Could I have been born as someone else?

[DBT]

We can say "they are identical things" not "they are an identical thing", and, we can only say "they are the same thing" not "they are the same things".

Assuming there could be two things really identical (why not, who knows?) they will have to be, necessarily, in different locations (or else our model of reality is completely wrong). So, two identical things necessarily are not the same thing. So, if it's the same thing then there's just one thing. no plural.
EB

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Even things that are referred to as being 'identical' are not literally identical to the finest detail, down to atomic structure. A close examination reveals many differences, a spot here, frayed edge there....the word 'identical' being used for general purposes.

 

[Juma]

Another thought experiment to put the problem into focus, originated by Derek Parfit and with modifications from Joe Kern:

We know that it's possible to live with only half a brain. In principle, there is nothing preventing someone with only a half a functioning brain from getting a transplant to fill the other half. They would feel different after the operation, but if done properly their memories would remain intact, so they would experience undergoing a change (perhaps in personality, mood, temperament) rather than ceasing to exist. Presumably, with the right technology, the same thing could be said of a partial or entire brain transplant; for the sake of argument, let's assume that if your brain was successfully transferred to the body of someone physically identical to you, it would feel like "waking up" in that body.



Does the problem make sense? The way I look at it, there is a fact of the matter, from my perspective, about which person I will "wake up" as. Let's suppose one body is in Syria and the other is in Denmark, and afterwards they have to live the remainder of their lives in these countries. Before the operation, I would just be in one place. After the operation, I would still be in just one place: either Syria or Denmark. I wouldn't experience being two people at once, in two different places at once. Rationally, I would hope to wake up in Denmark rather than Syria, as these are tangibly different outcomes for my well-being. There doesn't seem to be any way, even in principle, to physically predict where I would end up, so I ought to conclude that it's not a real question. However, prior to the split, it seems incontrovertibly, actually true that I should either look forward to waking up in Denmark or dread waking up in Syria, since I can't possibly experience being in both places at the same time.

It's this me-ness that I'm trying to get at, isolated from the extrinsic facts about my body and brain. On the one hand, there shouldn't be such a thing if dualism is false, and I think it is. On the other hand, there is no answer to the above riddle that doesn't involve something distinct from the physical world. How to resolve this paradox?

I also fail to see where there would be a problem.

We can conceive fictional scenarios where several people end up somehow remembering the same past. As a consequence, each of them believes they are the actual, original person who went through the events as they remember them. That they are different people is not in question and therefore they must have different subjective experiences from each other. Where would be the problem?

From the point of view of the person who is going to be split between two bodies, so to speak, and so before the split, he is still one person and there's also no paradox. The point you bring about his belief as to which of two people he will be is also not problematic. We all have beliefs and some of them are wrong. For example, the ordinary belief you may have before going to sleep that you are going to wake up the same person is obviously not literally true. And so in the scenario you describe, the question of which one of two people you will wake up as is non-sensical. All we need to reply is that two people will wake up one morning, one in Denmark the other in Syria, and that it is just so that they will have identical memories. So what? Where would be the problem?

The only problem is probably if you want to insist that you wake up each morning as literally the same person, as if there was some sort of metaphysical absolute in that. This problem is solved if we take the notion of person as a social convention based on the kind of biographical and physical continuity that we can normally expect in our lives. However, your scenario is based on removing this convention: We still have people, two people, two persons, but now we fictionally assume that at some point these two persons were the same person or more precisely were made out of the same person. It's a changed notion. Again, there's no problem with that and certainly no paradox. You just need to be clear about the notion you use.
EB

What is your definition of "person"? Why couldnt we allow a definition so that what our first person (!) view works?

To me we are the same person when we awake as when we go to sleep.
If the body is copied we get two of the same person. Etc.

 

[ryan]

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Of clothes that look the same you still can't say that they are the same thing but you can say they are identical things. My point stands.
EB

I have no idea what you are talking about.

 

[The AntiChris]

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Of clothes that look the same you still can't say that they are the same thing but you can say they are identical things. My point stands.
EB

I have no idea what you are talking about.

I think Speakpigeon's attempting to describe the distinction between qualitative and quantitative (numerical) identity.

It's explained in the introduction to the entry on identity in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/).

 

[Speakpigeon]

I also fail to see where there would be a problem.

