Compatibilism: What's that About?

[DBT]

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.
If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

Then it is time for you to give us your definition of "free will", so we know specifically what you are arguing against.

I am arguing that there is no such thing as free will. Therefore, I'm responding to any definitions given by others, compatibilism, Libertarian, the common perception that the ability to make decisions is free will, etc.

We experience the brain generated impulses or drives to act: to eat, sleep, drink, work, buy what we need or want and so on. Each of these needs, wants, habits, addictions is an article of will and often one article of will is in conflict with another, an addiction to smoking as opposed to the desire to give up smoking, etc, to indulge versus to abstain.

As will is formed as an aspect of an article, to smoke, drink, eat, the need to work, invest, raise a family ....will is not the means by which we think, feel or act.

We have will, in fact multiple expressions of will. But, for the reasons outlined above, it is not free will.

 

[DBT]

I wonder if DBT or other hard determinists make a distinction between the following:

A quantum experiment in which “spin up” is registered instead of “spin down.”

A rock rolling down a hill.

A maniac running amok and killing a bunch of strangers.

A man being forced to drive his hijacked car at gunpoint by a criminal.

My choosing eggs instead of pancakes this morning for breakfast.

Who said that I was a hard determinist? The issue is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism....giving their definition of free will as, essentially, acting according to one's will without restriction or impediment.

The validity of this definition is questioned by incompatibilists. I argue on the side of incompatibilism for the given reasons

Basically -''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X'' - so the action that follows is inevitable for all things that happen within a determined system. Nothing to do with free will, therefore the term is merely a semantic construct.

If you are an incompatibilist, you are either a hard determinist or a libertarian. Both believe free will is incompatible with determinism. The difference is that the hard determinist rejects free will, whereas the libertarian rejects determinism, or at least rejects the idea that determinism affects human choices. Since you obviously are not a libertarian but are an incompatibilist, it follows you are a hard determinist by definition.

I wonder if you would explain what difference, if any, you see between the five choices that I gave?

I also wonder if you would address the idea that in any given situation, given identical antecedent events, a person would not have done differently, as opposed to could not have done differently. You go for the latter and I go for the former. The distinction, I think, is crucial.

The concept of free will is problematic, be a matter of determinism or indeterminism.

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore, indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

Where is freedom of will without regulative control? Actions within the system simply flow deterministically.

Where is freedom of will to be found in random or probabilistic events? Events that simply happen without agency, control or being willed.

You did not answer my questions, which is fair enough if you don’t want to. You simply restated your “regulative control” argument, an argument I have already deconstructed and rebutted, but you didn’t address my rebuttal, either. So unless you want to address my rebuttals of your arguments I don’t see how the conversation can move forward.

As to your questions, time is an issue.

1 - compatibilism doesn't define free will in terms of QM. The compatibilist claim is that free will is compatible with determinism, not QM. I argue that neither determinism or QM allow free will.

2 - A rock rolling down a hill is a chaotic but deterministic event.

3 - A maniac runs amok because his mind has become unhinged. His genetic makeup and his environment has brought him to the point where he has lost the ability to think rationally, feel empathyfor others (perhaps a sociopath) or consider the consequences of his actions...he lashes out in order to gratify his need and desire to inflict pain and suffering onto others.

4 - A man who has had his vehicle hijacked and forced to drive at gunpoint is being forced to act under external compulsion, against his will. As opposed to actions produced by a deterministic process, ''even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents''

5 - You choosing eggs over pancakes is brain function, an action that was determined by inputs and neural processing before the action was made conscious; in accordance with inner necessity.

Unconscious mind
''Previous research has shown motor-related brain activity preceding conscious intent by a fraction of a second, but this study is the first to show unconscious predictive activity in a region associated with decision making—the prefrontal cortex—according to Haynes. The results support the notion that unconscious brain activity comes first and conscious experience follows as a result, says Patrick Haggard of University College London, who was not involved with the study. “We all think that we have a conscious free will,” he says. “However, this study shows that actions come from preconscious brain activity patterns and not from the person consciously thinking about what they are going to do.”


More:
''Here we propose neural computations that can account for the formation of categorical decisions about sensory stimuli by accumulating information over time into a single quantity: the logarithm of the likelihood ratio favoring one alternative over another.We also review electrophysio-logical studies that have identified brain structures that may be involved in computing this sort of decision variable.The ideas presented constitute a framework for understanding how and where perceptual decisions are formed in the brain.''

 

[DBT]

Realizable alternatives do not exist within a determined system. The action that is taken is the only action possible in any given moment in time.

You are presuming that to be "realizable" requires that the option actually be realized. That's incorrect. An option may be realizable without ever being realized. For example, every option on a restaurant's menu is realizable. If someone selects that option, the chef has the ingredients and the skills required to cook that meal. There may be an option on the menu that no one ever selects. It is still realizable despite the fact that it will never ever be prepared and served. Realizable simply means it can be prepared and served. Realizable does not mean that it will be prepared and served, ever.

It's the same problem of confusing or conflating what "can" happen with what "will" happen. If something will happen, then it certainly will happen. But if something can happen, it may happen or it may never happen.

Given a deterministic universe, whenever a choosing event shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, but "I would have done otherwise" will always be false.

If options are not realizable, they were never on the table as true options, determinsm doesn't allow it. My point is that there can be no 'could have done otherwise' in determinism.

The action that is taken is the only action, 'I could have chosen y instead of x' is an illusion- each brain performs actions according to its information condition - inner necessity - at each and every point in time.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.
If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

Then it is time for you to give us your definition of "free will", so we know specifically what you are arguing against.

I am arguing that there is no such thing as free will. Therefore, I'm responding to any definitions given by others, compatibilism, Libertarian, the common perception that the ability to make decisions is free will, etc.

We experience the brain generated impulses or drives to act: to eat, sleep, drink, work, buy what we need or want and so on. Each of these needs, wants, habits, addictions is an article of will and often one article of will is in conflict with another, an addiction to smoking as opposed to the desire to give up smoking, etc, to indulge versus to abstain.

As will is formed as an aspect of an article, to smoke, drink, eat, the need to work, invest, raise a family ....will is not the means by which we think, feel or act.

We have will, in fact multiple expressions of will. But, for the reasons outlined above, it is not free will.

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

1. "Will" is our specific intent to do something.
2. "Deciding" what we will do is the mental operation by which the brain causally determines the will, especially when we have multiple, competing desires.
3. "Freedom" is absence of some meaningful and relevant constraint that prevents us from doing what we want to do. For example, coercion and undue influence prevent us from deciding for ourselves what we will do.
4. "Coercion" is when someone forces their will upon another by some meaningful threat, such as a guy holding a gun.
5. "Undue influence" includes coercion, and other things like a significant mental illness that compromises the brain's ability to make a rational moral choice, hypnosis and other forms of manipulation, authoritative command like between a commander and soldier, parent and child, doctor and patient, etc., and any similar influence that reasonably removes a person's ability to decide for themselves what they will do.

