Do

[fast]

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do? Missy didn't do anything. Something happened to her.

That sense of "do" is the sense that presupposes intentionality.

The tree is swaying. What is the tree doing? The tree is swaying.

The ball is rolling. What is the ball doing? The ball is rolling.

That sense of "do" excludes the presupposition of intentionality.

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do?

As you can see, if we use the first sense of "do," she didn't do anything, but if we use the second sense of "do", then she did do something. She fell.

I've heard it said by someone who objects to Humes notions of causality that intentionality causes action. I think there's a truth somewhere in this forrest of gobblygook that is not too from that statement. Yes, I intend to raise my hand and my hand raises, but the connection doesn't seem at first glance to me to be dead accurate.

I intend to raise my hand, and I raise my hand. In the case where I intended to raise my hand and did so, it was not my intent but me who did so.

To the dismay of a few, I'm sure, I believe there is a marked difference well worth entertaining that reasonably distinguishes myself from my organs, and yes, even the brain specifically.

My brain isn't doing anything, not in the first sense, that is. Because of the brains activity that allows for consciousness, I am able to do things. Not only do I intend to raise my hand, but I also act on that intent, but it's not the intent that causes the hand to raise. I cause the hand to raise while I intend to raise my hand.

Now, in cases where intent is involved and thus I don't raise it unintentionally, there is still a necessity that I form intent when acting on the intention to act.

 

[Juma]

No. You dont act on your intent. That would be an infinite recursion.
Your brain acts. That act is you and your intentions.

 

[bilby]

“To be is to do - Socrates

To do is to be - Sartre

Do Be Do Be Do - Sinatra”

― Kurt Vonnegut

 

[DBT]

I intend to raise my hand, and I raise my hand. In the case where I intended to raise my hand and did so, it was not my intent but me who did so.

To the dismay of a few, I'm sure, I believe there is a marked difference well worth entertaining that reasonably distinguishes myself from my organs, and yes, even the brain specifically..

The brain is doing the self, doing the intent, doing the self experiencing perception of intent and self experiencing performing the action. The whole production from conscious intent to conscious action being the doing of the brain.

 

[fast]

Did the car hit me, or did the person hit me with the car? If you want to say the car hit me, then fine, but don't say the motor hit me. The brain does things, but not like consciousness does. The referent of the word "brain" is one thing, but something that comes about because of the brain is not the brain itself.

It seems rather silly to say the brain thinks.

 

[untermensche]

Human society and thinking is based on the unspoken but believed idea that humans have full agency and can make decisions freely.

But the advertising world says that is not true of everybody.

 

[fast]

No. You dont act on your intent. That would be an infinite recursion.
Your brain acts. That act is you and your intentions.

I agree that the brain acts in the way that it does something, but like I've alluded to, there is an underlying ambiguity of doing something. The brain performs a function, and part of its function enables the possibility of intentionality, but the brain itself in its performance of its function excludes intentionality. That the brain and the central nervous system gives rise to conscious awareness is no good reason to conflate the two anymore than we should insist the heart is blood flow. No blood flow without a beating heart, sure, and no consciousness without a functioning brain, yes, but let us see them for what they are and not just what they do.

 

[untermensche]

No. You dont act on your intent. That would be an infinite recursion.
Your brain acts. That act is you and your intentions.

Where is the recursion of a consciousness acting?

I see no recursion in a singular consciousness directing a singular brain based on the ideas contained in that consciousness.

 

[DBT]

Did the car hit me, or did the person hit me with the car? If you want to say the car hit me, then fine, but don't say the motor hit me. The brain does things, but not like consciousness does. The referent of the word "brain" is one thing, but something that comes about because of the brain is not the brain itself.

It seems rather silly to say the brain thinks.

You were hit by the car because the brain of the person in control of the car happened to be distracted for a moment, attention was diverted elsewhere and by the time you were spotted it was too late to stop the car.

The car being under the control (or loss of control) of the person and the person, organism/body/brain/mind as a whole is specifically guided by the brain of the person.

 

[ryan]

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do? Missy didn't do anything. Something happened to her.

That sense of "do" is the sense that presupposes intentionality.

