Could I have been born as someone else?

[DBT]

Not sure how what I said could 'seem to imply dualism.' I thought I was stating the very opposite.

One person would be both a self and other simultaneously, where selfhood is not the same thing as other.

I have no idea what that means. Sorry.

Both self and other are physically the same thing yet you call them something different; why?

The same thing physically....how? Are identical twins the ''same thing,'' as in one and the same person?

The very description 'twins' defines them as two people. Two distinct people/objects occupying their own space and location regardless of whether you can tell them apart or not.

 

[ryan]

Not sure how what I said could 'seem to imply dualism.' I thought I was stating the very opposite.

One person would be both a self and other simultaneously, where selfhood is not the same thing as other.

I have no idea what that means. Sorry.

Both self and other are physically the same thing yet you call them something different; why?

The same thing physically....how? Are identical twins the ''same thing,'' as in one and the same person?

The very description 'twins' defines them as two people. Two distinct people/objects occupying their own space and location regardless of whether you can tell them apart or not.

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

 

[DBT]

Not sure how what I said could 'seem to imply dualism.' I thought I was stating the very opposite.

One person would be both a self and other simultaneously, where selfhood is not the same thing as other.

I have no idea what that means. Sorry.

Both self and other are physically the same thing yet you call them something different; why?

The same thing physically....how? Are identical twins the ''same thing,'' as in one and the same person?

The very description 'twins' defines them as two people. Two distinct people/objects occupying their own space and location regardless of whether you can tell them apart or not.

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

How does that help?

 

[Juma]

Not sure how what I said could 'seem to imply dualism.' I thought I was stating the very opposite.

One person would be both a self and other simultaneously, where selfhood is not the same thing as other.

I have no idea what that means. Sorry.

Both self and other are physically the same thing yet you call them something different; why?

The same thing physically....how? Are identical twins the ''same thing,'' as in one and the same person?

The very description 'twins' defines them as two people. Two distinct people/objects occupying their own space and location regardless of whether you can tell them apart or not.

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

Twins are two different, independent, things.

 

[ryan]

Not sure how what I said could 'seem to imply dualism.' I thought I was stating the very opposite.

One person would be both a self and other simultaneously, where selfhood is not the same thing as other.

I have no idea what that means. Sorry.

Both self and other are physically the same thing yet you call them something different; why?

The same thing physically....how? Are identical twins the ''same thing,'' as in one and the same person?

The very description 'twins' defines them as two people. Two distinct people/objects occupying their own space and location regardless of whether you can tell them apart or not.

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

How does that help?

It's not perfect, but it would have been more helpful. It's like saying, r is the same letter as r, hence they are the same letters, and we see that there are two of them. But the first letter in the name ryan is the same letter (not plural letters) as the letter before y in the name I gave; there is only one of them.

 

[DrZoidberg]

If, instead of the ordinary white lower-middle class upbringing I actually had, I was stolen away at birth and raised on a Polynesian island, I would still be me, just with different experiences. That is, I can imagine what it would be like to grow up somewhere else, speak a different language, and spend my time doing totally different things from what I do now; if that turn of events took place, I would simply be that person. Thus, it is conceivable that I would still exist even if many of the details of my life (my upbringing, my location, my values, my physique, my diet, etc.) were different from what they actually are. With me so far?

How far can this be extended? Would I still exist if, instead of the pair of gametes from my parents that fused to create my DNA, a different pair of gametes from my parents that were very similar to those fused instead? Suppose they were the same in every way, except the genes that affect eye color encoded a slightly lighter shade of brown in my irises. If I would still exist even if all the relevant details of my life were different, as in the Polynesian island example, surely I would still exist if something as small as my eye color were different. In other words, the Polynesian island version of me is a lot further away from the lighter-eyed version of me, but I can conceive of being either one without much trouble. So, even if the biological events that determined my DNA had gone a little differently, I'm reasonably confident that I would still exist.

