Consciousness

[ryan]

So rivers disappear do they? Do rivers really disappear, or does the water go somewhere else? Then I can make a raw egg disappear by cooking it? Maybe you are correct semantically, but you know as well as I nothing is disappearing from that egg.

Unless you are going to claim that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality, like mass/energy, angular momentum, quantum spin, or electric charge, then your statements about things being conserved are meaningless in this context.

That's why I brought up panpsychism and why it's appealing.

 

[ryan]

So rivers disappear do they? Do rivers really disappear, or does the water go somewhere else? Then I can make a raw egg disappear by cooking it? Maybe you are correct semantically, but you know as well as I nothing is disappearing from that egg.

If I light a match a flame appears and then disappears.

The flame exists because of a "process".

A process that begins and ends.

The heat phtons and light photons of the flame disperse. They don't disapear. The parts of the flame are conserved.

 

[untermensche]

If I light a match a flame appears and then disappears.

The flame exists because of a "process".

A process that begins and ends.

The heat phtons and light photons of the flame disperse. They don't disapear. The parts of the flame are conserved.

The flame itself is a temporary phenomena.

Here for a while and then gone forever.

 

[ryan]

So rivers disappear do they? Do rivers really disappear, or does the water go somewhere else? Then I can make a raw egg disappear by cooking it? Maybe you are correct semantically, but you know as well as I nothing is disappearing from that egg.

Particles decays into other particles....

you have somehow totally blinded yourself for the fact that a lot (maybe all) of what exists in this world is not static objects but dynamic processes. Have you never thought what the frequency of the wave of particles means? That particles are mere wavefunction maximas? That time is a dimension as is the space dimensions?

What there is is interaction between processes in time. That is all there is.

No, all there is is matter and energy and their locations; and probably consciousness.

Atoms are processes. They are structures of interaction between particles (waves)
Particles are processes they are structures of interactions between smaller parts.

You seem to have some magical view of the physical matter as some sort of substance that
Is always there.
Something like a sort of deistic lego.

That's why I originally said that matter is conserved, and you twisted it, like usually.

 

[Juma]

Particles decays into other particles....

you have somehow totally blinded yourself for the fact that a lot (maybe all) of what exists in this world is not static objects but dynamic processes. Have you never thought what the frequency of the wave of particles means? That particles are mere wavefunction maximas? That time is a dimension as is the space dimensions?

What there is is interaction between processes in time. That is all there is.

No, all there is is matter and energy and their locations; and probably consciousness.

matter is just energy so according to your twisted way of thinking then there is nothing but energy...

But this is bullshit. There ARE structure in this world. That structure exists and is as important on any level!

Atoms are processes. They are structures of interaction between particles (waves)
Particles are processes they are structures of interactions between smaller parts.

You seem to have some magical view of the physical matter as some sort of substance that
Is always there.
Something like a sort of deistic lego.

That's why I originally said that matter is conserved, and you twisted it, like usually.

? What? Matter is not conserved. Electric charge is conserved, momentum is conserved. Matter is not.

 

[fromderinside]

Best answer: Consciousness, if it exists. is a socially derived state. Since I'm apparently posting to your, probably human created, posts, Yes, right now I'm experiencing consciousness.

....

But consciousness is the ability to experience.

That is something that exists in anticipation of future experience, not just based on old experience.

Humans with consciousness plan and do things in the present to reach those goals.

The only question is whether they do it as they experience it, as a consciousness that plans and then controls.

Or whether this experience is some illusion?

Consciousness that has control as mere illusion is a consciousness that serves no purpose. It exists but is not needed in any way. The question is then why?

How do I love thee .....

So subconscious planning is out, sub conscious programming next steps is out, ....... finally something, experiencing, that actually requires consciousness -setting aside planning and controlling which are probably just punching out existing to-dos -

Finally why I do love thee, rejecting illusion just because one doesn't see benefits for one doing as other's are seen to expect. If that were conscious it would take place after the expectations had been expressed. We don't experience in real time, we experience after information arrives permitting us to experience.

 

[ryan]

Nobody is arguing those parallels of brain activity and the consciousness. The hard problem is about assuming that there is something more than just brain activity. But it's a hard problem because there doesn't seem to be any way to demonstrate it.

Maybe your stance is that there is no problem in the first place. Some people take this stance. But I can't ignore the fact that something unexpressible exists in addition to my brain activity simply because it feels like [unexpressible].

No, the hard problem is understanding how the brain forms conscious experience. That the brain is forming this activity is quite clear... we just don't know how.