A. Reliable cause and effect in itself is neither coercive nor undue, so it poses no threat to this definition of free will. Only specific causes are coercive (like the guy with the gun) or undue (like an unsound mind that is subject to hallucinations and delusions).

B. The fact that it is our own brains that make this choice poses no threat to this definition of free will. We've known for centuries that mental events are performed by our own brains and that normal functioning can be impaired by extraordinary illnesses or injuries.

So, what is your argument against this definition of free will?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If options are not realizable, they were never on the table as true options, determinsm doesn't allow it. My point is that there can be no 'could have done otherwise' in determinism.

Determinism not only allows a "could have done otherwise", it necessitates it. All of mental events are equally necessitated. This includes our use of the notion of what we "can" do within a choosing operation. In a decision between A and B, it is logically necessary that "we can choose A" is true and "we can choose B" is also true. And, assuming it was causally necessary from any prior point in time that we would choose A, then A will become the "that which we would do" and B will become "that which we could have done". Both causal necessity and logical necessity bring about those two statements of fact.

A true option may be realizable without ever being realized. That is how options, abilities, possibilities work. Every option on a restaurant's menu is realizable. If someone selects that option, the chef has the ingredients and the skills required to cook that meal. That is what makes the option truly "realizable".

An "ability" is real, even if the ability is never exercised. You keep insisting that if the ability is never exercised it must not be a real ability. You have the "true" ability to throw your phone out the window, even if you never do so.

There may be an option on the menu that no one will ever select. It is still realizable despite the fact that it will never ever be prepared and served. Realizable simply means it can be prepared and served. Realizable does not mean that it will ever be prepared or served, ever.

So, the fact that something "will not" happen never implies that it "can not" happen. Confusing or conflating what "can" happen with what "will" happen is how determinism ended up with the cognitive dissonance claim that "you could not have done otherwise". Everyone knows that it is true that they "could" have done otherwise, because they had just seen "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" both being true at the beginning.

But there is no cognitive dissonance in the claim that "you would not have done otherwise", because they know that there was only one thing they would do given their reasons at the time.

On the other hand, there's nothing like cognitive dissonance to get attention.

Given a deterministic universe, whenever a choosing event shows up in the causal chain, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true, but "I would have done otherwise" will always be false.

The action that is taken is the only action, 'I could have chosen y instead of x' is an illusion- each brain performs actions according to its information condition - inner necessity - at each and every point in time.

No, there is no "illusion". The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

 

[fromderinside]

The brain is a complicated thing and conscious awareness sometimes shows up after some insignificant decisions have already been made. So what? It is still our own brains that are making the decisions, and they are doing so according to our own goals and reasons. The brain is where "freely choosing what we will do" is going on. And, that brain will make a different decision if a guy is pointing a gun at it and telling it what to do than it would when free of coercion and undue influence.




... At the end of choosing what we will do, there is a single (and causally inevitable) intention that drives our behavior to a specific outcome.


.... There are diverse desires, such as the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to be slim. This is a conflict of desires. We resolve this conflict by choosing what we will actually do about these two desires.

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

... the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

A liberal dose of word salad incomprehensible logic, and a tone of declaration on the rump of the sacrificed calf.

Please give us one model, verified (materially substantiated) , that stands up as a model of reality created by and resident in the brain that remains fairly constant over even three minutes.

Failing that your flailing is just that.

Or, put another way, present evidence or leave your chanting in your closet.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The brain is a complicated thing and conscious awareness sometimes shows up after some insignificant decisions have already been made. So what? It is still our own brains that are making the decisions, and they are doing so according to our own goals and reasons. The brain is where "freely choosing what we will do" is going on. And, that brain will make a different decision if a guy is pointing a gun at it and telling it what to do than it would when free of coercion and undue influence.




... At the end of choosing what we will do, there is a single (and causally inevitable) intention that drives our behavior to a specific outcome.


.... There are diverse desires, such as the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to be slim. This is a conflict of desires. We resolve this conflict by choosing what we will actually do about these two desires.

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

... the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

A liberal dose of word salad incomprehensible logic, and a tone of declaration on the rump of the sacrificed calf.

Please give us one model, verified (materially substantiated) , that stands up as a model of reality created by and resident in the brain that remains fairly constant over even three minutes.

Failing that your flailing is just that.

Or, put another way, present evidence or leave your chanting in your closet.

The model allows you to navigate your body through a doorway. There's the doorway. And there's you. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, we simply call it "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. When the model is inaccurate enough to create a problem, for example when you walk into a glass door, thinking it is open, then that is called an "illusion".

Now, when you imagine yourself walking down the beach, picking up and examining different sea shells, that is your own manipulation of the model in your head.

Perhaps these quotes from noted neuroscientists will help:

Instead of using your senses to constantly rebuild your reality from scratch every moment, you’re comparing sensory information with a model that the brain has already constructed: updating it, refining it, correcting it. Your brain is so expert at this task that you’re normally unaware of it.

Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You (Kindle Locations 774-776). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions.

Graziano, Michael S. A.. Consciousness and the Social Brain (p. 8). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

 

[DBT]

I said that I am arguing against the concept of free will. Compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism. I argue that it is not.
If a Libertarian came along, I would argue against Libertarian free will.

Then it is time for you to give us your definition of "free will", so we know specifically what you are arguing against.

I am arguing that there is no such thing as free will. Therefore, I'm responding to any definitions given by others, compatibilism, Libertarian, the common perception that the ability to make decisions is free will, etc.

We experience the brain generated impulses or drives to act: to eat, sleep, drink, work, buy what we need or want and so on. Each of these needs, wants, habits, addictions is an article of will and often one article of will is in conflict with another, an addiction to smoking as opposed to the desire to give up smoking, etc, to indulge versus to abstain.

As will is formed as an aspect of an article, to smoke, drink, eat, the need to work, invest, raise a family ....will is not the means by which we think, feel or act.

We have will, in fact multiple expressions of will. But, for the reasons outlined above, it is not free will.

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

1. "Will" is our specific intent to do something.
2. "Deciding" what we will do is the mental operation by which the brain causally determines the will, especially when we have multiple, competing desires.
3. "Freedom" is absence of some meaningful and relevant constraint that prevents us from doing what we want to do. For example, coercion and undue influence prevent us from deciding for ourselves what we will do.
4. "Coercion" is when someone forces their will upon another by some meaningful threat, such as a guy holding a gun.
5. "Undue influence" includes coercion, and other things like a significant mental illness that compromises the brain's ability to make a rational moral choice, hypnosis and other forms of manipulation, authoritative command like between a commander and soldier, parent and child, doctor and patient, etc., and any similar influence that reasonably removes a person's ability to decide for themselves what they will do.