Combining these two concepts together, there doesn't seem to be any logical cutoff point after which I would no longer be 'allowed' to exist. If I would exist even if my DNA and the content of my life were different, couldn't I have been born as a different person entirely? As Thomas Nagel put it, why did the laws of the universe not only result in my existence, but also result in my existence as the particular person I am?

According to a philosopher Deleuze, you aren't just the content of your mind and your behaviour. It's also your context. Even if you would do the same thing in both cultures, the fact that you live in different cultures will mean that your actions will be interpreted differently. The same applies for various sub-groups within the same culture. Behaviours that signal competence and power in the upper middle class world will most likely come across as effeminate and weak by the lower classes.

So basically, it's the wrong question to ask.

 

[Treedbear]

...
According to a philosopher Deleuze, you aren't just the content of your mind and your behaviour. It's also your context. ...

Thanks for mentioning Deleuze. Hadn't heard of him before but I'm struck by how similar his ideas about the "metaphysical relationship between identity and difference" are to mine. Although we might differ on his interpretation of "the virtual". I'll get back to you when I've had time to think more on it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Ya, I don't see any way at all in which you'd be one of those people. There's an infinite possible set of potential people who could exist and a finite subset of that exists in our world and a different finite subset would exist on that other world. While I suppose that it's mathematically possible that the same individual could show up in both subsets, the probability of that happening is less probable than monkeys flying out of your butt or Trump turning out to be a competent and effective President.

If you were born as someone else, you would be someone else - full stop. You wouldn't exist and someone else would exist instead of you.

So... looking at millions of bodies, what factor makes us identify a particular one as "me"? Had I been born at the same time to the same parents, but a different sperm had fertilized the ovum from which I grew, would there be another individual who would be "me", such that "I" would not exist? Tried to ask that question of some adults when I was about six... they looked at me funny.

The essential factor is that we don't subjectively experience being two different people at the same time. It's not so different from being confined all your life inside one particular room with just one window and a particular view on the neighbourhood. At some point you start to identify with it. Anybody who would be there instead of you would feel and think the same. And to some extent it's what happens to many people who don't move around much. They identify with their little community and local area, its streets, its trees, its weather. We are essentially what we think and what we think is largely a function of the neighbourhood, and a big chunk of that neighbourhod is definitely our own body.

Whatever we come to think, we're stuck within the room of our own mind and the neighbourhood of our own lives because we can't have the experience that would come with "having" two different bodies.

And, yes, I don't know why that is but your guess is as good as mine.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

The whole 'continuity' thing is an illusion generated by your brain, which has access to your memories, but not to the memories of others. The fact is that much of that memory is demonstrably false, and it contains HUGE gaps - so continuity is a lie you are telling yourself.

Good point.

Maybe a more appropriate notion than continuity would that of the absence of contradicton in the narrative of your life as you can remember it. As long as you don't remember both being, say, Donald and being Hillary then you'll think you're doing Ok.

Although, if we did have conflicting memories to the point that it would be the norm then maybe we would quickly learn to manage it and just get on with our two different lives (or more than two).

I could be difficult in term of social organisation and personal relationship but from a strictly psychological angle it might work. Instead of "How are you today, Hillary?", we would ask "So, who are you today? Donald? Hillary?" Quite a bother to decide who we should vote for.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

...
The word "me" can mean two very different things: the public persona and the subjective experience of being.

The public persona is what requires the notion of continuity. We conceive of the public "me" as the person evolving in a continuous manner from birth to now, a historical continuum. As a social species, we need this notion badly because we need to be able to trust that other people are what they seem to be and not some spooky look-alike.

But the subjective me is trully whatever we experience subjectively now. Continuity of our historical person is no longer essential. A clone of me will think he is me even though continuity would be lost. We just need to have the same memories, which is just about conceivable, while we definitely couldn't share the same continuity.

So the two notions are conceptually irreconcileable. It's just one of those facts about human beings that we have this duality. It's a by-product, a side-effect, a glitch. ...

