Consciousness

[PyramidHead]

There are people who do not remember any yesterdays. They wake up each morning with no memory. There is no "stream of" consciousness, only consciousness.

Consciousness is not a thing. It is a constantly changing mental/virtual representation of the information that is fed into conscious activity by inputs, a collection of ever changing things, connectivity, memory and processing, etc, hence the reference 'stream of consciousness' even though it's not technically correct.

Not to be pedantic, but representations are traditionally things. I mentioned this in an earlier post and you ignored it. In all cases--except this one--a representation is a tangible entity that can be pointed to and observed publicly. Representations include things like signs, models, schematics, maps, and lists. Representations aren't felt as anything, they don't have any phenomenal quality on their own (unless a mind interacts with them, of course).

I'm coming around to the idea that conscious experience is an aspect or property of things like brains, rather than a thing in itself, but this mental aspect still seems irreducible to any physical aspect of the thing, despite being causally related to it. But these labels might be meaningless distinctions we apply to an unknown, unified whole that accounts for all aspects.

But consciousness, if you want to call it a representation, is therefore a thing in itself: a thing that represents the sensory world through mental properties. Some things are abstractions that just aid communication, however.

As to ryan's suggestion that mental properties (or the "thing" of consciousness) can be ascribed to all of matter, I disagree. Sometimes ideas come along that appear to solve an existing conceptual problem on a purely conceptual level, but have no relationship to the actual universe. I think panpsychism may be such an idea, attractive to philosophers because of the conundrums it can allegedly address, but otherwise without any evidence or likelihood of being empirically true.

 

[untermensche]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

It is that which is aware of representations made by the brain.

It is the ability to have a subjective awareness of representations.

Those that claim it is merely the representations are quite lost.

 

[PyramidHead]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

It is that which is aware of representations made by the brain.

It is the ability to have a subjective awareness of representations.

Those that claim it is merely the representations are quite lost.

What term would you use to describe "representations made by the brain", then? I agree maybe that consciousness is not merely representations, but as usual you seem to be over-stating your opinions for dramatic impact (a la "observing a damaged brain tells us nothing about how a healthy brain works").

 

[untermensche]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

It is that which is aware of representations made by the brain.

It is the ability to have a subjective awareness of representations.

Those that claim it is merely the representations are quite lost.

What term would you use to describe "representations made by the brain", then? I agree maybe that consciousness is not merely representations, but as usual you seem to be over-stating your opinions for dramatic impact (a la "observing a damaged brain tells us nothing about how a healthy brain works").

I said that looking at damage does not tell us anything about how the brain creates consciousness.

It does not explain activity in any way. It merely can show general locations that have an association with some subjective report.

And this is not an overstatement either.

Consciousness is that which is aware of vision and thoughts and emotions and all the rest.

Vision, thoughts and emotions are the representations.

Not consciousness.

Not in any way is consciousness a representation.

 

[ryan]

As to ryan's suggestion that mental properties (or the "thing" of consciousness) can be ascribed to all of matter, I disagree. Sometimes ideas come along that appear to solve an existing conceptual problem on a purely conceptual level, but have no relationship to the actual universe. I think panpsychism may be such an idea, attractive to philosophers because of the conundrums it can allegedly address, but otherwise without any evidence or likelihood of being empirically true.

You want evidence for a topic for philosophy??? Why wouldn't I just be in a science thread talking about the evidence, and then I can go get my Nobel Prize.

That's philosophy for you, and philosophy is still where we are at with the consciousness. So don't try to make me look delusional when I know exactly how less accurate, historically speaking, any philosophical theory is over any scientific theory. I claim no certainty for panpsychism, never have and probably never will.

If I can show that panpsychism is rational (well show from compiling information out there) then I have done my job in a philosophical respect.

