Demystifying Determinism

[Kylie]

If there is only one possible outcome, it's not a choice.

Presumably you're saying that there's no choice under determinism (because determinism allows only one outcome).

It follows therefore that what you mean by choice is a non-determined (random/uncaused) outcome. I don't think that's what most people who use the word mean by 'choice'.

I would say that a choice is where I have multiple different options and each option has a non-zero chance of being the actual outcome.

If things are predestined, then the outcome is 100%, and thus all the other options necessarily do NOT have a non-zero chance.

You've avoided answering my point - "what you mean by choice is a non-determined (random/uncaused) outcome. ".

Is this really what you think most people mean by 'choice'?

You think that I'm under the impression that just because I have a few choices available that I decide on one randomly?

It follows from what you've been saying.

You said that determinism does not allow choice. Therefore when you say you "have a few choices available" then you must be assuming non-determinism.

This leaves two possibilities. Either your choice is not reliably determined (random) or you are claiming that we have  libertarian free will (i.e. humans are in some sense self-determining entities).

As you appeared to be taking the same position as DBT I assumed you rejected libertarian free will. Can you clarify please?

*sigh*

I hate it when people play word games like this rather than address the actual meaning of my posts.

Let me explain.

If the world is deterministic, then when I sit at the restaurant, I am given a menu with three dishes - chicken, pork, steak. However, the fact that I will choose chicken has been locked in from the moment of the Big Bang. Thus, we can assign probabilities like this:

Chicken = 100%
Pork = 0%
Steak = 0%

Since there is only one possible outcome - namely, that I order the chicken - there is no choice. In a deterministic world, there is no choice.

If the world is NOT deterministic, then when I sit at the restaurant, I am given a menu with three dishes - chicken, pork, steak. This time, we can assign probabilities like this:

Chicken = 70%
Pork = 10%
Steak = 20%

In this case the outcome is not locked in until I actually decide which to order. Prior to this point, it can not be predicted with 100% accuracy. Sure, someone may use what they know of me to make a prediction, but they cannot claim to KNOW FOR SURE, because there is always the chance they could be wrong.

But the fact that the different options have a non-zero probability does not mean that I am choosing randomly. I weigh the different options using my own SUBJECTIVE opinions before making my decision.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I can't predict what my choice is until I make it. But someone who knows me very well could predict it before me?
Guess what? No one in the world knows me better than I do.

Sorry. I was looking at it from a man's point of view. My ex knew me better than I did.

If there's some way to know with 100% accuracy that I will choose one option - say, that I will choose the chicken for my dinner - then all other options HAVE been eliminated, since the probability of them being chosen is now at 0%.

Well, did you know with 100% accuracy that you would choose the chicken before you chose it? If you did then you never considered any other option. But if you did not already know that you would choose the chicken, then the steak and the pork chops were, from your viewpoint, still real possibilities.

The logical operation of choosing requires at least two distinct things that you can choose to do. If you believed that chicken was your only choice, then you would not have given the steak or the pork chops any consideration, and you would have simply ordered the chicken without bothering with choosing.

But if you were uncertain what you would order, then you would spend at least a brief moment considering the steak and another moment considering the pork chops. Your ability to choose the steak, the chicken, and the pork chops could not be questioned. You had to presume that you had that ability to order any of the three, or you would never have considered anything but the chicken.

So far you have been saying that my future actions have been 100% predictable. That means that I am locked in to that course of action no matter what. Your argument means that, in theory, you can predict what I will eat for breakfast on the 17 of August, 2056, and there's nothing I can do to avoid that.

First, in a world of perfectly reliable causation, prediction is theoretically possible, but often not practically possible. So, 100% reliable causation does not automatically come with 100% predictability.

Second, if we had the ability to predict your breakfast on 08/17/56 we would have to keep it a secret, or you would simply choose something else.

Third, there is no "locking" involved. Events simply follow from one to the next in an orderly fashion until it is 08/17/56 and you're deciding what you will have for breakfast. If you wish to think of the choice as "locked in", then you should also think of the choosing as "locked in", and also the fact that you would be the single object in the entire universe making choice as "locked in" as well.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

So, if that's the case, then isn't the criminal similarly locked into committing a crime? They aren't CHOOSING to commit the crime, they are merely completing a course of action that was written in stone at the Big Bang. They can't avoid it at all. So how can they be held responsible?

