Consciousness

[DBT]

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So you can go with two substances, physical and mental, or you can go with one fundamental substance composed of mind and body, thus panpsychism.

False dichotomy. Mental activity can be a physical process yet have no relationship the concept of panpsychism ( a philosophical position) or your conclusion ''thus panpsychism''

 

[untermensche]

Are you claiming that consciousness can or cannot give the brain an order, force it, to move the arm?

Can consciousness give the brain an order, force it, to do anything? To imagine a pig?


Just answer this. Just briefly as you can answer the exact questions asked.

The questions are wrong.

How can consciousness, which is something the brain is forming and generating and constantly updating while consciously active, order the very agency that is forming and generating it?

Your questions imply autonomy of consciousness.

Yes I am claiming there is a clear dichotomy between a brain and the products of brain activity. They are not the same thing.

To not think such a dichotomy exists is to think there is no dichotomy between the activity in a computer chip and the image on a computer screen.

But your answer is clear.

You believe despite every contrary perception in your life your consciousness can do nothing. It is purely passive.

BUT the brain does not need some other thing (consciousness) with passive "awareness" to be aware.

It does not need a consciousness to have vision.

It does not need a consciousness to know where the body is in space and move it.

It does not need a consciousness to understand the difference between hot and cold.

A passive consciousness that does nothing does not serve a brain in the least. The brain has no need for such a thing.

A consciousness with a measure of control. A feedback mechanism of control.

Well that is a different matter. A brain could use such a thing quite a bit.

 

[PyramidHead]

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So you can go with two substances, physical and mental, or you can go with one fundamental substance composed of mind and body, thus panpsychism.

False dichotomy. Mental activity can be a physical process yet have no relationship the concept of panpsychism ( a philosophical position) or your conclusion ''thus panpsychism''

If I understand this third option correctly, you're saying that mental activity is a physical process in essentially the same way that the paint drying on my house is a physical process. The problem with this claim is that mental representations are tangible in a way that the process of generating them is not. In other words, it's probably correct that say that a person's experience of tasting a carrot is generated in some way by a physical process occurring in the brain (and tongue). But it's another thing to say that the taste of a carrot is that process. That just gets us back to Mary's room again. You're right that mental activity can best be described as something brains do. But any process can be rendered as a list of steps, however long and interconnected. Are you saying that somewhere in this gigantic list, the actual taste of a carrot (and not just the process that generates it) can be found?

 

[untermensche]

Yes, consciousness is that which is capable of experiencing the carrot.

And right to say that generating that which can experience and that which is experienced is not the same thing as experiencing something.

 

[PyramidHead]

Yes, consciousness is that which is capable of experiencing the carrot.

And right to say that generating that which can experience and that which is experienced is not the same thing as experiencing something.

The question remains: what is the ontological status of the "that" in "that which can experience"? How do we accurately refer to it: is it a thing, an aspect of a thing, a perspective on a thing?

If it's a a thing, what is it made of? Why can't I observe it unless it's mine? How does it interact with other things?

If it's just an aspect of a thing, like an aspect of the brain, why does it resist complete description? I can describe every aspect of something like a screwdriver and presumably not leave anything out, but no matter how detailed my description of a carrot's taste, I can't fully communicate what it actually tastes like. Is this merely a failure of language?

 

[untermensche]

Yes, consciousness is that which is capable of experiencing the carrot.

And right to say that generating that which can experience and that which is experienced is not the same thing as experiencing something.

The question remains: what is the ontological status of the "that" in "that which can experience"? How do we accurately refer to it: is it a thing, an aspect of a thing, a perspective on a thing?

We describe it as we describe living things, as an entity.

If it's a a thing, what is it made of? Why can't I observe it unless it's mine? How does it interact with other things?

The entity has no external features to observe.

It is something that arises out of a working brain. But not visible to the eye.

All that is visible are cells and their chemical and electrical activity.

If it's just an aspect of a thing, like an aspect of the brain, why does it resist complete description? I can describe every aspect of something like a screwdriver and presumably not leave anything out, but no matter how detailed my description of a carrot's taste, I can't fully communicate what it actually tastes like. Is this merely a failure of language?

The taste of something is an experience.

No amount of words about the experience will equal the experience.

Experience of taste or color or pain is one thing and language is another. This is a limit of language, not a failure. Language does not fail because it does not do all things anymore than the legs fail because they do not allow jumping over the moon.

 

[ryan]

Yes, consciousness is that which is capable of experiencing the carrot.

And right to say that generating that which can experience and that which is experienced is not the same thing as experiencing something.

