Demystifying Determinism

[DBT]

The division between 'environment' and 'inner necessity' is the division between 'not me' and 'me'. Using ong words and phrases doesn't change that; Inner necessity is me, and I am inner necessity.

It is inner necessity that negates free will, regardless of it being ''me.'' Neurons and networks is the agency that generates thought and response. Calling neurons 'us' doesn't imbue them with free will. ''It is me, therefore free will,'' is an assertion, not an argument.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

Again, you present excellent arguments against libertarian free will.

Nothing to do with LFW. Free will is simply an incoherent notion in any version, Functionality is not free will. Not 'It's me doing it, therefore free will'' Not acting in accordance with our will, which is entailed and inevitable, etcetera.

The bottom line is: free will is merely a label, like God, Angels, Demons, evil spirits.....things people believe in because it brings them some sense of meaning, making sense of the world.....oh, we have 'free will,' everything is alright, we can sleep easy.

That would be genuinely helpful, if only anyone here was arguing for libertarian free will.

Nobody is, least of all me. Some compatibilist do slip into that cloak with their murmurings of 'may have done otherwise'

None of your arguments here address free will as defined by compatiblists, other than to assert that their definition is wrong.

Everything I have said, quotes and cited deals with the shortcomings of the compatibilist definition of free will. Namely, ignoring inner necessitation, which is just as much an issue as external elements. That will is fixed by antecedents, not freely willed or chosen, and actions necessarily follow. That actions freely performed as determined does not equate to free will......

It has all been addressed countless times. I'm not saying anything controversial. It's basic incompatibilism, where it is shown why free will is incompatible with determinism.

But a priori definitions are not wrong, they cannot be wrong, and it's pointless to claim that they are wrong.

Your problem with compatibism appears to simply be a manifestation of linguistic prescriptivism - if I say "free will", you refuse to accept that it means what I have explicitly and clearly told you I mean, and you respond as though i mean what you want me to mean.

That's not how language works.

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.


Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism? Bruce Silverstein
B.A. in Philosophy

There are none.

Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered down version of one or both of the two concepts.

As I understand it, Determinism (which I take to be Causal Determinism) posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing:

If Causal Determinism is true (i.e., accurately describes the state of the universe), then humans lack Free Will because the truth of Causal Determinism means that (a) humans lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, as human cognition is simply a form of activity that is governed by Causal Determinism, and (b) there are no such thing as true “options” or “alternatives” because there is one, and only one, activity that can ever occur at any given instant; and
If Free-Will exists in its pure form, then Causal Determinism is not true because the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.
As I understand Causal Determinism and Free Will, they are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism. As William James aptly observed:

“The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Causal Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line at Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of Causal Determinism and Free Will. Or, as William James less generously observed, all efforts to harmonize Causal Determinism an Free Will are a “quagmire of evasion.”

 

[The AntiChris]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. in Philosophy
There are none.

Hello, Mr. Silverstein,

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we think and do. We observe people deciding for themselves what they will do (free will) routinely every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered down version of one or both of the two concepts.

Free Will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (significant mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). This is the operational definition of free will, the one used by everyone when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It is not "watered down". It is simply all that free will needs to be.

Causal Determinism is the reasonable belief that all events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary from any prior point in time, and inevitably will happen. This includes the motion of the planets as well as the thoughts going through our heads right now. Again, this is not watered down. It is simply all that determinism needs to be.

As I understand it, Determinism (which I take to be Causal Determinism) posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can will occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can would only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot will not possibly actually occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

Generally correct. However there is a semantic issue created when you equate what "can" happen with what "will" happen. It is the logical nature of possibilities that there are multiple things that "can" happen even though there is only one thing that "will" happen. It is a common mistake, and it is easily corrected by simply replacing "can" with "will" in your paragraph. I've made the corrections for your convenience. Let me know if you have any question.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

There is nothing in the operational notion of free will that requires freedom from prior causes. It is common knowledge that human behavior is influenced both by our nature and our nurture, by both our genetic dispositions and the social influences of parents, schools, peers, etc. Free will is never expected to be free of our nature or our nurture. It is only expected to be free of coercion and undue influence. If you think that free will must have some other, extraordinary capabilities, then you probably have the wrong notion of free will.

Causal determinism does not "eliminate all but one option". The choosing operation does that. The choosing operation is something that actually happens in physical reality, specifically within our own brains. Determinism simply asserts that choosing will proceed through a series of reliable mental events involving the consideration of our options in terms of our goals and reasons, and then, based on that evaluation, selecting the single option.

Based on the foregoing:

If Causal Determinism is true (i.e., accurately describes the state of the universe), then humans lack Free Will because the truth of Causal Determinism means that (a) humans lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, as human cognition is simply a form of activity that is governed by Causal Determinism, ...