In the same fashion, the criminal is locked in to CHOOSING to commit the crime, and being the single object in the entire universe that made that choice for himself.

And, in similar fashion, we too are locked in to holding the criminal responsible, because his deliberate act was the prior cause of our holding him responsible.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

Again, if the course of their actions was written in stone at the moment of the Big Bang, then they are not making a choice. They are simply following the only path that is available to them.

Nope. No stone tablets. No paths carved out in advance. Just one event reliably causing the next which reliably causes the next ... ad infinitum. One of those events happened to be the criminal contemplating how he might benefit from committing the crime. Another of those events happened to be us holding him responsible for his deliberate act.

 

[Jarhyn]

However, the fact that I will choose chicken has been locked in from the moment of the Big Bang. Thus, we can assign probabilities like this

No, we can't because those aren't probabilities at all. Probabilities only exist in the context of variables.

What you've mapped is the reified system, where it will go, on the basis of a particular constant, the "reification constant", some constant that defines the initial state.

That is merely a value.

The point is to in fact look at that value and say "does that value exist inside the set of values predicted by this sweep of variance upon the system in this moment?" And when it is we call it "free" and when it "probably is" we call it "probably free", and when it hasn't been decided yet but it's a viable plan it's "provisionally, probably free", and so on.

Eventually, reality will reveal, for every such plan, whether it was free or not. It all comes down to the Incompleteness Theorem ruling out ANY critter in the universe from having perfect forward knowledge, a world where images can be false.

It really again comes down to identifying that this is all a discussion of whether the will's set of predicted universes contains the universe, and then making additional decisions on how to adjust knowledge on that basis.

 

[fromderinside]

consistent with the fact they are evolved, not determined,

This right here is, yet again, a kernel of deep failure to understand determinism. It is a revelator of fatalism, not determinism.

Not relevant. Evolution is a deterministic terminus, labelling it adds nothing.

 

[The AntiChris]

lIf the world is NOT deterministic, then when I sit at the restaurant, I am given a menu with three dishes - chicken, pork, steak. This time, we can assign probabilities like this:

Chicken = 70%
Pork = 10%
Steak = 20%

In this case the outcome is not locked in until I actually decide which to order. Prior to this point, it can not be predicted with 100% accuracy. Sure, someone may use what they know of me to make a prediction, but they cannot claim to KNOW FOR SURE, because there is always the chance they could be wrong.

But the fact that the different options have a non-zero probability does not mean that I am choosing randomly. I weigh the different options using my own SUBJECTIVE opinions before making my decision.

It appears that you are an advocate of libertarian free will (not common among atheists).

The problem with libertarian (agent self-determined) free will is that it's difficult to see how an agent's reasons can reliably be tethered to an agent's actions in an indeterministic environment.

 

[Kylie]

Well, did you know with 100% accuracy that you would choose the chicken before you chose it? If you did then you never considered any other option. But if you did not already know that you would choose the chicken, then the steak and the pork chops were, from your viewpoint, still real possibilities.

I'd say that the instant I knew 100% that I would choose the chicken was the moment I chose it.

First, in a world of perfectly reliable causation, prediction is theoretically possible, but often not practically possible. So, 100% reliable causation does not automatically come with 100% predictability.

Then how can you possibly show that it's deterministic?

Second, if we had the ability to predict your breakfast on 08/17/56 we would have to keep it a secret, or you would simply choose something else.

Not if it's deterministic. After all, if it's deterministic, then I can't avoid it, can I? It's been determined.

Third, there is no "locking" involved. Events simply follow from one to the next in an orderly fashion until it is 08/17/56 and you're deciding what you will have for breakfast. If you wish to think of the choice as "locked in", then you should also think of the choosing as "locked in", and also the fact that you would be the single object in the entire universe making choice as "locked in" as well.

And why not? Aren't all those other things determined as well?

In the same fashion, the criminal is locked in to CHOOSING to commit the crime, and being the single object in the entire universe that made that choice for himself.

And, in similar fashion, we too are locked in to holding the criminal responsible, because his deliberate act was the prior cause of our holding him responsible.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

It seems it does. It seems to me that it's robbing us of free will.