We can conceive fictional scenarios where several people end up somehow remembering the same past. As a consequence, each of them believes they are the actual, original person who went through the events as they remember them. That they are different people is not in question and therefore they must have different subjective experiences from each other. Where would be the problem?

From the point of view of the person who is going to be split between two bodies, so to speak, and so before the split, he is still one person and there's also no paradox. The point you bring about his belief as to which of two people he will be is also not problematic. We all have beliefs and some of them are wrong. For example, the ordinary belief you may have before going to sleep that you are going to wake up the same person is obviously not literally true. And so in the scenario you describe, the question of which one of two people you will wake up as is non-sensical. All we need to reply is that two people will wake up one morning, one in Denmark the other in Syria, and that it is just so that they will have identical memories. So what? Where would be the problem?

The only problem is probably if you want to insist that you wake up each morning as literally the same person, as if there was some sort of metaphysical absolute in that. This problem is solved if we take the notion of person as a social convention based on the kind of biographical and physical continuity that we can normally expect in our lives. However, your scenario is based on removing this convention: We still have people, two people, two persons, but now we fictionally assume that at some point these two persons were the same person or more precisely were made out of the same person. It's a changed notion. Again, there's no problem with that and certainly no paradox. You just need to be clear about the notion you use.
EB

What is your definition of "person"?

I don't need to have any special definition but there are several senses so it's a question of what people mean in the context. We just need to look at how the word is used. My point is based on the fact that different things, for example Mrs. Jones yesterday and Mrs. Jones today, can be regarded as the same person, i.e. Mrs. Jones. It's a social convention and possibly also something coming from how perception works.

Why couldnt we allow a definition so that what our first person (!) view works?

You can use it this way. You just need to make clear which of the different senses you are using.

To me we are the same person when we awake as when we go to sleep.

We certainly are considered the same person by social convention. I guess most of us feel they are the same person as yesterday. But clearly it's a convention and this is why it is possible to equivocate and find problems where there is none.

If the body is copied we get two of the same person. Etc.

No, if there are two things they can only be "identical things", not "the same thing". If it's the same thing then there's just one thing, possibly at different times or seen from different angles etc. This apply to a person: you can say "this is same person I saw yesterday" if there is only one person. But if you have two people, as suggested in the scenario, they may be identical people but not the same person. That was my point with ryan.

It's just basic English usage. You can choose to disregard standard usage but don't complain if people don't understand what you mean.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Of clothes that look the same you still can't say that they are the same thing but you can say they are identical things. My point stands.
EB

I have no idea what you are talking about.

I think Speakpigeon's attempting to describe the distinction between qualitative and quantitative (numerical) identity.

It's explained in the introduction to the entry on identity in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/).

Well, I was just making a grammatical point. That philosophers can make philosophical hay out of that is somewhat beside my point although what they say is obviously correct. This is a different way of looking at it.

Good point.
EB

- - - Updated - - -

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Of clothes that look the same you still can't say that they are the same thing but you can say they are identical things. My point stands.
EB

I have no idea what you are talking about.

Go back to your English teacher when you were little and ask her to explain it to you.
EB

 

[Juma]

What is your definition of "person"?

I don't need to have any special definition but there are several senses so it's a question of what people mean in the context. We just need to look at how the word is used. My point is based on the fact that different things, for example Mrs. Jones yesterday and Mrs. Jones today, can be regarded as the same person, i.e. Mrs. Jones. It's a social convention and possibly also something coming from how perception works.

Why couldnt we allow a definition so that what our first person (!) view works?

You can use it this way. You just need to make clear which of the different senses you are using.

To me we are the same person when we awake as when we go to sleep.

We certainly are considered the same person by social convention. I guess most of us feel they are the same person as yesterday. But clearly it's a convention and this is why it is possible to equivocate and find problems where there is none.

If the body is copied we get two of the same person. Etc.

No, if there are two things they can only be "identical things", not "the same thing". If it's the same thing then there's just one thing, possibly at different times or seen from different angles etc. This apply to a person: you can say "this is same person I saw yesterday" if there is only one person. But if you have two people, as suggested in the scenario, they may be identical people but not the same person. That was my point with ryan.