 

[PyramidHead]

As to ryan's suggestion that mental properties (or the "thing" of consciousness) can be ascribed to all of matter, I disagree. Sometimes ideas come along that appear to solve an existing conceptual problem on a purely conceptual level, but have no relationship to the actual universe. I think panpsychism may be such an idea, attractive to philosophers because of the conundrums it can allegedly address, but otherwise without any evidence or likelihood of being empirically true.

You want evidence for a topic for philosophy??? Why wouldn't I just be in a science thread talking about the evidence, and then I can go get my Nobel Prize.

That's philosophy for you, and philosophy is still where we are at with the consciousness. So don't try to make me look delusional when I know exactly how less accurate, historically, any philosophical theory is over any scientific theory. I claim no certainty for panpsychism, never have and probably never will.

What makes panpsychism just a "topic for philosophy" rather than a scientific hypothesis? It's making a claim about the universe and the nature of matter. This amounts to a prediction about what will eventually be discovered when science figures out a way to research this stuff. So it's entirely a scientific question. There isn't a separate category of theories in a drawer labeled "philosophy" that miraculously do not need any evidence other than parsimony or conceptual convenience. If it's a statement that something is true, it should be demonstrable that it's true, in which case it's just science. If it's not demonstrable yet, that's okay, it's still science. If it's not demonstrable even in principle, it's no different from saying the opposite and it doesn't mean anything. At least that's how the normal framework goes, and it's been successful at separating the wheat from the chaff so far. I never said you were certain about panpsychism, I just identified it as your suggestion since you were the one advocating it as a legitimate possibility.

 

[fromderinside]

I' a bit more reductive than that. Different senses often get information from the same source. It makes sense brains would adapt to connect those sensory contiguities. If we start with a primitive vertebrate brain, a manta, being able to distinguish relevant shape from irrelevant shape, then connect that with olfactory identities associated with those shapes we have a pretty goo basis for arguing the manta is conscious of relevant entities without the need for will, or a consciousness, or any other homunuclus, type thing.

We have a pretty good sensory homunculus structural representation in our human cortex which has been shown to treat information from several or all senses and to issue impulses directed to several effectors as the result ob being stimulated. But it is clear that this center is not the seat of consciousness if it is something that needs be aware. Awareness and command seem to be responsibilities of other regions of cortex and midbrain. No study has linked the physical representation of us to to the  Cortical homunculus.

If we look at sense individually we find organization in the regions of brain dealing with them in terms of similarity of location, color, scent, and frequency just as it arises from the input sensors. We also find descending control relevant to each sense modulating subsequent inputs along with lateral and other structure connectivity appropriate with a variety of functions associated with specific midbrain and hindbrain structures. So the brain has been aware for some 300 million years during which time it has evolved many conditioning and integrating structures and capacities.

There is an arousal system originating in the  Pons which gives start signals with more recently evolved structures when ever any sense becomes active. We have another system of cells originating in the  Locus coeruleus associated with arousal, attention, stress and anxiety which, unlike most other nerve tracts, passes horizontally through the midbrain and cortex.

As a social animal we have developed the capability to read others by using systems originated to repeat what has been sensed, we have recently come to call these subsystems empathy systems since we tend to feel what we see and hear and smell when these cells are active. If they are consciousness they don't show integration, rather they show specific pattern response behavior and they often tend to be linked to neuro-hormonal systems.

Taking all this together I find we have much capacity to plan, be aware of other's intentions, to form coherent models. But I see no locus nor integrated system for such as a consciousness, I see just the ability to be conscious of, which is quite different. We are very advanced Mantas.

 

[ryan]

You want evidence for a topic for philosophy??? Why wouldn't I just be in a science thread talking about the evidence, and then I can go get my Nobel Prize.

That's philosophy for you, and philosophy is still where we are at with the consciousness. So don't try to make me look delusional when I know exactly how less accurate, historically, any philosophical theory is over any scientific theory. I claim no certainty for panpsychism, never have and probably never will.