Causal determinism is true AND humans have the ability to choose for themselves what they will do. Your argument is a false dichotomy. You are ignoring all of the obvious cases where it is causally determined that the person will encounter a problem or issue that requires them to make a decision! The human cognition that invariably follows will be a consideration of the two (or more) possibilities in terms of the person's own goals and reasons, in a deterministic fashion that leads inevitably to their own choice.

As you can see, there is no conflict between causal determinism and free will.

What may be leading you astray is the metaphorical notion that Causal Determinism actually causes or determines anything (as in "governed by Causal Determinism"). Causal determinism only describes the event. It cannot "control" any event. It is not some kind of boogeyman wresting control or freedom from our hands. Causal determinism is about us making a choice deterministically according to who and what we are at that moment in time.

...and (b) there are no such thing as true “options” or “alternatives” because there is one, and only one, activity that can will ever occur at any given instant; ...

Again, you're falling victim to your own figurative thinking. Causal determinism means that there is only one activity that ever will occur at any given instant. Many other things still could have happened, but they never would have happened, given the circumstances.

The empirical fact is that choosing actually happens, and it happens a lot. The fact that every step in the choosing process is an event that was causally necessary from any prior point in time should double your conclusion that it is really happening, rather than make you question what you just have seen with your own eyes.

The source of your error is the figurative thought that, "If it never would have happened, then it is AS IF it never could have happened". Figurative statements are very common, but they have one drawback: Every figurative statement is literally false.

The literal meaning of "can happen" is that it is physically possible, but still may never happen. The literal meaning of "will happen" is that it will happen. We cannot confuse "can" with "will" without creating a paradox.

... and If Free-Will exists in its pure form, then Causal Determinism is not true because the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.

Well, from a compatibilist's perspective, free will as a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence, is free will in its pure form.

And, because choosing exists as a real operation that takes place within a real brain that exists in the real world, we must also conclude that the options and alternatives that come to mind while choosing are also true options and true alternatives.

And, if causal determinism is to be taken seriously, it must begin acknowledging these simple empirical facts.

The key fact is that our choice is being made by us, and by no other object in the physical universe. The control of the choice is located within our own brain, as it considers these inevitable options, applies its own inevitable criteria, and makes its own inevitable choice.

So, pretty much everything you have concluded in that paragraph is false.

As I understand Causal Determinism and Free Will, they are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism.

(i) No, Bruce. Causal Determinism cannot exclude any causal mechanism and still be true. ALL causal mechanisms, including the choosing process, are presumed to be deterministic.

(ii) No, Bruce. Free Will cannot be defined as an "illusion" and still be compatible with determinism. Free will is a real event, that takes place in the real physical world, and is performed by a real human brain.

The illusion is that reliable causation and people choosing for themselves what they will do, are somehow incompatible.

As William James aptly observed:
“The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”

Sorry Doctor James, but if you had applied your own Pragmatism to the problem then you too would be a compatibilist. But you didn't. It was you, William, who pointed out that most intractable philosophical problems could be solved by addressing the definitions of the terms being used. Once we found agreeable definitions, the problems would resolve themselves.

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Causal Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line at Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

And anyone who goes there for guidance should also see my review of their article, Compatibilism: What's Wrong and How to Fix It".

It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of Causal Determinism and Free Will. Or, as William James less generously observed, all efforts to harmonize Causal Determinism an Free Will are a “quagmire of evasion.”

Sorry, Bruce, but it is not sufficient to simply "say" that the arguments for Compatibilism are unsatisfying. I find it quite satisfying to point out that reliable cause and effect is not incompatible with people choosing for themselves what they will do.

As to the incompatibilist arguments, I find in them a quagmire of paradoxes, with few claims that are empirically verifiable.

 

[DBT]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

Relatively speaking. The dog is on the chain, the chain is removed, the dog is free of the chain. Acting according to your will, without external force, coercion or undue influence, is to be free from these restrictions, but is not a matter of free will for reasons that have been given.

 

[DBT]

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. in Philosophy
There are none.

Hello, Mr. Silverstein,

You know it's a quote.

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we think and do. We observe people deciding for themselves what they will do (free will) routinely every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

If that's the best argument, the best argument for compatibility fails for the reasons given by Silverstein and others, including me on this forum.

Compatibilists are unable to present a rational argument that supports their belief in the existence of free will in a deterministic universe, except by defining determinism and/or free will in a way that is a watered down version of one or both of the two concepts.

Free Will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (significant mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). This is the operational definition of free will, the one used by everyone when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It is not "watered down". It is simply all that free will needs to be.

Causal Determinism is the reasonable belief that all events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary from any prior point in time, and inevitably will happen. This includes the motion of the planets as well as the thoughts going through our heads right now. Again, this is not watered down. It is simply all that determinism needs to be.

That line of rationale fails because 'it's me deciding, therefore free will' ignores inner necessity, it ignores that information processing has absolutely nothing to do with 'will' yet alone 'free will,' it ignores that the non-chosen state and condition of the brain equates to the state of us, be it rational, irrational, adaptive or maladaptive, there is no choice.