It seems to me you've accepted the "spooky look-alike" within the subjective experience.

I would hardly be the only one. It seems to be a feature of human psychology.

But a clone of me is an imposter, even if an unwitting one. And I'd think twice about sacrificing my own life for the life of my clone, even though the rest of society saw nothing wrong with it. (Of course it would set a worrisome precedent.)

A clone is not the original from the objective side of the equation because it is at least conceivable to be able to prove which is the original and which is the clone. Not so with the subjective experience of being. Whatever the memories of the clone, he will experience himself as "me". Even if he has specific memories showing he is the clone not the original he will still think of himself as "me". Subjectively, the mechanism must be exactly the same as the one which makes you think you are you. Objectively, you will desperately reach out to the argument that the clone can be proven to be a clone just to validate your belief that you are the original "you". But your memories and current perception could be misleading to the point that you would believe to be the original even though you would be the clone. So it's only by assuming that everything is in order that you can assert that you are the original you. But if not everything is in order if could be that you could still assume, wrongly then, that eveything is in order.

I also think you seem to have it backwards in that it's the subjective experience of "me" that has to do with our evolution as a social species, rather than the objective concept of our existence. Subjectivity is all about how the brain models the self in relation to its environment. A paradox, but not a glitch.

That's what we all believe and we don't have any alternative model for how that could work differently but we don't actually know that this is true. You are arguing like the proverbial Christmas turkey: so far so good!

I think that if we can ever hope to solve what's been called the "hard problem" of consciousness and explain it in simple language which everyone can understand than we will need to do so from an objective point of view. That's how the scientific method works.

Good luck with that. It's like looking for your lost keys around the lampost because that's where the light is.

I contend that simply having the same memories and subjective experience doesn't necessarily establish what is true about "me".

My point is that there's nothing true about "me". At least nothing so different from having a particular view on a neighbourhood from a particular room inside which you would be stuck all your life. What's true about it is that that would be be where you are but it would be false in the sense that you could be in any room with a view on any neighbourhood and still feel the uniqueness of this view. Objectively speaking, being oneself is relative to the contingencies of life. There's really nothing much to it.

However, subjectively speaking it's different in the sense that you couldn't experience being a different person at the same time. And if you could experience being different people from one moment to the next you wouldn't even notice the switch so in effect you would always experience being you even if you were a different person every hour of your life.

The clearest evidence being that there are many things we simply don't know about ourselves. And there is much of what is essential to "me" and to having the ability to experience "me" that is more than the subjective experience. It's not like some painting on the wall in front of you. It's the complex interplay of memories, sensations, and all the preconceptions we've created. It's a dynamic process which requires continuity in order to function.

I have had a weird experience once whereby I was for a short spell minimally conscious but couldn't remember anything at all about anything and had no perception whatsoever of the things around me or even my own body. So I see my biographical memories and my sense of the real world out there as being an integral part of the painting on the wall and then it just happens that there's nothing else to look at.

You are talking about what you believe to be the case and that's fine but if you really want to understand you need to look beyond your belief system. And that's also the scientific thing to do.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

We can say "they are identical things" not "they are an identical thing", and, we can only say "they are the same thing" not "they are the same things".

Assuming there could be two things really identical (why not, who knows?) they will have to be, necessarily, in different locations (or else our model of reality is completely wrong). So, two identical things necessarily are not the same thing. So, if it's the same thing then there's just one thing. no plural.
EB

 

[PyramidHead]

Another thought experiment to put the problem into focus, originated by Derek Parfit and with modifications from Joe Kern:

We know that it's possible to live with only half a brain. In principle, there is nothing preventing someone with only a half a functioning brain from getting a transplant to fill the other half. They would feel different after the operation, but if done properly their memories would remain intact, so they would experience undergoing a change (perhaps in personality, mood, temperament) rather than ceasing to exist. Presumably, with the right technology, the same thing could be said of a partial or entire brain transplant; for the sake of argument, let's assume that if your brain was successfully transferred to the body of someone physically identical to you, it would feel like "waking up" in that body.