A. Reliable cause and effect in itself is neither coercive nor undue, so it poses no threat to this definition of free will. Only specific causes are coercive (like the guy with the gun) or undue (like an unsound mind that is subject to hallucinations and delusions).

B. The fact that it is our own brains that make this choice poses no threat to this definition of free will. We've known for centuries that mental events are performed by our own brains and that normal functioning can be impaired by extraordinary illnesses or injuries.

So, what is your argument against this definition of free will?

As pointed out, absence of constraint applies all determined actions, everything that happens within a determined system happens without constraint. A determined action must necessarily proceed as determined....without constraint.

Determined actions are not chosen actions, they are actions necessitated by antecedent conditions, there is no alternative, therefore no choice (choice being the possibility of doing otherwise).


''When Danielle picked up the black Lab, was she able to pick up the blond Lab? It seems not. Picking up the blond Lab was an alternative that was not available to her. In this respect, she could not have done otherwise. Given her psychological condition, she cannot even form a want to touch a blond Lab, hence she could not pick one up. But notice that, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would have done so. Of course, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would not suffer from the very psychological disorder that causes her to be unable to pick up blond haired doggies. The classical compatibilist analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’ thus fails. According to the analysis, when Danielle picked up the black Lab, she was able to pick up the blonde Lab, even though, due to her psychological condition, she was not able to do so in the relevant respect. Hence, the analysis yields the wrong result.

So even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls.''

The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility​

''The BCN-evidence indicates that many actions for which the actor can give reasons are automatic responses to external stimuli, many of which are not recognized by the actor.

Yet, we do think that these findings spell trouble for the new compatibilist, for, if these findings are true, new compatibilists must find a way to view automatic actions as actions for a reason if they are to avoid the conclusion that acting for reasons is exceptional. Because new compatibilists are also committed to the thesis that the ability to act for reasons distinguishes actions for which the actor is responsible from action for which she is not, it follows that new compatibilists must come up with an account of what distinguishes automatic actions for a reason from automatic actions that were not for a reason


''However, as we discussed, developments in the BCN-sciences suggest that it is not as obvious as it seems that our ability to act for reasons can serve as an unproblematic basis for our views of free will and responsibility. The BCN-findings indicate that most of daily life consists of automatic responses to external stimuli.

To accommodate this insight, the new compatibilists must find a way to distinguish automatic actions for a reason from automatic actions that were not for a reason. It is not obvious that this distinction can be made without an appeal to something like the freedom to do otherwise. Furthermore, developments in the BCN-sciences suggest that our self-reports and self-understanding are not necessarily evidence of the ability to act for reasons.

This underscores a problem that arises independent of the BCN-findings: How to justify our everyday ascriptions of personal responsibility for wrongdoings (including us taking responsibility for our own wrongdoings). Wrongdoings typically disclose a failure to respond adequately to the reasons that exist. So the new compatibilist seems committed to the view that at least in certain cases wrongdoers were capable of responding to the reasons to which they, in fact, did not respond.

This sounds as obscure as being able to do otherwise than one, in fact, did, but the new compatibilist might point out that in our everyday practices we routinely infer that some people are responsible for wrongdoings based on the reasons they provide. However, if the BCN-science are right that giving reasons is a matter of post hoc interpretation rather than of recalling motivations it might be that the differences between those who are deemed to be responsible for their wrongdoings and those who are not, have more to do with their ability to interpret what they did than with their ability to act for reasons.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

1. "Will" is our specific intent to do something.
2. "Deciding" what we will do is the mental operation by which the brain causally determines the will, especially when we have multiple, competing desires.
3. "Freedom" is absence of some meaningful and relevant constraint that prevents us from doing what we want to do. For example, coercion and undue influence prevent us from deciding for ourselves what we will do.
4. "Coercion" is when someone forces their will upon another by some meaningful threat, such as a guy holding a gun.
5. "Undue influence" includes coercion, and other things like a significant mental illness that compromises the brain's ability to make a rational moral choice, hypnosis and other forms of manipulation, authoritative command like between a commander and soldier, parent and child, doctor and patient, etc., and any similar influence that reasonably removes a person's ability to decide for themselves what they will do.

A. Reliable cause and effect in itself is neither coercive nor undue, so it poses no threat to this definition of free will. Only specific causes are coercive (like the guy with the gun) or undue (like an unsound mind that is subject to hallucinations and delusions).

B. The fact that it is our own brains that make this choice poses no threat to this definition of free will. We've known for centuries that mental events are performed by our own brains and that normal functioning can be impaired by extraordinary illnesses or injuries.

So, what is your argument against this definition of free will?

As pointed out, absence of constraint applies (to) all determined actions, everything that happens within a determined system happens without constraint.

Sorry, but no. A thief points a gun at you and says, "Stop, hand over your wallet!" Hasn't he constrained you from walking away? Hasn't he prevented you from spending your own money according to your own choices?

Both his actions and yours, are causally necessary from any prior point in time, but the fact the he is constraining you does not disappear. Within a perfectly deterministic system, there are still meaningful constraints, and thus there are still meaningful freedoms.

A determined action must necessarily proceed as determined....without constraint.

And to solve the riddle: Each constraint that occurs "must necessarily proceed as determined...without constraint". If it happens, then it necessarily happened. Constraints happen. For example, the electricity may go out due to a storm, and everything plugged in stops working, preventing you from watching TV. That's a meaningful constraint.

Determined actions are not chosen actions, they are actions necessitated by antecedent conditions, there is no alternative, therefore no choice (choice being the possibility of doing otherwise).

And yet the people in the restaurant are making choices. They have in front of them a literal menu of alternatives. And they must make a choice if they want to have dinner tonight.

Pretending that choosing isn't happening will not make it go away. One cannot dispute empirical facts.

''When Danielle picked up the black Lab, was she able to pick up the blond Lab? It seems not. Picking up the blond Lab was an alternative that was not available to her. In this respect, she could not have done otherwise. Given her psychological condition, she cannot even form a want to touch a blond Lab, hence she could not pick one up. But notice that, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would have done so. Of course, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would not suffer from the very psychological disorder that causes her to be unable to pick up blond haired doggies. The classical compatibilist analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’ thus fails. According to the analysis, when Danielle picked up the black Lab, she was able to pick up the blonde Lab, even though, due to her psychological condition, she was not able to do so in the relevant respect. Hence, the analysis yields the wrong result.
So even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls.''

