Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

WAB is back from voluntary exclusion. Whoop Whoop Who.

What is a judgment based on nothing burgers? See WAB comments above.

Theists cannot do anything beyond naming Commandments Laws. Determinists do pretty well specifying and testing scientific laws. By the way, what are the Laws of Nature?

Well, DBT, you’ve got a dogma, every bit as impenetrable as the dogma of Christian theism.

The problem is that now you are just repeating your claims like a mantra, without addressing salient points raised. I asked: why do you not see a distinction between would not have done otherwise, and could not have done otherwise? No answer. I asked: how is it that the brain evolved to give us the illusion of choice, as you would have it, rather than no choice at all? Of what use would such a brain be, and why would evolution favor something useless? No answer. I asked if you had read and would wish to comment on the Swartz paper. No answer. I asked why you see no distinction between a rock rolling down a hill and someone deciding what to have for breakfast. No answer.

You did address the distinction I made between determinism and hard determinism but your answer is inapposite. You simply deny that there is a distinction without giving any reason why this should be so. You don’t get to redefine terms to suit your argument.

So, unless you decide to address these larger points, the conversation, such as it is, does seem to be at a dead end. You are simply repeating over and over again claims that have been rebutted, without addressing the rebuttals. It’s exactly like talking with a theist, at this point. So be it. *shrug*

From the peanut gallery.

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Posturing.

 

[Jarhyn]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

WAB is back from voluntary exclusion. Whoop Whoop Who.

What is a judgment based on nothing burgers? See WAB comments above.

Theists cannot do anything beyond naming Commandments Laws. Determinists do pretty well specifying and testing scientific laws. By the way, what are the Laws of Nature?

Well, DBT, you’ve got a dogma, every bit as impenetrable as the dogma of Christian theism.

The problem is that now you are just repeating your claims like a mantra, without addressing salient points raised. I asked: why do you not see a distinction between would not have done otherwise, and could not have done otherwise? No answer. I asked: how is it that the brain evolved to give us the illusion of choice, as you would have it, rather than no choice at all? Of what use would such a brain be, and why would evolution favor something useless? No answer. I asked if you had read and would wish to comment on the Swartz paper. No answer. I asked why you see no distinction between a rock rolling down a hill and someone deciding what to have for breakfast. No answer.

You did address the distinction I made between determinism and hard determinism but your answer is inapposite. You simply deny that there is a distinction without giving any reason why this should be so. You don’t get to redefine terms to suit your argument.

So, unless you decide to address these larger points, the conversation, such as it is, does seem to be at a dead end. You are simply repeating over and over again claims that have been rebutted, without addressing the rebuttals. It’s exactly like talking with a theist, at this point. So be it. *shrug*

From the peanut gallery.

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Spoken like someone who does not have the first clue about what decision is. I've discussed it and if you don't want to look at the metaphysics of decision in the face, that's your problem.

As long as local systems determine events based on local states, decision exists because this is the nature of decision. No matter how low you go, local state factors into determination in ways that exclude the meaningfulness of outside factors to the event.

Decision exists, with the cause being a function of the local state plus input.

 

[fromderinside]

... The very ideas of consciousness, experience, feeling, beliefs, and desires are not objective beyond control experimenters apply to individual experiments. ...

Since those are the words and concepts that are relevant to this discussion this conversation appears to be done.

My very best friend was a classical Philosopher still studying at the time of Angela Davis at UCLA. He never quit even though he knew philosophy needed to change to remain relevant.

Given we've learned more than the totality of what we knew before the seventies it seems philosophers could at least delve into the realms where there is uncertainty about the value of rationalism. Perhaps philosophers can contribute, as statistics have contributed, to bridging the barrier between number and measure.

But, No. Marvin Edwards has declared Philosophy dead. I'm still confident methods and chains of an argument are available to pierce the boundary between what we think the mind is now and means whereby we can determine means to actually construct a sound deterministic basis for such a concept. perhaps a little statistical thought needs to be applied.

I do favor formality.

What is a belief?

Belief: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/

Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express (see the entry on propositions). For example, if two sentences mean the same thing (e.g., “snow is white” in English, “Schnee ist weiss” in German), they express the same proposition, and if two sentences differ in meaning, they express different propositions. (Here we are setting aside some complications about that might arise in connection with indexicals; see the entry on indexicals.) A propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true—a mental state of the sort canonically expressible in the form “S A that P”, where S picks out the individual possessing the mental state, A picks out the attitude, and P is a sentence expressing a proposition. For example: Ahmed [the subject] hopes [the attitude] that Alpha Centauri hosts intelligent life [the proposition], or Yifeng [the subject] doubts [the attitude] that New York City will exist in four hundred years. What one person doubts or hopes, another might fear, or believe, or desire, or intend—different attitudes, all toward the same proposition. Contemporary discussions of belief are often embedded in more general discussions of the propositional attitudes; and treatments of the propositional attitudes often take belief as the first and foremost example.

