Euthyphro dilemma, divine command theory, etc.

[Underseer]

If it is external, not self-generated, it is "objective."

That depends on what you mean by external. If you mean an external authority, then the whole point of the Euthyphro dilemma is that you can't get an objective morality from an external authority. An external authority can only give you moral relativism; if you want objective morality you have to come up with a definition that does not invoke an authority.

Thanks for, uh, helping get back on topic.

Mostly when I try to bring up the Euthyphro dilemma with a theist, it doesn't matter how carefully I explain it, or how many links I provide, they just keep re-asserting that an external authority is the only possible source of objective morality. They don't want to talk about it, they just keep re-asserting that. What am I doing wrong?

 

[George S]

Mostly when I try to bring up the Euthyphro dilemma with a theist, it doesn't matter how carefully I explain it, or how many links I provide, they just keep re-asserting that an external authority is the only possible source of objective morality. They don't want to talk about it, they just keep re-asserting that. What am I doing wrong?

Their objection is to moral relativism. That is, the contrast to "objective" morality is "relative" morality. Their use of "relative morality" means that each group gets to decide what is moral even when obviously immoral. ("What would stop a community from deciding pedophilia is wonderful when morality is relative? As in the forced marriage of children in Nigeria. [See today's news about the child (14) bride who poisoned her new husband and a couple of his friends.]")

Not that the US doesn't have its history, too. In Delaware in 1895 the age of consent was 7, although most colonies followed English Common Law: 10-12. Almost all states raised the minimum to 16 by 1920.

In the theist's world of objective morality from the Bible we find no age of consent, but at least one example of a child of three years being "taken to wife." Nevertheless the theist asserts that Biblical morality is Best. Somehow, though, the examples of Biblical immorality (how to do slavery right, baby brides, capital punishment (stoning, cruel but not unusual then) for a teen sassing the 'rents, and for gathering firewood on the Sabbath) are blithely ignored.

Theists say: If there is no God of Perfect Justice then others (not me, of course) have "gotten away with" injustice and will never be punished. Wouldn't it be great if that bad guy over there would suffer for his sadistic cruelty in the end?

Well, yes, for the other guy, they say. But me, I have adopted the God of Perfect Forgiveness. I am a serial sinner. I always feel bad about my sin and beg forgiveness (always granted) and do pretty well at not repeating sins, instead finding new and novel ones.

Morality is subjective. Can a robot be cruel to another robot? Can a robot be cruel to a human being? Moral judgment involves the subjective intent, a first-person conscious intent, on the part of an actor. The actor had a choice. There was a real sense in which the actor could have done differently. Because his or her choice could have been predicted to cause harm to someone [else] we judge that act immoral. (Libertarians insert the "else".)

Because morality is a judgement, a real judgment call, it is necessarily self-generated as all judgements are.

 

[Underseer]

What a strange and narrow definition of moral relativism.

So according to conservochristians, a statement like "It's moral when god does it, but not when you do the same thing" or "It's moral if god commands it, but not if you command it" do not count as moral relativism?

 

[fromderinside]

Empirical evidence of what? Why people prefer babies to fat old men?

A little late to the game. How about that old chestnut Bonobos social organization versus Chimpanzee social organization.

Chimps & Bonobos
http://www.eva.mpg.de/3chimps/files/apes.htm

Item:

Bonobos are female dominant, with females forming tight bonds against males through same-sex socio-sexual contact that is thought to limit aggression. In the wild, they have not been seen to cooperatively hunt, use tools, or exhibit lethal aggression.

Chimpanzees are male dominant, with intense aggression between different groups that can be lethal. Chimpanzees use tools, cooperatively hunt monkeys, and will even eat the infants of other chimpanzee groups.

Right now I'd go so far as to say while there is obviously strong genetic components underlying social behavior an apes, including humans. The human historical long term, more down the road, influences seem to be linked to evolution of social behavior systems to the end that humans are currently reducing their tendencies to kill, one on one, through learned behavior and neighborhood organization. This suggests relativism is a practical part of human morality.