The tree is swaying. What is the tree doing? The tree is swaying.

The ball is rolling. What is the ball doing? The ball is rolling.

That sense of "do" excludes the presupposition of intentionality.

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do?

As you can see, if we use the first sense of "do," she didn't do anything, but if we use the second sense of "do", then she did do something. She fell.

I've heard it said by someone who objects to Humes notions of causality that intentionality causes action. I think there's a truth somewhere in this forrest of gobblygook that is not too from that statement. Yes, I intend to raise my hand and my hand raises, but the connection doesn't seem at first glance to me to be dead accurate.

I intend to raise my hand, and I raise my hand. In the case where I intended to raise my hand and did so, it was not my intent but me who did so.

To the dismay of a few, I'm sure, I believe there is a marked difference well worth entertaining that reasonably distinguishes myself from my organs, and yes, even the brain specifically.

My brain isn't doing anything, not in the first sense, that is. Because of the brains activity that allows for consciousness, I am able to do things. Not only do I intend to raise my hand, but I also act on that intent, but it's not the intent that causes the hand to raise. I cause the hand to raise while I intend to raise my hand.

Now, in cases where intent is involved and thus I don't raise it unintentionally, there is still a necessity that I form intent when acting on the intention to act.

In philosophy, intentionality means something much different than notions of intension. If you are finding intentionality in literature on philosophy, then intension was not how they meant to use it. Intentionality is the metaphysical connection of how the mind can be about something else (i.e. aboutness) even though it's physically detached.

 

[fast]

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do? Missy didn't do anything. Something happened to her.

That sense of "do" is the sense that presupposes intentionality.

The tree is swaying. What is the tree doing? The tree is swaying.

The ball is rolling. What is the ball doing? The ball is rolling.

That sense of "do" excludes the presupposition of intentionality.

Missy is running. What is Missy doing? Missy is running.

Missy fell. What did Missy do?

As you can see, if we use the first sense of "do," she didn't do anything, but if we use the second sense of "do", then she did do something. She fell.

I've heard it said by someone who objects to Humes notions of causality that intentionality causes action. I think there's a truth somewhere in this forrest of gobblygook that is not too from that statement. Yes, I intend to raise my hand and my hand raises, but the connection doesn't seem at first glance to me to be dead accurate.

I intend to raise my hand, and I raise my hand. In the case where I intended to raise my hand and did so, it was not my intent but me who did so.

To the dismay of a few, I'm sure, I believe there is a marked difference well worth entertaining that reasonably distinguishes myself from my organs, and yes, even the brain specifically.

My brain isn't doing anything, not in the first sense, that is. Because of the brains activity that allows for consciousness, I am able to do things. Not only do I intend to raise my hand, but I also act on that intent, but it's not the intent that causes the hand to raise. I cause the hand to raise while I intend to raise my hand.

Now, in cases where intent is involved and thus I don't raise it unintentionally, there is still a necessity that I form intent when acting on the intention to act.

In philosophy, intentionality means something much different than notions of intension. If you are finding intentionality in literature on philosophy, then intension was not how they meant to use it. Intentionality is the metaphysical connection of how the mind can be about something else (i.e. aboutness) even though it's physically detached.

I know that when we speak of intentions, that's just a subset of intentionality, but I'm still shaky on the distinction. Intentions imply intentionality, but not the inverse. Intensions, is something different altogether.

- - - Updated - - -

Did the car hit me, or did the person hit me with the car? If you want to say the car hit me, then fine, but don't say the motor hit me. The brain does things, but not like consciousness does. The referent of the word "brain" is one thing, but something that comes about because of the brain is not the brain itself.

It seems rather silly to say the brain thinks.

You were hit by the car because the brain of the person in control of the car happened to be distracted for a moment, attention was diverted elsewhere and by the time you were spotted it was too late to stop the car.

The car being under the control (or loss of control) of the person and the person, organism/body/brain/mind as a whole is specifically guided by the brain of the person.

It seems misguided to refer to the brain as being distracted.

 

[fast]

Human society and thinking is based on the unspoken but believed idea that humans have full agency and can make decisions freely.

But the advertising world says that is not true of everybody.