Belief:
NOUN

1. an acceptance that a statement is true or that something exists.
   "his belief in the value of hard work" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   guess · speculation · surmise · fancy · notion · suspicion · presumption ·
   [more]
   • something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion or conviction.
     "we're prepared to fight for our beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     opinion · view · viewpoint · point of view · attitude · stance · stand ·
     [more]
   • a religious conviction.
     "Christian beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     ideology · principle · ideal · ethic · conviction · doctrine · teaching · dogma · tenet · canon · article of faith · credence · creed · credo · code of belief
2. (belief in)
   trust, faith, or confidence in someone or something.
   "a belief in democratic politics" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   faith · trust · reliance · confidence · credence · freedom from doubt · optimism · hopefulness · hope

Expression of one's thoughts. Our problem with determinism is that one side believes Laws of Nature refers to all things within a capsule of determinism, while the other side believes Scientific Law refers to all material things within a capsule determinism.

The test by those who believe it to be Scientific Law refers to the completeness in which determinism is reflected in the consistency of scientific law.

On the other hand, those who are stuck with laws of nature require self-referenced things into a determinism meant only for objective things.

Seems to me that if one can't get from here to there one should reconsider one's belief of what is here to there.

My goal is to provide a path to those who have no model uniting all things to what is determined is to reduce qualitative to quantitative. One way is to reduce what is qualitative to those combinations of quantitative elements that produce them.

IMHO we are getting ahead of ourselves. It's been only about 20 years now that we've been able to measure work being done locally in the brain. We also have huge clues about the materiality of our qualitative products arising from genetics and evolutionary genetics.

Take a breath.

 

[DBT]

Well, DBT, you’ve got a dogma, every bit as impenetrable as the dogma of Christian theism.

The problem is that now you are just repeating your claims like a mantra, without addressing salient points raised. I asked: why do you not see a distinction between would not have done otherwise, and could not have done otherwise? No answer. I asked: how is it that the brain evolved to give us the illusion of choice, as you would have it, rather than no choice at all? Of what use would such a brain be, and why would evolution favor something useless? No answer. I asked if you had read and would wish to comment on the Swartz paper. No answer. I asked why you see no distinction between a rock rolling down a hill and someone deciding what to have for breakfast. No answer.

You did address the distinction I made between determinism and hard determinism but your answer is inapposite. You simply deny that there is a distinction without giving any reason why this should be so. You don’t get to redefine terms to suit your argument.

So, unless you decide to address these larger points, the conversation, such as it is, does seem to be at a dead end. You are simply repeating over and over again claims that have been rebutted, without addressing the rebuttals. It’s exactly like talking with a theist, at this point. So be it. *shrug*

It's a question of definitions in relation to physical states and conditions, not dogma.

If you haven't noticed, I not the only one arguing. If I am being labelled dogmatic, so are the members of the opposition.

You are asserting dogma in the assumption that your position is right and the opposition, me in this instance, are wrong.

It's not a matter of ''would have'' - determinism, by definition, doesn't allow alternate actions. The action taken, being determined, is the only possible action possible. There is no ''could have'' - ''could have'' within a determined system is an illusion.

Soft determinism is a Red Herring:
''Soft determinism is, in the words of William James, a ‘quagmire of evasion’. James claims that there is a fundamental contradiction in claiming that we are morally free and responsible and also claiming that it is ultimately our nature that will define our morality. Sure then, we can only be fully morally responsible if we had been the designer of our own being. As this is not the case, we are therefore not morally responsible.''

 

[DBT]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

Thank you for chiming in by offering your opinion.

 

[DBT]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

DBT is just presenting the standard historical argument with its neuroscience upgrades. It is very popular these days. The incompatibilists, both the hard determinists and the libertarians, imagine causal necessity to be a constraint, something that we must somehow be "free of" if we are to be truly free.

Rather than a matter of popularity, the issue is validity. Neuroscience provides the evidence that we as conscious entities do not control brain functionality, that on the contrary, it is brain functionality that shapes and forms our conscious experience, thoughts and actions.

That the state of the brain equals the state of us, how we think, what we think and what we do.

That is adaptive intelligence, but not free will. The compatibilist relies on mislabeling and misdirection in an attempt to establish what is not there.
What do we have?

Information processing is present with intelligence as a feature of processing power, response is thus enabled - not by 'free will' - but action enabled by intelligent information processing.


Once again:

''The liberty of spontaneity, a key idea in the soft determinist line of argument, can be criticized because it is arguably not enough to make us morally responsible.

This is shown here: if the absence of constraints is all that is needed for us to make free choices then surely this should apply to inanimate objects such as rocks, boulders or clouds. If there was a rock fall which killed a person camping underneath, it seems ridiculous to attribute blame to those rocks. In addition, if acting voluntarily is to be considered central to the theory then animals could be seen to be morally responsible. Either way it can be argued that the theory rests on a flawed principle; thus undermining the whole compatibilist theory.