The state and activity of the brain is the state of us. So, saying 'it is us' doesn't equate to free will.

In determinism the decision making process is one of entailment, not choice. Thoughts and actions are entailed, not chosen, not freely willed.

Consequently, the compatibilist definition of free will crumbles.

Saturday night, that's all I have time for. I'll leave the other thread for tomorrow.

 

[The AntiChris]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

Relatively speaking. The dog is on the chain, the chain is removed, the dog is free of the chain. Acting according to your will, without external force, coercion or undue influence, is to be free from these restrictions, but is not a matter of free will for reasons that have been given.

That doesn't follow.

Relatively speaking, acting (expressing one's will) without coercion or undue influence one is expressing one's will free of coercion or undue influence. That's a fact.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. in Philosophy
There are none.

Hello, Mr. Silverstein,

You know it's a quote.

The point is that your quoting Bruce Silverstein doesn't advance your argument if Mr. Silverstein is making the same logical errors as you.

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we think and do. We observe people deciding for themselves what they will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will), routinely every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

If that's the best argument, the best argument for compatibility fails for the reasons given by Silverstein and others, including me on this forum.

Yet neither you nor Bruce have been able to muster a logical attack upon a very simple truth.

Free Will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (such as significant mental illness, manipulation, authoritative command, etc.). This is the operational definition of free will, the one used by everyone when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Causal Determinism is the reasonable belief that all events are reliably caused by prior events, such that every event is causally necessary from any prior point in time, and inevitably will happen. This includes not just the motion of the planets but also the thoughts going through our heads right now.

That line of rationale fails because 'it's me deciding, therefore free will' ignores inner necessity,

What you are ignoring is that inner necessity happens to include decision-making, as when someone chooses for themselves what they will order for dinner in a restaurant. Choosing is a form of inner necessity.

it ignores that information processing has absolutely nothing to do with 'will' yet alone 'free will,'

What you are ignoring is that choosing IS information processing. And, of course, choosing for ourselves what we will order for dinner, while free of coercion and undue influence, is a choice of our own free will. Free will does not require freedom from our brain's normal decision-making process, which you keep implying that it does.

As to will, it was our chosen intention to have dinner at this restaurant. That explains why we are now sitting at the table, reading the menu, and choosing what we will have for dinner. And once we decide what we intend to have for dinner, we convey that intention to the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

A person's will is their deliberate intention to do something, such as intending to have dinner at the restaurant or intending to have the Chef Salad for dinner. I don't understand how this concept seems to elude you.

it ignores that the non-chosen state and condition of the brain equates to the state of us, be it rational, irrational, adaptive or maladaptive, there is no choice.

You cannot claim "there is no choice" when neuroscience tells us that decision making is a real function of the brain. And, because it is our own brain that deliberately chooses what we will order for dinner, it is also us deliberately choosing what we will order for dinner. This is all pretty simple stuff.

The state and activity of the brain is the state of us. So, saying 'it is us' doesn't equate to free will.

Yes indeed, the state and activity of the brain is the state and activity of us. Thus, when the brain chooses what we will order for dinner, while free of coercion and undue influence, it/us is doing so of our own free will.

In determinism the decision making process is one of entailment, not choice. Thoughts and actions are entailed, not chosen, not freely willed.

You continue to blunder into a false dichotomy. If it is deterministically entailed that we will be sitting in a restaurant, reading the menu, then it is also deterministically entailed that choosing will happen. There is no deviation around choosing. There will be no alternative but to choose (or go without dinner).

Consequently, the compatibilist definition of free will crumbles.

Sorry, but still delusional. The best way to escape a delusion is by simple empirical observation. Watch the people in the restaurant, each choosing for themselves what they will order for dinner. And they are free to make this choice for themselves, free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

 

[DBT]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

Relatively speaking. The dog is on the chain, the chain is removed, the dog is free of the chain. Acting according to your will, without external force, coercion or undue influence, is to be free from these restrictions, but is not a matter of free will for reasons that have been given.

That doesn't follow.

Relatively speaking, acting (expressing one's will) without coercion or undue influence one is expressing one's will free of coercion or undue influence. That's a fact.

Of course it follows.

The relationship between will and action has been explained many times;

''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.


''Freedom of action'' refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted actions within a determined system, where things work without coercion as determined (fixed by antecedents), but not freely willed.

There lies the fatal flaw for compatibilism: equating a determined action that is - necessarily - freely performed, and claiming this to be an example of free will.

 

[DBT]

Determinism: What are the best arguments for compatibilism?
Bruce Silverstein, B.A. in Philosophy
There are none.

Hello, Mr. Silverstein,

You know it's a quote.

The point is that your quoting Bruce Silverstein doesn't advance your argument if Mr. Silverstein is making the same logical errors as you.

No, he is not. Silverstein is clearly and concisely pointing out the flaws in the compatibilist definition of free will.

Compatibilism is based on redefining both the nature of freedom and will in order to give an impression of compatibility with determinism.