I can describe every aspect of something like a screwdriver and presumably not leave anything out, but no matter how detailed my description of a carrot's taste, I can't fully communicate what it actually tastes like. Is this merely a failure of language?

Well we are still able to talk about the mind and have most people know what we mean.

It seems to be a property of matter (a certain process of matter), yet it does not necessarily have an effect on matter. Let it be a property of matter as inert as "squareness" but with it's own existence as an entity.

 

[PyramidHead]

The question remains: what is the ontological status of the "that" in "that which can experience"? How do we accurately refer to it: is it a thing, an aspect of a thing, a perspective on a thing?

We describe it as we describe living things, as an entity.

If it's a a thing, what is it made of? Why can't I observe it unless it's mine? How does it interact with other things?

The entity has no external features to observe.

It is something that arises out of a working brain. But not visible to the eye.

All that is visible are cells and their chemical and electrical activity.

This is interesting to me, because an entity as such is only definable by its effects. An observable phenomena exerts some effect on the senses, providing a surface for photons to bounce off, sending pressure waves through the air, and so on. Or, it has effects that can only be indirectly observed in the behavior of other entities, like wind causing a flag to ruffle in the breeze.

Consciousness doesn't seem to satisfy either of these criteria completely. I can observe my own experiences, but I can't observe the 'entity' that experiences them. And I can observe neither the entity nor the experience itself in others. If we're being consistent with science, it's likely that consciousness doesn't exert any indirect effects either, as there is always some physical signature that can be identified as the cause.

That's why I hesitate to call consciousness an entity in the same sense that the notebook on my desk is an entity. Yet, I don't disagree with you when you say it arises out of a working brain (and is not just identical to the workings of a brain). Perhaps we need a new category or concept to describe it, but nothing else seems to share the features in question.

The taste of something is an experience.

No amount of words about the experience will equal the experience.

Experience of taste or color or pain is one thing and language is another. This is a limit of language, not a failure. Language does not fail because it does not do all things anymore than the legs fail because they do not allow jumping over the moon.

What I meant was to ask whether it's an insurmountable limit, or something that could potentially change with enough research. Daniel Dennett famously said that the Mary's Room thought experiment was begging the question by assuming the experience of redness would not be included in a complete physical description of the neurophysiology of seeing something red. In other words, if she ACTUALLY knew all that there is to know about color perception in the brain, somehow that information would convey to Mary what it would be like to see a red object. This seems impossible to me, but I don't know how to show that it's impossible. My incredulity might just be clouding my ability to imagine a scientific fact that would fully represent the redness of red.

 

[PyramidHead]

I can describe every aspect of something like a screwdriver and presumably not leave anything out, but no matter how detailed my description of a carrot's taste, I can't fully communicate what it actually tastes like. Is this merely a failure of language?

Well we are still able to talk about the mind and have most people know what we mean.

It seems to be a property of matter (a certain process of matter), yet it does not necessarily have an effect on matter. Let it be a property of matter as inert as "squareness" but with it's own existence as an entity.

That's a big addition, though, the part about having its own existence. No other property can be said to exist independently of the object that instantiates it, unless you're a Platonist. And even in that case, the property should be eventually describable by a finite number of statements. If you want to define squareness, there's a limited number of features you have to account for, and then you're done, there's no further information that can be added. Subjective experience, or mental activity if you like, can only be described in terms of other subjective experiences, and if you try to use purely physical language to capture it you can't even begin.

There's also the inescapable sense of personal identification with consciousness. If consciousness is the thing that has experiences and feels sensations, I am my consciousness. But it doesn't really make sense to say that I'm a property or a process, because those aren't things in themselves, things that can be aware they exist.

What I'm getting at is that consciousness doesn't fit into any of the categories we normally use to name something. It's not an entity, since it doesn't effect anything and can't be observed. It's not a process or a property, since it can't be fully described, and it corresponds to whatever it is I mean when I say 'me'.

 

[fromderinside]

Why does the brain need something to be aware of the movement in addition to itself? Does the brain not have access to visual input, proprioceptive input? Why does it need something conscious of the movement thinking it is initiating movement for feedback?

Well the brain is part of the human around it and its merely doing what has been enabled through evolution to contribute. Consciousness is something we humans seem to believe we have. I'm just trying to explain that fact in context of what human senses are known to process. Seems the problem is finding a way to use what the brain does to contribute to a particular human successfully producing more humans.

What that appears to be is a feedback related process and an 'experiencing' producing some combination of predicting what's probably coming and reporting what has just passed. To give something like that a fitness badge one needs to explain how such a system can help in the successfully producing of babies thingie. My take is it's a set of calculations patched on to recent history as an experience. That might be all that's necessary to put a plus sign on it's function for fitness.