Soft determinism is, in the words of William James, a ‘quagmire of evasion’. James claims that there is a fundamental contradiction in claiming that we are morally free and responsible and also claiming that it is ultimately our nature that will define our morality. Sure then, we can only be fully morally responsible if we had been the designer of our own being. As this is not the case, we are therefore not morally responsible.''

That essentially sums up the failure of compatibilism.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... The very ideas of consciousness, experience, feeling, beliefs, and desires are not objective beyond control experimenters apply to individual experiments. ...

Since those are the words and concepts that are relevant to this discussion this conversation appears to be done.

My very best friend was a classical Philosopher still studying at the time of Angela Davis at UCLA. He never quit even though he knew philosophy needed to change to remain relevant.

Given we've learned more than the totality of what we knew before the seventies it seems philosophers could at least delve into the realms where there is uncertainty about the value of rationalism. Perhaps philosophers can contribute, as statistics have contributed, to bridging the barrier between number and measure.

But, No. Marvin Edwards has declared Philosophy dead. I'm still confident methods and chains of an argument are available to pierce the boundary between what we think the mind is now and means whereby we can determine means to actually construct a sound deterministic basis for such a concept. perhaps a little statistical thought needs to be applied.

I do favor formality.

What is a belief?

Belief: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/

Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express (see the entry on propositions). For example, if two sentences mean the same thing (e.g., “snow is white” in English, “Schnee ist weiss” in German), they express the same proposition, and if two sentences differ in meaning, they express different propositions. (Here we are setting aside some complications about that might arise in connection with indexicals; see the entry on indexicals.) A propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true—a mental state of the sort canonically expressible in the form “S A that P”, where S picks out the individual possessing the mental state, A picks out the attitude, and P is a sentence expressing a proposition. For example: Ahmed [the subject] hopes [the attitude] that Alpha Centauri hosts intelligent life [the proposition], or Yifeng [the subject] doubts [the attitude] that New York City will exist in four hundred years. What one person doubts or hopes, another might fear, or believe, or desire, or intend—different attitudes, all toward the same proposition. Contemporary discussions of belief are often embedded in more general discussions of the propositional attitudes; and treatments of the propositional attitudes often take belief as the first and foremost example.

Belief:
NOUN

1. an acceptance that a statement is true or that something exists.
   "his belief in the value of hard work" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   guess · speculation · surmise · fancy · notion · suspicion · presumption ·
   [more]
   • something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion or conviction.
     "we're prepared to fight for our beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     opinion · view · viewpoint · point of view · attitude · stance · stand ·
     [more]
   • a religious conviction.
     "Christian beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     ideology · principle · ideal · ethic · conviction · doctrine · teaching · dogma · tenet · canon · article of faith · credence · creed · credo · code of belief
2. (belief in)
   trust, faith, or confidence in someone or something.
   "a belief in democratic politics" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   faith · trust · reliance · confidence · credence · freedom from doubt · optimism · hopefulness · hope

Expression of one's thoughts. Our problem with determinism is that one side believes Laws of Nature refers to all things within a capsule of determinism, while the other side believes Scientific Law refers to all material things within a capsule determinism.

The test by those who believe it to be Scientific Law refers to the completeness in which determinism is reflected in the consistency of scientific law.

On the other hand, those who are stuck with laws of nature require self-referenced things into a determinism meant only for objective things.

Seems to me that if one can't get from here to there one should reconsider one's belief of what is here to there.

My goal is to provide a path to those who have no model uniting all things to what is determined is to reduce qualitative to quantitative. One way is to reduce what is qualitative to those combinations of quantitative elements that produce them.

IMHO we are getting ahead of ourselves. It's been only about 20 years now that we've been able to measure work being done locally in the brain. We also have huge clues about the materiality of our qualitative products arising from genetics and evolutionary genetics.

Take a breath.

A belief is one's confidence that a proposition is true. Your example is that people who believe in "Laws of Nature" will reach different conclusions than people who believe in "Scientific Law". So, you understand the causative nature of a belief. At the very least, different beliefs can cause different conclusions.

But perhaps the more significant causation of a belief is its effect upon behavior. For example, the mob that broke into the U. S. Capitol building on January 6th, 2021 believed the lie that Trump had won the November 2nd, 2020 election, and that the election had been stolen from them.

The "self-referenced" things you speak of cannot be swept under the rug by suggesting one is qualitative and the other is quantitative. In the reality that our brain is supposed to help us cope with, all things are both qualitative and quantitative. The quality of the mob's belief was low, because it was false. The quantity of the Capitol Police who were injured or killed was a measure of the damage done.

I would suggest that the only reason that anyone cares about the quantity of anything is because it usually relates to the quality of our lives. I don't think you get one without the other. I don't think you can validly reduce the notion of quality to the notion of quantity without losing quality.

But, maybe that's just my belief.

As to determinism and free will, there is no reason for our belief, (a) that all events are reliably caused by prior events (determinism), conflicts with our other belief, (b) that the most significant prior causes of our deliberate acts is the act of deliberation that precedes them (free will). The notion that they conflict is a false belief, a delusion induced by an imaginary need to be "free of causal necessity", which poses no real constraint in the real world.