The story of Danielle in the SEP begins a paragraph earlier:

"Suppose that Danielle is psychologically incapable of wanting to touch a blond haired dog. Imagine that, on her sixteenth birthday, unaware of her condition, her father brings her two puppies to choose between, one being a blond haired Lab, the other a black haired Lab. He tells Danielle just to pick up whichever of the two she pleases and that he will return the other puppy to the pet store. Danielle happily, and unencumbered, does what she wants and picks up the black Lab."

So, as with many of the examples of persons not having free will, Danielle has a psychological impediment. She is not able to want to pick up the blond puppy. No compatibilist in their right mind would suggest that she was still able to pick up the blond puppy. Picking up the blond puppy was not a realizable option, for her, even though it would have been a realizable option for most people.

For most people, picking up the blond puppy is a real possibility, just as real a possibility as picking up the black puppy. For most people, it would be a real choice, between two things that a person could actually do, if they chose to.

But the incompatibilist cannot speak of most people, because for most people, their argument fails.

The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility​

''The BCN-evidence indicates that many actions for which the actor can give reasons are automatic responses to external stimuli, many of which are not recognized by the actor.

Yet, we do think that these findings spell trouble for the new compatibilist, for, if these findings are true, new compatibilists must find a way to view automatic actions as actions for a reason if they are to avoid the conclusion that acting for reasons is exceptional. Because new compatibilists are also committed to the thesis that the ability to act for reasons distinguishes actions for which the actor is responsible from action for which she is not, it follows that new compatibilists must come up with an account of what distinguishes automatic actions for a reason from automatic actions that were not for a reason


''However, as we discussed, developments in the BCN-sciences suggest that it is not as obvious as it seems that our ability to act for reasons can serve as an unproblematic basis for our views of free will and responsibility. The BCN-findings indicate that most of daily life consists of automatic responses to external stimuli.

To accommodate this insight, the new compatibilists must find a way to distinguish automatic actions for a reason from automatic actions that were not for a reason. It is not obvious that this distinction can be made without an appeal to something like the freedom to do otherwise. Furthermore, developments in the BCN-sciences suggest that our self-reports and self-understanding are not necessarily evidence of the ability to act for reasons.

This underscores a problem that arises independent of the BCN-findings: How to justify our everyday ascriptions of personal responsibility for wrongdoings (including us taking responsibility for our own wrongdoings). Wrongdoings typically disclose a failure to respond adequately to the reasons that exist. So the new compatibilist seems committed to the view that at least in certain cases wrongdoers were capable of responding to the reasons to which they, in fact, did not respond.

This sounds as obscure as being able to do otherwise than one, in fact, did, but the new compatibilist might point out that in our everyday practices we routinely infer that some people are responsible for wrongdoings based on the reasons they provide. However, if the BCN-science are right that giving reasons is a matter of post hoc interpretation rather than of recalling motivations it might be that the differences between those who are deemed to be responsible for their wrongdoings and those who are not, have more to do with their ability to interpret what they did than with their ability to act for reasons.''

Geez, now there are New Compatibilists? Back when I first ran into the issue in the public library, there were no "compatibilists" at all. There was just determinism, and free will, and the imaginary issue between the two, you know, the "versus".

I've explained in detail in this thread what "the ability to do otherwise" is all about. Whether an incompatibilist can actually hear the explanation or confront it with any valid argument remains an open question.

Whether the Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences are capable of untangling themselves from the philosophical paradoxes that lead otherwise sane and intelligent people to question free will and personal responsibility is up for grabs. The silly paradox of free will "versus" determinism certainly gathers a lot of (undeserved) attention. But I would suggest that the sciences need to avoid that Chinese Finger Trap unless they are capable of escaping this self-induced hoax.

 

[fromderinside]

The brain is a complicated thing and conscious awareness sometimes shows up after some insignificant decisions have already been made. So what? It is still our own brains that are making the decisions, and they are doing so according to our own goals and reasons. The brain is where "freely choosing what we will do" is going on. And, that brain will make a different decision if a guy is pointing a gun at it and telling it what to do than it would when free of coercion and undue influence.




... At the end of choosing what we will do, there is a single (and causally inevitable) intention that drives our behavior to a specific outcome.


.... There are diverse desires, such as the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to be slim. This is a conflict of desires. We resolve this conflict by choosing what we will actually do about these two desires.

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

... the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

A liberal dose of word salad incomprehensible logic, and a tone of declaration on the rump of the sacrificed calf.

Please give us one model, verified (materially substantiated) , that stands up as a model of reality created by and resident in the brain that remains fairly constant over even three minutes.

Failing that your flailing is just that.

Or, put another way, present evidence or leave your chanting in your closet.

The model allows you to navigate your body through a doorway. There's the doorway. And there's you. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, we simply call it "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. When the model is inaccurate enough to create a problem, for example when you walk into a glass door, thinking it is open, then that is called an "illusion".

Now, when you imagine yourself walking down the beach, picking up and examining different sea shells, that is your own manipulation of the model in your head.

Perhaps these quotes from noted neuroscientists will help:

Instead of using your senses to constantly rebuild your reality from scratch every moment, you’re comparing sensory information with a model that the brain has already constructed: updating it, refining it, correcting it. Your brain is so expert at this task that you’re normally unaware of it.

Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You (Kindle Locations 774-776). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions.

Graziano, Michael S. A.. Consciousness and the Social Brain (p. 8). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

Bravo. A couple citations. Now explain them.

Here is a recent Eaglemen paper

The brain is a complicated thing and conscious awareness sometimes shows up after some insignificant decisions have already been made. So what? It is still our own brains that are making the decisions, and they are doing so according to our own goals and reasons. The brain is where "freely choosing what we will do" is going on. And, that brain will make a different decision if a guy is pointing a gun at it and telling it what to do than it would when free of coercion and undue influence.




... At the end of choosing what we will do, there is a single (and causally inevitable) intention that drives our behavior to a specific outcome.


.... There are diverse desires, such as the desire to eat chocolate, and the desire to be slim. This is a conflict of desires. We resolve this conflict by choosing what we will actually do about these two desires.

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

... the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

A liberal dose of word salad incomprehensible logic, and a tone of declaration on the rump of the sacrificed calf.

Please give us one model, verified (materially substantiated) , that stands up as a model of reality created by and resident in the brain that remains fairly constant over even three minutes.

Failing that your flailing is just that.

Or, put another way, present evidence or leave your chanting in your closet.

The model allows you to navigate your body through a doorway. There's the doorway. And there's you. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, we simply call it "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. When the model is inaccurate enough to create a problem, for example when you walk into a glass door, thinking it is open, then that is called an "illusion".

Now, when you imagine yourself walking down the beach, picking up and examining different sea shells, that is your own manipulation of the model in your head.

Perhaps these quotes from noted neuroscientists will help:

Instead of using your senses to constantly rebuild your reality from scratch every moment, you’re comparing sensory information with a model that the brain has already constructed: updating it, refining it, correcting it. Your brain is so expert at this task that you’re normally unaware of it.

Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You (Kindle Locations 774-776). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions.

Graziano, Michael S. A.. Consciousness and the Social Brain (p. 8). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

If you read Eagleman experimental papers carefully you'll find that sense models are improved by new sense information adding or modifying existing sense templates repeatedly throughout the cortex generating enabling channels for cerebellar activations of routines effector targeted loci, not through manipulation of an existing model stored in brain or memory.

That is to say sense information courses through ascending and descending pathways triggering existing activated neurons from similar information, modifying outcomes in s the current moment. The mind is not operating on the models, sense information is acting on the existing models so to speak. Of course evidence is strong that working models can be replaced with contrary models quite quickly.

Back to the point. What we call consciousness is that narrative, visual, language, tactile, etc. subvocal and other sensory integrated which we must support status of being in order to express it. All those little joy tools you use like 'think', 'decide', 'choose' are built just as are other logical constructions to represent a frame for animating it. They are after the fact justifications for what we do, act, perform.

Once one removes these enablers we are back to this then that or determined behaviors generated in response to complex situations.

In other words I have no problems with Eagleman and few with Graziani when it comes to what underlies human behavior. What they wrote and how you interpret it is to which I disagree. Pull out the "I do this and I do that" and you have a machine called a human getting along in a determined world.

here is something that might grab your interest from Eagleman

A neural model for temporal order judgments and their active recalibration: a common mechanism for space and time: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00470/full​

.... The similar properties in psychophysics of space and time perception raise the possibility that common mechanisms may be shared between the two domains. We suggest that many of the research paradigms used in spatial perception may help us to better understand the mechanisms of time perception. Further theoretical and electrophysiological explorations are crucial for this field.

I would hope so for Einstein's sake.

 

[DBT]

Geez, now there are New Compatibilists? Back when I first ran into the issue in the public library, there were no "compatibilists" at all. There was just determinism, and free will, and the imaginary issue between the two, you know, the "versus".

I've explained in detail in this thread what "the ability to do otherwise" is all about. Whether an incompatibilist can actually hear the explanation or confront it with any valid argument remains an open question.

Whether the Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences are capable of untangling themselves from the philosophical paradoxes that lead otherwise sane and intelligent people to question free will and personal responsibility is up for grabs. The silly paradox of free will "versus" determinism certainly gathers a lot of (undeserved) attention. But I would suggest that the sciences need to avoid that Chinese Finger Trap unless they are capable of escaping this self-induced hoax.

Compatibilism has not changed over time? The compatibilism of Hobbs is the same as Dennett's ''evitability?''

Semi compatibilism with its claim that responsibility is compatible with determinism, Fischer, et al? Reason responsiveness? Regulative control?

Actions are either caused/necessitated or they are free, there is no middle ground. Determinism necessitates all actions, therefore they are not freely chosen actions. Being determined, actions proceed or unfold as determined.

Wanting to do X is fully determined by prior causes. Once the desire to do X is felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

Sorry, but no. A thief points a gun at you and says, "Stop, hand over your wallet!" Hasn't he constrained you from walking away? Hasn't he prevented you from spending your own money according to your own choices?

Both his actions and yours, are causally necessary from any prior point in time, but the fact the he is constraining you does not disappear. Within a perfectly deterministic system, there are still meaningful constraints, and thus there are still meaningful freedoms

Constraint comes in many forms, both external and internal.

Being free of external constraint, the thief with a gun, doesn't free you from the internal constraint of your own condition and information from the external world acting upon you, shaping your character and molding your thoughts and determining your response.

The absence of one - the thief with a gun - doesn't exclude inner necessitation.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

Perhaps these quotes from noted neuroscientists will help:

Instead of using your senses to constantly rebuild your reality from scratch every moment, you’re comparing sensory information with a model that the brain has already constructed: updating it, refining it, correcting it. Your brain is so expert at this task that you’re normally unaware of it.

Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You (Kindle Locations 774-776). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions.

Graziano, Michael S. A.. Consciousness and the Social Brain (p. 8). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

Bravo. A couple citations. Now explain them.

They simply confirm that the notion of the brain symbolically modeling reality is a common understanding in neuroscience.

If you read Eagleman experimental papers carefully you'll find that sense models are improved by new sense information adding or modifying existing sense templates repeatedly throughout the cortex generating enabling channels for cerebellar activations of routines effector targeted loci, not through manipulation of an existing model stored in brain or memory.

I'm not qualified to read Eagleman's experimental papers. But I do have three of his books, which help ordinary people like me understand the results of neuroscience experiments.

...
Back to the point. What we call consciousness is that narrative, visual, language, tactile, etc. subvocal and other sensory integrated which we must support status of being in order to express it. All those little joy tools you use like 'think', 'decide', 'choose' are built just as are other logical constructions to represent a frame for animating it. They are after the fact justifications for what we do, act, perform.

But I'm not the only one using terms like "think", "decide", and "choose". The whole point of neuroscience is to find the underlying mechanisms that make thinking and deciding possible, to discover how thinking, memory, and choosing are carried out within the neural structure.

For example, neuroscience locates areas of the brain that are involved in specific mental functions so that when these functions are impaired, the neuro surgeon has some clue where to look for the damage.

Once one removes these enablers we are back to this then that or determined behaviors generated in response to complex situations.

No. Once you remove the language you remove the meaning of it all. Memory, choosing, imagining, thinking and feeling, are all meaningful neural functions.

In other words I have no problems with Eagleman and few with Graziani when it comes to what underlies human behavior. What they wrote and how you interpret it is to which I disagree. Pull out the "I do this and I do that" and you have a machine called a human getting along in a determined world.

But how do you describe the behavior of this "machine called a human getting along in a determined world", without including "he decided to do this, instead of that, which caused the pedestrian to be hit in the intersection".

One of the problems with hard determinism (which I keep bringing up) is that it wipes out meaningful distinctions between events as it goes about reminding us repeatedly that every event is causally necessitated, without distinction.

All of the meaning is in the distinctions! For example, freely chosen or coerced.

here is something that might grab your interest from Eagleman

Nope. It didn't.

 

[fromderinside]

... The correct understanding of what is going on is this: the brain has a model of reality and a language for performing operations with that model. When we are uncertain as to what we will do, we imagine what we can do to resolve that uncertainty. We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing option A (one "possible" future). We use the model to imagine the outcome of choosing B (a second "possible" future). The feelings produced by these mental excursions lead us to choose which action we "will" perform in the real world.

Ironically, all this imagining is not "imaginary". Mental events are assumed to be representations of physical events within the brain. And these physical events are taking place in empirical reality within the brain. A human society forms a language for communicating what is happening in our minds, as in "What were you thinking of that made you do that?".