(Case 1) If one hemisphere of your brain dies, the right lets say, then you will continue to live and have a conscious existence based just on the functioning of the left hemisphere. If this left hemisphere is then transplanted into a new body (a second body) identical to your original body, you will continue to exist from that left hemisphere in that new body, just as if your whole brain had been transplanted into a new body.

But, what if:

(Case 2) Your whole brain is functioning, and it is removed from your body, but before it is transplanted into the new body, the two hemispheres are split from each other, and the right hemisphere is destroyed? The result is the same as in (Case 1): just your left hemisphere is in a new body. It should not matter whether the right hemisphere died while still attached to your left hemisphere in your old body, or after it was detached outside your body. You should therefore believe as you did in (Case 1), that you will exist in that new body, just off the functioning of your left hemisphere.

So now, what if:

(Case 3) Your whole brain is functioning, and it is removed from your body, and the two hemispheres are split from each other (the same as the previous case so far), but instead of the right hemisphere being destroyed, it is transplanted into another (a third) body identical to your original body? From the point of view of your left hemisphere, what happens to the right hemisphere after splitting should not matter. Once the two are separated, to Lefty (which is the person who is the left hemisphere in the new body) the fate of the right hemisphere is an extrinsic fact. So, if you become Lefty in (Case 2), then you should also become Lefty in (Case 3).

But here we have the problem, because this exact same story could be told from the perspective of Righty, and we would conclude that you should become Righty in (Case 3). There are competing claims for who you will become in (Case 3).

Does the problem make sense? The way I look at it, there is a fact of the matter, from my perspective, about which person I will "wake up" as. Let's suppose one body is in Syria and the other is in Denmark, and afterwards they have to live the remainder of their lives in these countries. Before the operation, I would just be in one place. After the operation, I would still be in just one place: either Syria or Denmark. I wouldn't experience being two people at once, in two different places at once. Rationally, I would hope to wake up in Denmark rather than Syria, as these are tangibly different outcomes for my well-being. There doesn't seem to be any way, even in principle, to physically predict where I would end up, so I ought to conclude that it's not a real question. However, prior to the split, it seems incontrovertibly, actually true that I should either look forward to waking up in Denmark or dread waking up in Syria, since I can't possibly experience being in both places at the same time.

It's this me-ness that I'm trying to get at, isolated from the extrinsic facts about my body and brain. On the one hand, there shouldn't be such a thing if dualism is false, and I think it is. On the other hand, there is no answer to the above riddle that doesn't involve something distinct from the physical world. How to resolve this paradox?

 

[ronburgundy]

If, instead of the ordinary white lower-middle class upbringing I actually had, I was stolen away at birth and raised on a Polynesian island, I would still be me, just with different experiences. That is, I can imagine what it would be like to grow up somewhere else, speak a different language, and spend my time doing totally different things from what I do now; if that turn of events took place, I would simply be that person. Thus, it is conceivable that I would still exist even if many of the details of my life (my upbringing, my location, my values, my physique, my diet, etc.) were different from what they actually are. With me so far?

How far can this be extended? Would I still exist if, instead of the pair of gametes from my parents that fused to create my DNA, a different pair of gametes from my parents that were very similar to those fused instead? Suppose they were the same in every way, except the genes that affect eye color encoded a slightly lighter shade of brown in my irises. If I would still exist even if all the relevant details of my life were different, as in the Polynesian island example, surely I would still exist if something as small as my eye color were different. In other words, the Polynesian island version of me is a lot further away from the lighter-eyed version of me, but I can conceive of being either one without much trouble. So, even if the biological events that determined my DNA had gone a little differently, I'm reasonably confident that I would still exist.