 

[Kylie]

However, the fact that I will choose chicken has been locked in from the moment of the Big Bang. Thus, we can assign probabilities like this

No, we can't because those aren't probabilities at all. Probabilities only exist in the context of variables.[/qu

What you've mapped is the reified system, where it will go, on the basis of a particular constant, the "reification constant", some constant that defines the initial state.

That is merely a value.

The point is to in fact look at that value and say "does that value exist inside the set of values predicted by this sweep of variance upon the system in this moment?" And when it is we call it "free" and when it "probably is" we call it "probably free", and when it hasn't been decided yet but it's a viable plan it's "provisionally, probably free", and so on.

Eventually, reality will reveal, for every such plan, whether it was free or not. It all comes down to the Incompleteness Theorem ruling out ANY critter in the universe from having perfect forward knowledge, a world where images can be false.

It really again comes down to identifying that this is all a discussion of whether the will's set of predicted universes contains the universe, and then making additional decisions on how to adjust knowledge on that basis.

You seem to either be using a formal language system I am unfamiliar with, or argument from technobabble.

In either case, I have no idea what you are saying.

 

[Kylie]

lIf the world is NOT deterministic, then when I sit at the restaurant, I am given a menu with three dishes - chicken, pork, steak. This time, we can assign probabilities like this:

Chicken = 70%
Pork = 10%
Steak = 20%

In this case the outcome is not locked in until I actually decide which to order. Prior to this point, it can not be predicted with 100% accuracy. Sure, someone may use what they know of me to make a prediction, but they cannot claim to KNOW FOR SURE, because there is always the chance they could be wrong.

But the fact that the different options have a non-zero probability does not mean that I am choosing randomly. I weigh the different options using my own SUBJECTIVE opinions before making my decision.

It appears that you are an advocate of libertarian free will (not common among atheists).

The problem with libertarian (agent self-determined) free will is that it's difficult to see how an agent's reasons can reliably be tethered to an agent's actions in an indeterministic environment.

If you mean that I believe that the concept of free will is inconsistent with a universe in which everything that happens is an unavoidable consequence of everything that has come before, then yes.

I can't imagine why such an attitude would be rare among atheists though. Can you explain why?

And why is it difficult to see how an agent's reasons can reliably be tethered to an agent's actions in an indeterministic environment? That's all technobabble to me.

 

[The AntiChris]

If you mean that I believe that the concept of free will is inconsistent with a universe in which everything that happens is an unavoidable consequence of everything that has come before, then yes.

I can't imagine why such an attitude would be rare among atheists though.

That's not what I said.

You claimed that genuine choices (i.e. free will) are only possible "If the world is NOT deterministic". It was this claim that I suggested was uncommon among atheists.

And why is it difficult to see how an agent's reasons can reliably be tethered to an agent's actions in an indeterministic environment? That's all technobabble to me.

It's essentially the 'luck objection' to libertarian free will. There's a jargon-free explanation here: Free will, libertarianism, and luck

"One especially prominent objection to libertarianism is the “luck objection.” According to this objection, if our actions aren’t causally determined, then our actions or crucial facts about our actions become matters of luck or chance in a way that undermines our free will."

 

[Jarhyn]

However, the fact that I will choose chicken has been locked in from the moment of the Big Bang. Thus, we can assign probabilities like this

No, we can't because those aren't probabilities at all. Probabilities only exist in the context of variables.[/qu

What you've mapped is the reified system, where it will go, on the basis of a particular constant, the "reification constant", some constant that defines the initial state.

That is merely a value.

The point is to in fact look at that value and say "does that value exist inside the set of values predicted by this sweep of variance upon the system in this moment?" And when it is we call it "free" and when it "probably is" we call it "probably free", and when it hasn't been decided yet but it's a viable plan it's "provisionally, probably free", and so on.

Eventually, reality will reveal, for every such plan, whether it was free or not. It all comes down to the Incompleteness Theorem ruling out ANY critter in the universe from having perfect forward knowledge, a world where images can be false.

It really again comes down to identifying that this is all a discussion of whether the will's set of predicted universes contains the universe, and then making additional decisions on how to adjust knowledge on that basis.

You seem to either be using a formal language system I am unfamiliar with, or argument from technobabble.

In either case, I have no idea what you are saying.

Your inability to parse this means you need to look up the words you don't understand or read it more slowly.

I suppose most have a hard time understanding rigorous constructions of basic arithmetic too.

