CONSTITUTION DRAFTING PROJECT

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Constitution Drafting Project | Constitution Center

The Constitution Drafting Project brings together three teams of leading constitutional scholars—team libertarian, team progressive, and team conservative—to draft and present their ideal constitutions.

constitutioncenter.org

The National Constitution Center’s Constitution Drafting project brings together three teams of leading constitutional scholars—team libertarian, team progressive, and team conservative—to draft and present their ideal constitutions. Team libertarian was led by Ilya Shapiro of the Cato Institute and included Timothy Sandefur of the Goldwater Institute and Christina Mulligan of Brooklyn Law School. Team progressive was led by Caroline Fredrickson of Georgetown Law School and included Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School and Melissa Murray of New York University School of Law. Team conservative was led by Ilan Wurman of Arizona State University College of Law and included Robert P. George of Princeton University, Michael McConnell of Stanford Law School, and Colleen A. Sheehan of Arizona State University. The project was generously supported by Jeff Yass.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTION BY ILYA SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, AND CHRISTINA MULLIGAN

This was probably an easier project for us than for our conservative and progressive counterparts because the current United States Constitution is fundamentally a libertarian or, more precisely, classical liberal document. So much so that, at the outset, we joked that all we needed to do was to add “and we mean it” at the end of every clause. After all, the Constitution set out a government of limited and enumerated powers, powers that are divided both “horizontally” among the three branches of the federal government and “vertically” in a federalist system that recognizes, while limiting, the sovereignty of states, in order to protect “the blessings of liberty.” That original structure provided a mechanism to preserve the full range of individual liberties because it largely withheld from government the power to violate them. The Reconstruction Amendments further advanced that project by extending the Constitution’s libertarian guarantees to protect against state violation, including eradicating slavery, the single greatest contradiction to the ethos of the American experiment. Unfortunately, many parts of our fundamentally libertarian constitution, particularly those that limit federal power, have been more often ignored, or cleverly evaded, than honored, especially by court decisions that have perverted the actual meaning of the document’s text. Our task was therefore largely to clarify and sharpen those provisions— most notably the Commerce Clause, which has been transformed by legal interpretation into a charter of expansive federal power far beyond what the framers envisioned.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION BY CAROLINE FREDRICKSON, JAMAL GREENE, AND MELISSA MURRAY

When we were asked to draft the “progressive” Constitution, we recognized that the task came with baggage. Progressives’ relationship with the Constitution has long been fraught. At various points in history, progressives have loudly complained that the Constitution ratified in 1788 was designed for an agrarian society of slaveholding white males. It created sclerotic political institutions that are frightfully ill-equipped to meet the demands of a modern, global, and pluralistic society. Further, for at least the last half century, progressives have been characterized as disdainful of the Constitution’s structural limits on government power and eager to read into its text a more expansive understanding of individual rights. On these accounts, an original vision of the Constitution as a demand for a limited federal government is framed as antithetical to a progressive vision of a government powerful enough to promote the public good while constrained by judges committed to protecting fundamental human rights . These accounts are facile at best. At worst, they misrepresent both the Constitution itself and a progressive understanding of constitutional democracy. With that in mind, as we embarked upon this exercise, we wanted to make clear our own view that the Constitution, as drafted in 1787, is not completely incompatible with progressive constitutionalism. Indeed, in our view, the original Constitution establishes a structure of divided government that is a necessary precondition for a constitutional democracy with robust protections for individual rights. Accordingly, we took this exercise as an opportunity to strengthen those structural protections for democratic government that we believe serve the exercise of individual rights. This draft progressive Constitution is written in the spirit of the Virginia Plan, with a recognition that debate and refinement must follow. And similar to the framers in 1787, we also are focusing on the structures of government over developing an exhaustive set of rights. We believe that embedding democracy more effectively in our Constitution will better protect rights than an explicit description of each and every right.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION BY ROBERT P. GEORGE,1 MICHAEL W. McCONNELL,2 COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN,3 AND ILAN WURMAN