We (often) do have have free will. By that, I mean that it's seldom that we are constrained to act against how we would otherwise want to act or restrained from acting against how we would otherwise want to act. In other words, we are not acting of our own free will when acting or refraining to act because of compelling forces contrary to our wants.

If a carjacking victim (under the threat of violence) is told to exit her vehicle, then although the person has the ability (and thus can) resist the compelling force, there is still the presence of force pressuring action to act in discordance to their otherwise wants. An untied dog that stays put when he would otherwise prefer to run about is not acting in accordance to preference if the choice to stay is attributable to constraining or refraining forces of pressure.

 

[Juma]

Human society and thinking is based on the unspoken but believed idea that humans have full agency and can make decisions freely.

But the advertising world says that is not true of everybody.

We (often) do have have free will. By that, I mean that it's seldom that we are constrained to act against how we would otherwise want to act or restrained from acting against how we would otherwise want to act. In other words, we are not acting of our own free will when acting or refraining to act because of compelling forces contrary to our wants.

If a carjacking victim (under the threat of violence) is told to exit her vehicle, then although the person has the ability (and thus can) resist the compelling force, there is still the presence of force pressuring action to act in discordance to their otherwise wants. An untied dog that stays put when he would otherwise prefer to run about is not acting in accordance to preference if the choice to stay is attributable to constraining or refraining forces of pressure.

That is seriously fucked up. So the dog doesnt know what it wants but you do?
What we do is always a mixture of constraints. Thats whag we are.

 

[ryan]

In philosophy, intentionality means something much different than notions of intension. If you are finding intentionality in literature on philosophy, then intension was not how they meant to use it. Intentionality is the metaphysical connection of how the mind can be about something else (i.e. aboutness) even though it's physically detached.

I know that when we speak of intentions, that's just a subset of intentionality, but I'm still shaky on the distinction. Intentions imply intentionality, but not the inverse. Intensions, is something different altogether.

The one you meant has the s, like for agency or when one intends to do something. The other one has the t.

The most interesting thing to me about the consciousness is intentionality. How do we connect symbols to objects, or compare one thing to another if the brain and everything else is all made of the same stuff without these properties? What are these special connections we make? What is their nature? Can we ever know their nature?

 

[DBT]

It seems misguided to refer to the brain as being distracted.

Why so? Focus of attention can be quite narrow. Attention span may be short. It is not possible to be aware of everything, so you were not seen, the driver was probably texting, consequently you were hit by the car because the driver was distracted/brain/attention span, focusing on the screen to the detriment of your safety.

 

[fast]

It seems misguided to refer to the brain as being distracted.

Why so? Focus of attention can be quite narrow. Attention span may be short. It is not possible to be aware of everything, so you were not seen, the driver was probably texting, consequently you were hit by the car because the driver was distracted/brain/attention span, focusing on the screen to the detriment of your safety.

The failure to distinguish oneself from the brain (that makes it possible) leads to some extraordinarily strange claims. My brain doesn't get hungry, get in the car, drive to the store, buy groceries, commit the crime of felony evasion, cut on stoves, and cook fried gizzards (covered with flour and corn meal) with extra salt and course pepper. Brains don't do those things. How could they stir the food? They don't have any hands.

The idea the brain did this or the brain did that (to me) is so funny that I can't even take it seriously. It's so strange to me that I second guess whether people who espouse these things are just joshing with me or playing some kind of devils advocate mind game. I think. I study. I drive. I remember yesterday. Me, me, me. Not my brain! How silly to imbue the brain as doing these things. Oh yes, I've heard the ole "we are our brains" bit, but it doesn't take much to crack through that scandal. We are not what we have.

 

[fast]

We (often) do have have free will. By that, I mean that it's seldom that we are constrained to act against how we would otherwise want to act or restrained from acting against how we would otherwise want to act. In other words, we are not acting of our own free will when acting or refraining to act because of compelling forces contrary to our wants.

If a carjacking victim (under the threat of violence) is told to exit her vehicle, then although the person has the ability (and thus can) resist the compelling force, there is still the presence of force pressuring action to act in discordance to their otherwise wants. An untied dog that stays put when he would otherwise prefer to run about is not acting in accordance to preference if the choice to stay is attributable to constraining or refraining forces of pressure.