This is based on a rigorous construction, mostly of math, and so yes there's a lot of formal language in there. It's not language that is particularly difficult, as far as I can tell, it just takes having the ability to hold at least two abstractions at a time.

If you need to study it or help in studying it, I'm absolutely available to answer questions.

To answer your other questions: atheists tend towards materialism, and, among other things, "libertarian free will" is not a coherent concept but moreover relies on a concept of immaterial and non-observable soul. It comes from a contradiction existing deep in the axioms upon which someone operates and that hole right there opens up to let a lot of stupid in.

At any rate, it's going to be hard for you to understand until you actually directly do the exercises: make a deterministic system in isolation, open up the thought processes of the things that exist in that system, and then figure out how to "extend" that system across some "dimension of variance".

I have done my best to give a few examples of this: entity is at door, entity has an instruction given unto itself to walk through the door. There is in this moment for this dwarf two observable outcomes: the door opens or it does not.

So it all comes down to whether this fantastic image the dwarf has of walking through the door is "real" or not (don't overthink what it means to be an 'image' here or what that must mean. That too has a formal meaning here).

As you can see the ability of an image to contain falseness is exactly what makes ALL this language operate, and it all comes down to asking and answering "is this an image of reality you cooked up?"

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Well, did you know with 100% accuracy that you would choose the chicken before you chose it? If you did then you never considered any other option. But if you did not already know that you would choose the chicken, then the steak and the pork chops were, from your viewpoint, still real possibilities.

I'd say that the instant I knew 100% that I would choose the chicken was the moment I chose it.

That works fine. I think we're saying the same thing. Choosing begins when we are not 100% sure of what we will do, but are only 100% sure of what we can do. Choosing ends when we are 100% sure of what we will do. That's the point of the logical operation of choosing, to get from uncertainty of will to certainty of will.

First, in a world of perfectly reliable causation, prediction is theoretically possible, but often not practically possible. So, 100% reliable causation does not automatically come with 100% predictability.

Then how can you possibly show that it's deterministic?

By simply asking you, "Why did you choose the chicken?" ("What caused you to make that choice?")

Second, if we had the ability to predict your breakfast on 08/17/56 we would have to keep it a secret, or you would simply choose something else.

Not if it's deterministic. After all, if it's deterministic, then I can't avoid it, can I? It's been determined.

The most significant cause is your choosing it. Your choosing it will be caused by your own goals and reasons. There will, of course, be a history of prior causes behind your having those specific goals and those specific reasons at that specific time. And, your knowledge of the prediction would be part of your reasoning. So, it will inevitably be up to you to decide, as is usually the case with any choice you make.

Determinism can only validly claim that there will be a reliable history of causation behind your goals and your reasons, and that it will inevitably be you, and only you, that will be actually doing the choosing.

Third, there is no "locking" involved. Events simply follow from one to the next in an orderly fashion until it is 08/17/56 and you're deciding what you will have for breakfast. If you wish to think of the choice as "locked in", then you should also think of the choosing as "locked in", and also the fact that you would be the single object in the entire universe making choice as "locked in" as well.

And why not? Aren't all those other things determined as well?

Determinism can reasonably assert that all events are reliably caused by prior events. However, the final responsible cause of any deliberate act will be the act of deliberation that precedes it. In other words, when it appears to you that you are making a choice, it is not an illusion. You are simply observing yourself making a choice, just as you observe yourself walking to your car, or fixing lunch, or doing anything else that you actually do.

In the same fashion, the criminal is locked in to CHOOSING to commit the crime, and being the single object in the entire universe that made that choice for himself.

And, in similar fashion, we too are locked in to holding the criminal responsible, because his deliberate act was the prior cause of our holding him responsible.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

It seems it does. It seems to me that it's robbing us of free will.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (hypnosis, significant mental illness, authoritative command, etc.).

Determinism reasonably asserts that either it will be inevitable from any prior point in time that you will be making your decision while being coerced or unduly influenced, or it will be inevitable from any prior point in time that you will be making the choice of your own free will.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

 

[Kylie]

If you mean that I believe that the concept of free will is inconsistent with a universe in which everything that happens is an unavoidable consequence of everything that has come before, then yes.

I can't imagine why such an attitude would be rare among atheists though.

That's not what I said.