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

 

[ryan]

The heat phtons and light photons of the flame disperse. They don't disapear. The parts of the flame are conserved.

The flame itself is a temporary phenomena.

Here for a while and then gone forever.

It's your perception of the flame that changes to a different perception, but nothing disappears outside of your consciousness. It's just matter and energy changing locations.

 

[ryan]

No, all there is is matter and energy and their locations; and probably consciousness.

matter is just energy so according to your twisted way of thinking then there is nothing but energy...

Matter is not just energy. Matter equates to a quantity of energy, but it is not just energy.

But this is bullshit. There ARE structure in this world. That structure exists and is as important on any level!

According to Britannica and common sense, "Matter material substance that constitutes the observable universe, and together with energy, forms the basis of all objective phenomenon". https://www.britannica.com/topic/matter

Atoms are processes. They are structures of interaction between particles (waves)
Particles are processes they are structures of interactions between smaller parts.

You seem to have some magical view of the physical matter as some sort of substance that
Is always there.
Something like a sort of deistic lego.

That's why I originally said that matter is conserved, and you twisted it, like usually.

? What? Matter is not conserved. Electric charge is conserved, momentum is conserved. Matter is not.

If you would just look at what I originally wrote so I wouldn't have to repeat myself until I make a mistake, you would see that I said matter and energy are conserved. If matter decreases, energy must increase and vice versa.

 

[PyramidHead]

No, the hard problem is understanding how the brain forms conscious experience. That the brain is forming this activity is quite clear... we just don't know how.

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

Panpsychism has several problems, however, and other than the fact that it's a good conceptual fix to some philosophical problems, it doesn't have any evidence for it specifically.

 

[ryan]

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

Panpsychism has several problems, however, and other than the fact that it's a good conceptual fix to some philosophical problems, it doesn't have any evidence for it specifically.

Yes, but neither does any other philosophical theory of the consciousness. That's why it's still philosophical.

 

[PyramidHead]

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

Panpsychism has several problems, however, and other than the fact that it's a good conceptual fix to some philosophical problems, it doesn't have any evidence for it specifically.

Yes, but neither does any other philosophical theory of the consciousness. That's why it's still philosophical.

Your comment seems to imply that all philosophical theories are on equal evidential ground. That's clearly not true. The theory that all minds are composed of yellow and purple styrofoam in the candy dimension is philosophical, but not supported by any evidence. The theory that consciousness is an emergent property of brains is at least supported by the fact that so far, only organisms with brains display any of the behaviors we normally associate with consciousness. Panpsychism has to reconcile that fact with its claims that paper clips possess consciousness.

 

[ryan]

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

Panpsychism has several problems, however, and other than the fact that it's a good conceptual fix to some philosophical problems, it doesn't have any evidence for it specifically.

Yes, but neither does any other philosophical theory of the consciousness. That's why it's still philosophical.

Your comment seems to imply that all philosophical theories are on equal evidential ground. That's clearly not true. The theory that all minds are composed of yellow and purple styrofoam in the candy dimension is philosophical, but not supported by any evidence. The theory that consciousness is an emergent property of brains is at least supported by the fact that so far, only organisms with brains display any of the behaviors we normally associate with consciousness. Panpsychism has to reconcile that fact with its claims that paper clips possess consciousness.

The consciousness is still philosophical because a lack of observable evidence means that science has yet to take it over and put it into their scientific realism construction (which is still philosophy but improperly called "science"). Science requires evidence; philosophy requires logic or at least good reasoning. I don't know the exact details, but I have read that there are some versions of panpsychism that have been considered actual philosophical theories, while some have yet to achieve that status. I don't know exactly what the requirements are to be a philosophical theory, but I do know for sure that at least some panpsychism theories are philosophical theories. I can probably find the reference if you need.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism. But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely and doesn't make any sense in terms of conservation.

 

[PyramidHead]

That was not what I was saying at all. And according to Chalmers, who coined the term:

"What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?" (1995, 202, emphasis in original). from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

How, if there is a how, will explain some, but it might not explain everything about the consciousness.

We do know how to override the brain and switch consciousness off. We know how to alter consciousness, we know how to disrupt consciousness, we know how to warp consciousness, we even know how to control consciousness to some degree, Delgado, et al, but we don't know how the brain is generating it. There lies the problem.

You are oversimplifying the problem. If panpsychism is true, then you never switch off the consciousness.

Panpsychism has several problems, however, and other than the fact that it's a good conceptual fix to some philosophical problems, it doesn't have any evidence for it specifically.