It's just basic English usage. You can choose to disregard standard usage but don't complain if people don't understand what you mean.
EB

I totally agree. And of course its a social convention, sll words are social conventions. But. What I suggested is a usage of the word "person" so that copying a persons body actually results in two instances of the same person. Thus the same person will have different experiences depending on which body you refers to.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I don't need to have any special definition but there are several senses so it's a question of what people mean in the context. We just need to look at how the word is used. My point is based on the fact that different things, for example Mrs. Jones yesterday and Mrs. Jones today, can be regarded as the same person, i.e. Mrs. Jones. It's a social convention and possibly also something coming from how perception works.

Why couldnt we allow a definition so that what our first person (!) view works?

You can use it this way. You just need to make clear which of the different senses you are using.

To me we are the same person when we awake as when we go to sleep.

We certainly are considered the same person by social convention. I guess most of us feel they are the same person as yesterday. But clearly it's a convention and this is why it is possible to equivocate and find problems where there is none.

If the body is copied we get two of the same person. Etc.

No, if there are two things they can only be "identical things", not "the same thing". If it's the same thing then there's just one thing, possibly at different times or seen from different angles etc. This apply to a person: you can say "this is same person I saw yesterday" if there is only one person. But if you have two people, as suggested in the scenario, they may be identical people but not the same person. That was my point with ryan.

It's just basic English usage. You can choose to disregard standard usage but don't complain if people don't understand what you mean.
EB

I totally agree. And of course its a social convention, sll words are social conventions.

Sure, words are conventions but my point was that what is meant (by the word "person") is itself a social convention, like, say, the notion of the United States of America is a social convention in that the U.S.A as such only exist as a convention, a fictional entity cobbled together from snippets of historical facts, grand ideals and borders one could build beautiful walls along.

But. What I suggested is a usage of the word "person" so that copying a persons body actually results in two instances of the same person. Thus the same person will have different experiences depending on which body you refers to.

No, you are being grammatically inconsistent. Grammatically, it's the two instances that will have different experiences, not the person. Here, you conceive of a completely abstract notion of personhood. In your scenario, what exists as flesh and blood are the two instances, each one undergoing different life processes and having as a result different experiences. And then you have this abstract notion of a particular person that your instances are instances of. This abstract person doesn't interact with the real world except as an idea inside your mind. It's mental construct just as the ordinary notion of a person is a social convention.
EB

 

[Juma]

I don't need to have any special definition but there are several senses so it's a question of what people mean in the context. We just need to look at how the word is used. My point is based on the fact that different things, for example Mrs. Jones yesterday and Mrs. Jones today, can be regarded as the same person, i.e. Mrs. Jones. It's a social convention and possibly also something coming from how perception works.

Why couldnt we allow a definition so that what our first person (!) view works?

You can use it this way. You just need to make clear which of the different senses you are using.

To me we are the same person when we awake as when we go to sleep.

We certainly are considered the same person by social convention. I guess most of us feel they are the same person as yesterday. But clearly it's a convention and this is why it is possible to equivocate and find problems where there is none.

If the body is copied we get two of the same person. Etc.

No, if there are two things they can only be "identical things", not "the same thing". If it's the same thing then there's just one thing, possibly at different times or seen from different angles etc. This apply to a person: you can say "this is same person I saw yesterday" if there is only one person. But if you have two people, as suggested in the scenario, they may be identical people but not the same person. That was my point with ryan.

It's just basic English usage. You can choose to disregard standard usage but don't complain if people don't understand what you mean.
EB

I totally agree. And of course its a social convention, sll words are social conventions.

Sure, words are conventions but my point was that what is meant (by the word "person") is itself a social convention, like, say, the notion of the United States of America is a social convention in that the U.S.A as such only exist as a convention, a fictional entity cobbled together from snippets of historical facts, grand ideals and borders one could build beautiful walls along.

But. What I suggested is a usage of the word "person" so that copying a persons body actually results in two instances of the same person. Thus the same person will have different experiences depending on which body you refers to.

No, you are being grammatically inconsistent. Grammatically, it's the two instances that will have different experiences, not the person. Here, you conceive of a completely abstract notion of personhood. In your scenario, what exists as flesh and blood are the two instances, each one undergoing different life processes and having as a result different experiences. And then you have this abstract notion of a particular person that your instances are instances of. This abstract person doesn't interact with the real world except as an idea inside your mind. It's mental construct just as the ordinary notion of a person is a social convention.
EB

That person has two instances with bodies that has perceptions. Thus the person has perceptions

 

[Speakpigeon]

That person has two instances with bodies that has perceptions.

Why not.

Thus the person has perceptions

No.