As part of its “Constitutional Drafting” Project, the National Constitution Center asked three committees representing different perspectives on matters of politics and jurisprudence to draft new constitutions for the United States of America, 2020. Our committee was tasked with framing the “conservative” constitution. The members of our committee were not unanimous with respect to every provision in the proposed document; as with the Constitution of the United States, some provisions represent compromises. From the perspective of none of us is our proposed constitution perfect. Nor do we suppose that a perfect constitution is possible—for our society or any society. And, of course, our constitution will contain faults and flaws reflecting our own all-too-fallible judgments. As conservatives, we were tempted to leave the Constitution largely unchanged, amending only those provisions most obviously in need of alteration. However, in the spirit of the NCC’s project, we attempted to think more boldly and propose changes that we believe would improve the Constitution to meet the exigencies of our era. Above all— and this is the real point of the exercise—we hope that our efforts will spur constructive discussion of the purposes of a constitution for a free people dedicated to the experiment in self-government. A sound constitution will serve justice and the common good—that is its justifying purpose. A constitution cannot, however, and will not propose to, resolve all disputes (or all disputes that may someday arise) concerning political ends. Recognizing that reasonable people of goodwill can and do disagree about what justice and the common good require, a sound constitution will establish fair and workable procedures for resolving disputes about such matters. Our proposed Constitution, therefore, in large part consists in the articulation of basic principles and the establishment of institutions and procedures for effectuating those principles in the political life of the people. The Constitution of the United States is not properly understood as a contract based on self-interest; nor is it merely a system built on shrewd institutional arrangements. It is an agreement whose authority derives from the people themselves, with the crucial qualification that the people are morally bound to exercise their authority in accordance with the standards of a higher, natural law. The Constitution is America’s charter. To consent to it even tacitly, James Madison argued, is to make a pledge to every other American to defend their equal natural rights. As such, the Constitution is a pact of social trust, grounded in the principles of the Declaration of Independence, viz., the recognition of our common humanity and the respect and protection that citizens owe one another. This is what Lincoln meant when he said that the Constitution is like a silver picture frame around the Declaration’s apple of gold. The picture frame was made “not to conceal, or destroy the apple, but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple— not the apple for the picture.” We thus begin with a reaffirmation of the principles of the Declaration.

Posted for discussion.

 

[Jarhyn]

Constitution Drafting Project | Constitution Center

The Constitution Drafting Project brings together three teams of leading constitutional scholars—team libertarian, team progressive, and team conservative—to draft and present their ideal constitutions.

constitutioncenter.org

The National Constitution Center’s Constitution Drafting project brings together three teams of leading constitutional scholars—team libertarian, team progressive, and team conservative—to draft and present their ideal constitutions. Team libertarian was led by Ilya Shapiro of the Cato Institute and included Timothy Sandefur of the Goldwater Institute and Christina Mulligan of Brooklyn Law School. Team progressive was led by Caroline Fredrickson of Georgetown Law School and included Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School and Melissa Murray of New York University School of Law. Team conservative was led by Ilan Wurman of Arizona State University College of Law and included Robert P. George of Princeton University, Michael McConnell of Stanford Law School, and Colleen A. Sheehan of Arizona State University. The project was generously supported by Jeff Yass.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTION BY ILYA SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, AND CHRISTINA MULLIGAN

This was probably an easier project for us than for our conservative and progressive counterparts because the current United States Constitution is fundamentally a libertarian or, more precisely, classical liberal document. So much so that, at the outset, we joked that all we needed to do was to add “and we mean it” at the end of every clause. After all, the Constitution set out a government of limited and enumerated powers, powers that are divided both “horizontally” among the three branches of the federal government and “vertically” in a federalist system that recognizes, while limiting, the sovereignty of states, in order to protect “the blessings of liberty.” That original structure provided a mechanism to preserve the full range of individual liberties because it largely withheld from government the power to violate them. The Reconstruction Amendments further advanced that project by extending the Constitution’s libertarian guarantees to protect against state violation, including eradicating slavery, the single greatest contradiction to the ethos of the American experiment. Unfortunately, many parts of our fundamentally libertarian constitution, particularly those that limit federal power, have been more often ignored, or cleverly evaded, than honored, especially by court decisions that have perverted the actual meaning of the document’s text. Our task was therefore largely to clarify and sharpen those provisions— most notably the Commerce Clause, which has been transformed by legal interpretation into a charter of expansive federal power far beyond what the framers envisioned.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION BY CAROLINE FREDRICKSON, JAMAL GREENE, AND MELISSA MURRAY

When we were asked to draft the “progressive” Constitution, we recognized that the task came with baggage. Progressives’ relationship with the Constitution has long been fraught. At various points in history, progressives have loudly complained that the Constitution ratified in 1788 was designed for an agrarian society of slaveholding white males. It created sclerotic political institutions that are frightfully ill-equipped to meet the demands of a modern, global, and pluralistic society. Further, for at least the last half century, progressives have been characterized as disdainful of the Constitution’s structural limits on government power and eager to read into its text a more expansive understanding of individual rights. On these accounts, an original vision of the Constitution as a demand for a limited federal government is framed as antithetical to a progressive vision of a government powerful enough to promote the public good while constrained by judges committed to protecting fundamental human rights . These accounts are facile at best. At worst, they misrepresent both the Constitution itself and a progressive understanding of constitutional democracy. With that in mind, as we embarked upon this exercise, we wanted to make clear our own view that the Constitution, as drafted in 1787, is not completely incompatible with progressive constitutionalism. Indeed, in our view, the original Constitution establishes a structure of divided government that is a necessary precondition for a constitutional democracy with robust protections for individual rights. Accordingly, we took this exercise as an opportunity to strengthen those structural protections for democratic government that we believe serve the exercise of individual rights. This draft progressive Constitution is written in the spirit of the Virginia Plan, with a recognition that debate and refinement must follow. And similar to the framers in 1787, we also are focusing on the structures of government over developing an exhaustive set of rights. We believe that embedding democracy more effectively in our Constitution will better protect rights than an explicit description of each and every right.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION BY ROBERT P. GEORGE,1 MICHAEL W. McCONNELL,2 COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN,3 AND ILAN WURMAN