Yes, but neither does any other philosophical theory of the consciousness. That's why it's still philosophical.

Your comment seems to imply that all philosophical theories are on equal evidential ground. That's clearly not true. The theory that all minds are composed of yellow and purple styrofoam in the candy dimension is philosophical, but not supported by any evidence. The theory that consciousness is an emergent property of brains is at least supported by the fact that so far, only organisms with brains display any of the behaviors we normally associate with consciousness. Panpsychism has to reconcile that fact with its claims that paper clips possess consciousness.

The consciousness is still philosophical because a lack of observable evidence means that science has yet to take it over and put it into their scientific realism construction (which is still philosophy but improperly called "science"). Science requires evidence; philosophy requires logic or at least good reasoning. I don't know the exact details, but I have read that there are some versions of panpsychism that have been considered actual philosophical theories, while some have yet to achieve that status. I don't know exactly what the requirements are to be a philosophical theory, but I do know for sure that at least some panpsychism theories are philosophical theories. I can probably find the reference if you need.

Panpsychism is definitely a philosophical theory. I wasn't saying it's not. I was just saying that philosophical theories can be evaluated against the evidence just like in science.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism.

Is panpsychism a kind of reductionism? It seems to put the thing that needs to be reduced at the very bottom. Everything we know about consciousness, so far, indicates that it comes late in the universe, as a result of a sufficient level of integration and complexity. Panpsychism is forced to deny that observation in order to say consciousness predates everything, including brains.

But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely.

Ah, but panpsychism has the same problem: if all of my individual parts are micro-conscious, you still have to show how a combination of many micro-conscious parts can give rise to what feels like a single conscious entity. The explanation of that phenomenon is the same problem as the ghost in the machine. So, on that level, panpsychism and emergent physicalism are on the same footing. Panpsychism has the additional problem of making sense of something like a conscious baseball bat, or a conscious spoon, which are not required by the competing theory.

 

[ryan]

Panpsychism is definitely a philosophical theory. I wasn't saying it's not. I was just saying that philosophical theories can be evaluated against the evidence just like in science.

I was just saying that there are some kinds of panpsychism that have not (but are close?) to becoming philosophic theories, and I don't know why that is.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism.

Is panpsychism a kind of reductionism? It seems to put the thing that needs to be reduced at the very bottom.

But that is what reductionism is all about, explaining the whole system from its parts, no emergence needed.

But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely.

Ah, but panpsychism has the same problem: if all of my individual parts are micro-conscious, you still have to show how a combination of many micro-conscious parts can give rise to what feels like a single conscious entity. The explanation of that phenomenon is the same problem as the ghost in the machine. So, on that level, panpsychism and emergent physicalism are on the same footing. Panpsychism has the additional problem of making sense of something like a conscious baseball bat, or a conscious spoon, which are not required by the competing theory.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, but that's the problem of panpsychism that I was referring to. Panpsychism also has a problem with why does the "little" consciousness exist with a particle. What "psycho-material glue" is holding them together? But then again, this is still a problem for the emergence theories.

As for the unity problem, there is one type of known observable behavior that appears to be unified like a consciousness, and that is entanglement. And lately, entanglement has now become theoretically shown to be possible in the brain, and there is even some evidence of this. So it shouldn't be too much of a stretch to think of the "mental parts" also being entangled into a unified object.

 

[PyramidHead]

I was just saying that there are some kinds of panpsychism that have not, (but are close?) to becoming philosophic theories.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism.

Is panpsychism a kind of reductionism? It seems to put the thing that needs to be reduced at the very bottom.

But that is what reductionism is all about, explaining the whole system from its parts, no emergence needed.

But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely.

Ah, but panpsychism has the same problem: if all of my individual parts are micro-conscious, you still have to show how a combination of many micro-conscious parts can give rise to what feels like a single conscious entity. The explanation of that phenomenon is the same problem as the ghost in the machine. So, on that level, panpsychism and emergent physicalism are on the same footing. Panpsychism has the additional problem of making sense of something like a conscious baseball bat, or a conscious spoon, which are not required by the competing theory.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, but that's the problem of panpsychism that I was referring to. Panpsychism still has a problem with why does the "little" consciousness exist with a particle. What "psycho-material glue" is holding them together?

As for the unity problem, there is one type of known observable behavior that appears to be unified like a consciousness, and that is entanglement. And lately, entanglement has now become theoretically shown to be possible in the brain, and there is even some evidence of this. So it shouldn't be too much of a stretch to think of the "mental parts" also being entangled into a unified object.