You claimed that genuine choices (i.e. free will) are only possible "If the world is NOT deterministic". It was this claim that I suggested was uncommon among atheists.

You said, "It appears that you are an advocate of libertarian free will (not common among atheists)."

From Wikipedia: "Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics. In particular, libertarianism is an incompatibilist position which argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe."

Seems to be pretty much the same thing to me. Both seem to be saying that free will and a deterministic universe are mutually incompatible.

In any case, you have failed to actually answer my question and show that such a position is rare among atheists.

And why is it difficult to see how an agent's reasons can reliably be tethered to an agent's actions in an indeterministic environment? That's all technobabble to me.

It's essentially the 'luck objection' to libertarian free will. There's a jargon-free explanation here: Free will, libertarianism, and luck

"One especially prominent objection to libertarianism is the “luck objection.” According to this objection, if our actions aren’t causally determined, then our actions or crucial facts about our actions become matters of luck or chance in a way that undermines our free will."

False dichotomy. Why are "things are set in stone from the beginning of the universe" and "Things just happen from sheer random chance" the only two options? If I am faced with ordering steak, pork, or chicken for dinner, I will carefully consider all the options before making a choice. Your false dichotomy would seem to claim that such consideration has no effect on the outcome at all.

 

[Kylie]

If you need to study it or help in studying it, I'm absolutely available to answer questions.

Maybe you can find a polite way to, "Maybe you need to read it more slowly" while you're at it instead of treating me like a child simply because I'm not familiar with this kind of language.

 

[Kylie]

Well, did you know with 100% accuracy that you would choose the chicken before you chose it? If you did then you never considered any other option. But if you did not already know that you would choose the chicken, then the steak and the pork chops were, from your viewpoint, still real possibilities.

I'd say that the instant I knew 100% that I would choose the chicken was the moment I chose it.

That works fine. I think we're saying the same thing. Choosing begins when we are not 100% sure of what we will do, but are only 100% sure of what we can do. Choosing ends when we are 100% sure of what we will do. That's the point of the logical operation of choosing, to get from uncertainty of will to certainty of will.

Agreed.

First, in a world of perfectly reliable causation, prediction is theoretically possible, but often not practically possible. So, 100% reliable causation does not automatically come with 100% predictability.

Then how can you possibly show that it's deterministic?

By simply asking you, "Why did you choose the chicken?" ("What caused you to make that choice?")

I used my subjective feelings to make a choice.

Now, want to tell me how subjective feelings can be set in stone?

Second, if we had the ability to predict your breakfast on 08/17/56 we would have to keep it a secret, or you would simply choose something else.

Not if it's deterministic. After all, if it's deterministic, then I can't avoid it, can I? It's been determined.

The most significant cause is your choosing it. Your choosing it will be caused by your own goals and reasons.

Only if everything in the universe is objective in nature. And I don't hold to that position.

In any case, it seems that your argument here is, "You choice is caused by your choice."

There will, of course, be a history of prior causes behind your having those specific goals and those specific reasons at that specific time. And, your knowledge of the prediction would be part of your reasoning. So, it will inevitably be up to you to decide, as is usually the case with any choice you make.

Determinism can only validly claim that there will be a reliable history of causation behind your goals and your reasons, and that it will inevitably be you, and only you, that will be actually doing the choosing.

It seems to ignore subjective feelings.

Third, there is no "locking" involved. Events simply follow from one to the next in an orderly fashion until it is 08/17/56 and you're deciding what you will have for breakfast. If you wish to think of the choice as "locked in", then you should also think of the choosing as "locked in", and also the fact that you would be the single object in the entire universe making choice as "locked in" as well.

And why not? Aren't all those other things determined as well?

Determinism can reasonably assert that all events are reliably caused by prior events. However, the final responsible cause of any deliberate act will be the act of deliberation that precedes it. In other words, when it appears to you that you are making a choice, it is not an illusion. You are simply observing yourself making a choice, just as you observe yourself walking to your car, or fixing lunch, or doing anything else that you actually do.

How can it be that I am making the choice when the outcome of the situation could have been predicted by anyone with sufficiently detailed knowledge? After all, if that's true, then nothing I can do myself is unique, and so how can it be MY choice?

In the same fashion, the criminal is locked in to CHOOSING to commit the crime, and being the single object in the entire universe that made that choice for himself.

