Compatibilism: What's that About?

[steve_bank]

When you want to eat something, why choose one food over another?

Maybe the OP should be titled imagining quantum uncertainty and how it may relate to free will.

To m indeterminate has several contextual meanings.

When I see the word indeterminate my first thought is a causal physical problem with an insufficient number of variables to mathematically solve the problem.

 

[DBT]

Compatibists understand that indeterminism doesn't support free will and that determinism doesn't allow alternate options to be realized in any given instance .....therefore a semantic construct is offered; acting in accordance with one's will.

Never mind that acting in accordance with one's will is necessitated with no deviation from whatever is determined.

Or that freedom by definition requires the possibility to do otherwise in each instance...which of course is impossible within a determined system.

And around and around it goes....but, but, but, but......!!

 

[fromderinside]

The hard determinist's interpretation of reliable causation, as a monster that strips us of our control and our freedom, is spreading a false view of reliable cause and effect. The fact that we ourselves have prior causes does not change the fact that we ourselves are the true prior causes of new events.

... What exits us is cause to only the thing or event to which we are responding. We don't cause.

I don't think one can say on the one hand that our reactions cause effects, and then claim that we don't do any causing. Even if every action were a reaction, we would still be doing a heck of a lot of causing.

Our reaction doesn't become cause. That does not make us causal. Whatever exits from us is effect from external cause. Yes we are external to what we react. That doesn't make us causal since we are reacting.

No, that's still not making sense to me. Let's try an example. The Covid-19 virus reacts to its external environment by invading living cells and using that cell's material to reproduce itself. Do we, or do we not, consider the virus to be the "cause" of a disease?

Every living organism is biologically driven to survive, thrive, and reproduce. Each species is the cause of changes in its own environment, whether it be trees growing into a forest or the bees pollenating them. No living organism is merely an effect. Every effect is itself a cause.

To claim otherwise would deny the fundamental meaning of causal necessity!

It's a lame claim to say our response is cause since we are generally reactive beings. Think of things this way :whatever we do is effect."

A lame claim? It's a simple observation of nature. And if "whatever we do is effect", then why wouldn't this be true of our each of our prior causes as well? If we must pass that test then so must those prior causes. You would no longer have "causal necessity", because you would no longer have any "causes".

We convert food to usable energy but that is purely mechanical, er, biological.

And where did we get the food? Well, we got the food from the grocery store, but the food was caused by the farmers. The farmers caused the food to grow by causing the land to be tilled, causing the seeds to be planted, causing the ground to be fertilized and watered, causing the wheat and corn to be harvested.

We are thermodynamic middlemen. No intent formed. No information in no response. Information in to what we react is a effect of our position relative to our situation which is keeping things the way they are.

I'm pretty sure that the truckers and the packagers and the salesmen are the middlemen between us and the farmer.

We may deceive ourselves that we intend something when all we do is react.

Actually, taking your viewpoint seriously would be a self-deception. Humans have evolved words and concepts that help us to describe a real world rich in its variety and functions. The hard determinists seem intent upon removing these tools of our survival one by one. First goes "free will", then goes "responsibility", then goes "self", and now even "causation" exits stage right until nothing is left. All of our meaningful distinctions disappear one by one until:

It's turtles all the way down.

Well, let's hope that one of those turtles can drive a tractor...

I have a single response to all your protestations. I never said we caused anything. I said we react. If other things react to our reactions that only suggests whatever caused us to react also caused others to react to our reaction. We are but players in what caused us to react we never take on attributes of cause, we only express effect. The meaning of determinism is in there.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Compatibists understand that indeterminism doesn't support free will

Correct.

and that determinism doesn't allow alternate options to be realized in any given instance .....

Assuming we are speaking of mutually exclusive options, no one ever expects them both to be realized. Only one will be chosen, the other is the one you could have chosen, but didn't.

Both were choosable and both were realizable, if chosen. But only one was realized. The other option was a real possibility that was never actualized.

It's important to keep these things straight.

... therefore a semantic construct is offered; acting in accordance with one's will.

Free will is about one's freedom to choose one's will ("I will" do something) from a number of realizable options ("I can" do this and "I can" do that, but what "will" I do?).