As part of its “Constitutional Drafting” Project, the National Constitution Center asked three committees representing different perspectives on matters of politics and jurisprudence to draft new constitutions for the United States of America, 2020. Our committee was tasked with framing the “conservative” constitution. The members of our committee were not unanimous with respect to every provision in the proposed document; as with the Constitution of the United States, some provisions represent compromises. From the perspective of none of us is our proposed constitution perfect. Nor do we suppose that a perfect constitution is possible—for our society or any society. And, of course, our constitution will contain faults and flaws reflecting our own all-too-fallible judgments. As conservatives, we were tempted to leave the Constitution largely unchanged, amending only those provisions most obviously in need of alteration. However, in the spirit of the NCC’s project, we attempted to think more boldly and propose changes that we believe would improve the Constitution to meet the exigencies of our era. Above all— and this is the real point of the exercise—we hope that our efforts will spur constructive discussion of the purposes of a constitution for a free people dedicated to the experiment in self-government. A sound constitution will serve justice and the common good—that is its justifying purpose. A constitution cannot, however, and will not propose to, resolve all disputes (or all disputes that may someday arise) concerning political ends. Recognizing that reasonable people of goodwill can and do disagree about what justice and the common good require, a sound constitution will establish fair and workable procedures for resolving disputes about such matters. Our proposed Constitution, therefore, in large part consists in the articulation of basic principles and the establishment of institutions and procedures for effectuating those principles in the political life of the people. The Constitution of the United States is not properly understood as a contract based on self-interest; nor is it merely a system built on shrewd institutional arrangements. It is an agreement whose authority derives from the people themselves, with the crucial qualification that the people are morally bound to exercise their authority in accordance with the standards of a higher, natural law. The Constitution is America’s charter. To consent to it even tacitly, James Madison argued, is to make a pledge to every other American to defend their equal natural rights. As such, the Constitution is a pact of social trust, grounded in the principles of the Declaration of Independence, viz., the recognition of our common humanity and the respect and protection that citizens owe one another. This is what Lincoln meant when he said that the Constitution is like a silver picture frame around the Declaration’s apple of gold. The picture frame was made “not to conceal, or destroy the apple, but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple— not the apple for the picture.” We thus begin with a reaffirmation of the principles of the Declaration.

Posted for discussion.

I'll have to sit down later and compare each to the original section by section and see what is different and what is the same in each, and probably post my own version later tonight.

I can already see problems in each of them, from the way the libertarians despise the federal income tax and limitations on the right to bear arms so much that they give carte blanche on weapon proliferation to the way that conservatives offer an open door to non-education of citizens.

 

[Lumpenproletariat]

"Libertarian"?
"Progressive"?
"Conservative"?

What about all the other isms left out of this Triumvirate? and probably to get stepped on by it?

Will this new "Constitution" be ready for adoption in a week from Tuesday?



needed: a Dialogue Jury-type process,
open to all, questioning all


What's needed is not another platform or manifesto Papal Bull handed down from on high, or from this or that crusade-cult (or coalition of cults). What's needed is a dialogue process, long-term, and inclusive so anyone who wants to could participate, with no domination by an elitist clique pretending to be the "libertarians" or "progressives" or "conservatives" who know what's best for us.


For something serious, a wide-based dialogue process is necessary, with the broadest possible participation. Dialogue only, no speeches. Charismatic speech-makers have proved that their only talent is to entertain and manipulate audiences with their speaking skill, not find answers and make needed decisions.

What's needed is an increased dialogue process extending over many decades, not a new instant Whiz-Bang 3rd Party or "Constitution" or Law-Giver or crusade to elect the latest charismatic demagogue. What's really needed might require 100 years to finally reach success at doing or prescribing the necessary changes which really might work.



The dialogues we need would be conducted at least partly via computer communication, similar to chat rooms, e.g. The dialogues initially can be either by computer or face-to-face encounters, but the computer communication option has be offered to everyone who would want to participate. And participation has to be arranged to fit each participant's need or convenience, in a 24-7 system ("drafting project") anyone can join at such time(s) that it accords with their individual schedule.