Within this language we have the notion of choosing and how choosing works. We have the notion of multiple, real "possibilities". And we have the notion of a single "actuality".

As it turns out, within the domain of human influence (stuff we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we can imagine.

Choosing is a deterministic causal mechanism that exercises control over what we do next, which exercises control over what happens next.

Perhaps these quotes from noted neuroscientists will help:

Instead of using your senses to constantly rebuild your reality from scratch every moment, you’re comparing sensory information with a model that the brain has already constructed: updating it, refining it, correcting it. Your brain is so expert at this task that you’re normally unaware of it.

Eagleman, David. The Brain: The Story of You (Kindle Locations 774-776). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

Second, the brain uses internal data to construct simplified, schematic models of objects and events in the world. Those models can be used to make predictions, try out simulations, and plan actions.

Graziano, Michael S. A.. Consciousness and the Social Brain (p. 8). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

Bravo. A couple citations. Now explain them.

They simply confirm that the notion of the brain symbolically modeling reality is a common understanding in neuroscience.

If you read Eagleman experimental papers carefully you'll find that sense models are improved by new sense information adding or modifying existing sense templates repeatedly throughout the cortex generating enabling channels for cerebellar activations of routines effector targeted loci, not through manipulation of an existing model stored in brain or memory.

I'm not qualified to read Eagleman's experimental papers. But I do have three of his books, which help ordinary people like me understand the results of neuroscience experiments.

...
Back to the point. What we call consciousness is that narrative, visual, language, tactile, etc. subvocal and other sensory integrated which we must support status of being in order to express it. All those little joy tools you use like 'think', 'decide', 'choose' are built just as are other logical constructions to represent a frame for animating it. They are after the fact justifications for what we do, act, perform.

But I'm not the only one using terms like "think", "decide", and "choose". The whole point of neuroscience is to find the underlying mechanisms that make thinking and deciding possible, to discover how thinking, memory, and choosing are carried out within the neural structure.

For example, neuroscience locates areas of the brain that are involved in specific mental functions so that when these functions are impaired, the neuro surgeon has some clue where to look for the damage.

Once one removes these enablers we are back to this then that or determined behaviors generated in response to complex situations.

No. Once you remove the language you remove the meaning of it all. Memory, choosing, imagining, thinking and feeling, are all meaningful neural functions.

In other words I have no problems with Eagleman and few with Graziani when it comes to what underlies human behavior. What they wrote and how you interpret it is to which I disagree. Pull out the "I do this and I do that" and you have a machine called a human getting along in a determined world.

But how do you describe the behavior of this "machine called a human getting along in a determined world", without including "he decided to do this, instead of that, which caused the pedestrian to be hit in the intersection".

One of the problems with hard determinism (which I keep bringing up) is that it wipes out meaningful distinctions between events as it goes about reminding us repeatedly that every event is causally necessitated, without distinction.

All of the meaning is in the distinctions! For example, freely chosen or coerced.

here is something that might grab your interest from Eagleman

Nope. It didn't.

It should have because it is a strong example of examination of neural processing objective scientific rather than subjective introspective technique.

To wit: ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology https://cspeech.ucd.ie/Fred/docs/historyOfPsychology.pdf

According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of ‘‘behaviour,’’ that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird. 2006 Elsevier Inc.

It is a shame that introspection is still used because it takes away from the objective interpretation of neural function. We are to try our hardest to come up with Operations, material methods, to attach to our wanderings into our "minds" - a subjective looking at how the nervous system and endocrine systems generate behavior - when subjectively considering what is going on within us for use in experiment.

Most of the twentieth century Philosophy has been about reconciling subjective behaving beings with the demands for objective methods to determine what is and is not reality.

The point is reality is not a story told around a campfire.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It is a shame that introspection is still used because it takes away from the objective interpretation of neural function. We are to try our hardest to come up with Operations, material methods, to attach to our wanderings into our "minds" - a subjective looking at how the nervous system and endocrine systems generate behavior - when subjectively considering what is going on within us for use in experiment.

Psychoanalysis is based upon introspection. Neuroscience is a study of the brain's functioning as it relates to our thoughts and feelings, and other mental facilities.

Most of the twentieth century Philosophy has been about reconciling subjective behaving beings with the demands for objective methods to determine what is and is not reality.

Well, no, neuroscience is not about determining what is "real" and what is "not real". It is about understanding how our brains operate to keep our hearts beating and our thoughts flowing. Neuroscience is about all the specific mechanisms in the brain that enable us to remember, to think, to decide, etc.

The point is reality is not a story told around a campfire.

If reality cannot be told, then we can never learn from the experience of others. Our species would likely be extinct by now. The whole point of having intelligence is to provide a means of conferring information from one generation to the next. Our newborns do not come out fully formed as with many other species. They learn all of the important stuff from others. Whether this information is conveyed around a campfire or in a lecture hall is irrelevant. The key is that we want the information to be meaningful, relevant, and accurate enough to be useful.

 

[Jarhyn]

It is a shame that introspection is still used because it takes away from the objective interpretation of neural function. We are to try our hardest to come up with Operations, material methods, to attach to our wanderings into our "minds" - a subjective looking at how the nervous system and endocrine systems generate behavior - when subjectively considering what is going on within us for use in experiment.

Psychoanalysis is based upon introspection. Neuroscience is a study of the brain's functioning as it relates to our thoughts and feelings, and other mental facilities.

Most of the twentieth century Philosophy has been about reconciling subjective behaving beings with the demands for objective methods to determine what is and is not reality.

Well, no, neuroscience is not about determining what is "real" and what is "not real". It is about understanding how our brains operate to keep our hearts beating and our thoughts flowing. Neuroscience is about all the specific mechanisms in the brain that enable us to remember, to think, to decide, etc.

The point is reality is not a story told around a campfire.

If reality cannot be told, then we can never learn from the experience of others. Our species would likely be extinct by now. The whole point of having intelligence is to provide a means of conferring information from one generation to the next. Our newborns do not come out fully formed as with many other species. They learn all of the important stuff from others. Whether this information is conveyed around a campfire or in a lecture hall is irrelevant. The key is that we want the information to be meaningful, relevant, and accurate enough to be useful.

Honestly, I find the idea that "the point of reality is not a story to have to tell" a remarkably ignorant position to hold.

It is a fact that every universe I have ever created has been created for the sake of creating a story for to tell others. To then say "that's not the point" is just an argument from incredulity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The point is reality is not a story told around a campfire.

