Eliminating Qualia

[ryan]

I'll say it again: i'm as hard core a physicalist that you can get. I don't deny anything mental. I'm also pretty sure that people who deny the existence of the mental are either called behaviourists or eliminativists depending on whether they want to deny the cognitive or the affective. I'm not sure of anyone who wants to deny the conative. People just forget it exists, which is a pity as quite a lot seems to ride on it. I don't remember ever having an internet row about the conative.

No, you think you are a physicalist. But your supervenience physicalism is dead and doesn't work. The physicalists are still left with no good ontology.

Now there are different flavours of behaviourist, but I can't think of any I've read here. There's the occasional linguistic behaviourist elsewhere, but beyond that?

Functionalism is the new behaviorism.

Just out of interest, why don't you accept heterophenomenology. I've never used a radio telescope or a cyclotron, but I trust the community of radiotelescopists or Cernians to tell me how the very big and very small looks. Why not run with Dennett's suggestion that we trust people's heterophenomenological reports as it just happens that they have the right kit - their brains - to report what is going on.

Or my suggestion - that we stop being dualists and accept that any system that solves the easy problem of consciousness and claims to also solve the hard one shoudl be assumed to do so? Most of the really intractable problems of science involved not more research, but changing the type of question or the way we ask the question. Why not here?

So you want to just accept anyone saying that they have an answer to the hard problem. Do they have to explain it, or do we just take their word for it?

 

[ruby sparks]

From what I understand, science does not yet acknowledge the existence of experience nor should it. Scientists, however, may use their philosophical instincts and attempt to hypothesize for it in some pseudoscientific sort of way and it somehow gives experience/qualia some sort of scientific consideration, but it will never go further than that.

I mean show me a proper experiment that tests for the mind. Seriously, maybe someone has thought of something so clever and so far outside of the box, and I will eat my words.

I showed you a book entitled 'The Science of Experience'. I don't know what else to add to that, other than, 'would you like some salt and pepper'?

Or do I need to refer you to the 'scientific study' section of the wiki page for consciousness or the wiki page for cognitive science?

This is part of my argument to the hardcore physicalists that do not acknowledge the existence of experiences in the mental sense of the term. They use scientific explanations - that use experiences/observation - to attempt to sift out the possibility of the mind. For years I have been on here arguing against these extreme physicalists; there are many but they aren't coming out for some reason. They take the stance that if it is not science (observable directly or indirectly), then we are just guessing randomly, and in most cases I agree, but not for the mind.

Perhaps just wait until one of them comes out then.

So far, you seem to have been making points about scientists which don't seem to be accurate, or to absent physicalists (of a type I've never met).

 

[ryan]

From what I understand, science does not yet acknowledge the existence of experience nor should it. Scientists, however, may use their philosophical instincts and attempt to hypothesize for it in some pseudoscientific sort of way and it somehow gives experience/qualia some sort of scientific consideration, but it will never go further than that.

I mean show me a proper experiment that tests for the mind. Seriously, maybe someone has thought of something so clever and so far outside of the box, and I will eat my words.

I showed you a book entitled 'The Science of Experience'. I don't know what else to add to that, other than, 'would you like some salt and pepper'?

Or do I need to refer you to the 'scientific study' section of the wiki page for consciousness or the wiki page for cognitive science?

This is part of my argument to the hardcore physicalists that do not acknowledge the existence of experiences in the mental sense of the term. They use scientific explanations - that use experiences/observation - to attempt to sift out the possibility of the mind. For years I have been on here arguing against these extreme physicalists; there are many but they aren't coming out for some reason. They take the stance that if it is not science (observable directly or indirectly), then we are just guessing randomly, and in most cases I agree, but not for the mind.

Perhaps just wait until one of them comes out then.

So far, you seem to have been making points about scientists which don't seem to be accurate, or to absent physicalists (of a type I've never met).

I guess you did your job as far as general public knowledge. I have been at this a long time, and maybe I have been tricked too many times. I will continue to look for legitimate scientific experiments that search for experiences/qualia, but I am not going to hold my breath.

 

[ruby sparks]

I showed you a book entitled 'The Science of Experience'. I don't know what else to add to that, other than, 'would you like some salt and pepper'?

Or do I need to refer you to the 'scientific study' section of the wiki page for consciousness or the wiki page for cognitive science?



