Downward Causation: Useful or Misguided Idea?

[Speakpigeon]

One more thing, I know that distinctions are made between beliefs, emotions and desires, but are these really different things? If I feel that I love my wife, is that not a candidate for being all of them?

I would see love as possible mixture of things, like indeed beliefs, emotions and desires.

I would add to this list impressions, which I take to be something else.

And, obviously, sensations.

But we're strange animals so our love can be just one of those things or any number of them making up one, eternal, thing.
EB

 

[WAB]

Sorry, DBT, my memory is in shambles. Heven't there been statements (not by you) in this thread, and others, that the hard problem has been resolved? Certainly, many scientists do not believe there is a problem, such as Dennet.

Newton knew it as well, L O N G before Chalmers, which Chalmers admits:



Quoth Locke:

there are many others, of course, who do or do not think there is a hard problem.

the worst from Dennet at a glance, IMhO]:



and this, from Hacker, sounds almost idiotic, or just petulant.

- Wikipedia.

Yes, well, some of that is open to interpretation.....however, if anyone has claimed to understand how a brain forms consciousness, they are wrong. Some of the examples above refers to the role, purpose or nature of consciousness rather claim to understand how it is achieved.

For instance - ''Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things'' -is not claiming the how of consciousness but the expression of it.

I'm good with that.

I have read the entire article, so I already suspect (won't say know ) that there is no explanation at all about how the brain creates consciousness, or what consciousness is.

There is a lot of quantitative data, of course: a lot about what is happening, but nothing about how it happens.

ergo: the hard problem remains the hard problem. There is no need to pretend otherwise.

Just show unter exactly and precisely where in the article the explanation for what consciousness is, and how it goes about resolving the hard problem.

http://www.jneurosci.org/content/29/27/8675

This is to Sub, ruby, and DBT.

I too think that the hard problem has not been solved. But I think we can find out a lot about consciousness nonetheless.

One way of looking at it is that there are many hard problems. I'm not sure I know how gravity appears either. Or life. Somehow, a description of both suffices to allow me to set the ultimate mystery aside.

I'm fine with that too. Perhaps I read somewhere else that someone said the hard problem had been resolved, or wasn't a hard problem. There is so much going on, so much to read, that it's really quite overwhelming.

Luckily, within a week or so I will have 30 days of downtime, no phones, no Internet, just some books, pyjamas, food, groups, and leisure.

And drugs! Whoo-hoooooooooooooo!

**Speakie: But we're strange animals so our love can be just one of those things or any number of them making up one, eternal, thing.

I regard love as the greatest value we can possibly have. Like that defiant Bishop Spong says, "Love wastefully."

It ain't like money. Love is infinitely replenished and infinitely inexhaustible.

Take those uses of 'infinitely' with that classic grain of salt. It's not literal.


Or maybe it is?[*rubs chin, like Rodin's Thinker]

 

[ruby sparks]

That being said, I also certainly fail to see how qualia could possibly be "eliminated".

This is almost certainly worthy of a separate thread, so I will start one.

 

[WAB]

Good idea!

[...and there was much rejoicing...] yaaaaaaayyy

 

[ruby sparks]

Here it is:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?13894-Eliminating-Qualia&p=536827#post536827

Personally, I'm as unconvinced as my fellow-poster speakpigeon at this point.

 

[ruby sparks]

Just to be clear, I have no problem at all with eliminativism in its broad sense, e.g. eliminating the concept of "phlogiston" with a better model of what causes combustion.

Yes, and I think all of us here, with the possible exception of sub, are saying that there are certain things (consciousness, mind, qualia, beliefs, pain, whatever) that we think should not be eliminated the way other things that we agree are suitable for elimination should be. Sub at least seems to say that he thinks there is a decent argument for eliminating at least some of the things that the rest of us are on balance more inclined to retain.

The question, I guess, is, are we wrong? Had we been born in the middle ages, we might well have been as reluctant to give up on (eliminate) demons.