And, in similar fashion, we too are locked in to holding the criminal responsible, because his deliberate act was the prior cause of our holding him responsible.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

It seems it does. It seems to me that it's robbing us of free will.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence (hypnosis, significant mental illness, authoritative command, etc.).

Determinism reasonably asserts that either it will be inevitable from any prior point in time that you will be making your decision while being coerced or unduly influenced, or it will be inevitable from any prior point in time that you will be making the choice of your own free will.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything.

If free will is deciding without coercion or other forms of undue influence , how do we define "undue"? After all, if my "choice" is the result of everything that has come before, then it seems to me that "everything that has come before" is certainly influencing me when I make my "choice". So why is that not "undue"?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I used my subjective feelings to make a choice.

Right. Feelings are always involved in choosing. David Eagleman in his PBS series, "The Brain", showed the case of one woman whose ability to shop for groceries was impaired by the inability to feel certainty about her choice. She could compare the ingredients on two cans intellectually but never felt the sensation that one choice was the right choice.

So, it's not just about reasoning, but also about our feelings.

Now, want to tell me how subjective feelings can be set in stone?

Well, the feelings, just like the thoughts, will be reliably caused. Thoughts will often come with feelings attached. Sometimes feelings arise from causes we cannot identify. But, it is still reasonable to presume that every thought and every feeling will be caused by something (most often by prior thoughts and feelings, but it could also be by some association with a past experience).

Nothing, except sculpture and architecture is ever set in stone.

Determinism is not about anything being decided or planned in advance. One event simply causes another event and so on until it gets to us choosing what we will have for dinner.

In any case, it seems that your argument here is, "You choice is caused by your choice."

Not quite. Our choices are caused by our choosing. Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is the thing we have decided we will do. This deliberate intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions as we go about doing X.

How can it be that I am making the choice when the outcome of the situation could have been predicted by anyone with sufficiently detailed knowledge?

Well, who made the choice? Was it the guy predicting what would be chosen, or, was it the guy who actually did the choosing?

After all, if that's true, then nothing I can do myself is unique, and so how can it be MY choice?

If the choice is caused by us, by our own thoughts and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, and/or any of the other things that make us uniquely us, then it clearly is a choice that can be attributed to us.

If free will is deciding without coercion or other forms of undue influence , how do we define "undue"? After all, if my "choice" is the result of everything that has come before, then it seems to me that "everything that has come before" is certainly influencing me when I make my "choice". So why is that not "undue"?

The normal influences that we are all exposed to in the due course of our lives do not usually force us to act against our will or prevent us from deciding for ourselves what we will do. For example, we're all exposed to commercial advertisements designed to influence us to buy some product. But these ads do not prevent us from deciding for ourselves whether to buy it or not. On the other hand, if we were under hypnosis, we would be controlled by the hypnotist, and if he told us to buy the product we would surely go out and buy it.

Courts of law have established precedents over the years as to what types of influences would remove our normal control.

 

[Jarhyn]

If you need to study it or help in studying it, I'm absolutely available to answer questions.

Maybe you can find a polite way to, "Maybe you need to read it more slowly" while you're at it instead of treating me like a child simply because I'm not familiar with this kind of language.

You claimed you didn't understand it, and I don't want to be ambiguous about wanting to actually discuss it and clarify the parts that are dense.

Many parts of it are very dense. Ten years ago or less, it would take me several runs through that post to fully assemble and critique it, and help is always nice in things like that.

But the fact is, you declared it technobabble and that is frankly insulting. I took the most charitable interpretation I could find at the moment and applied that instead of to say it was not something you could understand, in that case.

So if you have some part that in particular you find yourself stuck on, let me know.

As to how things of material have minds, why something you consider to make "subjective" decisions is doing so in an objectively describable way, that you need a number of college courses on. @Swammerdami would be better at describing the intro for you, but I give no guarantees they will.

 

[The AntiChris]

Seems to be pretty much the same thing to me. Both seem to be saying that free will and a deterministic universe are mutually incompatible.

The crucial difference is that libertarians go further and say that we do have free will and that the universe is indeterministic.

In any case, you have failed to actually answer my question and show that such a position is rare among atheists.

libertarian free will predominantly (but not exclusively) originates from religious ideas. Just Google "libertarian free will" and see the number of religious/apologetics sites defending it.