Perhaps just wait until one of them comes out then.

So far, you seem to have been making points about scientists which don't seem to be accurate, or to absent physicalists (of a type I've never met).

I guess you did your job as far as general public knowledge. I have been at this a long time, and maybe I have been tricked too many times. I will continue to look for legitimate scientific experiments that search for experiences/qualia, but I am not going to hold my breath.

Good idea. It's good to breathe during eating.

Seriously, making points about science 'denying experience' which is just completely incorrect and making points to types of 'experience denying' physicalists who aren't here is just daft.

 

[ruby sparks]

...and maybe I have been tricked too many times.

Now you're just starting to sound a bit paranoid.

 

[ryan]

I showed you a book entitled 'The Science of Experience'. I don't know what else to add to that, other than, 'would you like some salt and pepper'?

Or do I need to refer you to the 'scientific study' section of the wiki page for consciousness or the wiki page for cognitive science?



Perhaps just wait until one of them comes out then.

So far, you seem to have been making points about scientists which don't seem to be accurate, or to absent physicalists (of a type I've never met).

I guess you did your job as far as general public knowledge. I have been at this a long time, and maybe I have been tricked too many times. I will continue to look for legitimate scientific experiments that search for experiences/qualia, but I am not going to hold my breath.

Good idea. It's good to breathe during eating.

Seriously, making points about science 'denying experience' which is just completely incorrect and making points to types of 'experience denying' physicalists who aren't here is just daft.

Okay, just make sure you let me know when they find qualia.

 

[Subsymbolic]

No, you think you are a physicalist.

I'm pretty certain I'm a physicalist. Let's say I self identify as one, so stop repressing me!

But your supervenience physicalism is dead and doesn't work.

That's news to me and most most recent neurobiologists. Perhaps a little argument will help me understand the error of my ways. Or has Unter bitten you and turned you into a zombie of the sort that argues by declaration and fiat?

The physicalists are still left with no good ontology.

Again, perhaps a teeny weeny bit of argument might make this sweeping generalisation slightly more convincing.

Functionalism is the new behaviorism.

I quite agree. I'm not remotely a functionalist, I'm blatantly obviously a type type identity theorist for phenomenology and have repatedly stated that the meat and the motion are important. I'm a frustrated eliminitivist for the conceptualised content of folk psychology. It's complicated.

Just out of interest, why don't you accept heterophenomenology. I've never used a radio telescope or a cyclotron, but I trust the community of radiotelescopists or Cernians to tell me how the very big and very small looks. Why not run with Dennett's suggestion that we trust people's heterophenomenological reports as it just happens that they have the right kit - their brains - to report what is going on.

Or my suggestion - that we stop being dualists and accept that any system that solves the easy problem of consciousness and claims to also solve the hard one should be assumed to do so? Most of the really intractable problems of science involved not more research, but changing the type of question or the way we ask the question. Why not here?

So you want to just accept anyone saying that they have an answer to the hard problem. Do they have to explain it, or do we just take their word for it?

How about you explain exactly what I meant by the paragraph in bold? Perhaps by explaining precisely what the hard and easy problems of consciousness are. Because I'm not for a moment suggesting that we 'just take their word for it'. I'm suggesting a commonsense and deflationary solution to what is widely believed to be an intractable problem. I've pointed out that the metaphysical assumption that cleaves the hard and easy problems was demonstrably a fallacious argument from Descartes that, for reasons I have never understood, never seems to be questioned outside of the philosophical community. There is no reason whatsoever to think that the mind is better known than the body, because Descartes's argument sucked.

Here's probably his clearest articulation, from meditation six:

And, firstly, because I know that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive can be produced by God exactly as I conceive it, it is sufficient that I am able clearly and distinctly to conceive one thing apart from another, in order to be certain that the one is different from the other, seeing they may at least be made to exist separately, by the omnipotence of God; and it matters not by what power this separation is made, in order to be compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I do not observe that aught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence beyond my being a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.”

And it is painfully clear he is committing the logical fallacy of petitio principii - he's assuming the mind and body are separate things in his proof that they are separate things. It's a circular argument, and as everyone knows, circular arguments are bad because circular arguments are bad.

If we don't assume that the mind and body are distinct then the easy problem is the hard problem.

My position is more complicated than that, but that will do for now.

 

[ruby sparks]

Good idea. It's good to breathe during eating.

