Compatibilism: What's that About?

[pood]

I just signed up and have mostly skimmed this thread, apologies, but I was attracted here by the posts of Marvin Edwards. His thinking seems to comport with mine, a line of thought I find rather underrepresented in the debate on causal determinism and free will.

As he has pointed out, there is a difference between will and must. It is a distinction so important that there is even a fallacy, from modal logic, attached to this confusion, called the modal scope or just modal fallacy.

Suppose today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. The worry, going back to the ancient Greeks, is that if this is right, tomorrow there must be a sea battle; fatalism obtains, and no one has free will.

The modal fallacy lies in confusing necessity (could not have been otherwise) with contingency (could have been otherwise).

In the case of the sea battle, if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, sure enough, tomorrow there will be a sea battle. But it does not follow that there must be a sea battle.

All that follows is that true propositions, and the events that they describe or predict, must match — otherwise the propositions would be false.

If, then, tomorrow there is not a sea battle, then a different prior proposition would have been true — today it is true that tomorrow there will not be a sea battle.

Suppose God exists and knows in advance everything that I will do. If he knows today that tomorrow I will eat eggs for breakfast, then, intuition inclines us to think, tomorrow I must eat eggs for breakfast. But, as with the sea battle example, this is a modal fallacy. It’s true if God knows in advance I will eat eggs for breakfast, then sure enough I will do so. But it doesn’t follow that I must do so. If I have pancakes instead, then God would have had a different propositional foreknowledge, viz., that I will eat pancakes for breakfast tomorrow.

So it is with causal determinism. Given a vast ensemble of antecedent events — stretching all the way to the Big Bang? — tomorrow there will be a sea battle, or tomorrow I will eat eggs. But neither has to be the case. Rather, if there is no sea battle, or I eat pancakes instead of eggs, then a different ensemble of antecedent events would have preceded these choices or events.

As Marvin notes, determinism does not hold sway over us or cause us to do anything. The laws of nature are descriptive and not prescriptive. In fact, the idea that the so-called laws of nature govern the universe seems to be a hangover from theism, in which we have a lawgiver laying down the laws. But with no lawgiver there are no laws, only descriptions of what happens in the world, including our own freely willed acts.

 

[none]

Yep, skip the details. Way to go.

 

[pood]

Yep, skip the details. Way to go.

Is that addressed to me? If so, I don’t follow. What details do you need?

 

[none]

Yep, skip the details. Way to go.

Is that addressed to me? If so, I don’t follow. What details do you need?

You simply refused to read the thread.

 

[pood]

Yep, skip the details. Way to go.

Is that addressed to me? If so, I don’t follow. What details do you need?

You simply refused to read the thread.

I did not refuse to read the thread. I noticed Marvin’s comments while skimming through the thread, just as I said, and wanted to comment in support of them.

 

[pood]

But thanks for the warm welcome to a new poster.

 

[none]

Your lack of interest is overwhelming.

 

[pood]

Your lack of interest is overwhelming.

If you have something substantive to say about my post, please do so. Otherwise I’ll just pass over your comments in silence.

 

[none]

Oh trust me I skimmed it.

 

[pood]

Oh trust me I skimmed it.

So you are attacking me because I freely admitted that I only skimmed this thread but was attracted to this discussion by Marvin’s posts? I even offered apologies for that. It does not follow that I refused to read this thread, as you claimed. I simply have not had time to do so yet. This, in your mind, precludes me from responding to Marvin and giving my own thoughts which I believe dovetail with his? Don’t bother answering, it is a rhetorical question. Your unjustified attacks on me do not speak well of this forum so far. I hope this is the exception rather than the rule, but we’ll see.

 

[none]

Yeah.
Um, so you accidentally did it or was a conscious decision?

 

[pood]

Yeah.
Um, so you accidentally did it or was a conscious decision?

Accidentally did what? Never mind, it’s another rhetorical question. As mentioned, from now on I’ll pass over your stuff in silence, unless, unlikely as it may seem, you have some sort of substantive response to what I wrote or will write. Again, I hope, and for the moment trust, that you are not a fair specimen of this board.

 

[none]

You made a post.
That much I know, at least some here would agree.
I'm interested in how it got there. If you are not willing to discuss that, fine.
This is the philosophy section, a thread about compatiblism.
There are others on this thread more eloquent than myself, how did that happen?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I just signed up and have mostly skimmed this thread, apologies, but I was attracted here by the posts of Marvin Edwards. His thinking seems to comport with mine, a line of thought I find rather underrepresented in the debate on causal determinism and free will.

As he has pointed out, there is a difference between will and must. It is a distinction so important that there is even a fallacy, from modal logic, attached to this confusion, called the modal scope or just modal fallacy.