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we think and do. We observe people deciding for themselves what they will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will), routinely every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

Yet neither you nor Bruce have been able to muster a logical attack upon a very simple truth.

What we observe is surface appearance. How things appear to us. We may think that anyone can choose any of a number of options as they are present at any given moment in time, yet as we know from the very definition of determinism that you gave, that is an illusion.

It is an illusion formed though not having access to the underlying events/information that determine is always a fixed single outcome in each and every instance of decision making. The decision you make is not a matter of choice where other things could have been chosen, it is an inevitable decision (not a choice) entailed by events, both inner and outer, of which we have no access to, or regulative control over.

Consciousness is formed after the event. After inputs, after distribution of information, after processing, after action initiation...all unconscious mechanisms and processes responding to the events of the world.

Consequently, decision making in determinism is a matter of entailment, not choice.

That, Marvin, is not free will.

 

[The AntiChris]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

Relatively speaking. The dog is on the chain, the chain is removed, the dog is free of the chain. Acting according to your will, without external force, coercion or undue influence, is to be free from these restrictions, but is not a matter of free will for reasons that have been given.

That doesn't follow.

Relatively speaking, acting (expressing one's will) without coercion or undue influence one is expressing one's will free of coercion or undue influence. That's a fact.

Of course it follows.

The relationship between will and action has been explained many times;

''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.


''Freedom of action'' refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted actions within a determined system, where things work without coercion as determined (fixed by antecedents), but not freely willed.

There lies the fatal flaw for compatibilism: equating a determined action that is - necessarily - freely performed, and claiming this to be an example of free will.

All these rebuttals assume without argument that compatibilist free will is not real free will.

Earlier you said:

Which is not to say that there are no other definitions of free will.

What did you mean by this?

Are you saying that you accept that there exist alternative (to libertarian free will) concepts of free will?

Or are you saying simply that you are aware that alternative definitions exist, but you consider none of them real examples of free will? If so, on what grounds do you privilege your own version and dismiss all others?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Silverstein is clearly and concisely pointing out the flaws in the compatibilist definition of free will.

And I went through his essay point by point here. So, unless you have something new to add I think we're done with Bruce.

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we do. We observe ourselves and others deciding what they will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will), every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

Neither you nor Bruce Silverstein have been able to refute these simple facts.

What we observe is surface appearance. How things appear to us. We may think that anyone can choose any of a number of options as they are present at any given moment in time ...

It's not mere appearance. If you doubt that I can order any item on the menu, then name the item, and I will order it. It is a simple empirical test that demonstrates that I can, in fact, order that item. And, we can repeat that test for every item on the menu, if you like.

So, there can be no doubt that I actually can order any item on the menu, and that every item on the menu is a realizable alternative.

Now, determinism is welcome to claim that, in each such experiment, the specific item that you ask me to order was causally necessary from any prior point in time. The events, of course, will always only happen one way.

But in each case, it is also true that IF it had been determined to happen another way, then it would have happened that way instead. Saying that we "could have done otherwise" never implies that we "would have done otherwise". In fact, when we say that we "could have" done something, we are logically implying that (a) we did not do it, and (b) that we only would have done it under different circumstances.

It is important to keep the distinction between what we "can" do and what we "will" do. There are always multiple things that we "can" do, but only a single thing that we "will" do. If we conflate the two, and insist that, we only can do what we will do, we create paradoxes. Such as this one, which you should know well by now:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only one possibility, and only one thing that you can order."
Diner: "Oh. Okay. Then what is the one thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "The one thing you can order is the same as the one thing you will order. So, if you tell me first what you will order, then I can tell you what you can order."
Diner: "But how can I tell you what I will order if I don't know what I can order?!"

It is an illusion formed though not having access to the underlying events/information that determine is always a fixed single outcome in each and every instance of decision making.

It is not an illusion. It is simply the proper use of the English language. The restaurant menu contains a list of dinners that we "can" order. From that list, we select the dinner that we "will" order. There are multiple things that we "can" choose, and a single thing that we "will" choose. Choosing is the logical operation by which we reduce the restaurant menu to a single dinner order. It is a real event that happens in the real world.

The decision you make is not a matter of choice where other things could have been chosen, it is an inevitable decision (not a choice) entailed by events, both inner and outer, of which we have no access to, or regulative control over.

By definition, decision making is a matter of choice. By definition, there are multiple things that can be chosen and one thing that will be chosen. By neuroscience, we know that choosing is something that the brain does. By common sense, we know that whatever our brain deliberately decides, we have decided.

Consciousness is formed after the event. After inputs, after distribution of information, after processing, after action initiation...all unconscious mechanisms and processes responding to the events of the world.

There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that the diner in the restaurant is choosing from a literal menu of possibilities the single thing they will order for dinner.

A Libet-styled experiment does not enlighten us on free will. It is quite sufficient that everyone understands what we mean when we ask "Were the student subjects required to participate in the experiment in order to pass the course, or did they choose to participate of their own free will?"