I do insist, however, that consciousness is not a stand alone controller of anything.

 

[PyramidHead]

Why does the brain need something to be aware of the movement in addition to itself? Does the brain not have access to visual input, proprioceptive input? Why does it need something conscious of the movement thinking it is initiating movement for feedback?

Well the brain is part of the human around it and its merely doing what has been enabled through evolution to contribute. Consciousness is something we humans seem to believe we have. I'm just trying to explain that fact in context of what human senses are known to process. Seems the problem is finding a way to use what the brain does to contribute to a particular human successfully producing more humans. What that appears to be feedback related and it appears to be 'experiencing' some combination of predicting what's probably coming and reporting what has just passed. To give something like that a fitness badge one needs to explain how such a system can help in the successfully producing of babies thingie. My take is sit's a set of calculations patched on to recent history as an experience. That might be all that's necessary to put a plus sign on it's function for fitness.

I do insist,however that it's not a stand alone controller of anything.

It could also be an inevitable side effect of something else that confers a fitness benefit. Perhaps consciousness is an epiphenomenon of having a brain complex enough for language.

 

[ryan]

Well we are still able to talk about the mind and have most people know what we mean.

It seems to be a property of matter (a certain process of matter), yet it does not necessarily have an effect on matter. Let it be a property of matter as inert as "squareness" but with it's own existence as an entity.

There's also the inescapable sense of personal identification with consciousness. If consciousness is the thing that has experiences and feels sensations, I am my consciousness. But it doesn't really make sense to say that I'm a property or a process, because those aren't things in themselves, things that can be aware they exist.

Why not? It seems to be a kind of property dualism either running parallel or epiphenomenally to the physical.

What I'm getting at is that consciousness doesn't fit into any of the categories we normally use to name something. It's not an entity, since it doesn't effect anything and can't be observed.

The only thing that I am sure of is my consciousness. It's the most certain thing I know exists. Secondary certainty is the physical nature that my consciousness is aware of. The physical is what is observed by my consciousness, so that distinguishes them intrinsically. From that, it would seem to make sense that my consciousness as an entity is aware of the physical. "Aware of" is a subtle but definite divide between "me" and the matter that "me" is aware of.

It's not an entity, since it doesn't effect anything and can't be observed. It's not a process or a property, since it can't be fully described, and it corresponds to whatever it is I mean when I say 'me'.

There seems to be things out there that are not me (everything except my consciousness) even though my mind acts in concert with certain physical processes of my brain. If that does not constitute reason for its own independent (but causally dependent) existence, then I don't know what possible could.

 

[untermensche]

This is interesting to me, because an entity as such is only definable by its effects.

It's effects are seen. Like a flag flapping in the breeze.

In the manner and expressions in language of other people.

But I would say an entity can also be defined by it's abilities.

If something can experience sights and sounds and sensations and thoughts and emotions then it can be thought of as an entity.

I can observe my own experiences, but I can't observe the 'entity' that experiences them.

You don't observe your own experiences, you experience them. You do not observe pain or a cool breeze or a thought about your next project.

"You" are that which experiences.

And that which uses language to talk about ideas that have arisen because of your experiences.

What I meant was to ask whether it's an insurmountable limit, or something that could potentially change with enough research. Daniel Dennett famously said that the Mary's Room thought experiment was begging the question by assuming the experience of redness would not be included in a complete physical description of the neurophysiology of seeing something red. In other words, if she ACTUALLY knew all that there is to know about color perception in the brain, somehow that information would convey to Mary what it would be like to see a red object. This seems impossible to me, but I don't know how to show that it's impossible. My incredulity might just be clouding my ability to imagine a scientific fact that would fully represent the redness of red.

IMO Daniel Dennett is wrong a lot of the time. I think you are talking about an "emergent property".

A property that emerges because of the interaction of two properties that is not included in the two initial properties.

Like a match and air. That produces under the right conditions a fire.

But fire is not a match or air. But it exists without adding anything to the situation.

 

[untermensche]

Why does the brain need something to be aware of the movement in addition to itself? Does the brain not have access to visual input, proprioceptive input? Why does it need something conscious of the movement thinking it is initiating movement for feedback?

Well the brain is part of the human around it and its merely doing what has been enabled through evolution to contribute. Consciousness is something we humans seem to believe we have. I'm just trying to explain that fact in context of what human senses are known to process. Seems the problem is finding a way to use what the brain does to contribute to a particular human successfully producing more humans.

What that appears to be is a feedback related process and an 'experiencing' producing some combination of predicting what's probably coming and reporting what has just passed. To give something like that a fitness badge one needs to explain how such a system can help in the successfully producing of babies thingie. My take is it's a set of calculations patched on to recent history as an experience. That might be all that's necessary to put a plus sign on it's function for fitness.