Obviously this is not instinct nor objective in any immediate sense. The apparent permanence of social sexual systems among Bonobos and Chimpanzees suggest historical trending relativism is not so much the case with our ancestors. Moral relativism seems a particularly important aspect of human social construction though. But, as I said above, human morality is neither instinctive or objective in any day to day sense. Perhaps our extremely long periods from birth to usefulness lead our species to use conditions to maintain and improve likelihoods that the maximum number of beings get to and perform mating.

 

[George S]

What a strange and narrow definition of moral relativism.

So according to conservochristians, a statement like "It's moral when god does it, but not when you do the same thing" or "It's moral if god commands it, but not if you command it" do not count as moral relativism?

Their morality is, they say, objective. It is right here in this book. Written down once and for all. Remove it from the oven, it is done. Objectively there.
Humanist morality is all about people feeling good and it is always sinful when it feels good. Those libertines.

 

[Underseer]

I guess I should fess up. I've been using a fairly sloppy and vague definition of "objective" here. Has everyone else been doing the same thing?

In the strictest sense, something that is objectively moral is moral regardless of the understanding or perceptions of sentient beings, but unfortunately, this is incoherent because understanding is an intrinsic part of the definition of moral. I mean, if someone doesn't understand why something is moral, we don't judge them the same way we would judge someone who understands why something is wrong and does it anyway. This is why most of us don't consider animals to be moral or immoral, or why when a machine goes out of control and hurts someone, we do not regard the machine as immoral.

So if we're using the philosophical definition of "objective," then the concept of objective morality is incoherent.

Should we have a discussion about what we mean when we say "objective" morals? Should we instead talk about normative morality?

 

[fromderinside]

..... in historic frame subjectively perceived normative morality?

 

[Deborah]

Mostly when I try to bring up the Euthyphro dilemma with a theist, it doesn't matter how carefully I explain it, or how many links I provide, they just keep re-asserting that an external authority is the only possible source of objective morality. They don't want to talk about it, they just keep re-asserting that. What am I doing wrong?

Perhaps a theist may think of the situation as something like this. In real life it is often difficult to be sure of what is right. To be sure of what is right, so the thinking may go, one would have to be an all-knowing, benevolent being. The theist doesn't have a problem with imagining an all-knowing, benevolent being. He already believes in one - God.

However, if in contrast you take an atheist like me, just as the idea of the existence of an all-knowing, benevolent being seems fanciful so does the idea of the existence of an objective morality that would be ascertainable by an all-knowing, benevolent being (were such a being to exist) seem fanciful. I have difficulty in conceptualising morality as a domain of moral facts in which a right answer to any moral problem could in principle be ascertainable by a benevolent, all-knowing being.

 

[Underseer]

But that's just it, Deb.

The theist can't say his magical being is moral without establishing a definition of morality that is independent of the magical being in question, but once you do that, why introduce the magical being at all into the equation?

 

[Clivedurdle]

Just about everyone basically thinks they're a good person, overall.

Isn't this a statistical fallacy like everyone thinking they are more handsome, intelligent whatever than average? Isn't the reality that we all have a huge amount of baggage and false assumptions, which includes a belief in a relationship between religion and morality.

 

[Wiploc]

Mostly when I try to bring up the Euthyphro dilemma with a theist, it doesn't matter how carefully I explain it, or how many links I provide, they just keep re-asserting that an external authority is the only possible source of objective morality. They don't want to talk about it, they just keep re-asserting that. What am I doing wrong?

The theist doesn't know she is equivocating. You have to catch her at it, and show her what she did.

That means
1. asking what she personally means by "objective," and getting her to explain why god-based morality fits that definition.
2. Ask her why atheist morality is not "objective."
3. Point out to her that she used a different test, a different definition of "objective morality" in the two cases.
4. Point out that her whole argument is based on that equivocation. There is no one definition for which god-based morality is objective and atheist morality is not.
5. Make your claim that, for any one definition, either god-based morality is objective and so is atheist morality, or atheist morality is not objective but neither is god-based morality.
6. At this point, expect her to change the subject.