Consequently, decision making in determinism is a matter of entailment, not choice.

If we assume determinism, and we observe people making choices in the restaurant, then we must logically conclude that choosing was entailed. It is a false dichotomy to insist that entailment and choosing are mutually exclusive. They clearly are not.

 

[DBT]

What 'free will' means and how the term is commonly used is one thing, but whether it actually relates to determinism as it is defined by compatibilists is a different matter.

The answer to that is: no the compatibilist definition does not relate to determinism as it is defined because it ignores the most critical elements of determinism, relying on semantics, redefining freedom, will and determinism in order to give an impression of compatibility where none exists.

Ok, I think what you're saying is that whatever definition of free will is used it will always fail because freedom is incompatible with determinism.

In you view, are there any freedoms that are compatible with determinism?

Relatively speaking. The dog is on the chain, the chain is removed, the dog is free of the chain. Acting according to your will, without external force, coercion or undue influence, is to be free from these restrictions, but is not a matter of free will for reasons that have been given.

That doesn't follow.

Relatively speaking, acting (expressing one's will) without coercion or undue influence one is expressing one's will free of coercion or undue influence. That's a fact.

Of course it follows.

The relationship between will and action has been explained many times;

''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.


''Freedom of action'' refers to the unimpeded, unrestricted actions within a determined system, where things work without coercion as determined (fixed by antecedents), but not freely willed.

There lies the fatal flaw for compatibilism: equating a determined action that is - necessarily - freely performed, and claiming this to be an example of free will.

All these rebuttals assume without argument that compatibilist free will is not real free will.

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition. A definition that fails to establish free will as real free will. A definition that ignores a crucial element: inner necessity. That will is not the driver of behaviour. That will, a prompt or urge to act has nothing to do with forming the action being prompted, etetera.

Earlier you said:

Which is not to say that there are no other definitions of free will.

What did you mean by this?

Libertarian, common usage; choosing between options. Variations....classical compatibilism, compatibilism in transition, contemporary compatibilism....

Are you saying that you accept that there exist alternative (to libertarian free will) concepts of free will?

You should know that here are different ideas and variations on the notion of free will.

Or are you saying simply that you are aware that alternative definitions exist, but you consider none of them real examples of free will? If so, on what grounds do you privilege your own version and dismiss all others?

None of them have established the reality of freedom of will. The term itself is flawed. Again, will is not the driver of behaviour,it is subject to a process over which it has no agency, yet it is being labelled as being free.

It's ludicrous.

 

[DBT]

... Silverstein is clearly and concisely pointing out the flaws in the compatibilist definition of free will.

And I went through his essay point by point here. So, unless you have something new to add I think we're done with Bruce.

Your points did not score.

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation. We observe reliable cause and effect (causal determinism) in everything we do. We observe ourselves and others deciding what they will do, free of coercion and undue influence (free will), every day.

Two empirical observations cannot be contradictory, thus they must be compatible.

Neither you nor Bruce Silverstein have been able to refute these simple facts.

It has been refuted. What we observe is not complete. We do not have access to the necessary information to form a more complete understanding of the system or make predictions on its fixed evolution.

And given determinism, fixed evolution it is; no deviation, no alternate actions, no choice, no free will.

What we observe is surface appearance. How things appear to us. We may think that anyone can choose any of a number of options as they are present at any given moment in time ...

It's not mere appearance. If you doubt that I can order any item on the menu, then name the item, and I will order it. It is a simple empirical test that demonstrates that I can, in fact, order that item. And, we can repeat that test for every item on the menu, if you like.

It is surface appearance. When someone orders a meal, there are no observers to the underlying process that brought about that action, not even the customer her or himself, where thoughts and feeling emerge into conscious mind in response to the information acquired from the menu....or innate proclivities determining what is to be selected ahead of time, ie, you go in knowing exactly what you want.

So, there can be no doubt that I actually can order any item on the menu, and that every item on the menu is a realizable alternative.

Of course you can order. In fact, if determined, you must order, if determined, you cannot not order (events fixed, no deviation)....yet at no point in time can an alternate action be taken.

That is according to your own definition of determinism.

Now, determinism is welcome to claim that, in each such experiment, the specific item that you ask me to order was causally necessary from any prior point in time. The events, of course, will always only happen one way.

But in each case, it is also true that IF it had been determined to happen another way, then it would have happened that way instead. Saying that we "could have done otherwise" never implies that we "would have done otherwise". In fact, when we say that we "could have" done something, we are logically implying that (a) we did not do it, and (b) that we only would have done it under different circumstances.

It is important to keep the distinction between what we "can" do and what we "will" do. There are always multiple things that we "can" do, but only a single thing that we "will" do. If we conflate the two, and insist that, we only can do what we will do, we create paradoxes. Such as this one, which you should know well by now:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only one possibility, and only one thing that you can order."
Diner: "Oh. Okay. Then what is the one thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "The one thing you can order is the same as the one thing you will order. So, if you tell me first what you will order, then I can tell you what you can order."
Diner: "But how can I tell you what I will order if I don't know what I can order?!"