(It might be necessary for the dialogue sessions to each be limited to a one-day-only event, of several hours, and then terminated, i.e., replaced with new sessions (different groups) continuing forward as future one-day-only events.)

Arguing has to be allowed, even encouraged, as part of this dialogue process. Those who condemn arguing as something negative, though they're fully encouraged to participate, are necessarily in a contradictory position, because they would have to present the argument why arguing is bad. (Arguing that arguing is bad is a contradiction.) So arguing/debate must be part of this, and absolutely no one can be excluded, not even "trolls" or other subversives you wish would go away. The only solution to the unwanted "trolls" problem is for any particular dialogue tainted with "trolls" to terminate with no result but be succeeded by future dialogues to keep happening until some of them are able to find consensus on something. The paranoia to exclude "trolls" is a worse problem than the "trolls" themselves.

Every individual anywhere has to be admitted to this dialogue process, who wants to participate in it, regardless of geography or nationality or ethnicity or culture or other category. Personal ID of any kind cannot be made a requirement to participate. Possibly an age minimum could be imposed, but more preferred is a required easy-to-pass test of one's ability to communicate. E.g., anyone who "walks in the door" and says "I want to participate in the Constitution Dialogue" must be included, no questions asked. Some form of language requirement might be necessary.

This must be a process which excludes any participant from having more power than another -- power of any kind in the process. I.e., every single participant in the process must have the same power as any other participant, with no one granted any unequal power to dictate anything which others cannot dictate.

Hypothetically one such group/dialogue would deliberate and come to an agreement that this or that notable demagogue or guru or celebrity has some special capacity to prescribe to others what is best for society or the nation. Such an agreement in one group cannot be precluded, but this one group would be overruled by other groups, which might condemn any submission to such an authority figure, or might promulgate a different choice of who the authority figure should be. And thus no agreed authority figure could ever gain special power in the dialogue process.

The overall dialogue has to be spread out over thousands or millions of equal participants, so that each one participates in a small group (one group at a time, probably many groups over a long time span) with each group limited to a number small enough so that every participant is heard and can question others individually. (Perhaps the maximum number would be something like 10 or 15. Maybe a minimum isn't necessary, or 2 or 3 or 4 would be the prescribed minimum number in each group.)

(If there are hundreds of participants, these have to be divided into small groups, because the needed communication/dialogue between them -- not speeches -- is impossible with such a large number.)

If there is a voting system, it must be possible for any one participant to veto the whole group ("group" = the small dialogue group of 5 or 10 or 15 participants). The veto power ensures that each participant is entitled to have his/her input. If that dissident voice cannot be persuaded, then that group is unable to issue a "vote" or input into the decision-making at that point. Which is OK. There would be other groups reaching different outcomes.

The intention must be to find solutions to what's wrong: The premise is that something is wrong today which our current system and "strong leaders" (Trump, Putin, Hitler, Reagan, FDR, Obama, etc.) have proved unable to fix, so someone else or something different is needed to replace what's not working. The best kind of solution is probably a dialogue process of trying to persuade others -- i.e., those (whoever) who think they know a solution trying to persuade others.

If it's not possible to persuade a certain participant, that means more effort is necessary to persuade that one, or to persuade others in the future. If your current solution to the nation's or world's problems is rejected by someone, it has to wait for a future effort. Maybe you need to take it back to the drawing board and try out a revised version of it later. This is why it could require many decades for this dialogue process to make real progress, and why instant gratification is not possible.

We don't need a process where certain aggressive crusaders, like today's Reds and Blues with their celebrity speech-maker demagogues, are able to shove their program down our throats. Those who are not aggressive or elitist also need to be heard, including those not members of an aggressive crusade which has succeeded in forcing its way into power or influence over those less aggressive.

A "Constitution drafting project" based on this approach is what is needed. Not something to only entrench further the current cult-crusades, like the Reds and Blues, to promote their dominance over us.

 

[Rhea]

Interesting OP - I missed it when i first was made. Reading through to think about it…

 

[lpetrich]

All three teams have issued their versions:

• The Libertarian Constitution | The National Constitution Center
• The Progressive Constitution | The National Constitution Center
• The Conservative Constitution | The National Constitution Center

The actual Constitution: The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription | National Archives

I don't know who here has the patience to compare all four versions. I did a cursory look, and I found some differences (A: actual, L: libertarian, C: conservative, P: progressive).

House of Representatives terms: A: 2, L: 2, C: 3, P: 4

All agree on popular election of Reps. and a minimum age of 25 years.