Well, they would have to be. It wouldn't be enough to say that entanglement is just possible in the brain, it would have to be present in the brain at all times, if entanglement is the explanation for the unity of the mind. But even if that could be demonstrated it would just push the problem down one level; how do you go from entanglement, which is a purely physical phenomenon, to something like the feeling of hunger or vertigo? I'm not asking you specifically, I'm being rhetorical, the point being that the hard problem doesn't seem to get any easier by learning more about physics or neurobiology. There's always room to ask how that combination of physical factors could make me feel like I have a headache, when we could easily picture those same physical factors being true without the subjective experience of a headache.

 

[ryan]

I was just saying that there are some kinds of panpsychism that have not, (but are close?) to becoming philosophic theories.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism.

Is panpsychism a kind of reductionism? It seems to put the thing that needs to be reduced at the very bottom.

But that is what reductionism is all about, explaining the whole system from its parts, no emergence needed.

But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely.

Ah, but panpsychism has the same problem: if all of my individual parts are micro-conscious, you still have to show how a combination of many micro-conscious parts can give rise to what feels like a single conscious entity. The explanation of that phenomenon is the same problem as the ghost in the machine. So, on that level, panpsychism and emergent physicalism are on the same footing. Panpsychism has the additional problem of making sense of something like a conscious baseball bat, or a conscious spoon, which are not required by the competing theory.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, but that's the problem of panpsychism that I was referring to. Panpsychism still has a problem with why does the "little" consciousness exist with a particle. What "psycho-material glue" is holding them together?

As for the unity problem, there is one type of known observable behavior that appears to be unified like a consciousness, and that is entanglement. And lately, entanglement has now become theoretically shown to be possible in the brain, and there is even some evidence of this. So it shouldn't be too much of a stretch to think of the "mental parts" also being entangled into a unified object.

Well, they would have to be. It wouldn't be enough to say that entanglement is just possible in the brain, it would have to be present in the brain at all times, if entanglement is the explanation for the unity of the mind. But even if that could be demonstrated it would just push the problem down one level; how do you go from entanglement, which is a purely physical phenomenon, to something like the feeling of hunger or vertigo? I'm not asking you specifically, I'm being rhetorical, the point being that the hard problem doesn't seem to get any easier by learning more about physics or neurobiology. There's always room to ask how that combination of physical factors could make me feel like I have a headache, when we could easily picture those same physical factors being true without the subjective experience of a headache.

Just thinking out loud, but the beauty of pansychism is that we could have particles, another Standard model if you will, of mental components/particles. So just like the Standard model has symmetry of particles this "total model" would be like a symmetry of matter and mind particles.

Their parallel existence is still part of the hard problem, but there is something elegant about this, no?

What's more, is that entanglement of particles creates a unified free will (but limited free will) object. The mind that wants is not regulated by local cause and effect chain of events. The will is physically allowed to deviate, some, from what it is most likely suppose to do.

Everything from the growing popularity of quantum consciousness to physical models of the quantum consciousness points us in this direction. How awesome is that (If you like free will)?

 

[PyramidHead]

I was just saying that there are some kinds of panpsychism that have not, (but are close?) to becoming philosophic theories.

Reductionism is a successful explanation so far for the assumed domain of scientific realism, thus we get panpsychism.

Is panpsychism a kind of reductionism? It seems to put the thing that needs to be reduced at the very bottom.

But that is what reductionism is all about, explaining the whole system from its parts, no emergence needed.

But as you say, the consciousness appears to be emergent though; that is a problem for panpsychism. So you can pick your philosophical poison.

I think it would be easier to overcome panpsychism's problem over some ghost in a machine suddenly emerging when its observable parts are in the right order. The latter seems way less likely.

Ah, but panpsychism has the same problem: if all of my individual parts are micro-conscious, you still have to show how a combination of many micro-conscious parts can give rise to what feels like a single conscious entity. The explanation of that phenomenon is the same problem as the ghost in the machine. So, on that level, panpsychism and emergent physicalism are on the same footing. Panpsychism has the additional problem of making sense of something like a conscious baseball bat, or a conscious spoon, which are not required by the competing theory.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, but that's the problem of panpsychism that I was referring to. Panpsychism still has a problem with why does the "little" consciousness exist with a particle. What "psycho-material glue" is holding them together?

As for the unity problem, there is one type of known observable behavior that appears to be unified like a consciousness, and that is entanglement. And lately, entanglement has now become theoretically shown to be possible in the brain, and there is even some evidence of this. So it shouldn't be too much of a stretch to think of the "mental parts" also being entangled into a unified object.