Most of the atheists I encounter when discussing free will online are either compatibilists or hard determinists such as DBT (Hard determinism - a view on free will which holds that determinism is true, that it is incompatible with free will, and therefore that free will does not exist.).

False dichotomy. Why are "things are set in stone from the beginning of the universe" and "Things just happen from sheer random chance" the only two options? If I am faced with ordering steak, pork, or chicken for dinner, I will carefully consider all the options before making a choice. Your false dichotomy would seem to claim that such consideration has no effect on the outcome at all.

No. Not no effect. Just unreliable effect.

For your considerations to reliably affect your actions you require a reliable deterministic connection. This is not possible in an indeterministic universe.

 

[Jarhyn]

Imagine for a moment there is a system. "System" means something specific here, but for most, the naive definition will work.

The system is set up so that any time it is not "locked out" of access to "future sight": it can project forward for some period of time the perfect system state as a function of some free variable.

For the purposes of simplicity, we will assume the condition that locks something out of future sight is that the particular current range has been the subject of a previous future sight.

All future seeings must* be finite and extend from the moment of initiation forward.

The operation of "future sight" is that for some element of the system treated as "free", all executions of the system upon permutations of the state at the beginning of the initiation, through the variance, and out to the finite endpoint of "future sight" are rendered. Then, the agent may examine all of these results, a large but finite set, pick one, and replace the variable with the calculated result "what it will decide", and then the system will collapse back to the moment of future sight, the agent's decision function on this set determines the value of it's "next behavior", and then it behaves in that way.

This can be designed in reality as a deterministic mathematical system: the calculation of "future sight" is both perfect, and finite.

Now it stands that the system will only ever resolve one way: the calculation on the finite set of "possible futures" renders a fixed number as a function of a finite process.

It is deterministic, yet there are literally points that a defined agent may decide for itself what the future will be, on the basis of forward-planning.

There also follows from this that in other systems, approximations of this may be executed: by calculating what happens at critical bounds of a decision, one can rule out everything that happens between those bounds. Or, I don't need to know the exact values of a function between two consecutive zeroes to know that all points between them will share the same sign, and if the only determinant of the outcome is sign, I can just say "any of these" and skip a bunch of work.

I can sacrifice precision by saying "most of these get me what I want", and "certain events can block this but they are unlikely" and by accepting error and qualitative outputs, dramatically accelerate the capability until executing it can be done without needing a god power, but it may instead be done between the time the future moment of decision must be made, and the moment that moment is seen looming. It's less perfect and more limited, a pale shadow of this slice of omniscience described by "future sight" but is no less real math operating on the same concept to the best of the ability of the person so operating.

*Must, only for the sake of preventing weird seemingly paradoxical issue and runaway calculations that become much larger and more confusing.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Imagine for a moment there is a system. "System" means something specific here, but for most, the naive definition will work.

OED suggests that a system is "an organized or connected group of things". A solar system would be an organized group of planets connected by gravity to a star, such as our Sun. A central nervous system (CNS) would be an organized group of brain functions connected by neurons.

The system is set up so that any time it is not "locked out" of access to "future sight": it can project forward for some period of time the perfect system state as a function of some free variable.

So, here we are speaking specifically of the CNS, which provides mental functions, such as imagining the likely outcomes (prediction or "future sight") of our possible choices.

For the purposes of simplicity, we will assume the condition that locks something out of future sight is that the particular current range has been the subject of a previous future sight.

I'm guessing that the "current range...subject to previous future sight" would be our current understanding of how things are at the moment. Prior predictions that were incorrect would likely constrain us from making the same prediction. Prior predictions that were correct and useful (self-rewarding) would bias us in favor of those predictions.

All future seeings must* be finite and extend from the moment of initiation forward.

We do usually predict future events. However, we may use what we learned from past events to make future predictions more reliable. So, seeing both the past and the present are key to making accurate predictions (seeing's of the future). So, I'm not sure that you will be able to defend this assertion that suggests we can ignore the past and still make good predictions of the future.

The operation of "future sight" is that for some element of the system treated as "free", all executions of the system upon permutations of the state at the beginning of the initiation, through the variance, and out to the finite endpoint of "future sight" are rendered. Then, the agent may examine all of these results, a large but finite set, pick one, and replace the variable with the calculated result "what it will decide", and then the system will collapse back to the moment of future sight, the agent's decision function on this set determines the value of it's "next behavior", and then it behaves in that way.