I do insist, however, that consciousness is not a stand alone controller of anything.

Certainly I am conscious of past mistakes and successes. And future plans.

I'm not so sure my brain is.

 

[ryan]

What I meant was to ask whether it's an insurmountable limit, or something that could potentially change with enough research. Daniel Dennett famously said that the Mary's Room thought experiment was begging the question by assuming the experience of redness would not be included in a complete physical description of the neurophysiology of seeing something red. In other words, if she ACTUALLY knew all that there is to know about color perception in the brain, somehow that information would convey to Mary what it would be like to see a red object. This seems impossible to me, but I don't know how to show that it's impossible. My incredulity might just be clouding my ability to imagine a scientific fact that would fully represent the redness of red.

IMO Daniel Dennett is wrong a lot of the time. I think you are talking about an "emergent property".

A property that emerges because of the interaction of two properties that is not included in the two initial properties.

Like a match and air. That produces under the right conditions a fire.

But fire is not a match or air. But it exists without adding anything to the situation.

There are no emergent properties in science. Everything is reducible to the physics/Standard model. The actual emergence lies in the consciousness' ability to distinguish samples of what exists out there into whole objects.

 

[untermensche]

IMO Daniel Dennett is wrong a lot of the time. I think you are talking about an "emergent property".

A property that emerges because of the interaction of two properties that is not included in the two initial properties.

Like a match and air. That produces under the right conditions a fire.

But fire is not a match or air. But it exists without adding anything to the situation.

There are no emergent properties in science. Everything is reducible to the physics/Standard model. The actual emergence lies in the consciousness' ability to distinguish samples of what exists out there into whole objects.

There are all kinds of emergent properties.

Combine red and yellow and orange emerges.

Combine all the sounds from all the instruments in an orchestra and a symphony emerges.

This symphony can have effects on the psyche that no instrument alone can produce.

I am not sure what you mean.

The bottom line is that the activity in the brain that creates "that which can experience" when combined with the brain activity that creates the experience could possibly create something which is different from either activity. Something that emerges from the combination of two similar kinds of activity. So-called "qualia".

Like orange emerges if you combine red and yellow paint.

 

[ryan]

There are no emergent properties in science. Everything is reducible to the physics/Standard model. The actual emergence lies in the consciousness' ability to distinguish samples of what exists out there into whole objects.

There are all kinds of emergent properties.

Combine red and yellow and orange emerges.

Combine all the sounds from all the instruments in an orchestra and a symphony emerges.

This symphony can have effects on the psyche that no instrument alone can produce.

I am not sure what you mean.

The bottom line is that the activity in the brain that creates "that which can experience" when combined with the brain activity that creates the experience could possibly create something which is different from either activity. Something that emerges from the combination of two similar kinds of activity. So-called "qualia".

Like orange emerges if you combine red and yellow paint.

The best way I have read that explains reducibility is if you can take any system and see if everything about it can be predicted by its parts. In the case of everything scientific, physics/Standard model can do this.

 

[untermensche]

The best way I have read that explains reducibility is if you can take any system and see if everything about it can be predicted by its parts. In the case of everything scientific, physics/Standard model can do this.

There are many models.

And no unified model.

But what you are saying seems besides the point.

Do you not agree that a sound arises when you combine the sounds of many instruments that is not a sound of any specific instrument?

 

[couch_sloth]

IMO Daniel Dennett is wrong a lot of the time. I think you are talking about an "emergent property".

A property that emerges because of the interaction of two properties that is not included in the two initial properties.

Like a match and air. That produces under the right conditions a fire.

But fire is not a match or air. But it exists without adding anything to the situation.

There are no emergent properties in science. Everything is reducible to the physics/Standard model. The actual emergence lies in the consciousness' ability to distinguish samples of what exists out there into whole objects.

Even if we had the ability to reduce and understand each element causing consciousness/mind/subjective feeling, I doubt most people would find this satisfactory. i.e. For consciousness, most people probably won't be satisfied with a complex level of scientific explanation, which would seem satisfactory for most other things.

 

[ryan]

The best way I have read that explains reducibility is if you can take any system and see if everything about it can be predicted by its parts. In the case of everything scientific, physics/Standard model can do this.

There are many models.

And no unified model.

But what you are saying seems besides the point.

Do you not agree that a sound arises when you combine the sounds of many instruments that is not a sound of any specific instrument?

But it is the mind that unifies a sample of what is out there. It is still an emergent "whole" but only in the mind. Out there the sound waves are just parts that the brain unifies into something we perceive as whole, special and emergent.