Sean Carroll makes a strong point of this. His problem is with mixing ontologies--frameworks for describing relationships between concepts--to argue that a concept ought to be "eliminated". When you have an emergent system, the properties that describe that system do not necessarily make any sense with respect to the properties that describe components of the system--what it "supervenes" on. And one can't necessarily predict the properties of the emergent system in terms of the properties of the components that give rise to it. However, the emergent system does need to be compatible with its constituents. Carroll just thinks that it is misleading to say that the emergent system somehow causes the behavior of its components, because that mixes ontologies. One can talk about the individual behavior of molecules in a cloud of gas, but that kind of description needs to be kept walled off from describing the fluid properties of a gas, where one might want to talk about properties such as "pressure".

I admit that some of the things Carroll says about downward causation confuse me. The 'separate ontologies' thing is one of these.

Also, is it not possible to describe pressure in terms of the behaviour of molecules?

When Subsymbolic talks about "Eliminativism", he isn't necessarily talking about eliminating poor explanations such as the phlogiston theory. I take him to usually be talking about  eliminative materialism which tends to be a rival position to the so-called  theory of mind (often given the pejorative label of "folk psychology" by philosophers).

I thought that too, but sub has since clarified that he doesn't necessarily or always mean that particular, formal ism. That said, if we are specifically talking about, for example, qualia, then maybe we are addressing an aspect of that formal ism.

In a way, my new thread on qualia is meant to be a sort of test-bed. If I can understand how I might let go of qualia (or at least revise my understanding of them) then the issues around beliefs, pain, mind, consciousness etc might also be clarified in some way.

 

[ruby sparks]

One more thing, I know that distinctions are made between beliefs, emotions and desires, but are these really different things? If I feel that I love my wife, is that not a candidate for being all of them?

I would see love as possible mixture of things, like indeed beliefs, emotions and desires.

I would add to this list impressions, which I take to be something else.

And, obviously, sensations.

I do think that we and philosophers (including those of the applied sort called scientists) tend to like distinctions (some say it's one of the basic ways a brain functions. See: edge detection) and so we end up using words to try to describe the distinctive things. 'Mind' is, I think, just a collective term for a variety of supposedly distinct things which may not actually be as distinct as we think. Sometimes I think the word 'sensations' covers them all.

Which is why qualia might be a good test bed.

 

[untermensche]

What is happening is not elimination.

It is replacement of one thing with another.

But one thing that will never be replaced is the very idea of experience.

It is a concept that contains the idea of one thing experiencing another.

If you do not have some "thing" that can experience you cannot have experience.

And human experience is centered around a single "experiencer". Something that experiences some "things that can be experienced".

And it is the same "experiencer" for an entire lifetime.

It is the "I" everybody uses and has to have an inkling what they are talking about.

"I" liked that movie.

"I" went to the beach.

"I" am hungry.

This board is full of them. "I" have this opinion.

Always meaning "that thing that experiences" the "experiencer".

 

[Speakpigeon]

I admit that some of the things Carroll says about downward causation confuse me. The 'separate ontologies' thing is one of these.

Separate, or more appropriately here, alternative ontologies are OK. Separate realities are not.

Ontology
philosophical inquiry into the nature of being itself, a branch of metaphysics.

Even in the narrow sense used by Sub of "frameworks for describing relationships between concepts", separate ontologies seem safe to me.

I think it's relevant to note that science itself accommodates talks of the "macroscopic" and "microscopic" worlds. Different ontologies, same reality.

Although, it's true we need to be careful not to "mix" them.

And that's difficult.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

One more thing, I know that distinctions are made between beliefs, emotions and desires, but are these really different things? If I feel that I love my wife, is that not a candidate for being all of them?

I would see love as possible mixture of things, like indeed beliefs, emotions and desires.

I would add to this list impressions, which I take to be something else.

And, obviously, sensations.

I do think that we and philosophers (including those of the applied sort called scientists) tend to like distinctions (some say it's one of the basic ways a brain functions. See: edge detection) and so we end up using words to try to describe the distinctive things. 'Mind' is, I think, just a collective term for a variety of supposedly distinct things which may not actually be as distinct as we think.

