'will never happen' and 'cannot happen' exists only in the mind of philosophers. There's no practical distinction. This is only a problem if you think that could have done otherwise is a deal breaker for compatibilism. I don't.

The problem for me is that when you claim that we can do otherwise and DBT insists that we can't you're not talking about the same thing.

Then it sounds like you must make a choice. Think it over. Perhaps you'll find better words than mine.

I think I sense a little irritation here which is a shame because I genuinely think you present one of the most clearly thought through and persuasive defenses of compatibilism I've come across (I think it was probably my original link to your site that initiated your invitation to IIDB). It just seems to me that your exchanges with DBT have got a little bogged down recently and don't seem to be making any progress. I'm suggesting that one possible way forward is to challenge DBT's assumption that 'couldn't do otherwise' (in his sense of the expression) really does not threaten free will.