This is not changed by neuroscience. Neuroscience will help us understand how the brain operates as it provides itself with a model of the real world that it uses to imagine new possibilities, estimate the likely outcomes of different actions, and choose what the whole person will do. This is the brain's own explanation of what it is doing in real world.

 

[fromderinside]

... The very ideas of consciousness, experience, feeling, beliefs, and desires are not objective beyond control experimenters apply to individual experiments. ...

Since those are the words and concepts that are relevant to this discussion this conversation appears to be done.

My very best friend was a classical Philosopher still studying at the time of Angela Davis at UCLA. He never quit even though he knew philosophy needed to change to remain relevant.

Given we've learned more than the totality of what we knew before the seventies it seems philosophers could at least delve into the realms where there is uncertainty about the value of rationalism. Perhaps philosophers can contribute, as statistics have contributed, to bridging the barrier between number and measure.

But, No. Marvin Edwards has declared Philosophy dead. I'm still confident methods and chains of an argument are available to pierce the boundary between what we think the mind is now and means whereby we can determine means to actually construct a sound deterministic basis for such a concept. perhaps a little statistical thought needs to be applied.

I do favor formality.

What is a belief?

Belief: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/

Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express (see the entry on propositions). For example, if two sentences mean the same thing (e.g., “snow is white” in English, “Schnee ist weiss” in German), they express the same proposition, and if two sentences differ in meaning, they express different propositions. (Here we are setting aside some complications about that might arise in connection with indexicals; see the entry on indexicals.) A propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true—a mental state of the sort canonically expressible in the form “S A that P”, where S picks out the individual possessing the mental state, A picks out the attitude, and P is a sentence expressing a proposition. For example: Ahmed [the subject] hopes [the attitude] that Alpha Centauri hosts intelligent life [the proposition], or Yifeng [the subject] doubts [the attitude] that New York City will exist in four hundred years. What one person doubts or hopes, another might fear, or believe, or desire, or intend—different attitudes, all toward the same proposition. Contemporary discussions of belief are often embedded in more general discussions of the propositional attitudes; and treatments of the propositional attitudes often take belief as the first and foremost example.

Belief:
NOUN

1. an acceptance that a statement is true or that something exists.
   "his belief in the value of hard work" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   guess · speculation · surmise · fancy · notion · suspicion · presumption ·
   [more]
   • something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion or conviction.
     "we're prepared to fight for our beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     opinion · view · viewpoint · point of view · attitude · stance · stand ·
     [more]
   • a religious conviction.
     "Christian beliefs" ·
     [more]
     synonyms:
     ideology · principle · ideal · ethic · conviction · doctrine · teaching · dogma · tenet · canon · article of faith · credence · creed · credo · code of belief
2. (belief in)
   trust, faith, or confidence in someone or something.
   "a belief in democratic politics" ·
   [more]
   synonyms:
   faith · trust · reliance · confidence · credence · freedom from doubt · optimism · hopefulness · hope

Expression of one's thoughts. Our problem with determinism is that one side believes Laws of Nature refers to all things within a capsule of determinism, while the other side believes Scientific Law refers to all material things within a capsule determinism.

The test by those who believe it to be Scientific Law refers to the completeness in which determinism is reflected in the consistency of scientific law.

On the other hand, those who are stuck with laws of nature require self-referenced things into a determinism meant only for objective things.

Seems to me that if one can't get from here to there one should reconsider one's belief of what is here to there.

My goal is to provide a path to those who have no model uniting all things to what is determined is to reduce qualitative to quantitative. One way is to reduce what is qualitative to those combinations of quantitative elements that produce them.

IMHO we are getting ahead of ourselves. It's been only about 20 years now that we've been able to measure work being done locally in the brain. We also have huge clues about the materiality of our qualitative products arising from genetics and evolutionary genetics.

Take a breath.

A belief is one's confidence that a proposition is true. Your example is that people who believe in "Laws of Nature" will reach different conclusions than people who believe in "Scientific Law". So, you understand the causative nature of a belief. At the very least, different beliefs can cause different conclusions.

But perhaps the more significant causation of a belief is its effect upon behavior. For example, the mob that broke into the U. S. Capitol building on January 6th, 2021 believed the lie that Trump had won the November 2nd, 2020 election, and that the election had been stolen from them.

The "self-referenced" things you speak of cannot be swept under the rug by suggesting one is qualitative and the other is quantitative. In the reality that our brain is supposed to help us cope with, all things are both qualitative and quantitative. The quality of the mob's belief was low, because it was false. The quantity of the Capitol Police who were injured or killed was a measure of the damage done.

I would suggest that the only reason that anyone cares about the quantity of anything is because it usually relates to the quality of our lives. I don't think you get one without the other. I don't think you can validly reduce the notion of quality to the notion of quantity without losing quality.

But, maybe that's just my belief.