Broader, more encompassing terms are very helpful because they save us from having each time to produce a comprehensive list of all the more specific terms they cover. Time is of the essence.

More specific terms are necessary to make progress in our analysis and understanding of the world.

Not doing broad terminology shows mental fussiness. Not doing narrow terminology shows mental confusion.

There's just one proper way. You have to do it right.

Sometimes I think the word 'sensations' covers them all.

That could be 'confusion'. Be careful!

Which is why qualia might be a good test bed.

What's in subjective experience that would have no "quality"?

Except experience itself, if it can really be "bare", without any qualia. Obviously.

My opinion is not entirely settled on this one.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

What's in subjective experience that would have no "quality"?

Nothing, that I can see.

Except experience itself, if it can really be "bare", without any qualia. Obviously.

To me that seems impossible. No matter how bare, if it's an experience it has qualities, otherwise it wouldn't be an experience, surely?

What we call qualia might not be what we think they are. The term may be necessarily vague. It may even be that our conceptions are so awry that they do more to mislead than to inform.

But I don't think that makes qualia go away. Nor, at the moment, can I see any better way to describe any conscious experience, be it thoughts, or desires, or intentions or what have you, as not essentially experiences and therefore made up of qualia, or sensations. I don't think it should necessarily lead to any confusion. There might be a wide variety of variations which we could distinguish.

My guess would be that there is only 1 type of qualia and that they come in different combos. Simplistic, intuitive and amateur, I know, but at the same time, how could it be incorrect?

 

[Speakpigeon]

What's in subjective experience that would have no "quality"?

Nothing, that I can see.

Except experience itself, if it can really be "bare", without any qualia. Obviously.

To me that seems impossible. No matter how bare, if it's an experience it has qualities, otherwise it wouldn't be an experience, surely?

What bothers me is that there's apparently one thing on one side and many things on the other. Experience on one side and many qualia, all different, on the other. When you experience something you have the same thing each time, experience, while what you experience will differ as you will be experiencing different qualia. This seems to suggest to me that when you experience qualia, experience and qualia are not the same thing. Which further suggests there could be experience without qualia (and qualia without experience). I certainly see that as a reasonable possibility.

What we call qualia might not be what we think they are. The term may be necessarily vague. It may even be that our conceptions are so awry that they do more to mislead than to inform.

But I don't think that makes qualia go away. Nor, at the moment, can I see any better way to describe any conscious experience, be it thoughts, or desires, or intentions or what have you, as not essentially experiences and therefore made up of qualia, or sensations. I don't think it should necessarily lead to any confusion. There might be a wide variety of variations which we could distinguish.

My guess would be that there is only 1 type of qualia and that they come in different combos. Simplistic, intuitive and amateur, I know, but at the same time, how could it be incorrect?

I seems to me any instance of experience usually if not necessarily involves different qualia occurring at the same time. And then I experience sound qualia as completely foreign to colour qualia. But I wouldn't exclude the possibility of a continuum between these two different types, only we would normally only experience regions of the continuum far appart from each other. I think we only experience a minute fraction of all existing qualia. I would expect various forms of mental disturbance to give access to qualia hitherto unknown to the subject, which would be in itself somewhat disturbing.

Still, qualia are what you effectively experience. If a quale is somehow made up of some more fundamental things, these cannot be called 'qualia'. And in fact, I don't see that as a possibility! What seems possible to me is that qualia are properly caused by something else, for example some very smart brain processes. But that's not what you seem to be talking about.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Which further suggests there could be experience without qualia (and qualia without experience). I certainly see that as a reasonable possibility.

The word quale, to me, is a synonym for 'sensation'. Ditto for the plurals of both. As such, unlike you, I can't imagine how there could possibly be an experience without any, and probably vice versa.

What seems possible to me is that qualia are properly caused by something else, for example some very smart brain processes. But that's not what you seem to be talking about.

On the contrary, that would pretty much be my exact favourite explanation for them.

