You could start with what a mind is not what it does. You know, quit putting the house before the cart.
Nah, it's better to start with measureable data. There's no point launching into a big discussion about what mind could be just so you can then claim that the entire subject has no basis. No we'll start with the data, same as with everything else.
Mind crops up in a number of repeatable experiments. Let's start with subject reports.
Subjects reliably, repeatedly, and across cultures, report the existence of subjective internal experience. These are consistent within groups, consistent across groups, and consistent over time.
Subjects report using these internal experiences, and the imputation of their presence within others, to reliably predict the actions of others. These predictions are measurably more accurate than chance.
Subjects report using these internal experiences as part of directing attention to and away from certain observable phenomena. This effect creates extremely large and easily detectable differences in what data is then reportable by the subject. While there is some evidence that unattended channels are still actually picked up at some level, the difference it makes in terms of processing is vast.
Subjects report using these internal experiences as part of complex tasks performance. Again, by changing purely internal experiential conditions, large physically observably changes in task performance are repeatably established.
Subjects reports of internal subjective experience correlate extremely well with neurological activity around similar actual experience. For example, the activity that accompanies playing with a particular toy is repeated when searching for the same toy, even though the actual toy itself is not present to provide stimulation. Rats navigating a three dimensional maze can be observed to reproduce the same neural activation patterns when trying to reach a location as occurred when they were actually there. In short, the neurological evidence backs up the existence of the same logical patterns that subjects report experiencing.
So, these findings are generally grouped under a theory of mind - that there is an internal set of subjective experiences that is strongly connected to memory, decision making, and task performance. You seem to be keen to disavow this theory, in defiance of the existing scientific evidence.
Can you explain why?
None may have difficulty answering that question. One of the reasons why theories of eliminative materialism are so unpopular at the moment is the criticism they've come under as to whether their insistence on eliminating subject experience
does any work. It's not obvious that ignoring all mental events to the extent of denying them existence provides any benefit in terms of explanation or prediction. Given that it also leaves a huge number of scientific observations high and dry, it's not obvious why it should be adopted.
Mele has suggested that it is a phenomenon that originates from a handful of large US educational institutions that are seeking to rule out from consideration in the psychological sciences all questions relating to topics beyond neurophysiology. He notes that these same institutions share budgets between neurophysiological research and human behavioural studies. Statistically, the idea is far from established, but it feels like it's worth asking people who are seeking to restrict research in this way why they believe would be gained by doing so.
Unfortunately, most of the eliminativists I've spoken to seem to be very reluctant to answer this question. Maybe we'll do better this time?