Never mind that acting in accordance with one's will is necessitated with no deviation from whatever is determined.

Actually, it is the choosing that causally determines the will. That's how free will works.

Or that freedom by definition requires the possibility to do otherwise in each instance...which of course is impossible within a determined system.

Like I said above, given mutually exclusive options, no one ever expects both options to be realized. One of them becomes what you "will" do, the other becomes what you "could have" done, but didn't.

And around and around it goes....but, but, but, but......!!

Yes, apparently it does. What do you suppose we might do about this? Philosophy could, if it chooses, simply reframe their argument to be about whether "causal necessity" holds or not. Their argument would be "determinism versus indeterminism" rather than "determinism versus free will". After all, the opposite of determinism is indeterminism, not free will. And the opposite of free will is a will subjugated by coercion or undue influence, not determinism.

But they've mixed up and confused two very different subjects of study and debate. And that is why there is no resolution to be found. They say that "a problem well defined is half solved". But we do not have a well-defined problem.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I have a single response to all your protestations. I never said we caused anything. I said we react. If other things react to our reactions that only suggests whatever caused us to react also caused others to react to our reaction. We are but players in what caused us to react we never take on attributes of cause, we only express effect. The meaning of determinism is in there.

I hear you. You are saying there are no causes, there are only effects. That literally means that there are no prior causes, but only prior effects. So, how does that actually change how we behave? What is the significance of a world of reactions, with no control to be found anywhere?

 

[fromderinside]

I have a single response to all your protestations. I never said we caused anything. I said we react. If other things react to our reactions that only suggests whatever caused us to react also caused others to react to our reaction. We are but players in what caused us to react we never take on attributes of cause, we only express effect. The meaning of determinism is in there.

I hear you. You are saying there are no causes, there are only effects. That literally means that there are no prior causes, but only prior effects. So, how does that actually change how we behave? What is the significance of a world of reactions, with no control to be found anywhere?

Bad hearing Marvin Edwards. I said causes are passed on in any sequence. That would be caused by there being something other than determinism operating. Determinism is controlled by "... everything after time t=0 ... are fixed by natural law."

You have just rewritten the definition of cause-effect to be, cause-effect, cause-effect, cause-effect ... . That is something different from determinism. Cause is the state of affairs at time = 0. It is not time equal zero, then repeat, repeat, repeat, ... Effect is everything after time t = 0.

 

[DBT]

Compatibists understand that indeterminism doesn't support free will

Correct.

and that determinism doesn't allow alternate options to be realized in any given instance .....

Assuming we are speaking of mutually exclusive options, no one ever expects them both to be realized. Only one will be chosen, the other is the one you could have chosen, but didn't.

Both were choosable and both were realizable, if chosen. But only one was realized. The other option was a real possibility that was never actualized.

It's important to keep these things straight.

Choice means realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow options, only what is determined. Within a determined system, choice is an illusion.

The action taken is the only action possible.

The very definition of freedom demands realizable alternatives.

Freedom;​

1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action.

What the brain does is necessitated by the information that acts upon its systems and the actions it produces.


Behavioral response:
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

Free will is about one's freedom to choose one's will ("I will" do something) from a number of realizable options ("I can" do this and "I can" do that, but what "will" I do?).

There is no freedom to choose one's will. There is no choice in what neural networks are doing. What happens within the system determines output. Damage, lesions, etc, is the state of the system that produces undesirable behavioral results, chemical imbalance is a state of the system that produces undesirable behavioral results...that a healthy, functional brain produces rational, adaptive behaviour is a state of the system that is no more subject to choice than lesions or chemical imbalances.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.''

Actually, it is the choosing that causally determines the will. That's how free will works.

No choice is made. Determined actions proceed as determined. No course of action is willed or subject to change. The is no negotiation or maneuverability within a determined system.....determined actions unfold without impediment.

Yes, apparently it does. What do you suppose we might do about this? Philosophy could, if it chooses, simply reframe their argument to be about whether "causal necessity" holds or not. Their argument would be "determinism versus indeterminism" rather than "determinism versus free will". After all, the opposite of determinism is indeterminism, not free will. And the opposite of free will is a will subjugated by coercion or undue influence, not determinism.