That's been addressed a number of times.

It is an illusion formed though not having access to the underlying events/information that determine is always a fixed single outcome in each and every instance of decision making.

It is not an illusion. It is simply the proper use of the English language. The restaurant menu contains a list of dinners that we "can" order. From that list, we select the dinner that we "will" order. There are multiple things that we "can" choose, and a single thing that we "will" choose. Choosing is the logical operation by which we reduce the restaurant menu to a single dinner order. It is a real event that happens in the real world.

The illusion is the perception that you could have taken any of the options on the menu at any point in time.

But given your definition of determinism, you know that's not possible: a fixed progression of events, no deviation.

The decision you make is not a matter of choice where other things could have been chosen, it is an inevitable decision (not a choice) entailed by events, both inner and outer, of which we have no access to, or regulative control over.

By definition, decision making is a matter of choice. By definition, there are multiple things that can be chosen and one thing that will be chosen. By neuroscience, we know that choosing is something that the brain does. By common sense, we know that whatever our brain deliberately decides, we have decided.

Not in relation to determinism. Choice requires the possibility of taking any one of a number of options, while determinism only permits one: determined action, fixed by antecedents. Which is not a matter of choice, but entailment.

Which is why the decision-making process in determinism is entailment.

Computers select options, not on the basis of will or free will, but straight-out information processing. What is selected is determined by the criteria. Nothing is freely willed.

Consciousness is formed after the event. After inputs, after distribution of information, after processing, after action initiation...all unconscious mechanisms and processes responding to the events of the world.

There is nothing in neuroscience that contradicts the fact that the diner in the restaurant is choosing from a literal menu of possibilities the single thing they will order for dinner.

The selection is entailed. No alternate action is possible at any point in time. The selection was not freely willed. That is the point.

A Libet-styled experiment does not enlighten us on free will. It is quite sufficient that everyone understands what we mean when we ask "Were the student subjects required to participate in the experiment in order to pass the course, or did they choose to participate of their own free will?"

It shows that thoughts and actions are formed and generated prior to conscious representation and the will to act, that will is not the agency of thought and action, that nothing is being freely willed.

Consequently, decision making in determinism is a matter of entailment, not choice.

If we assume determinism, and we observe people making choices in the restaurant, then we must logically conclude that choosing was entailed. It is a false dichotomy to insist that entailment and choosing are mutually exclusive. They clearly are not.

We observe people going about their business, responding to the world around them, their environment...which is precisely the evolutionary role and function of the brain.

What we don't observe, and cannot observe, is the nature and the means by which all this is achieved.

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition. A definition that fails to establish free will as real free will

you realize this is the very heart of the No-True-Scotsman, no?

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

 

[steve_bank]

Usage gives words meaning, I agree. But only when it relates to someting observable.

I cut my finger and it hurts. I see somebody else cut a finger ad say it hurts. I conclude the experience is probably the same and I use the word pain accordingly.

Christians make liberal use of the word god without any definition at all.

Common usage does not validate anything.

By design our culture enforces the right of free choice. No individual or the govenmnet can tell you what to choose. Uncoerced free choice is observed,

We can see free choice does not exist in places like Saudi Arabia nd Iran.

Free will is not observable and is not testable. Free choice is observable and testable.

Like Chrtians talking about god, free will is discussed as if we inherently know what it means.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will is not observable and is not testable

Under compatibilism the freeness of a will is observable by setting a breakpoint. Did the will execution reach the breakpoint?

Congratulations, it was free with respect to the breakpoint location.

You can test your breakpoint engine, too, by validating output spits...

Obviously, not all wills can have their freedom tested this way since not all systems support breakpoint infrastructure. Even so, the point is not to observe it everywhere, just to prove that it is being observed somewhere.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The best argument for compatibilism is empirical observation, and we can observe determinism and free will simultaneously in the same event:

When a person decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own goals and reasons, it is free will.
When a person decides for themselves what they will do, according to their own goals and reasons, it is determinism.

It is free will because they were free from coercion and undue influence, which is all that free will requires.
It is determinism because the choice was caused by goals and reasons that have a reliable history of prior causes, which is all that determinism requires.

Neither you nor Bruce Silverstein have been able to refute these simple facts.

It has been refuted. What we observe is not complete. We do not have access to the necessary information to form a more complete understanding of the system or make predictions on its fixed evolution.

We presume that the event was reliably caused by prior events which can theoretically be traced back in time to the Big Bang (and earlier if your cosmology permits). Determinism is not an issue to the compatibilist.

And given determinism, fixed evolution it is; no deviation, no alternate actions, no choice, no free will.

That claim is refuted twice, once as a false dichotomy, and once again as a contradiction of empirical reality.