Combining these two concepts together, there doesn't seem to be any logical cutoff point after which I would no longer be 'allowed' to exist. If I would exist even if my DNA and the content of my life were different, couldn't I have been born as a different person entirely? As Thomas Nagel put it, why did the laws of the universe not only result in my existence, but also result in my existence as the particular person I am?

It simply comes down how the words "I", "me" , and "you" are defined (most philosophical debate is over definitions or words).

IF they are defined such that you are still you even if you are an entirely different person, then they are defined so vaguely that they contain nothing and mean nothing in the first place, so the statement "I would still be me." becomes a meaningless string of letters and conveys no comprehensible concepts.

At the other extreme, if "I" includes everything about your subjective psychological and objective physical properties, then you cease to exist as soon as anything about you changes, which also means "you" never exist longer than a millisecond, because there are constant changes to your physical and mental states. There are an infinite number of "you". That is also a near worthless definition.

We use those words and they have meaning and utility because we use them to refer to concepts that fall between such extremes, that do contain some required stable properties to qualify, but also exclude the things that are highly temporary and unstable.

It seems that most people use those words to largely exclude physical traits that don't have strong direct impact upon psychological subjective sense of self. So eye color would not be relevant, unless your environment treated you notably different due to eye color. There are things about you, how you view things, how you react, your emotional temperament, your memories, etc.. that not only do you recognize in yourself, but others associate with you and could recognize as you if you became physically altered beyond visual recognition.

In sum,if the psychological changes were such that people who have known you well for a long time, would think your body was taken over by another force, then you are no longer you. That would likely be the case if you were snatched at birth and raised in a drastically different environment, or if your genes controlling particular aspects of your neurology were modified, or even if a tumor or disease wiped out your memories and/or altered your basic temperament.

OTOH, if your physical appearance was completely altered, but your mental features left in tact such that if those other people couldn't see you, they would completely assume it was you, then you are still you in the sense of "you" that most people mean when they use that word. Of course, since our appearance does impact our experiences, you would slowly diverge from the former you and become a different you than you would have been without those alterations.

 

[The AntiChris]

Does the problem make sense?

No, not to me (although I do acknowledge that many people do find this perplexing).

The way I look at it, there is a fact of the matter, from my perspective, about which person I will "wake up" as.

For me, this is where you go wrong. Your intuition that you will wake up as either 'Lefty' or 'Righty' implies a unique 'you' that can only reside in one body. For me it's quite simple - wholebrain 'you' wakes up as 'Lefty' and as 'Righty'.

There are two people at the end of this procedure who sincerely believe that they are a continuation (the same person as) the original wholebrain 'you' and there is no test, either in practice or in principal, which can make any distinction.

On the other hand, there is no answer to the above riddle that doesn't involve something distinct from the physical world. How to resolve this paradox?

I don't see the apparent "paradox". Could you spell it out in the form of a logical syllogism (so we might identify precisely where our intuitions clash)?

 

[PyramidHead]

No, not to me (although I do acknowledge that many people do find this perplexing).

The way I look at it, there is a fact of the matter, from my perspective, about which person I will "wake up" as.

For me, this is where you go wrong. Your intuition that you will wake up as either 'Lefty' or 'Righty' implies a unique 'you' that can only reside in one body. For me it's quite simple - wholebrain 'you' wakes up as 'Lefty' and as 'Righty'.

That seems like a linguistic trick. There is no other scenario I can think of where it makes sense to say that someone (some one) woke up in Denmark and Syria simultaneously. Before and after the operation, all parties involved are still individuals with a unique first-person perspective. It's not that my first-person perspective can only reside in one particular body, but it definitely seems true that it can't reside in multiple bodies.

There are two people at the end of this procedure who sincerely believe that they are a continuation (the same person as) the original wholebrain 'you' and there is no test, either in practice or in principal, which can make any distinction.