But they've mixed up and confused two very different subjects of study and debate. And that is why there is no resolution to be found. They say that "a problem well defined is half solved". But we do not have a well-defined problem.

Neither indeterminism or determinism are compatible with freedom of will.


Brain function;
Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.''

 

[The AntiChris]

The very definition of freedom demands realizable alternatives.

If by "realizable alternatives" you mean non-deterministic alternatives then, no, you're wrong.

The definition of "freedom" certainly does not demand indeterminism.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I have a single response to all your protestations. I never said we caused anything. I said we react. If other things react to our reactions that only suggests whatever caused us to react also caused others to react to our reaction. We are but players in what caused us to react we never take on attributes of cause, we only express effect. The meaning of determinism is in there.

I hear you. You are saying there are no causes, there are only effects. That literally means that there are no prior causes, but only prior effects. So, how does that actually change how we behave? What is the significance of a world of reactions, with no control to be found anywhere?

Bad hearing Marvin Edwards. I said causes are passed on in any sequence. That would be caused by there being something other than determinism operating. Determinism is controlled by "... everything after time t=0 ... are fixed by natural law."

You have just rewritten the definition of cause-effect to be, cause-effect, cause-effect, cause-effect ... . That is something different from determinism. Cause is the state of affairs at time = 0. It is not time equal zero, then repeat, repeat, repeat, ... Effect is everything after time t = 0.

The meaningful and relevant "cause" of an effect is that which we would change in order to bring about a different effect.

For example, a disease causes a pandemic illness, the illness causes medical research to discover that a virus is causing the disease. Knowing that the cause of the disease is a virus, causes scientists develop vaccines that will cause our immune systems to destroy the virus. That's a causal chain.

The meaningful and relevant "cause" of the specific covid-19 virus is prior versions of another virus undergoing natural mutations over time within some host species. Right now we are serving as a host species for the new virus, so it is important for everyone to get vaccinated in order to curb the number of variations that we must deal with.

We are both the effects of prior events and the causes of future events. That's how the causal chain of determinism works. Every event is first an effect of prior events and then it is the cause of future events.

Where do we find this "natural law" that is "fixing" future events? We find the laws of nature in the behavior of the actual objects and forces that exist within the physical universe. When we discover consistent patterns of behavior that can help us to predict what those objects are likely to do under different circumstances, we record these consistent behaviors and metaphorically refer to them as "laws", "rules", or "principles" of behavior.

For example, the law of gravity describes how the masses of two inanimate objects cause them to fall toward each other. The rules of photosynthesis describe the biological process by which a leaf create food for a growing plant. The principles of psychology describe how the behavior of intelligent species is motivated by its various needs and chosen from among various possibilities according to its beliefs.

These laws, rules, and principles exist within the objects themselves. A human, falling from a building, is governed by the laws of gravity. A human, falling victim to a viral infection, is governed by the laws of biology. A human, falling victim to a false belief, is governed by the laws of psychology.

The laws of nature are found within us. These laws are not the gods of Olympus, manipulating us from afar. They are an integral part of who and what we are. And when we choose to act, such as when we hit a baseball with a bat, we are also forces of nature.

So, within the domain of human influence, we are specific and unique packages of the laws of nature, and we are actually "fixing" of the future, according to our own goals and our own interests.

Within the domain of human influence (things we can cause to happen if we choose to), the single inevitable future will be chosen by us, from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

 

[pood]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

 

[pood]

Here is my analysis of the above:

“Spin up” or “spin down” are fundamentally indeterministic under standard QM. There are no hidden variables influencing the outcomes, as demonstrated by the Bell experiments. However, although quantum outcomes are indeterministic, they are also probabilistic, in that probabilities can be obtained by squaring the amplitude of the wave function. In the spin up/down case, the probability is simple: 50-50. If you replace standard QM with MWI both outcomes are realized. If you replace standard QM with superdeterminism only one outcome can ever obtain and that outcome was determined at the Big Bang. It was also determined at the Big Bang that we can never conduct an experiment proving QM to be fully deterministic, and as a consequence of this alleged fact, as many have pointed out, science has no claim to discovering any truths about the world.

