Actually, maxparrish, I've read significant portions of the law dealing with subsidies, as well as summaries prepared by several organizations. I've been involved with a handful of organizations over the past few years focused on actually implementing the individual and small group marketplaces. While I don't claim to be an expert on every aspect of ACA, I am fairly certain that I have considerably more exposure than most. ...
As I mentioned...
- "Given that all of the 36 states who stood up exchanges assumed that their participants would receive subsidies
- "Given that the regulators in those states expected subsidies to be a part of the structure of their exchanges, and...
But expectations on how the law will be implemented says nothing about the actual intentions of the law's authors/approvers, nor does it tell us what the State's thought the law's original intentions were. However after passage States were well aware of what the administration and HHS intended to implement as law, and expected it in the pending HHS and IRS regulations. In other words, they "expected" the law would be implemented a certain way, just as the administration (and then IRS) said it would be implemented. To the degree that some, many, or all states expected anything says little about what they think the law intentions actually were.
- Given that the CBO expected subsidies flowing to those exchanges as part of their projections, and
- Given that the IRS anticipated subsidies when they developed all of their interactions with the exchanges, and
First, several prior quotes and links established that the CBO did not base its projections on "those exchanges".
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/cannon-adler-health-matrix-23.pdf (page 186-188)
The JCT and CBO produced revenue and spending estimates that assumed tax credits would be available in all fifty states. But this is not the same as ‘‘assum[ing] that the tax credits will be available through the federal exchange,’’ and neither the CBO nor JCT stated such an assumption when conducting their analysis. Indeed, the CBO has acknowledged it did not conduct a legal analysis of whether the statute authorizes tax credits through federal Exchanges.250 Thus its cost projections can hardly be considered authoritative. Like many of the PPACA’s supporters, it appears the CBO and JCT simply assumed that every state would create its own Exchange and
incorporated that miscalculation into their projections. Further evidence for this interpretation, if more were needed, is that the CBO made no mention of the hundreds of millions of dollars it would take to establish
and operate federally run Exchanges (just as Congress didn’t authorize those funds).251 The CBO simply assumed every state would establish own Exchange and did not even consider the question of what would
happen if they did not. There is no basis for relying upon CBO or JCT budget projections to overturn or alter the plain meaning of the PPACA’s text.
Also from the same link:
249. Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health
Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2012, at A17 (‘‘When Congress passed
legislation to expand coverage two years ago, Mr. Obama and lawmakers
assumed that every state would set up its own exchange . . . .’’).
As far as the IRS "anticipated" subsidies telling us anything, well, the background story of the credibility their "anticipation" on subsidies is too choice to ignore:
http://online.wsj.com/articles/kim-strassel-the-obamacare-irs-nexus-1406244677
We know this thanks to a largely overlooked joint investigation and February report by the House Oversight and Ways and Means committees into the history of the IRS subsidy rule. We know that in the late summer of 2010, after ObamaCare was signed into law, the IRS assembled a working group—made up of career IRS and Treasury employees—to develop regulations around ObamaCare subsidies. And we know that this working group initially decided to follow the text of the law. An early draft of its rule about subsidies explained that they were for "Exchanges established by the State."
Yet in March 2011, Emily McMahon, the acting assistant secretary for tax policy at the Treasury Department (a political hire), saw a news article that noted a growing legal focus on the meaning of that text. She forwarded it to the working group, which in turn decided to elevate the issue—according to Congress's report—to "senior IRS and Treasury officials." The office of the IRS chief counsel—one of two positions appointed by the president—drafted a memo telling the group that it should read the text to mean that everyone, in every exchange, got subsidies. At some point between March 10 and March 15, 2011, the reference to "Exchanges established by the State" disappeared from the draft rule.
Emails viewed by congressional investigators nonetheless showed that Treasury and the IRS remained worried they were breaking the law. An email exchange between Treasury employees in the spring of 2011 expressed concern that they had no statutory authority to deem a federally run exchange the equivalent of a state-run exchange.
Yet rather than engage in a basic legal analysis—a core duty of an agency charged with tax laws—the IRS instead set about obtaining cover for its predetermined political goal. A March 27, 2011, email has IRS employees asking HHS political hires to cover the tax agency's backside by issuing its own rule deeming HHS-run exchanges to be state-run exchanges. HHS did so in July 2011. One month later the IRS rushed out its own rule—providing subsidies for all.
That proposed rule was criticized by dozens of scholars and congressional members, all telling the IRS it had a big legal problem. Yet again, the IRS did no legal analysis. It instead brought in a former aide to Democratic Rep. Lloyd Doggett, whose job appeared to be to gin up an after-the-fact defense of the IRS's actions. The agency formalized its rule in May 2012.
The IRS did what its political task masters directed it to do.
- Given that nobody questioned the existence of subsidies in federally run exchanges until several months AFTER they were implemented instead of during the 3 years that they were being developed...
Except that your three year timeline and historical rendition is rather odd and surely wrong. The law(s) were crafted in 2009 and 2010, a period when nobody questioned that States would be mandated to provide exchanges and assumed almost all or all states would comply. In mid 2010 it was passed. In late summer the IRS working group started on the regulations, initially issuing a draft that conformed to the plain text of the law. By March 2011 political elements noticed some increasing focus on language by (I assume) critics so under political pressure, they changed their internal drafts and by summer the President's HHS helped by issuing its own conforming rule. By late 2011 the critics were active in noting the plain text, although dismissed by Obamacare supporters. Over-riding concerns expressed by critics, the IRS issued its own final rule in the summer of 2012.
In other words, no one questioned the law until AFTER it was clear that the administration was going to ignore it. Even Gruber was touting the old version, forgetting that the HHS had effectively granted federal exchanges subsidies not authorized in the law.
Then I think it is quite reasonable to deduce (not assume) that the intention is clear.
Leaving aside the question of whether or not it was a reasonable deduction if the facts were as you stated, I think it pretty clear that your assumptions were based on either misunderstandings, or false information provided by others. Not everybody understood or agreed with the implications of the law, nor were the laws intentions universally understood. In fact, the original intentions on tax and out-of-pocket subsidies were different than claimed by current Obamacare supporters.