Senators elected:

• A: original: by state legislatures, 17th Amendment: by popular vote. 2 Senators/state, 6 years
• L: however state legislatures wish. 2 Senators/state, 6 years
• C: by state legislatures. 1 Senator/state, 9 years, only one term
• P: by popular vote. 1 + 1 for each % of national population in the state, 6 years

All but P agree on minimum age of 30 years, P has 25 years.

P explicitly permits multimember House districts, allowing for a proportional House, and has a semi-proportional Senate. P also calls for independent commissions to do redistricting, while C calls for "compact and contiguous" House districts.

The P Senate proposal is semi-proportional, and it can be interpreted as 1 Senator per state and 100 additional Senators allocated among the states by population. I used some proportional-allocation algorithms, and I found similar but slightly different results.

State	Roundoff	Lgst Rmdr	HA: S-L	HA: D'Hondt
California	12	12	12	14
Texas	9	9	9	10
Florida	7	7	7	8
New York	6	6	6	7
Pennsylvania	4	4	4	4

The next states have 4, then 3, then 2, then 1, then 0 extra Senators. I currently live in Oregon, and it would get 1 extra Senator in all these algorithms.

Lgst Rmdr = largest remainder, HA = highest averages, S-L = Sainte-Laguë

Note that D'Hondt has a bias toward the largest states, while the other methods are more even.

I find it curious that P proposed 100 extra Senators, and not say twice the number of states of extra Senators.

 

[lpetrich]

So far, L very closely follows A, and I must say that I like some of what C has, even if I like P the best.

C has for Article I, Section 5, "Except for good cause shown, every Member shall be present during the sittings of the House or Senate, respectively, and shall vote for or against each question, unless the Member has a direct or pecuniary interest in the determination of such question." while L and P are close to the original.

C has something interesting in its Section 8:

Except as provided in the next paragraph, every bill, order, resolution, or vote which shall have passed both Houses by simple majority vote, before it shall become law shall be presented to the President for approval or disapproval. It shall become law if approved by the President or if not disapproved within ten days; or, being disapproved, if it shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Within three months of any law going into effect, such law may be repealed by a vote of three fifths of the Governors of the various States, or by vote of Governors representing three fifths of the population as determined by the preceding census.

No filibuster supermajority, but enough states can veto a law.

Under "Powers of Congress", L adds "but the general welfare shall not be construed to refer to the specific welfare of any particular group or individual" and C adds "and Congress shall not lay any capitation tax, tax on sales, or tax on real or personal property, which revenue sources are reserved to the States." C seems to reject nearly all forms of taxation.

A has "To establish Post Offices and post Roads;" L adds "provided that this shall not be construed to permit the establishment of any postal monopoly" C replaces it with "To establish a system for the prompt and efficient delivery of the mail;" and P adds "and to regulate methods of transportation and communication with foreign and native Nations, and among the several States;"

 

[Jarhyn]

All three teams have issued their versions:

• The Libertarian Constitution | The National Constitution Center
• The Progressive Constitution | The National Constitution Center
• The Conservative Constitution | The National Constitution Center

The actual Constitution: The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription | National Archives

I don't know who here has the patience to compare all four versions. I did a cursory look, and I found some differences (A: actual, L: libertarian, C: conservative, P: progressive).

House of Representatives terms: A: 2, L: 2, C: 3, P: 4

All agree on popular election of Reps. and a minimum age of 25 years.

Senators elected:

• A: original: by state legislatures, 17th Amendment: by popular vote. 2 Senators/state, 6 years
• L: however state legislatures wish. 2 Senators/state, 6 years
• C: by state legislatures. 1 Senator/state, 9 years, only one term
• P: by popular vote. 1 + 1 for each % of national population in the state, 6 years

All but P agree on minimum age of 30 years, P has 25 years.

P explicitly permits multimember House districts, allowing for a proportional House, and has a semi-proportional Senate. P also calls for independent commissions to do redistricting, while C calls for "compact and contiguous" House districts.

The P Senate proposal is semi-proportional, and it can be interpreted as 1 Senator per state and 100 additional Senators allocated among the states by population. I used some proportional-allocation algorithms, and I found similar but slightly different results.

State	Roundoff	Lgst Rmdr	HA: S-L	HA: D'Hondt
California	12	12	12	14
Texas	9	9	9	10
Florida	7	7	7	8
New York	6	6	6	7
Pennsylvania	4	4	4	4

The next states have 4, then 3, then 2, then 1, then 0 extra Senators. I currently live in Oregon, and it would get 1 extra Senator in all these algorithms.

Lgst Rmdr = largest remainder, HA = highest averages, S-L = Sainte-Laguë

Note that D'Hondt has a bias toward the largest states, while the other methods are more even.