Seriously, making points about science 'denying experience' which is just completely incorrect and making points to types of 'experience denying' physicalists who aren't here is just daft.

Okay, just make sure you let me know when they find qualia.

Right. Because that's relevant to what you were saying. Or something. Who said anything about finding or not finding qualia? One of your imaginary interlocutors who tricks you maybe.

 

[ryan]

I'm pretty certain I'm a physicalist. Let's say I self identify as one, so stop repressing me!
That's news to me and most most recent neurobiologists. Perhaps a little argument will help me understand the error of my ways. Or has Unter bitten you and turned you into a zombie of the sort that argues by declaration and fiat?

Haven't you ever looked into why supervenience has fallen out of favor? It's all but dead, and the reasons are really obvious.

But I don't want to get into it because I don't think you will tell me anything new that I don't already know about SP. And the convos between us are starting to become a pissing match (not saying it is your fault; it's just what it has become. I used to really enjoy convos with you some months ago).

The physicalists are still left with no good ontology.

Again, perhaps a teeny weeny bit of argument might make this sweeping generalisation slightly more convincing.

So you want to just accept anyone saying that they have an answer to the hard problem. Do they have to explain it, or do we just take their word for it?

How about you explain exactly what I meant by the paragraph in bold? Perhaps by explaining precisely what the hard and easy problems of consciousness are. Because I'm not for a moment suggesting that we 'just take their word for it'. I'm suggesting a commonsense and deflationary solution to what is widely believed to be an intractable problem. I've pointed out that the metaphysical assumption that cleaves the hard and easy problems was demonstrably a fallacious argument from Descartes that, for reasons I have never understood, never seems to be questioned outside of the philosophical community. There is no reason whatsoever to think that the mind is better known than the body, because Descartes's argument sucked.

I am certain that you are dead wrong. I gave my case.

 

[ryan]

Good idea. It's good to breathe during eating.

Seriously, making points about science 'denying experience' which is just completely incorrect and making points to types of 'experience denying' physicalists who aren't here is just daft.

Okay, just make sure you let me know when they find qualia.

Right. Because that's relevant to what you were saying. Or something. Who said anything about finding or not finding qualia? One of your imaginary interlocutors who tricks you maybe.

Well then tell me what the scientists are testing for if not qualia/experiences. What would it look like for a scientist to successfully observe (directly or indirectly) an experience? How do you think it is going to end for these "scientists", and why do you think this? Just humor me if nothing else.

 

[ruby sparks]

Right. Because that's relevant to what you were saying. Or something. Who said anything about finding or not finding qualia? One of your imaginary interlocutors who tricks you maybe.

Well then tell me what the scientists are testing for if not qualia/experiences. What would it look like for a scientist to successfully observe (directly or indirectly) an experience? How do you think it is going to end for these "scientists", and why do you think this? Just humor me if nothing else.

I would humour you, but I haven't a clue what you're on about.

Scientists from the relevant disciplines study mind. They do not deny experience. This is news to you apparently.

From what I understand, science does not yet acknowledge the existence of experience nor should it.

Yeah. You like dualisms, for sure.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

Next up, the science and scientists duality.

Also, human observation is not observable! It's the same as experience (eg pain)! In fact, it is an experience. It doesn't get you anywhere to swop for it, just because it's more scientificky.

 

[WAB]

...And it is painfully clear he is committing the logical fallacy of petitio principii - he's assuming the mind and body are separate things in his proof that they are separate things. It's a circular argument, and as everyone knows, circular arguments are bad because circular arguments are bad.

Correct me if I'm wrong, Sub, but I thought that circular arguments were bad because circular arguments were bad, and that certainly it has been shown that circular arguments are indeed quite bad, because, as it has been shown, once again, that circular arguments are bad, and furthermore, that circular arguments are bad because circular arguments are bad, and that certainly it has been shown that circular arguments are indeed quite bad, because, as it has been shown, once again, that circular arguments are bad, and furthermore...|

Not only that, why should we accept anything from some guy named Rene? Everyone knows that's a girl's name, right?

[...enter Speakie to tear me a new (_!_) ]

 

[ruby sparks]

Right. Because that's relevant to what you were saying. Or something. Who said anything about finding or not finding qualia? One of your imaginary interlocutors who tricks you maybe.