And I think both people are right, but one of them is in a first-world democracy and the other is in a war-torn hellhole. Before the operation, everything I know about being a person tells me I will only experience one of those outcomes. Never in history has there been an example of someone who can feel what it is like to be in two places simultaneously. So, if I'm sure of anything, I'm sure that when I get put to sleep for the procedure, the next time I open my eyes I will be in Syria or Denmark. My subjective experience will include what it feels like to exist in either of those places, not both. If the right half of my brain were destroyed, and only the left half went to Denmark, I could be certain that I would wake up there. But somehow, not destroying the right half--which should have no effect on the left half one way or the other, since they are separate--completely changes my confidence level with regards to my eventual destination. I know that after the fact, both people can legitimately claim they are the same person who underwent the operation.

I don't see the apparent "paradox". Could you spell it out in the form of a logical syllogism (so we might identify precisely where our intuitions clash)?

Maybe not a literal paradox, and in any case you found the inflection point where we disagree.

 

[The AntiChris]

No, not to me (although I do acknowledge that many people do find this perplexing).


For me, this is where you go wrong. Your intuition that you will wake up as either 'Lefty' or 'Righty' implies a unique 'you' that can only reside in one body. For me it's quite simple - wholebrain 'you' wakes up as 'Lefty' and as 'Righty'.

That seems like a linguistic trick.

It's not intentional trickery.

There is no other scenario I can think of where it makes sense to say that someone (some one) woke up in Denmark and Syria simultaneously.

It can only happen in thought experiments (at the moment!).

It's not that my first-person perspective can only reside in one particular body, but it definitely seems true that it can't reside in multiple bodies.

I can't see the distinction you're making. It seems binary - if your first person perspective cannot reside in multiple bodies (multiple instances) then it follows that it can only reside in a single body (a single instance).

Before the operation, everything I know about being a person tells me I will only experience one of those outcomes.

Yes it's a very strong intuition but it completely collapses in thought experiments like this.

Never in history has there been an example of someone who can feel what it is like to be in two places simultaneously.

Nothing I've suggested entails this (I agree with you it's nonsensical). All I've suggested is that the experiment results in two individuals, with completely separate subjective experiences, who both believe sincerely that they have identical pasts.

I ask again, try to set out your thoughts logically step by step so we can see where one of us might be going wrong.

 

[DBT]

Location. Location. Location....one eddy swirling within a stream, however short its tenure, is not the eddy swirling right beside it.

 

[ryan]

Sorry, I should have used a plural for "thing". They are identical/same things

We can say "they are identical things" not "they are an identical thing", and, we can only say "they are the same thing" not "they are the same things".

Assuming there could be two things really identical (why not, who knows?) they will have to be, necessarily, in different locations (or else our model of reality is completely wrong). So, two identical things necessarily are not the same thing. So, if it's the same thing then there's just one thing. no plural.
EB

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

 

[Speakpigeon]

We can say "they are identical things" not "they are an identical thing", and, we can only say "they are the same thing" not "they are the same things".

Assuming there could be two things really identical (why not, who knows?) they will have to be, necessarily, in different locations (or else our model of reality is completely wrong). So, two identical things necessarily are not the same thing. So, if it's the same thing then there's just one thing. no plural.
EB

There are two meanings, hence the reason I tried to correct myself. From Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/same, there is the meaning you mention but also,

Of an identical type; exactly similar:

‘they all wore the same clothes’

Of clothes that look the same you still can't say that they are the same thing but you can say they are identical things. My point stands.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Another thought experiment to put the problem into focus, originated by Derek Parfit and with modifications from Joe Kern:

We know that it's possible to live with only half a brain. In principle, there is nothing preventing someone with only a half a functioning brain from getting a transplant to fill the other half. They would feel different after the operation, but if done properly their memories would remain intact, so they would experience undergoing a change (perhaps in personality, mood, temperament) rather than ceasing to exist. Presumably, with the right technology, the same thing could be said of a partial or entire brain transplant; for the sake of argument, let's assume that if your brain was successfully transferred to the body of someone physically identical to you, it would feel like "waking up" in that body.