Well, they would have to be. It wouldn't be enough to say that entanglement is just possible in the brain, it would have to be present in the brain at all times, if entanglement is the explanation for the unity of the mind. But even if that could be demonstrated it would just push the problem down one level; how do you go from entanglement, which is a purely physical phenomenon, to something like the feeling of hunger or vertigo? I'm not asking you specifically, I'm being rhetorical, the point being that the hard problem doesn't seem to get any easier by learning more about physics or neurobiology. There's always room to ask how that combination of physical factors could make me feel like I have a headache, when we could easily picture those same physical factors being true without the subjective experience of a headache.

Just thinking out loud, but the beauty of pansychism is that we could have particles, another Standard model if you will, of mental components/particles. So just like the Standard model has symmetry of particles this "total model" would be like a symmetry of matter and mind particles.

Their parallel existence is still part of the hard problem, but there is something elegant about this, no?

What's more, is that entanglement of particles creates a unified free will (but limited free will) object. The mind that wants is not regulated by local cause and effect chain of events. The will is physically allowed to deviate, some, from what it is most likely suppose to do.

Everything from the growing popularity of quantum consciousness to physical models of the quantum consciousness points us in this direction. How awesome is that (If you like free will)?

That does nothing for me, sorry. I don't care about free will.

 

[OLDMAN]

The fly moves across the desk. It does this of it's apparent free will. Yet it has no brain to speak of, but still gives off the illusion of free will.

There is nothing "apparent" about the "will" of a fly.

But to me it feels as if "I" decide when to go to bed, not just the sensation of being tired.

I sense I have control over things. My movements, which ideas I accept or reject, what things I will say.

Not total control but a measure of control.

If others feel as if they have no control at all I have never heard of this.

So tell me when "you" decide to move. Which brain neurons do you access? Which memories do you call upon? Which nerves do you fire to control which muscles and in what order do you do all this? lol Your brain and muscles figured all this out before you were even self-conscious.

If I ask you to picture an apple in your head. What do you picture? Is it in colour, red or green. Is it a painting or 3d, On a table or in a basket or just an apple. Whatever picture you brain has served you is most likely complied from many pictures and memories. If I ask you next month, you may get a different picture altogether.

You are part of the system, but not the driver.

 

[Treedbear]

Not necessarily the only thing. I still have trouble with the idea of qualia. Why do I see a color such as red or have a taste such as sweet? It helps us distinguish differences of course. But it's still a mystery to me.

But I can see a purpose to consciousness, especially as it pertains to the notion of free will. As I've said before, I see the brain as a model-making machine. It somehow creates models of things in its environment and it can do so subconsciously. Actually mostly subconsciously. In other words it acts like a machine. I see the self (and by inference the conscious awareness of self) as a model that develops from a very young age. Before one is even aware of what a brain is. It's like an interactive book used to keep records of past behavior in order that the brain can predict what the self is likely to do in the future. The will represents the predicted outcome. I predict I'll choose chocolate when I go out for ice cream. When the prediction turns out to be wrong and I come back with vanilla it's because "I changed my mind", when in fact it was just a bad guess. So consciousness can effect the outcome but it doesn't control it anymore than a character in a book does. But it's not an illusion. It ceases to be an illusion when one realizes its an abstract representation. Just like all the other things we know of. We know things by their relationships to other things. Not as some absolute essence. So the bottom line is that consciousness can have a purpose and yet not be the source of one's motivation, or will.

What you call a predicted outcome is called a habit.

Humans have habits. They have tendencies.

But humans are able to change habits as well.

So if I'm in the habit of choosing chocolate my choice is not freely willed, or rather doesn't involve the will at all? Why is it that when people insist on never changing something they are called willful?

The reason why "will" is the most important issue is because an animal that has "will" can have dignity and purpose.

An animal that has no "will" is just a puppet going through a charade.

Purpose is essential for dignity since dignity is obtained by fulfilling one's purpose. But many things that don't have a will have purpose, including many sentient things. And even acting out a charade can serve a purpose, although it's often used to insinuate a lack of dignity.

And "free will" is a redundancy. If something has "will" that means it can make "free" as opposed to "forced" decisions.

The term "free will" is redundant at best, and misleading at worst. There is no perfect freedom. Freedom is always contingient on a limited range of possibilities. Within the topic of discussion we're talking about (in the opinion of some of us) the neurophysiological architecture of the brain. The wonder of its complexity is where I look for human dignity.