End of conversation.
EB

 

[ryan]

I have no idea what you are talking about.

Go back to your English teacher when you were little and ask her to explain it to you.
EB

She says that she also has no idea what you are talking about.

 

[Treedbear]

...

The clearest evidence being that there are many things we simply don't know about ourselves. And there is much of what is essential to "me" and to having the ability to experience "me" that is more than the subjective experience. It's not like some painting on the wall in front of you. It's the complex interplay of memories, sensations, and all the preconceptions we've created. It's a dynamic process which requires continuity in order to function.

I have had a weird experience once whereby I was for a short spell minimally conscious but couldn't remember anything at all about anything and had no perception whatsoever of the things around me or even my own body. So I see my biographical memories and my sense of the real world out there as being an integral part of the painting on the wall and then it just happens that there's nothing else to look at.

You are talking about what you believe to be the case and that's fine but if you really want to understand you need to look beyond your belief system. And that's also the scientific thing to do.
EB

That's the whole point I'm attempting to make. The subjective experience of "me" is very much the result of my belief system. But it's not complete. It would be like a red square thinking it was the same as a red triangle because its color appears to be the same. "Me" is just another model that the brain is making and continually modifying of something in its environment. That's what the brain does very well as a matter of survival. That's how it makes sense of the world. Lots of inter-related models continually modified and refined, but never knowing completely. The objects in its environment are real, but the models are only concepts. Why is subjective "me" different than the case of two objectively different objects that happen to share some specific attribute? The reason I've come to this system of belief is that the alternative is Plato and his system of Forms. That leads directly to dualism and religious idealism, which I won't ever again indulge in.

 

[DBT]

You are what 'your' brain is doing. Someone else is what 'their' brain is doing.

 

[Treedbear]

You are what 'your' brain is doing. Someone else is what 'their' brain is doing.

We can agree on that. Also, I think, that subjective experience doesn't reflect all of what one's brain is doing. It's only part of the story. There needs to be an objective understanding in order to avoid (i.e.; explain) the paradox embraced by dualism.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

You are what 'your' brain is doing. Someone else is what 'their' brain is doing.

We can agree on that. Also, I think, that subjective experience doesn't reflect all of what one's brain is doing. It's only part of the story. There needs to be an objective understanding in order to avoid (i.e.; explain) the paradox embraced by dualism.

Well, lots of illogical ideas end up embracing paradoxes due to the fact that paradoxes happen when you don't worry about logic. If you have a position which results in paradoxes, it probably means that your position is shit.

 

[DBT]

You are what 'your' brain is doing. Someone else is what 'their' brain is doing.

We can agree on that. Also, I think, that subjective experience doesn't reflect all of what one's brain is doing. It's only part of the story. There needs to be an objective understanding in order to avoid (i.e.; explain) the paradox embraced by dualism.

Dualism is a dud.

 

[Juma]

Why not.

Thus the person has perceptions

No.

End of conversation.
EB

Children have bodies. The bodies have perceptions, thus the children has perceptions.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Go back to your English teacher when you were little and ask her to explain it to you.
EB

She says that she also has no idea what you are talking about.

She is in Paris at the moment because she wanted to see the tomb of Jim Morrison (she was a fan). Well, she says she haven't heard of you for a long while. She also says she is not surprised you seem to not understand.

Anyway, she says 'hello'.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

...

I have had a weird experience once whereby I was for a short spell minimally conscious but couldn't remember anything at all about anything and had no perception whatsoever of the things around me or even my own body. So I see my biographical memories and my sense of the real world out there as being an integral part of the painting on the wall and then it just happens that there's nothing else to look at.

You are talking about what you believe to be the case and that's fine but if you really want to understand you need to look beyond your belief system. And that's also the scientific thing to do.
EB

That's the whole point I'm attempting to make. The subjective experience of "me" is very much the result of my belief system. But it's not complete. It would be like a red square thinking it was the same as a red triangle because its color appears to be the same. "Me" is just another model that the brain is making and continually modifying of something in its environment. That's what the brain does very well as a matter of survival. That's how it makes sense of the world. Lots of inter-related models continually modified and refined, but never knowing completely. The objects in its environment are real, but the models are only concepts. Why is subjective "me" different than the case of two objectively different objects that happen to share some specific attribute? The reason I've come to this system of belief is that the alternative is Plato and his system of Forms. That leads directly to dualism and religious idealism, which I won't ever again indulge in.