That is seriously fucked up. So the dog doesnt know what it wants but you do?
What we do is always a mixture of constraints. Thats whag we are.

There are two things at play (or to consider): compulsion and wants

Compulsion can take the form of constraint or restraint, but it can also be viewed as a force or pressure that sometimes can and sometimes cannot be overcome. Take a dog on a short strong chain for example. If he's attached to a 10 foot chain and his food is 15 feet away, he is compelled (restrained) from reaching his food. That would be an example of compulsion in the form of restraint whereby the force is so strong that it cannot be overcome.

That's not to say the dog is being held against his will. He has to want to get to the food for that. If he does want to get to the food but cannot overcome the chain preventing him, then the dog is being held against his will.

If the dog isn't on a chain but has been trained such that there will be a punishment if he eats without being given a command to do so, then the dog although capable of defying orders chooses to stay despite having a want to get the food is being held against his will.

That's why a carjacking victim being told to drive while at gun point is not acting of her own free will despite the ability to defy the threat pressuring her to obey commands of the gunman.

 

[fromderinside]

energy does

people do

life does

viruses do

vacuum

done.

 

[DBT]

Why so? Focus of attention can be quite narrow. Attention span may be short. It is not possible to be aware of everything, so you were not seen, the driver was probably texting, consequently you were hit by the car because the driver was distracted/brain/attention span, focusing on the screen to the detriment of your safety.

The failure to distinguish oneself from the brain (that makes it possible) leads to some extraordinarily strange claims. My brain doesn't get hungry, get in the car, drive to the store, buy groceries, commit the crime of felony evasion, cut on stoves, and cook fried gizzards (covered with flour and corn meal) with extra salt and course pepper. Brains don't do those things. How could they stir the food? They don't have any hands.

The idea the brain did this or the brain did that (to me) is so funny that I can't even take it seriously. It's so strange to me that I second guess whether people who espouse these things are just joshing with me or playing some kind of devils advocate mind game. I think. I study. I drive. I remember yesterday. Me, me, me. Not my brain! How silly to imbue the brain as doing these things. Oh yes, I've heard the ole "we are our brains" bit, but it doesn't take much to crack through that scandal. We are not what we have.

Ultimately there is no separation between the state of the brain and the state of self. These being one and the same. Whatever you think you are doing, it is the brain that is generating that experience of you distinguishing yourself from the brain. Brains form self identity, learn language and experience the world as someone called 'Fast' who posts on TFT.

 

[fast]

The failure to distinguish oneself from the brain (that makes it possible) leads to some extraordinarily strange claims. My brain doesn't get hungry, get in the car, drive to the store, buy groceries, commit the crime of felony evasion, cut on stoves, and cook fried gizzards (covered with flour and corn meal) with extra salt and course pepper. Brains don't do those things. How could they stir the food? They don't have any hands.

The idea the brain did this or the brain did that (to me) is so funny that I can't even take it seriously. It's so strange to me that I second guess whether people who espouse these things are just joshing with me or playing some kind of devils advocate mind game. I think. I study. I drive. I remember yesterday. Me, me, me. Not my brain! How silly to imbue the brain as doing these things. Oh yes, I've heard the ole "we are our brains" bit, but it doesn't take much to crack through that scandal. We are not what we have.

Ultimately there is no separation between the state of the brain and the state of self. These being one and the same. Whatever you think you are doing, it is the brain that is generating that experience of you distinguishing yourself from the brain. Brains form self identity, learn language and experience the world as someone called 'Fast' who posts on TFT.

What I'm saying is found in your own words. You said the brain generates experience and brains form self identity.

Do brains generate brains? No. You're not saying that. They generate the same thing, a brain? Again, no. You said brains generate something else. There is something else (other than the brain) that the brain generates. What? You said experience. Okay, so what's the problem? I'm not denying the necessary condition of the brain. I agree, no brain, then no experience. But you, you want, you want to deny distinction. It's not called experience surgery; it's called brain surgery, and if you operated on the brain, you could affect that which it generates, but it's that which it (it) generates.