A rock rolls down a hill because it has no choice in the matter. It does not have a brain or motor control. Hence it follows of physical inevitability the path of least resistance, a geodesic in spacetime as elucidated by Einstein in general relativity theory.

A maniac running amok has a brain and motor control but his brain is misfiring.

A man driving a hijacked car at gunpoint has a brain and motor control but no viable choice in the matter, because if he does not drive the car he will be killed.

Choosing between eggs and pancakes is a free choice. The choice is based on deterministic inputs, including memory. One remembers what eggs and pancakes taste like. The brain (me) receives current sensory input, including perhaps the smell of eggs cooking here and pancakes being made there. The brain (me) compares memories and current sensory inputs, and registers the degree of hunger in the belly, and evaluates which choice is preferable. The ultimate choice is determined by sensory inputs and memory. The choice itself is free and not coerced. That’s free will to me.

The hard determinist seems to share the (false) intuition with the libertarian that for a choice to be truly free, it must be free of all causal influences and entirely generated from within. This is impossible, of course. The mistake the hard determinist and the libertarian alike make is in adducing from this fact that true free will is impossible, whereas in fact true free will depends upon determinism.

The difference between choosing eggs or pancakes and the other scenarios seems clear to me. The brain, in choosing breakfast, has options. Yes, they are determined options, and the choice may be said to be “determined” by what the brain finds most appealing at the moment, but the choice still belongs to the brain (me) and it is the brain that determines what breakfast will be, the brain being part of the causally deterministic chain.

The quantum particle has no option about spin up or down.

The rolling rock has no option about its geodesic.

The misfiring brain has no option, but is at the whim of impulses because the brain is misfiring.

The guy driving the hijacked car has options, but unless he irrationally chooses the option of death he is compelled under duress to drive the car.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Choice means realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow options, only what is determined. Within a determined system, choice is an illusion.

I can show you people walking into a restaurant and browsing through an actual menu of realizable options. If you wish to test whether any of those options are realizable, just sit down and place an order. When the waiter brings you the meal, are you having an illusion? Or do you pick up your fork and start eating?

With a little thought, we can also demonstrate that all of these events were reliably caused. My invitation caused you to walk into the restaurant. Your desire to see whether the items on the menu were truly "realizable options" caused you to order the cheese burger, and then the salad, and then the apple pie. You only stopped because the waiter brought you the bill, holding you responsible for your orders, and you ran out of cash.

So, we have choosing actually happening, right in front of us. And, we have reliable causation actually happening, also right in front of us.

Since we found none of the illusions that you claimed exist, we must conclude that your assertion is the only real illusion here.

Determinism does not make choosing an illusion. Determinism makes choosing inevitable.

The action taken is the only action possible.

Would you like to test that by ordering a few more items from the menu? Feel free to take any action that you can afford to pay for. As you can clearly see, there are many possible actions. Not just the action taken, but also all the other actions that you could have taken, but didn't.

The very definition of freedom demands realizable alternatives.

And there they were, on the menu, right in front of both of us, where we could clearly see them. If you did not see them, then it would seem that you are the one having an illusion.

Freedom;​

1: the quality or state of being free: such as
a: the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action.

One thing we do not see in that list is "causation". There is no such thing as freedom from causation. We see "necessity", as in "You must stop at the red light", but we do not see freedom defined as the absence of "causal necessity". Causal necessity is the same thing as causation. There is no freedom from causation because every freedom we have involves the ability to cause something to happen. No causation, no freedom.

What the brain does is necessitated by the information that acts upon its systems and the actions it produces.

Information does not act upon anything. Causation never causes anything. Determinism never determines anything. None of these are causal agents with an interest, one way or another, in any outcomes.

We, on the other hand, have an interest in the outcomes of our actions. So, we choose what we will do.

Behavioral response:
''To successfully interact with objects in the environment, sensory evidence must be continuously acquired, interpreted, and used to guide appropriate motor responses. For example, when driving, a red light should motivate a motor command to depress the brake pedal. Single-unit recording studies have established that simple sensorimotor transformations are mediated by the same neurons that ultimately guide the behavioral response. However, it is also possible that these sensorimotor regions are the recipients of a modality-independent decision signal that is computed elsewhere. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and human observers to show that the time course of activation in a subregion of the right insula is consistent with a role in accumulating sensory evidence independently from the required motor response modality (saccade vs manual). Furthermore, a combination of computational modeling and simulations of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response suggests that this region is not simply recruited by general arousal or by the tonic maintenance of attention during the decision process. Our data thus raise the possibility that a modality-independent representation of sensory evidence may guide activity in effector-specific cortical areas before the initiation of a behavioral response.''