With input from the external world too, of course, a lot of the time.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Which further suggests there could be experience without qualia (and qualia without experience). I certainly see that as a reasonable possibility.

The word quale, to me, is a synonym for 'sensation'. Ditto for the plurals of both. As such, unlike you, I can't imagine how there could possibly be an experience without any, and probably vice versa.

You are very wrong!

Quale
A property, such as whiteness, considered independently from things having the property.

(Philosophy) an essential property or quality

(philosophy) a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.

What seems possible to me is that qualia are properly caused by something else, for example some very smart brain processes. But that's not what you seem to be talking about.

On the contrary, that would pretty much be my exact favourite explanation for them.

With input from the external world too, of course, a lot of the time.

And I would say this would seem a rather fundamental question to elucidate.

I wonder what all those smart scientists are paid for!

Twiddle their thumbs?!
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

You are very wrong!

Quale
A property, such as whiteness, considered independently from things having the property.

(Philosophy) an essential property or quality

(philosophy) a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.

I would disagree with those. How does that make me wrong and them right?

Qualia are objects that exist independently of experience? I'd like to see more than a bald statement about that.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You are very wrong!

Quale
A property, such as whiteness, considered independently from things having the property.

(Philosophy) an essential property or quality

(philosophy) a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.

I would disagree with those. How does that make me wrong and them right?

Grrr....

Qualia are objects that exist independently of experience?

Not necessarily.

The definitions given just don't assume either way because it's not the point. The definitions just say what we mean using the word quale.

Usually, except perhaps for the occasional oddball...

I'd like to see more than a bald statement about that.

Definitions are statements alright but not about the ontology of the world. They are statements about what people "normally" mean using a particular word.

That being said, it's unclear to me whether people who use the word "quale" assume subjective experience is necessary for qualia to exist at all or whether subjective experience may not necessarily involve any actual qualia.

I myself only recently started to have doubts and musings about this point. Suppose there's a quale nobody has ever actually experienced... Does it exist at all?

You get a bonus for answering correctly this one. Anyone can join.

Meanwhile, I guess I should have the time to prepare myself supper.
EB

 

[WAB]

I say we throw out the term qualia. It's a useless distraction, and puts far too much in Dennet's side of the court. Subjective experience is subjective experience. The content of this experience is qualitative, although, since we all experience consciousness, consciousness is not qualitative, but demonstrably objective.

ie: The content of private experience is qualitative; while the fact that we ALL experience, is, for all intents and purposes, objective.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I say we throw out the term qualia. It's a useless distraction, and puts far too much in Dennet's side of the court. Subjective experience is subjective experience. The content of this experience is qualitative, although, since we all experience consciousness, consciousness is not qualitative, but demonstrably objective.

ie: The content of private experience is qualitative; while the fact that we ALL experience, is, for all intents and purposes, objective.

So, you prefer the "content of private experience" rather than "qualia". I'm fine with that. "Qualia" is a bit cheap. "Content of private experience" unlike "qualia" is vague enough not to prejudge that this content should have a qualitative nature and it is effectively 23 characters more impressive than "qualia".

Still, could you explain why Dennett should be better pleased with the word "qualia" than with the more impressive expression "content of private experience" (I'm getting the hang of it, I think).

I don't know what you mean by "demonstrably" objective but I agree with your idea that subjectivity in this case is just as good as objectivity, except for the possibility that other people be all p-zombies. You can't rule that out.
EB

 

[WAB]

I say we throw out the term qualia. It's a useless distraction, and puts far too much in Dennet's side of the court. Subjective experience is subjective experience. The content of this experience is qualitative, although, since we all experience consciousness, consciousness is not qualitative, but demonstrably objective.

ie: The content of private experience is qualitative; while the fact that we ALL experience, is, for all intents and purposes, objective.

So, you prefer the "content of private experience" rather than "qualia". I'm fine with that. "Qualia" is a bit cheap. "Content of private experience" unlike "qualia" is vague enough not to prejudge that this content should have a qualitative nature and it is effectively 23 characters more impressive than "qualia".