What makes panpsychism just a "topic for philosophy" rather than a scientific hypothesis? It's making a claim about the universe and the nature of matter. This amounts to a prediction about what will eventually be discovered when science figures out a way to research this stuff. So it's entirely a scientific question. There isn't a separate category of theories in a drawer labeled "philosophy" that miraculously do not need any evidence other than parsimony or conceptual convenience. If it's a statement that something is true, it should be demonstrable that it's true, in which case it's just science. If it's not demonstrable yet, that's okay, it's still science. If it's not demonstrable even in principle, it's no different from saying the opposite and it doesn't mean anything. At least that's how the normal framework goes, and it's been successful at separating the wheat from the chaff so far. I never said you were certain about panpsychism, I just identified it as your suggestion since you were the one advocating it as a legitimate possibility.

No, there actually IS a clear distinction between science and philosophy. In order to formulate a scientific hypothesis, there has to be a way to test it. If there were a way to test it (and falsify it), then you may begin the scientific method and formulate a hypothesis. But you have to figure out a way to test for it using technology that is scientifically possible, then you can attempt to bring the consciousness into the realm of science. And of course it can still fail and be kicked back out.

 

[Juma]

You fail to realize that all this are models. There is nothing that makes particles more "real", more basal than the field.
You make the same mistake as uneducated people do when believing that matter is a continuous substance.
No fields -> no particles.
Particles are disturbances, excitations, of the field.

A field is continuous; the particles of course are not in some ways. If we look at it from Copenhagen interpretation, a field is just a space where a certain kind of particle has a probability > 0 of existing. From Wikipedia, "However, as we have discussed, it is more natural to think about a "field", such as the electromagnetic field, as a set of degrees of freedom indexed by position.".

But you could be right; the field could be something like just one big ocean where certain constructive or destructive "waves of energies" give particles their existence; this would ultimately mean "hidden variables" explain QM. If that's the case, sure, a field exists out there. But the way I was talking about is by having those waves just represent probability distributions in the form of wave functions. With the Copenhagen interpretation, you don't need an actual ontological existence of a field to exist out there.

1) no, hidden variables refers to something very different.
2) "copenhagen interpretation" is just a tale for the children. It has no physical significance.

 

[Juma]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

It is that which is aware of representations made by the brain.

It is the ability to have a subjective awareness of representations.

Those that claim it is merely the representations are quite lost.

Au contraire!
Being aware is the very essence of representation!

 

[untermensche]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

It is that which is aware of representations made by the brain.

It is the ability to have a subjective awareness of representations.

Those that claim it is merely the representations are quite lost.

Au contraire!
Being aware is the very essence of representation!

When there is experience there are two things. Not one.

There is the experience (the experience of vision or cold or of a thought or the experience of many other things) AND there is that which experiences it (consciousness).

There can never just be the experience.

And the experience, the representation, is not consciousness. It is what consciousness experiences.

Consciousness is a subjective experiencer of representations.

 

[ryan]

A field is continuous; the particles of course are not in some ways. If we look at it from Copenhagen interpretation, a field is just a space where a certain kind of particle has a probability > 0 of existing. From Wikipedia, "However, as we have discussed, it is more natural to think about a "field", such as the electromagnetic field, as a set of degrees of freedom indexed by position.".

But you could be right; the field could be something like just one big ocean where certain constructive or destructive "waves of energies" give particles their existence; this would ultimately mean "hidden variables" explain QM. If that's the case, sure, a field exists out there. But the way I was talking about is by having those waves just represent probability distributions in the form of wave functions. With the Copenhagen interpretation, you don't need an actual ontological existence of a field to exist out there.

1) no, hidden variables refers to something very different.

You seem to be denying the Copenhagen interpretation. That usually would mean a deterministic explanation of QM or hidden variables.

2) "copenhagen interpretation" is just a tale for the children. It has no physical significance.

You are wrong; read the 3 points of CI, http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/21st_century_science/lectures/lec15.html The 1st and 3rd points still apply today.