As to determinism and free will, there is no reason for our belief, (a) that all events are reliably caused by prior events (determinism), conflicts with our other belief, (b) that the most significant prior causes of our deliberate acts is the act of deliberation that precedes them (free will). The notion that they conflict is a false belief, a delusion induced by an imaginary need to be "free of causal necessity", which poses no real constraint in the real world.

This is not changed by neuroscience. Neuroscience will help us understand how the brain operates as it provides itself with a model of the real world that it uses to imagine new possibilities, estimate the likely outcomes of different actions, and choose what the whole person will do. This is the brain's own explanation of what it is doing in real world.

Fair. Up to Neuroscience which isn't something, can't provide us with something, etc. You are still offsetting so you can preserve decisions that aren't worth the time to make the statement. Neuroscience is a discipline that falls under life science which is guided by the material scientific laws of genetics, driven by normal deterministic scientific  Laws of Thermodynamics.

The laws of thermodynamics define a group of physical quantities, such as temperature, energy, and entropy, that characterize thermodynamic systems in thermodynamic equilibrium. The laws also use various parameters for thermodynamic processes, such as thermodynamic work and heat, and establish relationships between them. They state empirical facts that form a basis of precluding the possibility of certain phenomena, such as perpetual motion. In addition to their use in thermodynamics, they are important fundamental laws of physics in general, and are applicable in other natural sciences.

Just saying isn't a material scientific construct. One cannot enable by naming the brain as a decider.

If one follows the use of scientific material processes such as using energy to do work, one can, by observing cellular uptake of oxygen in the brain begin to measure brain functions.

"One's Confidence in" is a lay practice, it is not part of any form of lawfulness. Talk about building upon the sands .... . You've reverted, again.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Just saying isn't a material scientific construct. One cannot enable by naming the brain as a decider.

If one follows scientific material processes such as using energy to do work, observing cellular uptake of oxygen in the brain one can begin to measure brain functions.

"One's Confidence in" is a lay practice, it is not part of any form of lawfulness. Talk about building upon the sands .... . You've reverted, again.

Oh, sorry. Then please explain a belief using the laws of thermodynamics.

 

[pood]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

WAB is back from voluntary exclusion. Whoop Whoop Who.

What is a judgment based on nothing burgers? See WAB comments above.

Theists cannot do anything beyond naming Commandments Laws. Determinists do pretty well specifying and testing scientific laws. By the way, what are the Laws of Nature?

Well, DBT, you’ve got a dogma, every bit as impenetrable as the dogma of Christian theism.

The problem is that now you are just repeating your claims like a mantra, without addressing salient points raised. I asked: why do you not see a distinction between would not have done otherwise, and could not have done otherwise? No answer. I asked: how is it that the brain evolved to give us the illusion of choice, as you would have it, rather than no choice at all? Of what use would such a brain be, and why would evolution favor something useless? No answer. I asked if you had read and would wish to comment on the Swartz paper. No answer. I asked why you see no distinction between a rock rolling down a hill and someone deciding what to have for breakfast. No answer.

You did address the distinction I made between determinism and hard determinism but your answer is inapposite. You simply deny that there is a distinction without giving any reason why this should be so. You don’t get to redefine terms to suit your argument.

So, unless you decide to address these larger points, the conversation, such as it is, does seem to be at a dead end. You are simply repeating over and over again claims that have been rebutted, without addressing the rebuttals. It’s exactly like talking with a theist, at this point. So be it. *shrug*

From the peanut gallery.

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

“From the peanut gallery” is a gratuitous comment — itself a “peanut-gallery” type comment — and a form of well-poisoning. I have made a number of long, thoughtful posts in this and the other thread covering the topic. Whether one agrees or disagrees with my posts, they exemplify the opposite of “peanut-gallery” behavior.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

 

[fromderinside]

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

Nope. Deciding is not much more than agreeing with the sub-vocalizations you are calling consciousness which you have already produced. You are performing determined actions as you 'think' you are 'deciding'. Deciding is co-action or post-action justification, no more.

 

[fromderinside]

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

Nope. Deciding is not much more than agreeing with the sub-vocalizations you are calling consciousness which you have already produced. You are performing determined actions as you 'think' you are 'deciding'. Deciding is co-action or post-action justification, no more.

Things that don't exist such as 'self' and 'mind' are intervening variables created to 'humansplane' what is already being done.

 

[pood]

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

Nope. Deciding is not much more than agreeing with the sub-vocalizations you are calling consciousness which you have already produced. You are performing determined actions as you 'think' you are 'deciding'. Deciding is co-action or post-action justification, no more.

Do you have any evidence to support these claims?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Neuroscience provides the evidence that we as conscious entities do not control brain functionality, that on the contrary, it is brain functionality that shapes and forms our conscious experience, thoughts and actions.

That's okay. As long as it is our own "brain functionality" that is actually making the decision then that logically implies that "we" are making the decision. The alternative is dualism, separating "us" from "our brain". Neuroscience does not support the notion of a separate soul being controlled by the brain.