That claim is refuted as a false dichotomy. Free will does not require freedom from all prior causes. It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, which are certain specific causes. Where coercion or undue influence apply, the choice is not freely made, and thus not free will. But when coercion and undue influence are absent, we are free to make the choice for ourselves, and it is free will. Because we find examples of both free choices and unfree choices within our deterministic universe, we must conclude that determinism does not rule out either event. And, because we get both entailment and free will, simultaneously in the same causally necessary event, there is no "either one or the other". So, the dichotomy is false.

The claim that choosing does not happen is empirically refuted by neuroscience, which affirms the brain's decision making function. And it is also empirically refuted by simply watching the people in a restaurant, browsing the menu and placing their orders. Each diner is logically reducing a literal menu of alternate possibilities to a single dinner order. The logical operation is choosing.

It is surface appearance. When someone orders a meal, there are no observers to the underlying process that brought about that action, not even the customer her or himself, where thoughts and feeling emerge into conscious mind in response to the information acquired from the menu...

If you like, we can locate our restaurant in a hotel hosting two annual conventions, a convention of neuroscientists and a convention of physicists. We may assume that either one or the other will have the most detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms of choice. But the empirical events will remain the same. Each diner will be presented with a literal menu of alternate possibilities, each will choose for themselves what they will have for dinner, and each will tell their waiter their intent.

"I will have the Salad, please" says one. "I will have the Steak dinner, please", says another. All of them are adults with their own prior histories and their own reasons for ordering what they will order tonight. So, all of these orders are deterministically caused. None of the diners are coerced or unduly influenced to order something that goes against their own goals and their own reasoning. So, all of them are acting of their own free will.

And the waiters, empirically observing and writing down the orders, will later return to these diners with their meals, and the bill that they must pay before leaving.

We might wonder what other thoughts go through the heads of the neuroscientist as they are making their choice. Are they recalling the specific neural pathways involved in their own decision making? And we may wonder how the physicist interprets this event in terms of atomic interactions. Perhaps the waiters wonder why these diners seem to be taking longer to choose their dinners.

But, no matter, because they each still order their dinners, and each will responsibly pay the cashier on the way out. And this is all that is required for us to understand what free will and responsibility are about.

...or innate proclivities determining what is to be selected ahead of time, ie, you go in knowing exactly what you want.

Obviously, if I already know what I will order before I enter the restaurant, then I won't be looking at the menu. The "innate proclivity" would be the habit I acquired through my prior choices. On the other hand, if you're speaking of genetic dispositions for fat and protein, then those proclivities will not have any knowledge of what specific forms these substances take, but I will discover that over time by sampling different foods.

In any case, there can be no doubt that I actually can order any item on the menu, and that every item on the menu is a realizable alternative.

Of course you can order. In fact, if determined, you must order, if determined, you cannot will not not order (events fixed, no deviation)....yet at no point in time can will an alternate action be taken. That is according to your own definition of determinism.

It is never logically valid to force a "can" or a "cannot" into the definition of determinism. Please stop trying to do that and claiming it is my definition of determinism. It is not. It is dishonest to continually attribute that trope to me.

Determinism is not about what can and cannot happen. Determinism is about what will happen. Note the corrections I've made in your statement above.

The events, of course, will always only happen one way, and will not happen any other way. But when speaking of how things can happen or could have happened, we are assuming the condition "If it had been determined another way".

IF it had been determined to happen another way, then it would have happened that way instead. Saying that we "could have done otherwise" never implies that we "would have done otherwise". In fact, when we say that we "could have" done something, we are logically implying that (a) we did not do it, and (b) that we only would have done it under different circumstances.

It is important to keep the distinction between what we "can" do and what we "will" do. There are always multiple things that we "can" do, but only a single thing that we "will" do. If we conflate the two, and insist that, we only can do what we will do, we create paradoxes. Such as this one, which you should know well by now:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only one possibility, and only one thing that you can order."
Diner: "Oh. Okay. Then what is the one thing that I can order?"
Waiter: "The one thing you can order is the same as the one thing you will order. So, if you tell me first what you will order, then I can tell you what you can order."
Diner: "But how can I tell you what I will order if I don't know what I can order?!"

That's been addressed a number of times.

No. It hasn't. If it had, then you could have simply cut-n-pasted your response here, instead of merely claiming it had been addressed.

The illusion is the perception that you could have taken any of the options on the menu at any point in time.

It is not an illusion. It is a fact that I could have taken any of the options on the menu at any point in time. It is also a fact that I would not have taken any other option at any point in time. Both are undeniable facts.

Choice requires the possibility of taking any one of a number of options,

There are multiple possibilities, corresponding to the multiple things that we can choose, but only one actuality, corresponding to the single thing that we will choose. If we conflate possibility with actuality, or conflate can with will, we create the paradox I described above.

The human species has evolved these two separate notions, and the distinct logic and language for each of them, in order to deal with matters of uncertainty. When we do not know what will actually happen, we imagine what can possibly happen, to better prepare for what does happen. For example, people expecting a hurricane will board up their windows, even though there is a slim chance that the hurricane will never hit their home.

while determinism only permits one: determined action, fixed by antecedents.