Or, to put it more concisely, we choose what we will do based upon the information we have at hand. But wait, you were saying that this "decision process" is just an illusion, so, are you disagreeing with the scientists?

Brain function;
Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.''

It doesn't really matter to free will whether the choosing happens before, during, or after awareness. The point is that the choosing is happening, and our own brain is doing it. And as long as the brain is operating free of coercion and undue influence, it is still called free will.

 

[fromderinside]

Spin up/spin down quantum mechanics and probabilistic representation happenstance of one of many possibilities and choosing a random subject to make an order at a restaurant of the many possibilities at a random space-time. I don't see the difference.

Neither is the state of affairs when combined with the reality of an particular observer or observation. The observed transaction, if universally consistent, is lawful. If not it's just random data. The stuff of reality is beyond our ability to measure so we build a probablistic models which signal specific options all of which take place somewhere sometime. One of those realities is what we call the real world. Every one of those realities follow truly to definitive realities, all are deterministic, every one.

Going beyond our ability to measure takes away our ability to see the determined nature of the entire enterprise. So if it's probabilistic that's fine. Every outcome is determined in it's own reality. t/s = 0 is a defining marker where observational reality exists.

 

[DBT]

The very definition of freedom demands realizable alternatives.

If by "realizable alternatives" you mean non-deterministic alternatives then, no, you're wrong.

The definition of "freedom" certainly does not demand indeterminism.

That's not what I said.

 

[DBT]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

Who said that I was a hard determinist? The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

The validity of this definition is questioned by incompatibilists. I argue on the side of incompatibilism for the given reasons

Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X'' - so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system. Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

 

[DBT]

Choice means realizable options. Determinism doesn't allow options, only what is determined. Within a determined system, choice is an illusion.

I can show you people walking into a restaurant and browsing through an actual menu of realizable options. If you wish to test whether any of those options are realizable, just sit down and place an order. When the waiter brings you the meal, are you having an illusion? Or do you pick up your fork and start eating?

With a little thought, we can also demonstrate that all of these events were reliably caused. My invitation caused you to walk into the restaurant. Your desire to see whether the items on the menu were truly "realizable options" caused you to order the cheese burger, and then the salad, and then the apple pie. You only stopped because the waiter brought you the bill, holding you responsible for your orders, and you ran out of cash.

So, we have choosing actually happening, right in front of us. And, we have reliable causation actually happening, also right in front of us.

Since we found none of the illusions that you claimed exist, we must conclude that your assertion is the only real illusion here.

Determinism does not make choosing an illusion. Determinism makes choosing inevitable.

Nobody is arguing against the ability to be conscious of the world and to think and act in response to its objects and events. We can think and we can act. The issue is how that ability is achieved....a question of the nature of cognition and action within a determined system.

Simply defining free will as the ability to act according to ones will is insufficient for the given reasons, the world acts upon the agent, the brain is inseparable from the world, and it is this deterministic action upon the brain that governs thought and action.

And, you guessed it, once will is formed deterministically there is nothing prevents the action that follows if that action is determined. Not only is the following action not impeded, it freely progresses as determined.

This form of freedom of motion or action applies to all things, animals act unimpeded according to their nature, etc. necessitated actions not being the result of freely willed processes.


The anatomy of movement:
''Almost all of behavior involves motor function, from talking to gesturing to walking. But even a simple movement like reaching out to pick up a glass of water can be a complex motor task to study. Not only does your brain have to figure out which muscles to contract and in which order to steer your hand to the glass, it also has to estimate the force needed to pick up the glass. Other factors, like how much water is in the glass and what material the glass is made from, also influence the brains calculations. Not surprisingly, there are many anatomical regions which are involved in motor function.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Who said that I was a hard determinist?

Are you suggesting you're not?