That the state of the brain equals the state of us, how we think, what we think and what we do.

Exactly.

That is adaptive intelligence, but not free will.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

Note that free will does not claim to be free from our brain. Nor does it claim to be free from causation.

It only claims to be free from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Our own brain cannot coerce us, because it is us. And there's certainly nothing undue about having a brain (nearly all of us have one). So, it's a very ordinary influence. The only exception are cases where the brain is damaged in some way, by injury or illness. Such damage can be an extraordinary influence upon our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

So, the definition of free will, as a choice we made while "free of our brain", is just as silly as trying to define free will as a choice "free of causation".

To avoid these absurdities, we must use the operational definition of free will, a choice "free of coercion and undue influence".

The compatibilist relies on mislabeling and misdirection in an attempt to establish what is not there.

The incompatibilist relies on mislabeling and misdirection in an attempt to establish what is not there. They use absurd definitions of free will. They characterize causal necessity and determinism as having the power of causal agents, able to control us against our will, to make our decisions for us, to plan what we will do even before we are born.

What do we have? Information processing is present with intelligence as a feature of processing power, response is thus enabled - not by 'free will' - but action enabled by intelligent information processing.

Intelligent information processing includes choosing what we will do. Choosing for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is the operational definition of free will.

So, free will is what is going on within intelligent information processing. You cannot make the specific operation go away by pretending it is not part of the more general notion of intelligent information processing.

Once again:

''The liberty of spontaneity, a key idea in the soft determinist line of argument, can be criticized because it is arguably not enough to make us morally responsible.

This is shown here: if the absence of constraints is all that is needed for us to make free choices then surely this should apply to inanimate objects such as rocks, boulders or clouds. If there was a rock fall which killed a person camping underneath, it seems ridiculous to attribute blame to those rocks. In addition, if acting voluntarily is to be considered central to the theory then animals could be seen to be morally responsible. Either way it can be argued that the theory rests on a flawed principle; thus undermining the whole compatibilist theory."

I hope you are not waiting for me to explain why rocks do not have free will, while all intelligent species do. Please do not waste your time and mind with such silly nonsense.

"Soft determinism is, in the words of William James, a ‘quagmire of evasion’. James claims that there is a fundamental contradiction in claiming that we are morally free and responsible and also claiming that it is ultimately our nature that will define our morality. Sure then, we can only be fully morally responsible if we had been the designer of our own being. As this is not the case, we are therefore not morally responsible.''

That prompted me to read William James essay, "The Dilemma of Determinism", from his book, "The Will to Believe and Other Essays". James defended the notion of "chance", his short, blunt word for "indeterminism". He argued for the moral necessity of real possibilities. Determinism left us with everything inevitable, with no distinction between good results and bad results, and with no regrets for bad actions, and no motivation to make the world a better place. He made some valid points.

"The indeterminism I defend, the free-will theory of popular sense based on the judgment of regret, represents that world as vulnerable, and liable to be injured by certain of its parts if they act wrong." (WJ)

He concludes his essay with these words:

This reality, this excitement, are what the determinisms, hard and soft alike, suppress by their denial that anything is decided here and now, and their dogma that all things were foredoomed and settled long ago. If it be so, may you and I then have been foredoomed to the error of continuing to believe in liberty.

James, William . The Collected Works of William James (8 collections of William James containing dozens of lectures all with active table of contents). . Kindle Edition.

But my approach is very different. I have no evasions and no quagmires. I incorporate the notions of possibility and alternatives into the rational causal mechanism, thus preserving both determinism and free will, without the need for any causal indeterminism.

If I had to label my own determinism it would be "perfect determinism". I presume that all events, including quantum level events, are reliably caused through perfectly reliable causation. Not "by" perfectly reliable causation, because causation itself is merely a concept. The notions of "cause" and "effect" are used to describe the natural interactions of objects and forces as they bring about events. Only actual objects and the actual forces between them can be said to cause events.

We happen to be one of those objects that go about in the world causing things to happen, and doing so for our own reasons and our own interests. The empirical event in which we decide for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is commonly referred to as "free will" (literally a freely chosen "I will").

We call it "free will" for the same reason we call a cat a "cat", to distinguish the cat from other things, like dogs. We use the label "free will" to distinguish our freely chosen will from a "coerced" will or an "insane" will or an "involuntary accident".

The fact that an event is causally necessary from any prior point in eternity only means that each event is reliably caused by prior events. For example, our birth was causally necessitated by our parents sexual intercourse. The prior cause of our birth was not causally necessitated by causal necessity, it was causally necessitated by the intercourse. There was no threesome (that would be a reification fallacy).

That essentially sums up the failure of compatibilism.

In your dreams.

 

[pood]

On the standard interpretation of QM, quantum events are decidedly not deterministic. That quibble aside, Marvin has nailed it again. He keeps making my posts superfluous.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

On the standard interpretation of QM, quantum events are decidedly not deterministic. That quibble aside, Marvin has nailed it again. He keeps making my posts superfluous.

