- Mar 29, 2010
- No pls.
- Basic Beliefs
- Natural Philosophy, Game Theoretic Ethicist
Why would you need to be free* to do it whenever you wish, for it to be a free will**? Indeed many situations happen in which we are not free to hammer a nail, but we still have free will** in general.I do like his approach to the ideas in the clarity once the fundamental mechanics can be mashed out and demonstrated.I disagree. I think Marvin presents one of the clearest explanations/defences of compatibilism.his posts demonstrate the weakest understanding of Free Will here, other than you and FDI. He commits the most eggregious uses of sloppy language, beyond you and FDI .
Personally, I'd prefer it if Marvin attempted a different approach to DBT's particular dogmatic free will denialism but I'm not at all convinced that it would make any difference to DBT's responses.
It's a great approach to discussing it in a way someone who is not a hardened determinist can understand. It presents the fundamental question, which does revolve around "free from what?"
It lacks the satisfaction of examining "what, exactly is free and what exactly is it free from?"
Freedom is the ability to do what we want. To have an ability, like the ability to perform choosing or the ability to hammer a nail, means that you are free to choose and free to hammer a nail whenever you choose to do so.
A constraint is something that prevents you from doing what you want. Coercion prevents you from choosing what you want, and forces a choice on you that you don't want. Lacking a hammer, or a nail, or two arms may prevent you from hammering a nail.
Of course, the best hammers and nails are adamantine. However the best reasoning to make a choice is seldom adamant.
Indeed, I have the freely held** will* to find a gorgeous turkey feather this spring. It is not near the front of my priorities, but it's in there.
Whether this will* is free*, despite the fact I freely hold** it, is up to the state of reality and the progression of how causality cogitated. My partial will*, "keeping my eyes looking for the right patterns on the ground, where turkeys congregate" is clearly, trivially, free*. As to whether the whole thing's requirement of finding the feather is free* is not up to me.
Similarly, I could freely will** to hammer a nail, but my will* is not free* on account of the lack of the necessary bits of metal.
The will** and the will* are, in this model, separable.
Indeed so too are the "provisional freedom" assessments, subjective things, and the "actual result", a real and objective thing.