Personally, I solve the problem by distinguishing between on the one hand the contents of my mind, which includes things like my biographical memories, the sensations related to my body, my current thoughts, my feelings, etc., and on the other hand subjective experience in itself. It's like making the distinction between what you experience during a journey and the fact that you are on a journey.

It may be the case that the quality of the subjective experience of the contents of my mind is specific to subjective experience, i.e. it may have no other existence than as being the things you have the experience of, such the quality of redness, of pain, of any sound you hear etc.

The point is that once you accept this distinction it seems you have to accept that subjective experience in itself is probably no different from one person to the next. Mind contents on the other hand are expected to be very different, not in nature but in the details, such as biographical details about the subject.

This view helps solve the questions we have about a scenario where we imagine one person suddenly being split in two instances. In terms of subjective experience, we already accepted that different people probably have the same kind of subjective experience. So, the two instances of the same person would also have the same kind of subjective experience and that's not a problem.

Concerning the contents of the mind, we usually accept that they are a function of the interactions of the brain with its environment over the life of the subject. Two instances of the same person would have different environments and therefore different interactions and therefore different mind contents. So, they would not be identical any more than any two people taken at random would be. Their mind contents would be very similar, at least initially, but still different, i.e. not identical. According to this, I fail to see what would be the sense of characterising them as "the same person". How two different people could be thought of as the same person?

Subjectively, they would share very similar biographical memories (still not identical because current experience certainly affects whatever you remember of your past). So, in that sense, they would both claim to be the original Joe. Yet, all scenarios of splitting involves one original and one copy. So, objectively, it would always be possible, at least in principle, to track down who is the original and who is the clone. So, from an objective point of view again there's no problem. We would have two different people: one is the original and the other is the clone. The clone would have memories similar to that of the original but he would still be a clone. From a subjective point of view, both the original and the clone would feel that they are themselves, i.e. a unique persona. And they would evolve independently of each other. They would think the other guy is an imposter but who cares what people believe? We all have very different beliefs about at least something if not many things so it's no big deal. And again, other people would see the clone as being mistaken, at least in principle. Ultimately, the original and the clone are different because not two objects can be both identical and at the very same location so that while they may start as strickly identical because created as such (by hypothesis, because in practice we still don't know how to do that for macroscopic objects) they would diverge immediately as a result of their different environments and therefore interactions. And I fail to conceive of a scenario where we would have several instances of the same person that would remain strickly identical over the necessary period of time to form any thought.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

Personally, I solve the problem by distinguishing between on the one hand the contents of my mind, which includes things like my biographical memories, the sensations related to my body, my current thoughts, my feelings, etc., and on the other hand subjective experience in itself. It's like making the distinction between what you experience during a journey and the fact that you are on a journey.

It may be the case that the quality of the subjective experience of the contents of my mind is specific to subjective experience, i.e. it may have no other existence than as being the things you have the experience of, such the quality of redness, of pain, of any sound you hear etc.

The point is that once you accept this distinction it seems you have to accept that subjective experience in itself is probably no different from one person to the next. Mind contents on the other hand are expected to be very different, not in nature but in the details, such as biographical details about the subject.

Accepting this distinction is what made me ask the question in the first place. If it makes sense to talk about my subjective sense of "I exist" apart from the details of my particular experiences, it makes sense to wonder if it could have been connected to a different set of experiences. Of course, we ordinarily think this is true. I would have the same subjective sense of "I exist" if I had decided to have a muffin for breakfast today instead of yogurt. My internal perspective, illusory or not, would obtain in either situation. There is no reason to think it wouldn't obtain under radically different circumstances, as long as they still happen to this body.

And I fail to conceive of a scenario where we would have several instances of the same person that would remain strickly identical over the necessary period of time to form any thought.
EB

A useful way to imagine it is to assume for the sake of argument that parallel universes are all part of the same higher-dimensional multiverse. A pair of universes that are identical except for the position of one hydrogen atom in the center of the Milky Way would thus contain a pair of exactly identical Earths. They would be separated by "distance" along the axes of whatever higher dimensions govern the multiverse. There is nothing in principle preventing this from actually being the case, and the "distance" that separates them is no less real than the distance we ordinarily think of in 3 dimensions. If we accept this as a possibility, then there exists someone with your exact genetic makeup and mental content, living out exactly the same life as you, in a different universe.