I find it curious that P proposed 100 extra Senators, and not say twice the number of states of extra Senators.

I would rather see the Senate be 1+1+(0-1) evenly cut across the median, with 1 being by the legislative body on a single 9 year term, one being by popular vote of the state (also on 9 year term, limit one), and the additional senator (where such is afforded) elected by a method amendable by popular referendum of a state.

So far, L very closely follows A, and I must say that I like some of what C has, even if I like P the best.

C has for Article I, Section 5, "Except for good cause shown, every Member shall be present during the sittings of the House or Senate, respectively, and shall vote for or against each question, unless the Member has a direct or pecuniary interest in the determination of such question." while L and P are close to the original.

C has something interesting in its Section 8:

Except as provided in the next paragraph, every bill, order, resolution, or vote which shall have passed both Houses by simple majority vote, before it shall become law shall be presented to the President for approval or disapproval. It shall become law if approved by the President or if not disapproved within ten days; or, being disapproved, if it shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Within three months of any law going into effect, such law may be repealed by a vote of three fifths of the Governors of the various States, or by vote of Governors representing three fifths of the population as determined by the preceding census.

No filibuster supermajority, but enough states can veto a law.

Under "Powers of Congress", L adds "but the general welfare shall not be construed to refer to the specific welfare of any particular group or individual" and C adds "and Congress shall not lay any capitation tax, tax on sales, or tax on real or personal property, which revenue sources are reserved to the States." C seems to reject nearly all forms of taxation.

A has "To establish Post Offices and post Roads;" L adds "provided that this shall not be construed to permit the establishment of any postal monopoly" C replaces it with "To establish a system for the prompt and efficient delivery of the mail;" and P adds "and to regulate methods of transportation and communication with foreign and native Nations, and among the several States;"

I dislike that the governors can effectively swing land as if an even more concentrated second Senate. It seems rather insane.

Also, the 2a equivalent is kinda woo-woo on all of them.

 

[lpetrich]

The Constitution endorses patents and copyrights:

A: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;"

L: "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for no more than 28 years, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;"

The only change in L that I like -- copyrights have been extended to close to a century, something that creates needless legal barriers.

C: "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; but no extension or reduction of such times shall apply retroactively;"

Seems like C is very careful.

P: no change from A.

About declarations of war,

A has "To declare War,", L has "To declare war, or authorize military action in the absence of an invasion of the United States or its territorial possessions, or an attack upon its citizens residing therein", C has "Upon request from the President, to declare or authorize war; to authorize military measures short of war;", and P is unchanged.

L and C recognize that many military actions do not involve explicit declarations of war. In fact, declarations of war have been rare since World War II, not just by the US, but by every other nation.

 

[Jayjay]

I briefly browsed through the "constitutions". To me it seems this is an exercise where everyone is trying to mimic the form and language of the founding fathers, but at the same time insert their own little political pet peeves and projects into it. The end result isn't anything a good modern constitution should look like, or very surprising even.

 

[Jarhyn]

I briefly browsed through the "constitutions". To me it seems this is an exercise where everyone is trying to mimic the form and language of the founding fathers, but at the same time insert their own little political pet peeves and projects into it. The end result isn't anything a good modern constitution should look like, or very surprising even.

I would hazard to think that there are chunks of each that would be worthwhile to stitch together.

 

[lpetrich]

All four documents mention "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" -- essentially legalized piracy as a mode of warfare.

L's Article I Section 11 goes into gory detail about fiscal discipline.

Turning to Article II, Section I, we find some interesting differences about electing the President.

L keeps A unchanged about the Electoral College, while C and P have a popular vote with ranked-choice voting. C has a system of nomination by state legislatures or alternately with enough petition signatures. Each state legislature votes on which candidates it wants and the candidates with the most nominations get accepted as nominated.

Turning to Article III, L closely follows A, while C specifies 9 Supreme Court Justices elected for staggered 18-year terms, making a vacancy every 2 years, and P specifies terms of 18 years for all Federal judges.

 

[lpetrich]

Article V describes the amendment process.

How amendments are to be proposed:

• A: 2/3 of both houses of Congress or 2/3 of state legislatures
• L: 2/3 of both houses of Congress or 1/2 of state legislatures
• C: 2/3 of both houses of Congress or 2/3 of state legislatures
• P: 2/3 of both houses of Congress or 2/3 of state legislatures, or else those that represent 2/3 of the population

All four keep ratification by 3/4 of the states, though P also had ratification by states that add up to 3/4 of the population.

The US Constitution is supposedly one of the most difficult constitutions to amend, and neither L nor C nor P change that.

 

[lpetrich]

Then the Bill of Rights. L made them Article VII, and C part of Article I Section 12, while P continued calling the amendments "Amendments" rather than an additional section of the Constitution, just like A.