Suppose today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. The worry, going back to the ancient Greeks, is that if this is right, tomorrow there must be a sea battle; fatalism obtains, and no one has free will.

The modal fallacy lies in confusing necessity (could not have been otherwise) with contingency (could have been otherwise).

In the case of the sea battle, if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, sure enough, tomorrow there will be a sea battle. But it does not follow that there must be a sea battle.

All that follows is that true propositions, and the events that they describe or predict, must match — otherwise the propositions would be false.

If, then, tomorrow there is not a sea battle, then a different prior proposition would have been true — today it is true that tomorrow there will not be a sea battle.

Suppose God exists and knows in advance everything that I will do. If he knows today that tomorrow I will eat eggs for breakfast, then, intuition inclines us to think, tomorrow I must eat eggs for breakfast. But, as with the sea battle example, this is a modal fallacy. It’s true if God knows in advance I will eat eggs for breakfast, then sure enough I will do so. But it doesn’t follow that I must do so. If I have pancakes instead, then God would have had a different propositional foreknowledge, viz., that I will eat pancakes for breakfast tomorrow.

So it is with causal determinism. Given a vast ensemble of antecedent events — stretching all the way to the Big Bang? — tomorrow there will be a sea battle, or tomorrow I will eat eggs. But neither has to be the case. Rather, if there is no sea battle, or I eat pancakes instead of eggs, then a different ensemble of antecedent events would have preceded these choices or events.

As Marvin notes, determinism does not hold sway over us or cause us to do anything. The laws of nature are descriptive and not prescriptive. In fact, the idea that the so-called laws of nature govern the universe seems to be a hangover from theism, in which we have a lawgiver laying down the laws. But with no lawgiver there are no laws, only descriptions of what happens in the world, including our own freely willed acts.

I take a slightly different approach. Unlike Dennett, I have no qualms about using the word "inevitable". Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.

If my choice is inevitable, then it was also inevitable that it would be me, and no other object in the physical universe, that would do the choosing. In other words, my being "that which controls the choice" is also inevitable.

And, it will also be inevitable that, either I will make this choice of my own free will, or, my choice will be coerced or otherwise unduly influenced. So, my making this choice for myself, that is, of my own free will, would have been inevitable.

I don't think I can go along with the assessment of "must". Causal necessity would seem to logically imply a "must". The fact that I would make the choice of my own free will, was something that must happen, but the most meaningful and relevant cause of that choice would be me. The final responsible prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

However, we would not normally assert that a sea battle must happen tomorrow, unless we were certain that the battle would take place. And if we were indeed certain, then we would not waste time on philosophy, but would instead busy ourselves making every preparation we could to assure that we would win that battle. Fatalism would prove fatal.

Prediction is not causation. So, even though a man's choice for dinner could theoretically be predicted in advance by an omniscient being (God, Laplace's Daemon, or his wife), it would still be him making that choice, for his own reasons.

I don't think we need to trace the causes of our actions back to the Big Bang. All we really care about are the most meaningful and relevant causes, the causes that efficiently explain why the event happened, and the causes that we can actually do something about.

 

[pood]

Marvin,

I think we mostly agree here, though perhaps are using slightly different terminology.

I am skeptical of the idea of causal necessity. This is also called physical or nomological necessity, and I don’t believe it exists. Necessity pertains entirely to logic, I think. It is necessarily true that triangles have three sides. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessarily true that two plus two equals four, and so on. It is not necessarily true that I will have breakfast tomorrow, even if God foreknows I will or if there is a true prior proposition that I will.

Except for the “universal causal/necessity” part, I agree with you on this:

Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.

[/QUOTE]

For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.

But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?

If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.

 

[pood]

Crap, I’ve totally screwed up the quote formats. Let me try to edit.

 

[pood]

This should be a clean version:

Marvin,

I think we mostly agree here, though perhaps are using slightly different terminology.


I am skeptical of the idea of causal necessity. This is also called physical or nomological necessity, and I don’t believe it exists. Necessity pertains entirely to logic, I think. It is necessarily true that triangles have three sides. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessarily true that two plus two equals four, and so on. It is not necessarily true that I will have breakfast tomorrow, even if God foreknows I will or if there is a true prior proposition that I will.

Except for the “universal causal/necessity” part, I agree with you on this:

Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.

For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.

But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?

If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.

There does not seem to be a preview post function here?

 

[Bomb#20]

I take it by "has been demonstrated" and "have been given", you're referring to some incident where you blerk-will debaters, after borrowing a word from the broader community and redefining it under the baleful influence of a theistic religion and using it to commit equivocation fallacies, and after some in the broader community took back our word and used it correctly, told us you own the word now.

No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....

That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.

and determinism by definition does not allow us the option of doing otherwise in any given instance.