In many cases you are right. For example, here is the hard determinist's camp fire story:
"Gather around the fire kids, and I'll tell you a scary story. There is a boogeyman in the woods with magical powers. By casting his spell, he turns children like you into zombies. He takes away your control. He steals your freedom. Instead, everything you think and do becomes the thoughts that he instills in your mind without your even knowing it. He makes your choices for you, and you think they are your own. But all you can do is what he tells you to do, and you are trapped as a passive observer within your own head. And, guess what, HE'S ALREADY DONE IT!" (You hear the voices of the children screaming at this point). But the hard determinist continues, "You've heard of the laws of nature? That is a boogeyman! Do you remember what you did yesterday that led up to tonight's story? That is another boogeyman! Together they control every aspect of your life, and you can only sit and watch." (Now the children are sobbing uncontrollably).

Fortunately, for all of us, this is just a fairy tale, a story told around a campfire.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Geez, now there are New Compatibilists? ..

Compatibilism has not changed over time? The compatibilism of Hobbs is the same as Dennett's ''evitability?''

I wouldn't know. I solved the paradox with a simple insight in the public library, without any help from Dennett. I was about 15 years old at the time, which would have made Daniel Dennett about 19, and he probably hadn't written any books on the subject at that age.

The insight was that free will was a causally necessary event, in which I was the most meaningful and relevant cause of the event. Perhaps you'll share in this insight some day.

In any case, that insight has seen me through a lot of these discussions over the years. I've certainly learned many new things since then, but nothing that contradicts that insight.

Semi compatibilism with its claim that responsibility is compatible with determinism, Fischer, et al? Reason responsiveness? Regulative control?

Regulative control would be Patricia Churchland. I've seen a couple of her YouTube videos. I don't know any Fischer (other than Bobby the chess master).

I think the key thing that we all should keep in mind is that there are no experts in the field of philosophy. Everything in philosophy is basically someone sitting down and thinking about something. And my thinking is probably just as good as anyone else's (estimated IQ 127, not "genius", just "superior").

Now, when we get to neuroscience, there is more than just thinking about things, there's experimental evidence. So, I've read several books, by the author's David Eagleman, Michael Gazzaniga, and Michael Graziano.

Actions are either caused/necessitated or they are free, there is no middle ground.

And that is where your insight so far fails you. Surely you can see that freedom, the ability to do something without a meaningful constraint, requires a world of reliable causation. In order to type your comment you need a reliable keyboard, reliable fingers, and a reliable mind. Typing your comment is you causing an effect (the comment).

And, while you have a history of reliable causation stretching back to the Big Bang backing you up, the Big Bang's role in producing your comment is rather incidental. It is not a meaningful or relevant cause of the words you are typing. Is it?

So, we have a world of perfectly reliable causation, in which all events are necessitated by prior events. You are necessitated by your parents. They were necessitated by the evolution of the human species. The species was necessitated by the "random" (deterministic but unpredictable) mutation of DNA molecules, etc.

And now, here you are, causally necessitating your own comments. There is no break in the causal chain of events. You have prior causes and now you are the prior cause of your comments.

Are you "free" to type your comments? Well, freedom is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints upon your doing what you want to do. So, having seen your comments, I am convinced by the empirical evidence that you were in fact "free" to type your comments.

And you never had to step outside the causal chain in order to freely type your thoughts.

Actions are either caused/necessitated or they are free, there is no middle ground.

That is false in general. It can only be true in the special case where you find yourself meaningfully constrained by reliable cause and effect itself (as opposed to a specific cause, like the guy holding the gun, or if you are in a pair of handcuffs).

So, explain how reliable causation itself constrains you in any meaningful or relevant way.

Determinism necessitates all actions...

No. Determinism is not a causal agent. It does not go about in the world making things happen. The belief that determinism is a causal agent is superstitious nonsense.

Being determined, actions proceed or unfold as determined.

Yes, as causally determined by their prior causes. For example, your thoughts are the prior causes of your comment. And the "unfolding" happens as you gather your thoughts and type them into the comment box.

Wanting to do X is fully determined by prior causes.

Of course. But every event is always determined by prior causes. That's not a significant fact. In fact, it is probably the most trivial and insignificant fact in the whole universe.

The significant facts are what specifically caused something specific to happen. What we care about are the most meaningful and relevant causes of an event. A meaningful cause efficiently explains why the event happened. A relevant cause is something that we can actually do something about.

For example, rather than posting this response to the Big Bang, I post it as a reply to you. It is you, and not the Big Bang, that is making these false claims about freedom and causal necessity.

Once the desire to do X is felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

For goodness sake let's hope not! Men who experience a desire to have sex with a woman and who act upon that desire without thinking are called "rapists".

Constraint comes in many forms, both external and internal. Being free of external constraint, the thief with a gun, doesn't free you from the internal constraint of your own condition and information from the external world acting upon you, shaping your character and molding your thoughts and determining your response. The absence of one - the thief with a gun - doesn't exclude inner necessitation.

Internal constraint also goes by the name "self-control".

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

All actions, without distinction, are productions of deterministic processes. So, again, this is not a significant fact. It is a logical fact, but it is neither a meaningful nor a relevant fact. All of the meaning and relevance comes from the distinctions we make between different actions. For example, the distinction between making love and rape. To lose these distinctions makes everything meaningless. So, stop trying to do that.

 

[fromderinside]

It is a shame that introspection is still used because it takes away from the objective interpretation of neural function. We are to try our hardest to come up with Operations, material methods, to attach to our wanderings into our "minds" - a subjective looking at how the nervous system and endocrine systems generate behavior - when subjectively considering what is going on within us for use in experiment.

Psychoanalysis is based upon introspection. Neuroscience is a study of the brain's functioning as it relates to our thoughts and feelings, and other mental facilities.

Most of the twentieth century Philosophy has been about reconciling subjective behaving beings with the demands for objective methods to determine what is and is not reality.

Well, no, neuroscience is not about determining what is "real" and what is "not real". It is about understanding how our brains operate to keep our hearts beating and our thoughts flowing. Neuroscience is about all the specific mechanisms in the brain that enable us to remember, to think, to decide, etc.

The point is reality is not a story told around a campfire.

If reality cannot be told, then we can never learn from the experience of others. Our species would likely be extinct by now. The whole point of having intelligence is to provide a means of conferring information from one generation to the next. Our newborns do not come out fully formed as with many other species. They learn all of the important stuff from others. Whether this information is conveyed around a campfire or in a lecture hall is irrelevant. The key is that we want the information to be meaningful, relevant, and accurate enough to be useful.

Reality is only approached by those subject to it, never told nor realized. It is beyond the observer's kin to fathom reality. Full stop.

It is for this reason that there is relevance to subjective experience. It is all we have unless we tie what we believe to what is known. What is known is what is accomplished by objective, material, observation and analysis. This method, by the by, is the only hope for eventual understanding of at least local reality.