Still, could you explain why Dennett should be better pleased with the word "qualia" than with the more impressive expression "content of private experience" (I'm getting the hang of it, I think).

I don't know what you mean by "demonstrably" objective but I agree with your idea that subjectivity in this case is just as good as objectivity, except for the possibility that other people be all p-zombies. You can't rule that out.
EB

Well, I see your point about qualia being easier to type out! Score 1 for Speakie!

What I mean about putting the ball in Dennet's court is simply by flinging this word qualia around. As far as I know, he has popularized the term above and beyond anyone else? You tell me.

Also, let's look at the presumptuous and premature title of his major book: "Consciousness Explained."

I think it safe to say that consciousness has not been explained? Chalmers, regardless of what ever the actual fuck the hard or easy problems are, still has the upper hand, as far as little ole' me is concerned. I also think he's wickedly bright, and a LOT fookin' brighter than Dennet, Harris, or most of the neoroscientists who study consciousness, with the possible exception of Ramachandran.

As much as I defend Chalmers, I dislike the p-zombie thing. People with NO subjective experience are machines. They are purely fictional, like Twilight's silly zombies. It's a purely theoretical gambit, and distracting.

Do you agree?

I already know Subsie is fairly certain that I don't understand the p-zombie thingie, which is probably true, bless his heart. Subsie has been so kind to me, and charitable, he has won me over. He could call me a complete moron and I would not mind. Hell, I may be a complete moron!

**ETA: Why haven't any of you smartypantses addressed my thread about Kant being caught with his lederhosen down? Did you see where Kant admitted that he attacked Thomas Reid without even reading him???

Now, what kind of intellectual dishonesty is that? Remember, Kant was an internationally renowned and professional philosopher! He was NOT a member of the peanut gallery, like me.

I would have thought that Sub and Cop would have looked into it. And that maybe fast and yourself, Speakie, would have thought it worth at least worthy of a casual response.

The thread is here:

https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?13949-Ah-Hah!-Kant-Caught-with-his-Lederhosen-Down

 

[Subsymbolic]

I say we throw out the term qualia. It's a useless distraction, and puts far too much in Dennet's side of the court. Subjective experience is subjective experience. The content of this experience is qualitative, although, since we all experience consciousness, consciousness is not qualitative, but demonstrably objective.

ie: The content of private experience is qualitative; while the fact that we ALL experience, is, for all intents and purposes, objective.

Fuck the fuck off is it!

We have behaviour, including linguistic behaviour. We have the seventy odd year old realisation that this behaviour could be no more than simply being able to use the grammar correctly and we have the conjunction of intersubjective agreement that could be achieved by any p-zombie that processed information - there are few qualia that couldn't be correctly identified by a machine and named precisely by a Loebner prize style AI. Igor Alexander was pimping such a system around a decade ago, but it looks positively archaic when we look at the capabilities of modern systems from Google and all.

The possibility of zombies, radically different experiences and just being wrong about what seems intuitively obvious about our own case has not been remotely ruled out. Descartes was conflating two sorts of mental activity - either could achieve that trick and Dennett has carefully explained how it could be achieved from the intentional stance. That account wouldn't give you qualia at all; just the judgement that you had qualia.

Cases like binocular rivalry, blindspots, Phi and the absolute kludge that we fail to notice unless doing science suggests our user illusion is smaller, more fictitious and less real than we can comfortably admit. Dennett just takes the next logical step - when the only bit of your vision that can reasonably be said to look like we think it does is only a few degrees of visual angle wide and has a fat blind spot in it that we fail to notice except in extremis, that's not much room for visual qualia that are not fictional.
Once you concede that all the rest is simply fiction, you can hold desperately on to those few 'real' degrees of visual angle or you can just let the whole lot go.

I confess, the more I read here the more tempting I find the tidy austerity of Dennett's vision.


Even if none of this were true. I'm unclear what intellectual tradition you could make the claim above from; theology? literature? That's not to downplay their importance, just that they have no problem with fictional ontologies.