I.e., you're using an idiosyncratic definition of "option".

Everything id fixed as a matter of natural law.

No. "The only thing constant is change". Hardly anything is fixed as a matter of natural law: the speed of light, the quantum of action, the excess of matter over antimatter, and a handful of other things. Everything else changes constantly.

Will plays no part in freedom.

To simply claim that uncoerced behaviour is free will ignores the role of will, the inevitability or necessity of determinism and the nature of cognition.

That's what I said: you're de facto claiming that your lot own the word "free". You don't. Whatever it is about the role of will and the nature of cognition that you are claiming would have to be otherwise in order for your concept of "free" to correctly apply to them, you have no case for thinking "free" is an appropriate word for your concept.

Which reduces compatibilism to mere word play.

When you take a word that's already in common use, you redefine it, and then you tell the original users they're using it wrong, you're the one who's doing mere word play.

Again:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''

See, this is the point where blerk-will debaters break out of their navel-gazing and inflict their equivocation fallacies on broader philosophy. Free will and moral judgment don't have to go together. I know cats pretty well at this point, having lived with them my whole life; it's obvious they have free will. That doesn't make us judge them in moral terms. Morality evolves like everything else in biology, so of course species makes a difference. Humans have human morals; monkeys have monkey morals; dogs have dog morals; cats have no morals.

Quote:
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

I.e., the author is claiming he owns the word "free". Also the word "could", the word "fixed", and the word "unchangeable". (Also he's committing an ordinary non sequitur in statement 2: just because an action isn't determined doesn't mean we can't intentionally change the odds.)

 

[Marvin Edwards]

This should be a clean version:

Marvin,

I think we mostly agree here, though perhaps are using slightly different terminology.


I am skeptical of the idea of causal necessity. This is also called physical or nomological necessity, and I don’t believe it exists. Necessity pertains entirely to logic, I think. It is necessarily true that triangles have three sides. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessarily true that two plus two equals four, and so on. It is not necessarily true that I will have breakfast tomorrow, even if God foreknows I will or if there is a true prior proposition that I will.

Except for the “universal causal/necessity” part, I agree with you on this:

Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.

For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.

But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?

If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.

There does not seem to be a preview post function here?

The Preview button is in the upper right corner. The icon looks like a piece of paper with a magnifying glass. It's a toggle, so clicking it again returns to edit mode.

The block universe is a bit of fiction used to depict a deterministic universe. No such block exists in empirical reality. Time is the distance between events. Events are changes in the structure and location of objects. No object can be in different places at the same time, we simply do not have room for that.

No event is fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. The meaningful causes are usually the most direct causes of the event. As we trace the causes of causes back through the chain, each cause becomes less meaningful and less relevant, and more incidental.

So, nothing in the future is already fixed. Causal necessity only means that future events will be necessitated by prior events. And that seems to be the case when we look around us at what is happening and the most recent history of the prior events leading up to the current events. In fact, we may view history as the proof of causal necessity.

The necessity you were describing is called "logical necessity". And just like it is logically necessary that 2 + 2 = 4, it is also logically necessary that every choosing operation begins with at least two real possibilities, two things that we can choose to do. For example, when choosing between A and B, it is logically necessary that "I can choose A" must be true and equally necessary that "I can choose B" is also true. If either is false, then choosing halts, because it is impossible to choose between a single possibility.

So, "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must both be true statements, by logical necessity. And, at the end of our choosing operation, this guarantees that we end up with one "I will choose X" (A or B) and one "I could have chosen Y" (B or A).

The ability to do otherwise comes built-in, free of charge, with the choosing operation.

If I shift my weight to my left leg, and lift my right leg, then I will necessarily take one step. This is not a logical necessity, but a physical necessity. If I choose to walk to the kitchen, then I will necessarily walk to the kitchen. That is neither a logical nor a physical necessity, but rather a rational necessity, brought about by my reasoned choice to go there.

 

[pood]

1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise

2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible

4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable

5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

1. Does it? Or does it merely require that she would have acted otherwise, given different antecedent circumstances? There is a difference between “would” and “could.
2. Ok.
3. Why? If some events are not determined, then they are part of the historical stream of events that one considers in making a choice.
4. Why would free will involve changing anything? If you act in some fashion, you have not changed history. You have played a small part in making history be, what it in fact is.
5. I believe this is a non sequitur. I would say, rather, that free will depends upon determinism. To me, determinism just means that there are regularities in the world that are described, but not prescribed, by the so-called laws of nature. For sentient creatures to exist at all there must be regularities so that we can reliably predict the outcomes of our free acts. A world of unpredictable chaos would probably not have life at all, at least not life as we know it, to borrow from Mr. Spock.