 

[DBT]

Consciousness is not a thing. It is a constantly changing mental/virtual representation of the information that is fed into conscious activity by inputs, a collection of ever changing things, connectivity, memory and processing, etc, hence the reference 'stream of consciousness' even though it's not technically correct.

Not to be pedantic, but representations are traditionally things. I mentioned this in an earlier post and you ignored it.

I don't think that I ignored it.

A collection of diverse attributes, features and abilities that consciousness is composed of are are indeed 'things' but consciousness being composed of a collection of things is not itself a single ''thing'' - hence consciousness is not a thing. It may be said, pedantically if you like, that consciousness is a collection of things.

Which is something I've said many times in this thread and others threads.

 

[DBT]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

Don't be silly. Of course it is. You don't have actual objects like trees and animals and cars and people, the things of the world, inside you head...you have brain generated mental representations of these things in the form of conscious imagery and sensation.

 

[untermensche]

Consciousness is not a representation of anything.

Don't be silly. Of course it is. You don't have actual objects like trees and animals and cars and people, the things of the world, inside you head...you have brain generated mental representations of these things in the form of conscious imagery and sensation.

Consciousness is an awareness of the representation of the tree.

It is an experiencing of the representation. It is that which experiences all representations made by the brain.

Consciousness is not any kind of representation itself. It is the awareness, the experiencing of representations.

 

[Treedbear]

Don't be silly. Of course it is. You don't have actual objects like trees and animals and cars and people, the things of the world, inside you head...you have brain generated mental representations of these things in the form of conscious imagery and sensation.

Consciousness is an awareness of the representation of the tree.

It is an experiencing of the representation. It is that which experiences all representations made by the brain.

Consciousness is not any kind of representation itself. It is the awareness, the experiencing of representations.

Would you say that consciousness can ever exist even without experiences? Or are the two things inseparable(?).

 

[untermensche]

Consciousness is an awareness of the representation of the tree.

It is an experiencing of the representation. It is that which experiences all representations made by the brain.

Consciousness is not any kind of representation itself. It is the awareness, the experiencing of representations.

Would you say that consciousness can ever exist even without experiences? Or are the two things inseparable(?).

For there to be experience there must be two things.

That which is experienced.

And that which experiences it.

Without both there is no experience.

In theory there could still be that which experiences without the things it experiences. But it would have no experiences. No sense of anything.

However in human consciousness that which experiences has a lot to experience.

 

[fromderinside]

That which is aware in a way that knows it is aware is not a conglomeration.

It is the same "thing" aware of vision and hearing and thinking and touch and all that a human can be aware of.

A singular entity aware of all.

Being and knowing aware are different states.

Articulating and knowing aware are different states

How does one know one is aware? One knows one is aware because one articulates one is aware.

Seems to me there is some intermediate processing ongoing, probably historical processing, that leads the aware one to state that it is aware. That would put actual awareness in the past which is the way the processes actually take place. So, I say, again, consciousness is a historical articulation of what one has gathered from many awareness and attentions that one is in a coherent place. A coherent picture is not the same as a singular thing being conscious. It is entirely probable that the nervous system used in computing the historical dialogue did so as a conglomerate activity.

 

[untermensche]

That which is aware in a way that knows it is aware is not a conglomeration.

It is the same "thing" aware of vision and hearing and thinking and touch and all that a human can be aware of.

A singular entity aware of all.

Being and knowing aware are different states.....

"Knowing aware"?

This is gibberish to me.

There is awareness, a faculty.

And there are the things it can be aware of.

I can be aware of some sight or of a thought or of some sensation, like an itch.

The same "I" is aware of it all. Consciousness.

 

[fromderinside]

Things are related in my larger 'graph. "I" comes after as an articulation and it is the result of a conglomerate of being aware states. You are fixated on what you can think rather than what can impartially be demonstrated and verified to others. "I" is a historical state articulation and no more. Sure, is seems real, it feels real, but it can only exist after everything is gathered together into an organized scene. That may exist without articulation but it only exists after the information for the scene is sorted and arranged into what one can act upon from what one has gathered.