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism

Hard determinism (or metaphysical determinism) is a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

Free will is not about being free to carry out one's will. Free will is about a person being free to choose for themselves what they will do.

...Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X''

A person's "will" is very different from a person's "needs" or "desires". Our needs and desires are not chosen. But our will to act upon a desire is chosen. And the specific means by which we satisfy our needs is also chosen. This is why a person is held responsible for their deliberate acts, because they chose to do it.

They were not forced to do it. They did not do it accidentally. And they were of sound mind when they made the choice.

So, their choosing to do it was the final responsible prior cause of the behavior. And if their behavior was harmful, such that we want to prevent it from happening again, then our methods of correction will involve changing how they think about such choices in the future. This correction will normally involve both penalty and rehabilitation.

- so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system.

But, since all events are always inevitable within a deterministic system, the fact that they were inevitable is never worth mentioning. Yet the hard determinist annoyingly mentions it, over and over, as if it meant something. But it doesn't.

Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

No. The notion of free will, unlike universal causal necessity/inevitability, is an essential concept:

Free will distinguishes a deliberate act, from a forced act, an accidental act, or an insane act. This locates the responsible cause of the behavior so that we know which methods to use to correct it. This is a very important distinction, because using the wrong methods of correction are likely to backfire. For example, we want to correct an insane act by psychiatric treatment and we want to correct a coerced act by holding the guy with the gun responsible rather than the victim of coercion.

 

[pood]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

Who said that I was a hard determinist? The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

The validity of this definition is questioned by incompatibilists. I argue on the side of incompatibilism for the given reasons

Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X'' - so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system. Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

If you are an incompatibilist, you are either a hard determinist or a libertarian. Both believe free will is incompatible with determinism. The difference is that the hard determinist rejects free will, whereas the libertarian rejects determinism, or at least rejects the idea that determinism affects human choices. Since you obviously are not a libertarian but are an incompatibilist, it follows you are a hard determinist by definition.

I wonder if you would explain what difference, if any, you see between the five choices that I gave?

I also wonder if you would address the idea that in any given situation, given identical antecedent events, a person would not have done differently, as opposed to could not have done differently. You go for the latter and I go for the former. The distinction, I think, is crucial.

 

[Jarhyn]

A rock is organized matter.

And the behavior of the rock is fully governed by physical forces, like gravity, inertia, etc.

Your entire body and thinking are based on reactions at the atomic scale.

Everything is running on atoms, but atoms are not running anything.

Just like a computer is based on atomic scale actions in the circuits.

The computer is running on electricity, which is a transfer of electrons from one end of a circuit to another. But those electrons have no clue as to what's going on. Nor do any of the atoms. The only ones that know what's happening are the engineers and programmers, you know, the guys who built the machines and programmed them to serve us humans.

Our brains are hard wired by genetics and evolution with the capacity to learn and adapt.

And that ability to adapt enables us to modify our brains. A coed is invited to a party, but she remembers she has a chemistry test in the morning. So, she decides it would be better to stay home and study tonight. As she reviews her textbook and lecture notes, she is reinforcing the neural pathways related to that data, so that when she sees the question on the test, the answer will pop into her consciousness. She is, by her deliberate choice, modifying her own brain.

A philosophical case can be made that our thoughts are predetermined before we are born.

Sure. But the critical question is, "So what?" Causal necessity is a logical fact. But it is not a meaningful fact. And it is not a relevant fact to any human problem, question, or issue. So, why bring it up? The intelligent mind simply acknowledges it, and then ignores it.

Causal necessity is a useful model to understand philosophically. It is exactly the principle we engineers use to make solid statements about "what happened" and infer where bugs arise from.

Causal necessity is a fulcrum. It says when a piece of memory is changed without a write operation that some unintended or unmapped physical effect operated within the system. Or that a write happened but misbehaved for explainable reasons.

Causal necessity necessitates that my shape is a part of cause, too, and since I cause my own shape, I have some manner of free will.

I can play a video game. I can play the same game three times and make different decisions in all of them. Three different instances of the same fundamental universal architecture, three different results. You could hook it up to a dice roller, and get different results every time.

Some things are determined.

Some things aren't.

It's exactly the flexibility of determination versus probability collapse that gives this weird dichotomy in that the real universe appears semi-deterministic.