C adds "Neither a State nor the United States shall make or enforce any law that abridges the right of parents or other legal guardians to control the education and upbringing of their children, including the right to choose education outside of public schools; nor may they discriminate against any non-public school on the basis of its religious, philosophical, or ideological character; nor may the United States use its authority, by appropriations or otherwise, to displace State or local control over educational content."

Looking at the Second Amendment,

A: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

L: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

C: "Neither the States nor the United State shall make or enforce any law infringing the right to keep and bear arms of the sort ordinarily used for self-defense or recreational purposes, provided that States, and the United States in places subject to its general regulatory authority, may enact and enforce reasonable regulations on the bearing of arms, and the keeping of arms by persons determined, with due process, to be dangerous to themselves or others."

P: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation by the United States and by the States."

L wants no regulation of weapons, removing A's "a well-regulated Militia", while C and P broadly agree on the legitimacy of regulation of weapons, though C is more verbose about that than P.

 

[lpetrich]

One last bit.

L, Article VII, Section 13: "The right of the people to buy and sell lawful goods and services at mutually acceptable terms shall not be infringed by Congress or any state or tribal government."

Reminds me of a bit of Ayn Rand's "Atlas Shrugged" (Internet Archive):

The rectangle of light in the acres of a farm was the window of the library of Judge Narragansett . He sat at a table, and the light of his lamp fell on the copy of an ancient document. He had marked and crossed out the contradictions in its statements that had once been the cause of its destruction. He was now adding a new clause to its pages: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of production and trade . . ."

I briefly browsed through the "constitutions". To me it seems this is an exercise where everyone is trying to mimic the form and language of the founding fathers, but at the same time insert their own little political pet peeves and projects into it. The end result isn't anything a good modern constitution should look like, or very surprising even.

I would hazard to think that there are chunks of each that would be worthwhile to stitch together.

Why not do so? Or at least do what I did and compare these proposed Constitutions.

 

[lpetrich]

I briefly browsed through the "constitutions". To me it seems this is an exercise where everyone is trying to mimic the form and language of the founding fathers, but at the same time insert their own little political pet peeves and projects into it. The end result isn't anything a good modern constitution should look like, or very surprising even.

I agree that it does not depart very much from the original.

But I think that one can look at what other nations have done and try to deduce from them what to try to do. Much of the work is done for us, buy the creators of democracy ratings like Freedom House's Freedom in the World, the Economist magazine's Democracy Index, the Democracy Matrix, V-Dem, the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, ...

One finds several nations scoring consistently higher in democracy ratings than the US, or at least sometimes not much lower.

• All of Europe west of Finland, Germany, Austria and Italy, including those nations.
• Some Ex-UK nations: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland
• Latin America: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay
• East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
• Scattered nations elsewhere: Mauritius, Israel, ...

Consulting  List of countries by system of government nearly all of them have parliamentary systems, where the legislature chooses the acting executive. There are some countries with a US-style strong president: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay (typical of Latin America), and South Korea, and some countries with hybrid systems: France, Portugal, Taiwan, but those are not the top-rated.

 List of electoral systems by country - proportional representation is common in high-rated countries, and many such countries have only one legislative chamber. When they have two, the second one usually does not do very much. Think of the UK's House of Commons and its House of Lords.

 

[lpetrich]

Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracy - Parliamentary Powers Index Scores by Country

Let's see how the US stacks up.

• Strong legislature - yes
• Parliamentary system - no
• Weak or absent upper house - no
• Proportional representation - no
• Weak separate executive - no

This suggests:

• Weakening or abolishing the Senate.
• Having Congress take charge of at least some of the executive branch.
• Having proportional representation in Congress.

It's disappointing that the US is no longer a standard-bearer for democracy. When Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that she would not recommend the US Constitution to nation-builders elsewhere in the world, right-wingers howled. But what she said is what General Douglas MacArthur did in Japan, giving that nation a constitution modeled on the UK's system and not the US's.

The V-Dem ("Varieties of Democracy") project has a lot of historical data, so it may be possible to estimate when a lot of countries started doing better than the US.

 

[bilby]

I briefly browsed through the "constitutions". To me it seems this is an exercise where everyone is trying to mimic the form and language of the founding fathers, but at the same time insert their own little political pet peeves and projects into it. The end result isn't anything a good modern constitution should look like, or very surprising even.

I agree that it does not depart very much from the original.

But I think that one can look at what other nations have done and try to deduce from them what to try to do. Much of the work is done for us, buy the creators of democracy ratings like Freedom House's Freedom in the World, the Economist magazine's Democracy Index, the Democracy Matrix, V-Dem, the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, ...