Well, the thing about perfect determinism is that it makes a tidy little package to carry out to the trash.
Universal causal necessity/inevitability is a logical fact, but not a meaningful or relevant fact. It changes nothing. Everything remains exactly as it was before the first dude put his fingers into the Chinese Finger Trap that is the determinism "versus" free will paradox.

 

[fromderinside]

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

Nope. Deciding is not much more than agreeing with the sub-vocalizations you are calling consciousness which you have already produced. You are performing determined actions as you 'think' you are 'deciding'. Deciding is co-action or post-action justification, no more.

Do you have any evidence to support these claims?

First let me assure you that both auditory consciousness and visual consciousness exist without speech. These obvious capabilities, however, have little access to the structure of language.

That which passes through the language cortex seems to be concurrently heard. But does it take place before or after processing has taken place and signals are running to muscles engaging in vocal expression often heard as a voice in the head which is actually sub-vocalization in adults or even children above the age of five?

Generalizing, as we behave we are conscious of what we sense including chemically induced feelings, AND we are conscious of what we are thinking. I presume other integrative channels communicate via pons and reticulum through to the language cortex to provide a thought-scape for thinking. This latter statement is presumed because there is strong and long verified evidence these lower brain structures integrate from all senses. There is even an article I recently scanned that puts consciousness in the pons. When I recover it I'll provide it.

Articles such as the one below give evidence that sub-vocalization is driven even when other interfering tasks are instructed.

Internally generated conscious contents: interactions between sustained mental imagery and involuntary subvocalizations:​

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01445/full

Regarding instances of successful suppression, until more data are obtained, we remain agnostic regarding whether participants' performance (e.g., as reflected in their latencies) is consistent with “inhibition” accounts of cognitive control (cf., Aron, 2007; Levy and Wagner, 2011) or with other accounts, such as Jamesian ideomotor approaches in which successful suppression is interpreted as resulting, not from direct inhibition of the undesired action plan, but from the sustained activation of an incompatible action plan (see Hommel, 2009).

Our finding that the stimulus-triggered subvocalization arose despite participants' intentions, and despite the fact that the conscious field was occupied by other contents (e.g., the sustained imagery), is consistent with theorizing about the encapsulated nature of the generation of conscious contents (Fodor, 1983; Krisst et al., in press). From the standpoint of Krisst et al. (in press), this encapsulation is built into the system because it would be maladaptive for the generation of conscious contents to be controlled completely by one's beliefs or desires (see also Pylyshyn, 1984; Firestone and Scholl, 2014). From this standpoint, and consistent with the notion of the unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1856/1925), the RIT effect reflects the nature in which most conscious contents are (and should be) generated—automatically and independently of one's volition. Contents reflecting intentional, top-down processing are a small subset of all conscious contents. Our finding is also consistent with approaches that regard conscious contents as “action options” that, though activated in the conscious field, need not influence action directly (Allen et al., 2013). (Investigators have begun to examine the behavioral consequences of such unselected action options, Filevich and Haggard, 2013.) Together, these views concerning “action options” and about the encapsulated nature of content generation may have implications for our understanding of the basic mechanisms in psychopathological phenomena (e.g., in obsessions, ruminations, intrusive cognitions, compulsions, Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Magee et al., 2012).

Building on Filevich and Haggard (2013), future investigations could focus on the behavioral consequences of the unintentional subvocalizations triggered by the RIT. In addition, research could examine whether participants perceive the sustained imagery as associated with “the self” and perceive the unintentional imagery as “foreign to the self” (cf., Riddle and Morsella, 2009; Montemayor et al., 2013). It is our hope that future studies will build on this paradigm and on our findings, thereby yielding more insights about these elusive, self-generated states.

 

[DBT]

Marvin has things well in hand. And Copernicus is here as well.

FDI and DBT have futile arguments, and as Pood has aptly pointed out, discussing things with a hard determinist is essentially like discussing things with a theist.

WAB is back from voluntary exclusion. Whoop Whoop Who.

What is a judgment based on nothing burgers? See WAB comments above.

Theists cannot do anything beyond naming Commandments Laws. Determinists do pretty well specifying and testing scientific laws. By the way, what are the Laws of Nature?

Well, DBT, you’ve got a dogma, every bit as impenetrable as the dogma of Christian theism.

The problem is that now you are just repeating your claims like a mantra, without addressing salient points raised. I asked: why do you not see a distinction between would not have done otherwise, and could not have done otherwise? No answer. I asked: how is it that the brain evolved to give us the illusion of choice, as you would have it, rather than no choice at all? Of what use would such a brain be, and why would evolution favor something useless? No answer. I asked if you had read and would wish to comment on the Swartz paper. No answer. I asked why you see no distinction between a rock rolling down a hill and someone deciding what to have for breakfast. No answer.

You did address the distinction I made between determinism and hard determinism but your answer is inapposite. You simply deny that there is a distinction without giving any reason why this should be so. You don’t get to redefine terms to suit your argument.