(Case 1) If one hemisphere of your brain dies, the right lets say, then you will continue to live and have a conscious existence based just on the functioning of the left hemisphere. If this left hemisphere is then transplanted into a new body (a second body) identical to your original body, you will continue to exist from that left hemisphere in that new body, just as if your whole brain had been transplanted into a new body.

But, what if:

(Case 2) Your whole brain is functioning, and it is removed from your body, but before it is transplanted into the new body, the two hemispheres are split from each other, and the right hemisphere is destroyed? The result is the same as in (Case 1): just your left hemisphere is in a new body. It should not matter whether the right hemisphere died while still attached to your left hemisphere in your old body, or after it was detached outside your body. You should therefore believe as you did in (Case 1), that you will exist in that new body, just off the functioning of your left hemisphere.

So now, what if:

(Case 3) Your whole brain is functioning, and it is removed from your body, and the two hemispheres are split from each other (the same as the previous case so far), but instead of the right hemisphere being destroyed, it is transplanted into another (a third) body identical to your original body? From the point of view of your left hemisphere, what happens to the right hemisphere after splitting should not matter. Once the two are separated, to Lefty (which is the person who is the left hemisphere in the new body) the fate of the right hemisphere is an extrinsic fact. So, if you become Lefty in (Case 2), then you should also become Lefty in (Case 3).

But here we have the problem, because this exact same story could be told from the perspective of Righty, and we would conclude that you should become Righty in (Case 3). There are competing claims for who you will become in (Case 3).

Does the problem make sense? The way I look at it, there is a fact of the matter, from my perspective, about which person I will "wake up" as. Let's suppose one body is in Syria and the other is in Denmark, and afterwards they have to live the remainder of their lives in these countries. Before the operation, I would just be in one place. After the operation, I would still be in just one place: either Syria or Denmark. I wouldn't experience being two people at once, in two different places at once. Rationally, I would hope to wake up in Denmark rather than Syria, as these are tangibly different outcomes for my well-being. There doesn't seem to be any way, even in principle, to physically predict where I would end up, so I ought to conclude that it's not a real question. However, prior to the split, it seems incontrovertibly, actually true that I should either look forward to waking up in Denmark or dread waking up in Syria, since I can't possibly experience being in both places at the same time.

It's this me-ness that I'm trying to get at, isolated from the extrinsic facts about my body and brain. On the one hand, there shouldn't be such a thing if dualism is false, and I think it is. On the other hand, there is no answer to the above riddle that doesn't involve something distinct from the physical world. How to resolve this paradox?

I also fail to see where there would be a problem.

We can conceive fictional scenarios where several people end up somehow remembering the same past. As a consequence, each of them believes they are the actual, original person who went through the events as they remember them. That they are different people is not in question and therefore they must have different subjective experiences from each other. Where would be the problem?

From the point of view of the person who is going to be split between two bodies, so to speak, and so before the split, he is still one person and there's also no paradox. The point you bring about his belief as to which of two people he will be is also not problematic. We all have beliefs and some of them are wrong. For example, the ordinary belief you may have before going to sleep that you are going to wake up the same person is obviously not literally true. And so in the scenario you describe, the question of which one of two people you will wake up as is non-sensical. All we need to reply is that two people will wake up one morning, one in Denmark the other in Syria, and that it is just so that they will have identical memories. So what? Where would be the problem?

The only problem is probably if you want to insist that you wake up each morning as literally the same person, as if there was some sort of metaphysical absolute in that. This problem is solved if we take the notion of person as a social convention based on the kind of biographical and physical continuity that we can normally expect in our lives. However, your scenario is based on removing this convention: We still have people, two people, two persons, but now we fictionally assume that at some point these two persons were the same person or more precisely were made out of the same person. It's a changed notion. Again, there's no problem with that and certainly no paradox. You just need to be clear about the notion you use.
EB