Well then tell me what the scientists are testing for if not qualia/experiences. What would it look like for a scientist to successfully observe (directly or indirectly) an experience? How do you think it is going to end for these "scientists", and why do you think this? Just humor me if nothing else.

Personally, I think that science will come up with better and better explanations for it. Science is applied philosophy, imo. After all, we know more about the mind lately because of science. Theoretical philosophy is not making much headway other than regurgitating hypotheticals and hanging onto the coattails of its applied cousin. Descartes is still being cited regularly, ffs.

Can you observe life, Ryan? I don''t mean observing an entity or even a cell that displays it, I mean 'life' itself? Where's that located? Or gravity? I don't mean its effects nor do I mean an explanation for it or an understanding of it. Causality? Seen that lately? Time? I think I spotted it yesterday but I wasn't sure. It might only have been a fleeting passage of time I thought I saw.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Haven't you ever looked into why supervenience has fallen out of favor? It's all but dead, and the reasons are really obvious.

I'm unaware that it has fallen out of favour. Perhaps you can explain the reasons?

But I don't want to get into it because I don't think you will tell me anything new that I don't already know about SP. And the convos between us are starting to become a pissing match (not saying it is your fault; it's just what it has become. I used to really enjoy convos with you some months ago).

I'm sorry you feel that way.

Again, perhaps a teeny weeny bit of argument might make this sweeping generalisation slightly more convincing.

So you want to just accept anyone saying that they have an answer to the hard problem. Do they have to explain it, or do we just take their word for it?

How about you explain exactly what I meant by the paragraph in bold? Perhaps by explaining precisely what the hard and easy problems of consciousness are. Because I'm not for a moment suggesting that we 'just take their word for it'. I'm suggesting a commonsense and deflationary solution to what is widely believed to be an intractable problem. I've pointed out that the metaphysical assumption that cleaves the hard and easy problems was demonstrably a fallacious argument from Descartes that, for reasons I have never understood, never seems to be questioned outside of the philosophical community. There is no reason whatsoever to think that the mind is better known than the body, because Descartes's argument sucked.

I am certain that you are dead wrong.

I envy you your certainty. However I'm still keen to understand why.

I gave my case.

In that case I must have missed it. A link would be lovely.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Right. Because that's relevant to what you were saying. Or something. Who said anything about finding or not finding qualia? One of your imaginary interlocutors who tricks you maybe.

Well then tell me what the scientists are testing for if not qualia/experiences. What would it look like for a scientist to successfully observe (directly or indirectly) an experience? How do you think it is going to end for these "scientists", and why do you think this? Just humor me if nothing else.

Personally, I think that science will come up with better and better explanations for it. Science is applied philosophy, imo. After all, we know more about the mind lately because of science. Theoretical philosophy is not making much headway other than regurgitating hypotheticals and hanging onto the coattails of its applied cousin. Descartes is still being cited regularly, ffs.

Can you observe life, Ryan? I don''t mean observing an entity or even a cell that displays it, I mean 'life' itself? Where's that located? Or gravity? I don't mean its effects. Causality? Seen that lately?

You'll struggle to find a philosopher who is working in this sort of area citing Descartes approvingly. Scientists or science fundies just uncritically accepting Descartes' nonsense? there's plenty of that around.

I'm fucking Pavlovian...

 

[ruby sparks]

You'll struggle to find a philosopher who is working in this sort of area citing Descartes approvingly. Scientists or science fundies just uncritically accepting Descartes' nonsense? there's plenty of that around.

I meant here on this forum, lately.

 

[ryan]

I would humour you, but I haven't a clue what you're on about.

And that is the problem, so no need to continue.

 

[ryan]

I gave my case.

In that case I must have missed it. A link would be lovely.

I have been saying it over and over to you for the past few days.

 

[Subsymbolic]

You'll struggle to find a philosopher who is working in this sort of area citing Descartes approvingly. Scientists or science fundies just uncritically accepting Descartes' nonsense? there's plenty of that around.

I meant here on this forum, lately.

There are philosophers on this forum?

 

[ryan]

Subsymbolic, maybe I didn't say it over and over, but I did mention it a few days ago and just yesterday before you commented on this,

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

We start with observation. That's what reality is to us. It is only through subjective experiences do we begin to understand the outside. The outside hinges on the incoming information that we gather.

That's it. If you agree with my premises it's irrefutable.