So, unless you decide to address these larger points, the conversation, such as it is, does seem to be at a dead end. You are simply repeating over and over again claims that have been rebutted, without addressing the rebuttals. It’s exactly like talking with a theist, at this point. So be it. *shrug*

From the peanut gallery.

What you hold out as larger questions are irrelevant. Would and could refer from self. The so-called 'decision'-maker is deciding nothing. What one does is determined. The day you specify a neural construction that decides will be the day you understand determinism.

“From the peanut gallery” is a gratuitous comment — itself a “peanut-gallery” type comment — and a form of well-poisoning. I have made a number of long, thoughtful posts in this and the other thread covering the topic. Whether one agrees or disagrees with my posts, they exemplify the opposite of “peanut-gallery” behavior.

Of course the so-called decision-maker is deciding. Marvin and I have shown this repeatedly.

”A” neural construction does not decide. A vast network of neural constructions decides. The day you understand that the neural connections are both beneficiaries of, and producers of, deterministic behavior, will be the day you understand soft determinism. I won’t hold my breath.

Nobody is denying that neural networks process information and respond. An information processor, be it a computer or a brain, is able select options. This is a deterministic process (forget the poor rationale of 'soft determinism') that produces actions according to architecture and inputs, memory and sets of criteria. Actions inevitably follow unimpeded. Rather than freely willed activity, it is biological or mechanical functionality. If we are said to have free will, so has anything that acts unimpeded. The notion is absurd.

 

[DBT]

... Neuroscience provides the evidence that we as conscious entities do not control brain functionality, that on the contrary, it is brain functionality that shapes and forms our conscious experience, thoughts and actions.

That's okay. As long as it is our own "brain functionality" that is actually making the decision then that logically implies that "we" are making the decision. The alternative is dualism, separating "us" from "our brain". Neuroscience does not support the notion of a separate soul being controlled by the brain.

It's not okay for the idea of free will because brain functionality is not a matter of will, nor is it under the control or guidance of free will.

A computer loaded with algorithms is able to make decisions based on sets of criteria, basically the same principle as a brain, which is a matter of functionality not will.

That the state of the brain equals the state of us, how we think, what we think and what we do.

Exactly.

Yes, indeed, no free will required as an explanation for response and unrestricted action.


“You are free to do what you want, but you are not free to want what you want.” - Schopenhauer:

That is adaptive intelligence, but not free will.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

A brain 'decides' on the basis of architecture, inputs and criteria formed through experience: memory. This has nothing to do with free will.


''There is no such thing as free will. The mind is induced to wish this or that by some cause and that cause is determined by another cause, and so on back to infinity.'' - Spinoza

Note that free will does not claim to be free from our brain. Nor does it claim to be free from causation.

It only claims to be free from coercion and other forms of undue influence. Our own brain cannot coerce us, because it is us. And there's certainly nothing undue about having a brain (nearly all of us have one). So, it's a very ordinary influence. The only exception are cases where the brain is damaged in some way, by injury or illness. Such damage can be an extraordinary influence upon our ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

So, the definition of free will, as a choice we made while "free of our brain", is just as silly as trying to define free will as a choice "free of causation".

To avoid these absurdities, we must use the operational definition of free will, a choice "free of coercion and undue influence".

All things determined proceed or act without coercion or impediment. In fact, determinism necessitates the action. A robbery under threat of life proceeds unimpeded because the event is necessitated. It must happen. It cannot be otherwise.

Intelligent information processing includes choosing what we will do. Choosing for ourselves what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is the operational definition of free will.

Nothing required special in the form or 'free will.' Any mechanism capable of processing information and initiating action can do that.

So, free will is what is going on within intelligent information processing. You cannot make the specific operation go away by pretending it is not part of the more general notion of intelligent information processing.

So my computer is exercising its free will when spell check alters my spelling or provides options based on sets of criteria/

In your dreams.

The reasons are undeniable;


Compatibilism selects conditions that happen to affirm the consequent in order to support its conclusion, giving a definition of free will that disregards the nature of decision making, brain function and motor action, thereby reducing its argument to mere word play.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism.


1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.


1-You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.

2-In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.

3-But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.

4-So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.


''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

 

[Jarhyn]

Two people sit watching two screens.

One sits furiously clicking on a keyboard. Another sits also furiously clicking on a keyboard.

As one pushes in controls to a game, the other meaninglessly bangs on the keyboard while they watch a movie.

The same pixels play on one screen as on the other. The person watching these two events would not be able to tell which one is playing a movie and which one is playing a game.

The thing here is that these are not equal events. They do not have the same identity.

DBT and others would have us believe because we see one thing "on the screen" there are not meaningful distinctions that can be made because of the generalizable nature of our universe, that because there is only one play-through, it is a movie and not a game with meaningful decisions and choices.

Just because there is only one run of this crazy shit does not make it a movie.

In fact it means the stakes are higher to recognize that choices have enduring consequences.