One finds several nations scoring consistently higher in democracy ratings than the US, or at least sometimes not much lower.

• All of Europe west of Finland, Germany, Austria and Italy, including those nations.
• Some Ex-UK nations: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland
• Latin America: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay
• East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
• Scattered nations elsewhere: Mauritius, Israel, ...

Consulting  List of countries by system of government nearly all of them have parliamentary systems, where the legislature chooses the acting executive. There are some countries with a US-style strong president: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay (typical of Latin America), and South Korea, and some countries with hybrid systems: France, Portugal, Taiwan, but those are not the top-rated.

 List of electoral systems by country - proportional representation is common in high-rated countries, and many such countries have only one legislative chamber. When they have two, the second one usually does not do very much. Think of the UK's House of Commons and its House of Lords.

Australia's constitution doesn't attempt to establish any rights beyond the right to elect the Representatives and Senators. It's essentially just a list of rules for how government works (both the Commonwealth government, and the devolution of powers to state governments and/or their retention at the Commonwealth level); It doesn't attempt to address the behaviour of people outside the government, other than to establish freedom of trade and commerce between the member states and territories of the Commonwealth.

If you want to give Australians the right to X (or if you want to prohibit X), you need to pass legislation to do that. We don't have constitutional rights, in the way that Americans understand them.

I believe that this is more typical of national constitutions in general; The USA is an outlier in trying to define rights for citizens or residents within the constitution itself, rather than as legislative Acts.

We hear a lot about the US Constitution, not because it's a great example of the best constitutions in the world, nor because it's particularly good at establishing rules for national government, but because it's a rare example of a national constitution that directly affects residents. Most countries have constitutions that are only of interest to lawyers, politicians, and jurisprudence fetishists*.







Did you hear about the Jurisprudence fetishist? He got off on a technicality.

 

[lpetrich]

At Constitution Drafting Project | Constitution Center are five proposed Constitutional amendments: The amendments with introductions from each team/url] and [url=https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/The_Proposed_Amendments_AMENDMENTS.pdf]only the amendments

All of them are time-bombed:

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress

The amendments:

I: Presidential eligibility

No person shall be eligible to the office of President, except a person who shall have attained the age of thirty five years, and been a citizen, resident in the United States, for fourteen years.

Modifying the citizenship part of II.1. The existing part says that a President must be a lifelong citizen or else a citizen for as long as the Constitution has been in effect. It's amended to at least 14 years, thus allowing immigrants to become President if they have been citizens for long enough. With that amendment, Ilhan Omar could become President, since she has been a US citizen since 2000.

The existing part is, I think, a way of trying to avoid foreign domination, but I think that 14 years of citizenship should be enough for that.

 

[lpetrich]

II: Legislative Veto

Congress may by law provide for a veto, by majority votes in each of the Houses of Congress, of actions taken by the executive department, except actions adjudicating the applicability of a statute or regulation to a person. A failure by Congress to act pursuant to such a law shall not affect any judicial determination as to whether any law, or any actions of the executive department, are valid or enforceable.

Congress getting more power back would be good.

We could go a step further and run much of the Executive Department out of Congress, thus giving a semi-presidential system.

III: Impeachment
That's a long one. I'll try to summarize it.

1. Who may be impeached: the President, the Vice President, Federal judges, and "civil officers".
2. For what: "for serious criminal acts, or for serious abuse of the public trust."
3. After leaving office: impeachments up to 6 months, convictions up to 1 year.
4. Impeached people shall be subject to disqualification from holding office, and civil and criminal actions.
5. The House will do the indictment part, with a 3/5 vote to indict.
6. The Senate will do the trial part, with a 3/5 vote to convict.

The existing parts have a 2/3 Senate vote to convict.

It seems to me more precise than the original on what to be impeached for; the original has "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

 

[lpetrich]

IV: Appointments

Commendably precise about "advice and consent of the Senate":

Nominations shall be deemed to have received the advice and consent of the Senate unless disapproved by majority vote within three months of the nomination; but any Senator shall have the right to bring any nomination to the floor for debate and vote prior to that time. Any nomination made within the last three months of the President’s term shall lapse at the end of that term, unless sooner approved by the Senate.

So if the Senate does nothing, a nomination will go through.

There shall be nine judges of the supreme court, who shall hold their offices for staggered terms of eighteen years, such that every two years there shall be a vacancy. In the event of a vacancy resulting from death, resignation, impeachment, or other inability to perform the duties of the office, a new judge shall be appointed for the duration of the term only. After a term of office has expired, the judge whose term has expired may elect to sit on an inferior court during good behavior, which court is to be determined by the Chief Justice or as Congress shall direct.

That's good. I also like that a judge can continue to be a judge, even if in some lower court.