It is not clear what "some element of the system treated as 'free'" means, unless you can give us an example of the kind of specific "element" to consider and the constraint that the element is expected to be "free of".

I think you are saying that the decision making process is deterministic. Given the same problem, the same information, and the same person, the decision will be the same. Variations can be introduced through physical, biological, or rational causes. For example, a mosquito is buzzing near my ear and I swat it away, losing my train of thought. Or, I'm hungry and tired, so I make a mental mistake. Or, my information is bogus or my logic is bogus, resulting in a result that is inevitably (but reliably) wrong.

I'm not sure what "the system will collapse back to the moment of future sight" means. Each of the options will be a different future sight. So, we have multiple future sights. After the decision, we follow through on the future sight of the option we chose, and, as you say, it will causally determine our next behavior.

This can be designed in reality as a deterministic mathematical system: the calculation of "future sight" is both perfect, and finite.

I recoil at the notion of a "mathematical system". Neither the solar system nor the central nervous system appears to be a "mathematical" system. We can employ math to describe the quantitative aspects of these systems, but I believe that's about all that math is useful for in systems analysis.

Now it stands that the system will only ever resolve one way: the calculation on the finite set of "possible futures" renders a fixed number as a function of a finite process.

Exactly right. That's what "deterministic" means.

It is deterministic, yet there are literally points that a defined agent may decide for itself what the future will be, on the basis of forward-planning.

In other words, the choosing process is fully deterministic, but it is only performed by intelligent species, like us. There will be reasons for our choice being what it is, but they will be our own reasons, based on the predictions of the outcome of each option.

There also follows from this that in other systems, approximations of this may be executed: by calculating what happens at critical bounds of a decision, one can rule out everything that happens between those bounds.

What "other systems"?

What are the "critical bounds of a decision"? And why would we "rule out everything that happens between those bounds"?

Or, I don't need to know the exact values of a function between two consecutive zeroes to know that all points between them will share the same sign, and if the only determinant of the outcome is sign, I can just say "any of these" and skip a bunch of work.

I don't get how any values between two consecutive zeroes can share the same sign. It would seem that there must be negative signs and positive signs if the intervening values are to produce the second zero.

I can sacrifice precision by saying "most of these get me what I want", and "certain events can block this but they are unlikely" and by accepting error and qualitative outputs, dramatically accelerate the capability until executing it can be done without needing a god power, but it may instead be done between the time the future moment of decision must be made, and the moment that moment is seen looming. It's less perfect and more limited, a pale shadow of this slice of omniscience described by "future sight" but is no less real math operating on the same concept to the best of the ability of the person so operating.

In other words, due to imprecise and incomplete knowledge, our predictions of the outcomes of our choices are only estimates, but we can usually live with that.

 

[Jarhyn]

@Marvin, this is to discuss a function of math, with hypothetical but describable aspects, so as to not need to do the work of describing it.

The agent here is not necessarily a person but exists in the system it is a part of specifically to prove out a point.

Here we assume that the system forks itself along each "possible" future, and for the sake of brevity of calculation, prevent recursive forkings.

So assuming I am personally the agent with future sight in some LIFE simulator, I would say "I am hungry and shall die unless I 'eat food' in twenty frames, and I must decide in 10 frames which 'food' I will attempt to access, as all access attempts take 10 frames."

Then the system goes into a resolution state wherein at T+10, all values of 'the food' are substituted into "decision at T+10", the system produces the results of all variances through T+20, and then one of these with the best statistics is selected at T+10.

This represents perfect forward knowledge on a finite range.

It says "perfect finite forward knowledge" is a thing that determinism does not rule out, nor decision upon such perfect knowledge.

It's no less a choice.

So if we can recognize that perfect finite forward knowledge is not forbidden of "determinism", we can recognize that limited finite forward knowledge is also sensible as a concept and not the nonsense some claim it is, it just means that it's imperfect, and that our wills remain "provisional" even after they are selected.

The only thing that "future sight" changes is that the values produced cannot be wrong about the freeness of the will.

The point is just to show that this "transworld depravity" is not nonsensical, and is in fact part and parcel with strategic existence of any agent in any system of cellular automata.