Determinism only permits one actuality. Determinism permits multiple possibilities, as we can easily see by looking at the restaurant menu.

However, it is a bit weak to say "permits". Determinism necessitates that there will be a single actuality. Determinism necessitates that there will be multiple possibilities.

Which is not a matter of choice, but entailment. Which is why the decision-making process in determinism is entailment.

Again, it is not an either entailment or choice, but both entailment and choice. Choosing is a real physical event that, like all events, is causally necessitated (entailed) by prior events.

Computers select options, not on the basis of will or free will, but straight-out information processing. What is selected is determined by the criteria.

So, you admit then that choosing is an actual event that takes place in physical reality. I'm glad we've settled that.

A Libet-styled experiment does not enlighten us on free will. It is quite sufficient that everyone understands what we mean when we ask "Were the student subjects required to participate in the experiment in order to pass the course, or did they choose to participate of their own free will?"

It shows that thoughts and actions are formed and generated prior to conscious representation and the will to act, that will is not the agency of thought and action, that nothing is being freely willed.

And there you are once again substituting "freedom from causation" and "freedom from our brain" for freedom from coercion and undue influence. Free will does not require freedom from our brain's normal decision making function. Such a requirement is irrational.

Free will only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. Nothing more. Nothing less.

We observe people going about their business, responding to the world around them, their environment...which is precisely the evolutionary role and function of the brain. What we don't observe, and cannot observe, is the nature and the means by which all this is achieved.

Fortunately, we do not need to know the details of the how our brains work in order to determine who chose the Salad and who chose the Steak for dinner, and who is responsible for paying for each meal. In the restaurant, we can observe that no one was coerced or unduly influenced, and that each diner chose their dinner of their own free will, and is now responsible for their bill.

 

[steve_bank]

To Christians god is observable.

There nuber of falcoes that can come in when claiming free will is observable.

Like seeing god in the world, free will is subjective interpretation.

When thinking abuo tne universe causality does not necessarily equate to deterministic.

Quantum mechanics is causal but not deterministic. Causal meaning no violation of conservation.

Given the exact same initial conditions will the neurons in the brain always fore in exactly the same way? Probably not.

The old question in QM is whether the uncertainty in QM is a measurement problem or inherent to the universe.

Put an ordinary mtr on a battery and it will appear to be unchanging.

Increase the resolution and there will always be noise from quantum effects.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

To Christians god is observable.

No, I don't think so. No Christian is going to say that they can actually see God. Instead, they describe God as like the wind, in that we cannot see the wind, but can see the wind's effects.

There number of forces that can come in when claiming free will is observable.

Sure. There are physical forces, like gravity. There are biological forces, like the drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce. And there are rational forces, such as our will to do something, set by our own deliberate choice to do it. For example, I decide (rational) to go to the kitchen to get something to eat (biological), but my toe catches in the rug (physical) and I fall (physical) and scratch my arm (biological) causing it to bleed (biological). So I decide (rational) to clean and bandage my arm (biological), before going to the kitchen.

For determinism to hold, we assume that each of these forces are deterministic in their own domain, and that every event is reliably caused by some combination of the three.

Like seeing god in the world, free will is subjective interpretation.

No. Free will is an event, like hitting a ball with bat, or walking from one place to another, or totaling a column of numbers. The free will event is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, and that is what we observe the people in the restaurant doing, choosing for themselves, from a literal menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. Go to any restaurant near you, and you can watch it happening.

When thinking about the universe causality does not necessarily equate to deterministic.

When causality is perfectly reliable, it is called "deterministic". When causality is unreliable, it is called "indeterministic".

Quantum mechanics is causal but not deterministic.

I find it simpler to assume that quantum events are deterministic, and that they appear to be indeterministic due to our inability to predict what will happen next at that very small scale.

Causal meaning no violation of conservation.

If whenever A happens then B must also happen, we say that A "causes" B, and that B is the "effect" of A happening. Causation implies that there is something about A happening that "brings about" event B.

Given the exact same initial conditions will the neurons in the brain always force in exactly the same way? Probably not.

What will "cause" them to act differently?

The old question in QM is whether the uncertainty in QM is a measurement problem or inherent to the universe.

Well, when we flip a coin, we also face uncertainty. But we also know that how the coin lands will be reliably caused by the forces applied at a given angle by the thumb under the coin in a certain spot, and the force applied by the thumb, and the air resistance that slows the spin, and the force of gravity as the coin falls, and the angle that it hits the floor, etc. And, we presume we can build a machine that will reliably flip a coin such that it will always land heads or tails up.

So, indeterminism (or true randomness) can be a simple matter of not having sufficient knowledge to correctly determine how the coin will land, rather than a problem of unreliable causation.

Put an ordinary motor on a battery and it will appear to be unchanging. Increase the resolution and there will always be noise from quantum effects.

And, we may assume that those quantum effects are reliably caused by prior quantum events.