It is in the apparent inevitable push of living things to evolve. Being more capable of functioning, less subject to chaos more tuned to keeping energy longer and better is driving life forward. Finding and sustaining maximum entropies in the physical world guide us to certification of realities.

What you describe is hugging, clinging to, uncertain unproven, self identified, apparent realities can only lead to unforeseen catastrophic ends.

It is as I wrote early on. Philosophy is about rationalization and self evidence. Science is about observing and and building upon objective realities. The first is folly. The latter is continuously becoming more consistent and reliable, improving prospects for understanding over the past 600 years.

It is not about what we believe, what we subjectively know by looking inside ourselves. It is about what we objectively know and with which we can demonstrably exercise control over what is there that leads to actual knowledge.

Just as subjective fails in knowing it also fails in science as we are finding with Psychoanalysis, learning theory, functionalism, structuralism, and a variety of other self attributable isms. All are rotting on failed self insight precepts. Critics were right to throw out the bathwater with Wundt's Introspection, no matter how sincerely he believed in what he was about. We need an objective method.

Skinners counting bullae is not objective beyond observation of turds. Turds must be generated and knowing how and why they are generated might lead somewhere. But that wasn't the result of his method, Instead it was schedules of reinforcement.

Put Skinner there with Wundt. As for Freud find me the mechanics of for energies of ego, id, etc. They aren't there. Drop him into the shit bin as well.

WTF.

Permitting such as your smooth sounding platitude laden subjective declared sieves leads to an empty vessel. No knowledge remains, just empty proclamations.

Fluussshh!

 

[DBT]

Geez, now there are New Compatibilists? ..

Compatibilism has not changed over time? The compatibilism of Hobbs is the same as Dennett's ''evitability?''

I wouldn't know. I solved the paradox with a simple insight in the public library, without any help from Dennett. I was about 15 years old at the time, which would have made Daniel Dennett about 19, and he probably hadn't written any books on the subject at that age.

The insight was that free will was a causally necessary event, in which I was the most meaningful and relevant cause of the event. Perhaps you'll share in this insight some day.

In any case, that insight has seen me through a lot of these discussions over the years. I've certainly learned many new things since then, but nothing that contradicts that insight.

That term 'free will' is being asserted as a causally necessary event for the purpose of constructing an argument. All events within a determined system are 'causally necessitated events,' alternatives do not exist. A web of unfolding events where will plays no role in decision making. And if will plays no regulative role in decision making, how is it meant to be free?

Saying something is free doesn't make it free. Unimpeded but necessitated actions do not equate to freedom of will. Will is neither the originator or decision maker.

Semi compatibilism with its claim that responsibility is compatible with determinism, Fischer, et al? Reason responsiveness? Regulative control?

Regulative control would be Patricia Churchland. I've seen a couple of her YouTube videos. I don't know any Fischer (other than Bobby the chess master).

I think the key thing that we all should keep in mind is that there are no experts in the field of philosophy. Everything in philosophy is basically someone sitting down and thinking about something. And my thinking is probably just as good as anyone else's (estimated IQ 127, not "genius", just "superior").

Now, when we get to neuroscience, there is more than just thinking about things, there's experimental evidence. So, I've read several books, by the author's David Eagleman, Michael Gazzaniga, and Michael Graziano.

The evidence from neuroscience doesn't support free will. Actions are initiated by brain regions based on input and memory function and brought to consciousness. Will is not the regulator or the means by which thoughts and actions are generated.

We are whatever a brain is doing, architecture, inputs, memory function, mind, thought, action. We have will, but it is not 'free will.' Free will is merely an ideology built on semantics.

Actions are either caused/necessitated or they are free, there is no middle ground.

And that is where your insight so far fails you. Surely you can see that freedom, the ability to do something without a meaningful constraint, requires a world of reliable causation. In order to type your comment you need a reliable keyboard, reliable fingers, and a reliable mind. Typing your comment is you causing an effect (the comment).

What I said is just the nature of determinism. I pointed out that necessitated action, being determined, cannot have constraints, they must proceed as determined. The earth's orbit around the sun is not restrained, for instance, yet it is determined, gravity, mass, etc.

And, while you have a history of reliable causation stretching back to the Big Bang backing you up, the Big Bang's role in producing your comment is rather incidental. It is not a meaningful or relevant cause of the words you are typing. Is it?

So, we have a world of perfectly reliable causation, in which all events are necessitated by prior events. You are necessitated by your parents. They were necessitated by the evolution of the human species. The species was necessitated by the "random" (deterministic but unpredictable) mutation of DNA molecules, etc.

And now, here you are, causally necessitating your own comments. There is no break in the causal chain of events. You have prior causes and now you are the prior cause of your comments.

Are you "free" to type your comments? Well, freedom is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints upon your doing what you want to do. So, having seen your comments, I am convinced by the empirical evidence that you were in fact "free" to type your comments.

And you never had to step outside the causal chain in order to freely type your thoughts.

I type whatever is coming to mind. Thoughts are formed in response to the stimuli.

What comes to mind is determined by what I am being presented with - your argument - by reading your posts, which is sensory input, 'my' brain processes the acquired information according to neural architecture, memory function/past experience (brain information state) generating lines of thought. Which is not known until the necessary information is acquired and processed followed by related actions.

Which has very little to do with 'will' beyond the consciously felt impulse to respond, nothing whatsoever to do with 'free will.'

The cognitive process does not equate to free will.

No. Determinism is not a causal agent. It does not go about in the world making things happen. The belief that determinism is a causal agent is superstitious nonsense.

'Determinism'' refers to how the world works, its laws, principles, attributes. We have been through this. Nobody is saying that determinism is an entity or agent.

Once the desire to do X is felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

For goodness sake let's hope not! Men who experience a desire to have sex with a woman and who act upon that desire without thinking are called "rapists''

That's not what I meant, which I'm certain you know.

All actions, without distinction, are productions of deterministic processes. So, again, this is not a significant fact. It is a logical fact, but it is neither a meaningful nor a relevant fact. All of the meaning and relevance comes from the distinctions we make between different actions. For example, the distinction between making love and rape. To lose these distinctions makes everything meaningless. So, stop trying to do that.

Nobody is equating love to rape, being forced at gunpoint, etc, with acting according to ones will.

The issue here is: even when acting according to one's will, unimpeded, unrestricted, we are acting in accordance to inner necessity.

If an action is determined, wanting to do something is fully determined by prior causes and nothing prevents that person from doing what he wants, both the desire or will to act and the action is determined.


''Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity'' - Einstein.

 

[The AntiChris]

The evidence from neuroscience doesn't support free will.

You keep making the same mistake.

Of course "neuroscience" doesn't support incompatibilist free will - nothing does!

But "neuroscience" has nothing to say about compatibilist free will. To think that it does is to misunderstand the claims of compatibilists.